Ab urbe condita

[*](The Samnite War-Conflict between the Dictator and his Master of the Horse.) The advance into Samnium was made under doubtful auspices. This circumstance did not portend the result of the campaign, for that was quite favourable,

but it did foreshadow the insane passion which the commanders displayed. Papirius was warned by the pullarius [*](See note 16 to Book X.) that it would be necessary to take the auspices afresh. On his departure for Rome for this purpose, he strictly charged the Master of the Horse

to keep within his lines and not to engage the enemy. After he had gone Q. Fabius learnt from his scouts that the enemy were showing as much

carelessness as if there were not a single Roman in Samnium. Whether it was that his youthful temper resented everything being dependent on the Dictator, or whether he was tempted by the chance offered him of a brilliant success, at any rate, after making the necessary preparations and dispositions he advanced as far as Inbrinium — for so

is the district called —and fought a battle with the Samnites. Such was the fortune of the fight that had the Dictator himself been present he could have done nothing to make the success more complete. The general did

not disappoint his men, nor did the men disappoint their general. The cavalry made repeated charges but failed to break through the massed force opposed to them, and acting on the advice of L. Cominius, a military tribune, they removed the bits from their horses and spurred them on so furiously that nothing could withstand them. Riding down men and armour they spread carnage far and wide.

The infantry followed them and completed the disorder of the enemy. It is said that they lost 20,000 men that day. Some authorities whom I have consulted state that there were two battles fought in the Dictator's absence, and each was a brilliant success. In the oldest writers, however, only one battle is mentioned, and some annalists omit the incident altogether.

In consequence of the vast number slain, a large amount of spoil in the shape of armour and weapons was picked up on the battle-field, and the Master of the Horse had this collected into a huge heap and burnt. His

object may have been to discharge a vow to some deity. But if we are to trust the authority of Fabius, he did this to prevent the Dictator from reaping the fruits of his glory, or carrying the

spoils in his triumph and afterwards placing his name upon them.[*](The name of the victorious general was generally inscribed on such spoils of the enemy as were offered to a deity, generally either Romulus or Jupiter, and hung up in his temple. We have an instance of an inscription on the spoils in Vol. I. p. 244.) The fact also of his sending the despatches announcing his victory to the senate and not to the Dictator would seem to show that he was by no means anxious to allow him any share in the credit of it. At all events the Dictator took it in that night, and whilst everybody else was jubilant at the victory which

had been won, he wore an expression of gloom and wrath. He abruptly dismissed the senate and hurried from the Senate-house, repeatedly exclaiming that the authority and dignity of the Dictator would be as completely overthrown by the Master of the Horse as the Samnite legions had been if this contempt of his orders were to remain unpunished. In this angry and

menacing mood, he started with all possible speed for the camp. He was unable, however, to reach it before news arrived of his approach, for messengers had started from

the City in advance of him, bringing word that the Dictator was coming bent on vengeance, and almost every other word he uttered was in praise of T Manlius.[*](Papirius was evidently hoping to take T. Manlius for his model and re-enact the scene described in chap. vii.)

Fabius immediately summoned his troops to assembly, and appealed to them to show the same courage with which they had defended the republic from a brave and determined foe in protecting from the unrestrained ferocity of the Dictator the man under whose auspices and generalship they had been victorious.

He was coming, maddened by jealousy, exasperated at another man's merits and good fortune, furious because the republic had triumphed in his absence. If it were in his power to change the fortune of the day, he would rather that victory rested with the Samnites than with the Romans.

He kept talking about the contempt of orders as though the reason why he forbade all fighting were not precisely the same as that which makes him vexed now that we have fought.

Then, prompted by jealousy, he wanted to suppress the merits of others and deprive of their arms men who were most eager to use them, so as to prevent their being employed in his absence; now he is exasperated and furious because the soldiers were not crippled or defenceless though L. Papirius was not with them, and because Q. Fabius considered himself Master of the Horse and not the lacquey of the Dictator.

What would he have done if, as often happens amid the chances of war, the battle had gone against us, seeing that now, after the enemy has been thoroughly defeated and a victory won for the republic which even under his unrivalled generalship could not have been more complete, he is actually menacing the Master of the Horse with punishment! He would, were it in his power, treat all with equal severity, not only the Master of Horse but the military tribunes, the centurions, the men of the rank and file.

Jealousy, like lightning, strikes the summits, and because he cannot reach all he has selected one man as his victim whom he regards as the chief conspirator —your general.

If he should succeed in crushing him and quenching the splendour of his success, he will treat this army as a victor treats the vanquished, and with the same ruthlessness which he has been allowed to practise on the Master of the Horse. In defending his cause they will be defending the liberty of all.