Ab urbe condita

deliberate. Then they formally declared in the name of the whole college of tribunes that it was their determination that the consuls should bow to the will of the senate; if they offered any further opposition to the unanimous decision of that most august order, they, the tribunes, would order them to be thrown into

prison.[*](This marks an important stage in the growth of the tribunitian power. Hitherto they could only control the consul's acts by inhibition and the protection of those who refused obedience to the consul's orders; now they assumed executive power. But, illegal though the proceeding would have been, they had the support of all the citizens —plebs and senate alike —hence the resistance of the consuls was futile.) The consuls preferred defeat at the hands of the tribunes rather than at those of the senate. If, they said, the consuls could be coerced by the tribunes in virtue of their authority, and even sent to prison —and what more than this had ever a private citizen to fear? —then the senate had betrayed the rights and privileges of the highest office in the State, and made an ignominious surrender, putting the consulship under the yoke of

the tribunitian power. They could not even agree as to who should nominate the Dictator, so they cast lots and the lot fell to T. Quinctius. He nominated A. Postumius Tubertus, his father-in-law, a stern and resolute commander. The Dictator named L. Julius as the Master

of the Horse. Orders were issued for a levy to be raised and for all business, legal and otherwise, to be suspended in the City, except the preparations for war. The investigation of claims for exemption from military service was postponed till the end of the war, so even in doubtful cases men preferred to give in their names. The Hernici and the Latins were ordered to furnish troops; both nations carried out the Dictator's orders most zealously.

All these preparations were completed with extraordinary despatch. The consul Gn. Julius was left in charge of the defences of the City; L. Julius, the Master of the Horse, took command of the reserves to meet any sudden emergency, and to prevent operations from being delayed through inadequacy of supplies at the front.

As the war was such a serious one, the Dictator vowed, in the form of words prescribed by the Pontifex Maximus, A. Cornelius, to celebrate the Great Games if he were victorious.

He formed the army into two divisions, one of which he assigned to the consul Quinctius, and their joint force advanced up to the enemies' position.

As they saw that the hostile camps were separated by a short distance from each other, they also formed separate camps, about a mile from the enemy, the Dictator fixing his in the direction of Tusculum, the consul nearer Lanuvium. The four armies had thus separate entrenched positions,

with a plain between them broad enough not only for small skirmishes, but for both armies to be drawn out in battle order.

Ever since the camps had confronted each other there had been no cessation of small fights, and the Dictator was quite content for his men to match their strength against the enemy, in order that through the issues of these contests they might entertain the hope of a decisive and final victory. The enemy, hopeless of winning a regular battle, determined to stake everything on the chances of a night attack on the consul's camp.

The shout which suddenly arose not only startled the consul's outposts and the whole army, but even woke the Dictator.

Everything depended on prompt action; the consul showed equal courage and coolness; part of his troops reinforced the guards at the camp gates, the rest lined the entrenchments. As the Dictator's camp was not attacked, it was easier for him to see what had to be done. Supports were at once sent to the consul under Sp. Postumius Albus, lieutenant-general, and the Dictator in person with a portion of his force made for a place away from the actual fighting, from which to make an attack on the enemy's rear.

He left Q. Sulpicius, lieutenant-general, in charge of the camp, and gave the command of the cavalry to M. Fabius, lieutenant-general, with orders not to move their troops before daylight, as it was difficult to handle them in the confusion of a night attack.

Besides taking every measure which any other general of prudence and energy would have taken under the circumstances, the Dictator gave a striking instance of his courage and generalship, which deserves especial praise, for, on ascertaining that the enemy had left his camp with the greater part of his force, he sent M. Geganius with some picked cohorts to storm it.

The defenders were thinking more of the issue of their comrades' dangerous enterprise than of taking precautions for their own safety, even their outposts and picket-duty were neglected, and he stormed and captured the camp almost before the enemy realised that it was attacked.

When the Dictator saw the smoke —the agreed signal —he called out that the enemy's camp was taken, and ordered the news to be spread everywhere.