Ab urbe condita
Titus Livius (Livy)
Livy. History of Rome, Volumes 1-2. Roberts, Canon, Rev, translator. London, New York: J. M. Dent and Sons; E. P. Dutton and Co., 1912.
Whilst[*](The Siege of Veii —Appius and the Plebeian Tribunes.) peace prevailed elsewhere, Rome and Veii were confronting each other in arms, animated by such fury and hatred that utter ruin clearly awaited the vanquished. Each elected their magistrates, but on totally different
principles. The Romans increased the number of their consular tribunes to eight —a larger number than had ever been elected before. They were Manius Aemilius Mamercus —for the second time —L. Valerius Potitus —for the third time —Appius Claudius Crassus, M. Quinctilius Varus, L. Julius Julus, M. Postumius, M. Furius Camillus, and M. Postumius Albinus. The Veientines, on the other hand, tired of the annual canvassing for office, elected a
king. This gave great offence to the Etruscan cantons, owing to their hatred of monarchy and their personal aversion to the one who was
elected. He was already obnoxious to the nation through his pride of wealth and overbearing temper, for he had put a violent stop to the festival of the Games, the interruption of which is an act of
impiety. His candidature for the priesthood[*](priesthood. A national priest was elected annually to organise the Games and other State solemnities.) had been unsuccessful, another being preferred by the vote of the twelve cantons, and in revenge he suddenly withdrew the performers, most of whom were his own slaves, in the middle of the
Games. The Etruscans as a nation were distinguished above all others by their devotion to religious observances, because they excelled in the knowledge and conduct of them, and they decided, in consequence, that no assistance should be given to the Veientines as long as they were under a
king. The report of this decision was suppressed at Veii through fear of the king; he treated those who mentioned anything of the kind, not as authors of an idle tale, but as ringleaders of
sedition. Although the Romans had received intelligence that there was no movement on the part of the Etruscans, still, as it
was reported that the matter was being discussed in all their councils, they so constructed their lines as to present a double face, the one fronting Veii to prevent sorties from the city, the other looking towards Etruria to intercept any succour from that side.
As the Roman generals placed more reliance on a blockade than on an assault, they began to build huts for winter quarters, a novelty to the Roman soldier. Their plan was to keep up the war through the winter. The tribunes of the plebs had for a long time been unable to find any pretext for creating a revolt.
When, however, news of this was brought to Rome, they dashed off to the Assembly and produced great excitement by declaring that this was the reason why it had been settled to pay the troops. They, the tribunes, had not been blind to the fact that this gift from their adversaries would prove to be tainted with poison.
The liberties of the plebs had been bartered away, their able-bodied men had been permanently sent away, banished from the City and the State, without any regard to winter or indeed to any season of the year, or to the possibility of their visiting their homes or looking after their property. What did they think was the reason for this continuous campaigning?
They would most assuredly find it to be nothing else but the fear that if a large body of these men, who formed the whole strength of the plebs, were present, it would be possible to discuss reforms in favour of the plebeians. Besides, they were suffering much more hardship and oppression than the Veientines, for these passed the winter under their own roofs in a city protected by its magnificent walls and the natural strength of its position, whilst the Romans, amidst labour and toil, buried in frost and snow, were roughing it patiently under their skin-covered tents, and could not lay aside their arms even in the season of winter, when there is a respite from all wars, whether by land or sea.
This form of slavery, making military service perpetual, was never imposed either by the kings, or by the consuls who were so domineering before the institution of the tribuneship, or during the stern rule of the Dictator, or by the unscrupulous decemvirs —it was the consular tribunes who were exercising this regal despotism over the Roman plebs.
What would these men have done had they been consuls or Dictators, seeing that they have made their proconsular authority, which is only a shadow of the other, so outrageously cruel? But the commons had got what they had deserved.
Amongst all the eight consular tribunes not a single plebeian had found a place. Hitherto, with their utmost efforts, the patricians had usually filled only three places at a time; now a team of eight were bent on maintaining their power. Even in such a crowd not a single plebeian could get a footing, to warn his colleagues, if he could do nothing else, that those who were serving as soldiers were free men, their own fellow-citizens, and not slaves, and that they ought to be brought back, at all events in the winter, to their houses and their homes, and during some part of the year visit their parents and wives and children, and exercise their rights as free citizens in electing the magistrates. Whilst indulging in declamations of this sort, they found an opponent who was quite a match for them in Appius Claudius.
He had from early manhood taken his part in the contests with the plebs, and as stated above, had some years previously recommended the senate to break down the power of the tribunes by securing the intervention of their colleagues. He was not only a man of ready and versatile mind, but by this time an experienced debater.
He delivered the following speech on this occasion: — “If, Quirites, there has ever been any doubt as to whether it was in your interest or their own that the tribunes have always been the advocates of sedition, I feel quite certain that this year all doubt has ceased to exist. Whilst I rejoice that an end has at last been put to a long-standing delusion, I congratulate you, and on your behalf the whole State, that its removal has been effected just at the time when your circumstances are most prosperous.
Is there any one who doubts that whatever wrongs you may have at any time suffered, they never annoyed and provoked the tribunes so much as the generous treatment of the plebs by the senate, in establishing the system of pay for the soldiers?
What else do you suppose it was that they were afraid of at that time, and would today gladly upset, except the harmony of the two orders, which they look upon as most of all calculated to destroy their power? They are, really, like so many quack doctors looking for work, always anxious to find some diseased spot in the republic that there may be something which you can call them in to cure.” Then, turning to the tribunes, “Are you defending or attacking the plebs? Are you trying to injure the men on service or are you pleading their cause?
Or perhaps this is what you are saying, “Whatever the senate does, whether in the interest of the plebs or against them, we object to.”
Just as masters forbid strangers to hold any communication with their slaves, and think it right that they should abstain from showing them either kindness or unkindness, so you interdict the patricians from all dealings with the plebs, lest we should appeal to their feelings by our graciousness and generosity and secure their loyalty and obedience. How much more dutiful it would have been in you, if you had had a spark —I will not say of patriotism, but —of common humanity, to have viewed with favour, and as far as in you lay, to have fostered the kindly feelings of the patricians and the grateful goodwill of the plebeians!
And if this harmony should prove to be lasting, who would not be bold enough to guarantee that this empire will in a short time be the greatest among the neighbouring States?”
“I shall subsequently show not only the expediency but even the necessity of the policy which my colleagues have adopted of refusing to withdraw the army from Veii until their object was effected.
For the present I prefer to speak of the actual conditions under which it is serving, and if I were speaking not before you only but in the camp as well, I think that what I say would appear just and fair in the judgment of the soldiers themselves. Even if no arguments presented themselves to my mind, I should find those of my opponents quite sufficient for my purpose.
They were saying lately that pay ought not to be given to the soldiers because it never had been given. How then can they now profess indignation at those who have gained additional benefits being required to undergo additional exertion in proportion? Nowhere do we find labour without its reward, nor, as a rule, reward without some expenditure of labour.
Toil and pleasure, utterly dissimilar by nature, have been brought by nature into a kind of partnership with each other.
Formerly, the soldier felt it a grievance that he gave his services to the State at his own cost, he had the satisfaction, however, of cultivating his land for a part of the year, and acquiring the means of supporting himself and his family whether he were at home or on service.
Now he has the pleasure of knowing that the State is a source of income to him, and he is glad to receive his pay. Let him therefore take it patiently that he is a little longer absent from his home and his property, on which no heavy expense now falls.
If the State were to call him to an exact reckoning, would it not be justified in saying, “You receive a year's pay, put in a year's work. Do you think it fair to receive a whole twelve-month's pay for six months' service?”
It is with reluctance, Quirites, that I dwell on this topic, for it is those who employ mercenaries who ought to deal thus with them, but we want to deal with you as with fellow-citizens, and we think it only fair that you should deal with us as with your fatherland.” “Either the war ought not to have been undertaken, or
it ought to be conducted as befits the dignity of Rome and brought to a close as soon as possible.
It will certainly be brought to a close if we press on the siege, but not if we retire before we have fulfilled our hopes by the capture of Veii. Why, good heavens! if there were no other reason, the very discredit of the thing ought to inspire us with perseverance.
A city was once besieged by the whole of Greece for ten years, for the sake of one woman, and at what a distance from home, how many lands and seas lay between!
Are we growing tired of keeping up a siege for one year, not twenty miles off, almost within sight of the City? I suppose you think the reason for the war is a trivial one, and we do not feel enough just resentment to urge us to persevere.
Seven times have they recommenced war against us; they have never loyally kept to the terms of peace; they have ravaged our fields a thousand times; they forced the Fidenates to revolt;
they slew the colonists whom we settled there; they instigated the impious murder of our ambassadors in violation of the law of nations; they wanted to raise the whole of Etruria against us, and they are trying to do so today; when we sent ambassadors to demand satisfaction, they very nearly outraged them.”
“Are these the men with whom war ought to be carried on in a half-hearted and dilatory fashion? If such just reasons for resentment have no force with us, do not the following considerations, I pray you, possess any weight?
The city is hemmed in by immense siege-works which confine the enemy within his walls. He has not tilled his land, and what was tilled before has been devastated by war.
If we bring our army back again, has anybody the slightest doubt that they will invade our territory not only from a thirst for revenge, but also through the sheer necessity they are under of plundering other people's property since they have lost their own?
If we adopt your policy we do not postpone the war, we simply carry it within our own frontiers.” “Well, now, what about the soldiers in whom these worthy tribunes have suddenly become interested after vainly endeavouring to rob them of their pay; what about them?
They have carried a rampart and a fosse —each requiring enormous labour —over all that extent of ground; they have built forts, few at first, but after the army was increased, very numerous; they have raised defences not only against the city, but also as a barrier against Etruria in case any succours came from there.
What need to describe the towers, the vineae, the testudines, and the other engines used in storming cities? Now that so much labour has been spent and the work of investment at last completed, do you think that they ought to be abandoned in order that by next summer we may be again exhausted by the toil of constructing them all afresh?
How much less trouble to defend the works already constructed, to press on and persevere, and so bring our cares and labours to an end! For assuredly the undertaking is not a lengthy one, if it is carried through by one continuous effort, if we do not by our own interruptions and stoppages delay the fulfilment of our hopes.” “I have been speaking of the work and the loss of time.
Now there are frequent meetings of the national council of Etruria to discuss the question of sending succours to Veii. Do these allow us to forget the danger we incur by prolonging the war?
As matters now stand, they are angry, resentful, and say that they will not send any —Veii may be captured, as far as they are concerned. But who will guarantee that if the war is prolonged they will continue in the same mind?
For if you give the Veientines a respite they will send a more numerous and influential embassy, and what now gives such displeasure to the Etruscans, namely, the election of a king, may after a time be annulled either by the unanimous act of the citizens in order to win the sympathies of Etruria, or by voluntary abdication on the part of the king himself, through his unwillingness to allow his
crown to endanger the safety of his people.” “See how many disastrous consequences follow from the policy you recommend —the sacrifice of works constructed with so much trouble; the threatening devastation of our borders;
a war with the whole of Etruria instead of one with Veii alone.” This, tribunes, is what your proposals amount to; very much, upon my word, as if any one were to tempt a sick person, who by submitting to strict treatment could speedily recover, to indulge in eating and drinking, and so lengthen his illness and perhaps make it incurable.
“Though it might not affect this present war, it would, you may depend upon it, be of the utmost importance to our military training that our soldiers should be habituated not only to enjoy a victory when they have won one, but also, when a campaign progresses slowly, to put up with its tediousness and await the fulfilment of their hopes though deferred.
If a war has not been finished in the summer they must learn to go through the winter, and not, like birds of passage, look out for roofs to shelter them the moment autumn comes.
The passion and delight of hunting carries men through frost and snow to the forests and the mountains. Pray tell me, shall we not bring to the exigencies of war the same powers of endurance which are generally called out by sport or pleasure?
Are we to suppose that the bodies of our soldiers are so effeminate and their spirits so enfeebled that they cannot hold out in camp or stay away from their homes for a single winter? Are we to believe that like those engaged in naval warfare, who have to watch the seasons and catch the favourable weather, so these men cannot endure times of heat and cold?
They would indeed blush if any one laid this to their charge, and would stoutly maintain that both in mind and body they were capable of manly endurance, and could go through a campaign in winter as well as in summer. They would tell you that they had not commissioned their tribunes to act as protectors of the effeminate and the indolent, nor was it in cool shade or under sheltering roofs that their ancestors had instituted this very tribunitian power.
The valour of your soldiers, the dignity of Rome, demand that we should not limit our view to Veii and this present war, but seek for reputation in time to come in respect of other wars and amongst all other nations.” “Do you imagine that the opinion men form of us in this crisis is a matter of slight importance?
Is it a matter of indifference whether our neighbours regard Rome in such a light that when any city has sustained her first momentary attack it has nothing more to fear from her, or whether
on the other hand, the terror of our name is such that no weariness of a protracted siege, no severity of winter, can dislodge a Roman army from any city which it has once invested, that it knows no close to a war but victory, and that it conducts its campaigns by perseverance as much as by dash?
Perseverance is necessary in every kind of military operation, but especially in the conduct of sieges, for the majority of cities are impregnable, owing to the strength of their fortifications and their position, and time itself conquers them with hunger and thirst, and captures them as it will capture Veii unless the tribunes of the plebs extend their protection to the enemy and the Veientines find in Rome the support which they are vainly seeking in Etruria.
Can anything happen to the Veientines more in accordance with their wishes than that the City of Rome should be filled with sedition and the contagion of it spread to the camp?
But amongst the enemy there is actually so much respect for law and order that they have not been goaded into
revolution either by weariness of the siege or even aversion to absolute monarchy, nor have they shown exasperation at the refusal of succours by Etruria. The man who advocates sedition will be put to death on the spot, and no one will be allowed to say the things which are uttered amongst you with impunity.
With us the man who deserts his standard or abandons his post is liable to be cudgelled to
death, but those who urge the men to abandon the standards and desert from the camp are listened to, not by one or two only; they have the whole army for an audience.
To such an extent have you habituated yourselves to listen calmly to whatever a tribune of the plebs may say, even if it means the betrayal of your country and the destruction of the republic. Captivated by the attraction which that office has for you, you allow all sorts of mischief to lurk under its shadow.
The one thing left for them is to bring forward in the camp, before the soldiers, the same arguments which they have so loudly urged here, and so corrupt the army that they will not allow it to obey its commanders.
For evidently liberty in Rome simply means that the soldiers cease to feel any reverence for either the senate, or the magistrates, or the laws, or the traditions of their ancestors, or the institutions of their fathers, or military discipline.”
Appius[*](The siege of Veii pressed with greater Vigour.) was already quite a match for the tribunes even on the platform, and now his victory over them was assured by the sudden intelligence of a most unexpected disaster, the effect of which was to unite all classes in an ardent resolve to prosecute the siege of Veii more vigorously.
A raised way had been carried up to the city, and the vineae had almost been placed in contact with the walls, but more attention had been devoted to their construction by day than to their protection by night.
Suddenly the gates were flung open and an enormous multitude, armed mostly with torches, flung the flaming missiles on to the works, and in one short hour the flames consumed both the raised way[*](raised way. A slanting approach constructed of stones and earth kept in place by a framework of timber, along which the vineae and battering-rams were brought to the level of the walls.) and the vineae, the work of so many days.
Many poor fellows who vainly tried to render assistance perished either in the flames or by the sword. When the news of this reached Rome there was universal mourning, and the senate were filled with apprehension lest disturbances should break out in the City and the camp beyond their power to repress, and the tribunes of the plebs exult over the vanquished republic. Suddenly, however, a number of
men who, though assessed as knights, had not been provided with horses, after concerting a common plan of action, went to the Senate-house, and on permission being given to address the senate, they engaged to serve as cavalry on their own horses.
The senate thanked them in the most complimentary terms. When the news of this incident had circulated through the Forum and the City, the plebeians hastily assembled at the Senate-house and declared that they were now
part of the infantry force, and though it was not their turn to serve, they promised to give their services to the republic to march to Veii or wherever else they were led. If, they said, they were led to Veii they would not return till the city was taken. On hearing this it was with difficulty that the senate restrained their delight.
They did not, as in the case of the knights, pass a resolution of thanks to
be conveyed through the presiding magistrates, nor were any summoned into the House to receive their reply, nor did they themselves remain within the precincts of their House.
They came out on the raised space in front and each independently signified by voice and gesture to the people standing in the comitium the joy they all felt, and expressed their confidence that this unanimity of feeling would make Rome a blessed City, invincible and eternal. They applauded the knights, they applauded the commons, they showered encomiums on the very day itself, and frankly admitted that the senate had been outdone in courtesy and kindness.
Senators and plebeians alike shed tears of joy. At last the sitting was resumed, and a resolution was carried that the consular tribunes
should convene a public meeting and return thanks to the infantry and the knights, and say that the senate would never forget this proof of their affection for their country. They further decided that pay should be reckoned from that day for those who, though not called out, had volunteered to serve.
A fixed sum was assigned to each knight; this was the first occasion on which the knights received military pay. The army of volunteers marched to Veii, and not only reconstructed the works that had been lost, but constructed new ones. More care was taken in bringing up supplies from the City, that nothing might be wanting for the use of an army that had behaved so well.
The[*](Disaster incurred before Veii.) consular tribunes for the following year were C. Servilius Ahala —for the third time —Q. Servilius, Lucius Verginius, Q. Sulpicius, Aulus Manlius —for the second time —and Manius Sergius —also for the second time.
During their term of office, whilst every one was preoccupied with the Veientine war, Anxur was lost. The garrison had become weakened through the absence of men on furlough, and Volscian traders were admitted indiscriminately, with the result that the guard before the gates were surprised and the fortified post taken.
The loss in men was slight, as with the exception of the sick, they were all scattered about the fields and neighbouring towns, driving bargains like so many camp-followers. At Veii, the chief point of interest, things went no better.
Not only were the Roman commanders opposing one another more vigorously than they opposed the enemy, but the war was rendered more serious by the sudden arrival of the Capenates and the Faliscans.
As these two States were nearest in point of distance, they believed that if Veii fell they would be the next on whom Rome would make war.
The Faliscans had their own reasons for fearing hostilities, since they were mixed up in the previous war against Fidenae. So both States, after mutually despatching commissioners for the purpose, swore alliance with each other, and their two armies arrived unexpectedly at Veii.
It so happened that they attacked the entrenchments on the side where Manius Sergius was in command, and they created great alarm, for the Romans were convinced that all Etruria had risen and was present in great force. The same conviction roused the Veientines in the city to action, so the Roman lines of investment were attacked from within and from without.
Rushing from side to side to meet first the one attack, then the other, they were unable to confine the Veientines sufficiently within their fortifications or repel the assault from their own works and defend themselves from the enemy outside. Their only hope was if help came from the main camp so that the legions might fight back to back, some against the Capenates and Faliscans, and others against the sortie from the town.
But Verginius was in command of that camp, and he and Sergius mutually detested each other.
When it was reported to him that most of the forts had been attacked and the connecting lines surmounted, and that the enemy were forcing their way in from both sides, he kept his men halted under arms, and repeatedly declared that if his colleague needed assistance he would send to him.
This selfishness on his part was matched by the other's obstinacy, for Sergius, to avoid the appearance of having sought help from a personal foe, preferred defeat at the hands of the enemy rather than owe success to a fellow-countryman.
For some time the soldiers were being slaughtered between the two attacking forces; at last a very small number abandoned their lines and reached the main camp; Sergius himself, with the greatest part of his force, made his way to Rome. Here he threw all the blame on his colleague, and it was decided that Verginius should be summoned from the camp and his lieutenants put in command during his absence.
The case was then discussed in the senate; few studied the interests of the republic, most of the senators supported one or other of the disputants as their party feeling or private sympathy prompted them.
The leaders of the senate gave it as their opinion that whether it was through the fault or the misfortune of the commanders that such a disgraceful defeat had been incurred, they ought not to wait until the regular time for the elections, but proceed at once to appoint
new consular tribunes, to enter office on October 1. On their proceeding to vote on this proposal, the other consular tribunes offered no opposition, but strange to say, Sergius and Verginius —the
very men on whose account obviously the senate were dissatisfied with the magistrates for that year —after protesting against such humiliation, vetoed the resolution. They declared that they would not resign office before December 13, the usual day for new magistrates to take office.
On hearing this, the tribunes of the plebs, who had maintained a reluctant silence while the State was enjoying concord and prosperity, now made a sudden attack upon the consular tribunes, and threatened, if they did not bow to the authority of the senate, to order them to be imprisoned.
There upon C. Servilius Ahala, the consular tribune, replied: “As for you and your menaces, tribunes of the plebs, I should very much like to put it to the proof how your threats possess as little legality as you possess courage to carry them out, but it is wrong to storm against the authority of the senate.
Cease, therefore, to look for a chance of making mischief by meddling in our disputes; either my colleagues will act upon the senate's resolution, or if they persist in their obstinacy, I shall at once nominate a Dictator that he may compel them to resign.”
This speech was received with universal approval, and the senate were glad to find that without bringing in the bugbear of the plebeian tribunes' power, another and a more effectual method existed for bringing pressure to bear on the magistrates.
In deference to the universal feeling, the two recalcitrant tribunes held an election for consular tribunes who entered office on October 1, they themselves having previously resigned office.