Institutio Oratoria

Quintilian

Quintilian. Institutio Oratoria, Volume 1-4. Butler, Harold Edgeworth, translator. Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Press, William Heinemann Ltd., 1920-1922.

For this reason I must postpone some of my remarks to the portion of this work reserved for the treatment of that topic. [*]( XI. ii. 1 sqq. ) At length, however, our powers will have developed so far that the man who is not hampered by lack of natural ability will by dint of

v10-12 p.131
persistent study be enabled, when it comes to speaking, to rely no less on what he has thought out than what he has written out and learnt by heart. At any rate, Cicero records that Metrodorus of Scepsis, [*]( A philosopher of the Academic school, contemporary with Cicero, cp. de Or. ii. 360. ) Empylus of Rhodes, [*](Empylus is not mentioned elsewhere.) and our own Hortensius [*](Cp. Brut. 301. ) were able to reproduce what they had thought out word for word when it came to actual pleading.

If, however, some brilliant improvisation should occur to us while speaking, we must not cling superstitiously to our premeditated scheme. For premeditation is not so accurate as to leave no room for happy inspiration: even when writing we often insert thoughts which occur to us on the spur of the moment. Consequently this form of preparation must be conceived on such lines that we shall find no difficulty either in departing from it or returning to it at will.

For, although it is essential to bring with us into court a supply of eloquence which has been prepared in advance in the study and on which we can confidently rely, there is no greater folly than the rejection of the gifts of the moment. Therefore our premeditation should be such that fortune may never be able to fool us, but may, on the contrary, be able to assist us. This end will be obtained by developing the power of memory so that our conceptions may flow from us without fear of disaster, and that we may be enabled to look ahead without anxious backward glances or the feeling that we are absolutely dependent on what we can call to mind. Otherwise I prefer the rashness of improvisation to the coherence given by premeditation.