Institutio Oratoria
Quintilian
Quintilian. Institutio Oratoria, Volume 1-4. Butler, Harold Edgeworth, translator. Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Press, William Heinemann Ltd., 1920-1922.
For the contrary is nearer to the truth, that there is no point of dispute if the defendant makes no reply, and that consequently the basis originates with the defendant.
But in my opinion the origin of the basis varies and depends on the circumstances of the individual case. For instance in conjectural causes the affirmation may be regarded as determining the basis, since conjecture is employed by the plaintiff rather than the defendant, and consequently some have styled the basis originated by the latter negative. Again in any syllogism [*](i.e. where the law forms the major premise, while the minor premiss is the act which is brought under the law. ) the whole of the reasoning proceeds from him who
But on the other hand he who in such cases [*](Conjectural causes and the syllogism.) denies appears to impose the burden of dealing with such bases upon his opponent. For if he says
I did not do it,he will force his opponent to make use of con- jecture, and again, if he says
The law is against you,he will force him to employ the syllogism. Therefore we must admit that a basis can originate in denial. All the same we are left with our previous conclusion that the basis is determined in some cases by the plaintiff, in some by the defendant.
Suppose the accuser to affirm that the accused is guilty of homicide: if the accused denies the charge, it is he who will determine the basis. Or again, if he admits that he has killed a man, but states that the victim was an adulterer and justifiably killed (and we know that the law permits homicide under these circumstances), there is no matter in dispute, unless the accuser has some answer to make. Suppose the accuser does answer however and deny that the victim was guilty of adultery, it will be the accuser that denies, and it is by him that the basis is determined. The basis, then, will originate in the first denial of facts, but that denial is made by the accuser and not the accused.
Again the same question may make the same person either accuser or accused.
He who has exercised the profession of an actor, is under no circumstances to be allowed a seat in the first fourteen rows of the theatre.[*]( Reserved for eguites. ) An individual who had performed before the praetor in his private gardens, but had never been presented on the public stage, has taken his seat in one of the fourteen rows.
The accuser of course affirms that he has exercised the profession of an actor: the accused denies that he has exercised the profession. The question then arises
exercise of the profession of actor.If he is accused under the law regarding the seats in the theatre, the denial will proceed from the accused; if on the other hand he is turned out of the theatre and demands compensation for assault, the denial will be made by the accuser.
The view of the majority of writers [*](i.e. that the defendant makes the basis or status. See § 13. ) on this subject will, however, hold good in most cases. Some have evaded these problems by saying that a basis is that which emerges from affirmations and denials, such as
You did it,
I did not do it,or
I was justified in doing it.
But let us see whether this is the basis itself or rather that in which the basis is to be found. Hermagoras calls a basis that which enables the matter in question to be understood and to which the proofs of the parties concerned will also be directed. My own opinion has always been that, whereas there are frequently different bases of questions in connexion with a cause, the basis of the cause itself is its most important point on which the whole matter turns. If anyone prefers to call that the general question or general head of the cause, I shall not quarrel with him, any more than I have done hitherto if he produced a different technical term to express the same thing, although I know that whole volumes have been written on such disputes. I prefer however to call it the basis.
There is the greatest possible disagreement among writers about this as about everything else, but in this case as elsewhere they seem to me to have been misled by a passion for saying something different from their fellow-teachers. As a result there is still no agreement as to the number and names of bases, nor as to which are general and which special.
First there is οὐσία which Plautus calls essence, the only available translation: under this category we inquire whether a thing is. Secondly there is quality, the meaning of which is self-evident. Third comes quantity, which was subdivided by later philosophers as dealing with two questions as to magnitude and number. Next relation, involving questions of competence [*]( See §§ 52, 68 sqq., 84–86, which make the meaning of translatio fairly clear. No exact rendering is satisfactory. Literally it means transference of the charge : the sense is virtually the same as that of exceptio (a plea made by defendant in bar of plaintiff's action). Exception is too unfamiliar and technical a term. Competence, despite its vagueness, is perhaps the least unsatisfactory rendering. ) and comparison. This is followed by when and where. Then come doing, suffering and possessing,