Institutio Oratoria

Quintilian

Quintilian. Institutio Oratoria, Volume 1-4. Butler, Harold Edgeworth, translator. Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Press, William Heinemann Ltd., 1920-1922.

Of those who divorce eloquence from that yet fairer and more desirable title to renown, a virtuous life, some call rhetoric merely a power, some a science, but not a virtue, some a practice, some an art, though they will not allow the art to have anything in common with science or virtue, while some again call it a perversion of art or κακοτεχνία.

These persons have as a rule held that the task of oratory lies in persuasion or speaking in a persuasive manner: for this is within the power of a bad man no less than a good. Hence we get the common definition of rhetoric as the power of persuading. What I call a power, many call a capacity, and some a faculty. In order therefore that there may be no misunderstanding I will say that by power I mean δύναμις.

This view is derived from Isocrates, if indeed the treatise on

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rhetoric [*]( This treatise is lost. It may have been the work of the younger Isocrates. ) which circulates under his name is really from his hand. He, although far from agreeing with those whose aim is to disparage the duties of an orator, somewhat rashly defined rhetoric as πειθοῦς δημιουργός, the

worker of persuasion

: for I cannot bring myself to use the peculiar derivative which Ennius [*](Ann. ix. 309 (Vahlen). The derivative to which he objects is the rare word suada. ) applies to Marcus Cethegus in the phrase suadae medulla, the

marrow of persuasion.

Again Gorgias, [*](Gorg. 453 A. ) in the dialogue of Plato that takes its title from his name, says practically the same thing, but Plato intends it to be taken as the opinion of Gorgias, not as his own. Cicero [*](de Inv. I. v. 6, de Or. I. xxxi. 138 ) in more than one passage defined the duty of an orator as

speaking in a persuasive manner.

In his Rhelorica [*](cp. III. i. 20 and Cic. de Or. I. ii. 5. The work in question is better known as the de Inventione. ) too, a work which it is clear gave him no satisfaction, he makes the end to be persuasion. But many other things have the power of persuasion, such as money, influence, the authority and rank of the speaker, or even some sight unsupported by language, when for instance the place of words is supplied by the memory of some individual's great deeds, by his lamentable appearance or the beauty of his person.

Thus when Antonius in the course of his defence of Manius Aquilius tore open his client's robe and revealed the honourable scars which he had acquired while facing his country's foes, he relied no longer on the power of his eloquence, but appealed directly to the eyes of the Roman people. And it is believed that they were so profoundly moved by the sight as to acquit the accused.

Again there is a speech of Cato, to mention no other records, which informs us that Servius Galba escaped condemnation solely by

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the pity which he aroused not only by producing his own young children before the assembly, but by carrying round in his arms the son of Sulpicius Gallus.