Institutio Oratoria
Quintilian
Quintilian. Institutio Oratoria, Volume 1-4. Butler, Harold Edgeworth, translator. Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Press, William Heinemann Ltd., 1920-1922.
Again the same question may make the same person either accuser or accused.
He who has exercised the profession of an actor, is under no circumstances to be allowed a seat in the first fourteen rows of the theatre.[*]( Reserved for eguites. ) An individual who had performed before the praetor in his private gardens, but had never been presented on the public stage, has taken his seat in one of the fourteen rows.
The accuser of course affirms that he has exercised the profession of an actor: the accused denies that he has exercised the profession. The question then arises
exercise of the profession of actor.If he is accused under the law regarding the seats in the theatre, the denial will proceed from the accused; if on the other hand he is turned out of the theatre and demands compensation for assault, the denial will be made by the accuser.
The view of the majority of writers [*](i.e. that the defendant makes the basis or status. See § 13. ) on this subject will, however, hold good in most cases. Some have evaded these problems by saying that a basis is that which emerges from affirmations and denials, such as
You did it,
I did not do it,or
I was justified in doing it.
But let us see whether this is the basis itself or rather that in which the basis is to be found. Hermagoras calls a basis that which enables the matter in question to be understood and to which the proofs of the parties concerned will also be directed. My own opinion has always been that, whereas there are frequently different bases of questions in connexion with a cause, the basis of the cause itself is its most important point on which the whole matter turns. If anyone prefers to call that the general question or general head of the cause, I shall not quarrel with him, any more than I have done hitherto if he produced a different technical term to express the same thing, although I know that whole volumes have been written on such disputes. I prefer however to call it the basis.
There is the greatest possible disagreement among writers about this as about everything else, but in this case as elsewhere they seem to me to have been misled by a passion for saying something different from their fellow-teachers. As a result there is still no agreement as to the number and names of bases, nor as to which are general and which special.
First there is οὐσία which Plautus calls essence, the only available translation: under this category we inquire whether a thing is. Secondly there is quality, the meaning of which is self-evident. Third comes quantity, which was subdivided by later philosophers as dealing with two questions as to magnitude and number. Next relation, involving questions of competence [*]( See §§ 52, 68 sqq., 84–86, which make the meaning of translatio fairly clear. No exact rendering is satisfactory. Literally it means transference of the charge : the sense is virtually the same as that of exceptio (a plea made by defendant in bar of plaintiff's action). Exception is too unfamiliar and technical a term. Competence, despite its vagueness, is perhaps the least unsatisfactory rendering. ) and comparison. This is followed by when and where. Then come doing, suffering and possessing,
which for example are concerned with a person's being armed or clothed. Lastly comes κεῖσθαι or position, which means to be in a certain position, such for instance as being warm, standing or angry. Of these categories the first four concern bases, the remainder concern only certain topics for argument.