Institutio Oratoria

Quintilian

Quintilian. Institutio Oratoria, Volume 1-4. Butler, Harold Edgeworth, translator. Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Press, William Heinemann Ltd., 1920-1922.

But even in connection with things that are undoubtedly feasible, there may at times be room for conjecture, as for instance in questions such as whether Rome is ever likely to

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conquer Carthage, whether Hannibal will return to Africa if Scipio transports his army thither, or whether the Samnites are likely to keep faith if the Romans lay down their arms. [*](sc. at the Caudine Forks: see above, § 3. ) There are some things too which we may believe to be both feasible and likely to be carried into effect, but at another time or place or in another way.

When there is no scope for conjecture, our attention will be fixed on other points. In the first place advice will be asked either on account of the actual thing on which the orator is required to express his views, or on account of other causes which affect it from without. It is on the actual thing that the senate for instance debates, when it discusses such questions as whether it is to vote pay for the troops. In this case the material is simple.

To this however may be added reasons for taking action or the reverse, as for example if the senate should discuss whether it should deliver the Fabii to the Gauls when the latter threaten war, [*](See Livy, v. 36.) or Gaius Caesar should deliberate whether he should persist in the invasion of Germany, when his soldiers on all sides are making their wills. [*]( See Caesar, Gallic War, i. 39, where this detail is recorded, also 40 where the speech made to his troops is given. ) These deliberative themes are of a twofold nature.

In the first case the reason for deliberation is the Gallic threat of war, but there may still be a further question as to whether even without such threat of war they should surrender those who, contrary to the law of nations, took part in a battle when they had been sent out as ambassadors and killed the king with whom they had received instructions to treat.

In the second case Caesar would doubtless never deliberate on the question at all, but for the perturbation shown by his soldiers; but there is still room for enquiry whether quite apart from this occurrence it

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would be wise to penetrate into Germany. But it must be remembered that we shall always speak first on that subject which is capable of discussion quite apart from the consequences.

Some have held that the three main considerations in an advisory speech are honour, expediency and necessity. I can find no place for the last. For however great the violence which may threaten us, it may be necessary for us to suffer something, but we are not compelled to do anything; whereas the subject of deliberation is primarily whether we shall do anything.

Or if by necessity they mean that into which we are driven by fear of worse things, the question will be one of expediency. For example, if a garrison is besieged by overwhelmingly superior forces and, owing to the failure of food and water supplies, discusses surrender to the enemy, and it is urged that it is a matter of necessity, the words

otherwise we shall perish
must needs be added: consequently there is no necessity arising out of the circumstances themselves, for death is a possible alternative. And as a matter of fact the Saguntines [*]( In 218 B. C., when besieged by Hannibal. See Livy, xxi. 14. ) did not surrender, nor did those who were surrounded on the raft from Opitergium. [*]( C. Antonius was blockaded in an island off the Dalmatian coast which he held for Caesar 49 B. C. Reinforcements on rafts were sent to his rescue. Most were captured; but in one case, of a raft carrying 1,000 men from Opitergium in Venetia, surrender was scorned and the men slew each other rather than yield. See Lucan, iv. 462; Florus, ii. 33. )

It follows that in such cases also the question will be either one of expediency alone or of a choice between expediency and honour.

But,
it will be urged,
if a man would beget children, he is under the necessity of taking a wife.
Certainly. But he who wishes to become a father must needs be quite clear that he must take a wife.