Ab urbe condita

Titus Livius (Livy)

Livy. History of Rome, Volumes 1-2. Roberts, Canon, Rev, translator. London, New York: J. M. Dent and Sons; E. P. Dutton and Co., 1912.

Consequently[*](The Fabii at the Cremera.) the election of Caeso Fabius as consul, together with Titus Verginius, was welcomed by the plebs as much as by the patricians. Now that there was a favourable prospect of concord, he subordinated all military projects to the task of bringing the patricians and the plebs into union at the earliest possible moment.

At the beginning of his year of office he proposed that before any tribune came forward to advocate the Agrarian Law, the senate should anticipate him by themselves undertaking what was their own work and distributing the territory taken in war to the plebeians as fairly as possible. It was only right that those should have it by whose sweat and blood it had been won.

The patricians treated the proposal with scorn, some even complained that the once energetic mind of Caeso was becoming wanton and enfeebled through the excess of glory which he had won.

There were no party struggles in the City. The Latins were being harassed by the inroads of the Aequi. Caeso was despatched thither with an army, and crossed over into the territory of the Aequi to ravage it. The Aequi withdrew into their towns and remained behind their walls.

No battle of any importance took place. But the rashness of the other consul incurred a defeat at the hands of the Veientines, and it was only the arrival of Caeso Fabius with reinforcements that saved the army from destruction. From that time there was neither peace nor war with the Veientines, whose methods closely resembled those of brigands.

They retired before the Roman legions into their city; then when they found that they were withdrawn they made inroads on the fields, evading war by keeping quiet, and then making quiet impossible by war. So the business could neither be dropped nor completed. Wars were threatening in other quarters also; some seemed imminent as in the case of the Aequi and Volscians, who were only keeping quiet till the effect of their recent defeat should pass away, whilst it was evident that the Sabines, perpetual enemies of Rome, and the whole of Etruria would soon be in motion.

But the Veientines, a persistent rather than a formidable foe, created more irritation than alarm because it was never safe to neglect them or to turn the attention elsewhere.

Under these circumstances the Fabii came to the senate and the consul on behalf of his house spoke as follows: “As you are aware senators the Veientine war does not require a large force so much as one constantly in the field. Let the other wars be your care, leave the Fabii to deal with the Veientines.

We will guarantee that the majesty of Rome shall be safe in that quarter. We propose to carry on that war as a private war of our own at our own cost. Let the State be spared money and men there.”

A very hearty vote of thanks was passed; the consul left the House and returned home accompanied by the Fabii, who had been standing in the vestibule awaiting the senate's decision. After receiving instructions to meet on the morrow, fully armed, before the consul's house, they separated for their homes.

News of what had happened spread through the whole City, the Fabii were praised up to the skies; people said, “One family had taken up the burden of the State, the Veientine war had become a private concern, a private quarrel.

If there were two houses of the same strength in the City, and the one claimed the Volscians for themselves, the other the Aequi, then all the neighbouring states could be subjugated while Rome itself remained in profound tranquillity.” The next day the Fabii took their arms and assembled at the appointed place.

The consul, wearing his “ paludamentum,” [*](paludamentum —An ample and graceful cloak, the characteristic dress of the commander-in-chief. When a Roman magistrate quitted the City to take charge of an army or a province he put off the toga —the civilian dress —and assumed the paludamentum.) went out into the vestibule and saw the whole of his house drawn up in order of march. Taking his place in the centre, he gave the word of advance. Never has an army marched through the City smaller in numbers or with a more brilliant reputation or

more universally admired. Three hundred and six soldiers, all patricians, all members of one house, not a single man of whom the senate even in its palmiest days would deem unfitted for high command, went forth, threatening ruin to the Veientines through the strength of

a single family. They were followed by a crowd; made up partly of their own relatives and friends, whose minds were not occupied with ordinary hope and anxiety, but filled with the loftiest anticipations; partly of those who shared the public anxiety, and could not find words to express their

affection and admiration. “Go on,” they cried, “you gallant band, go on, and may you be fortunate; bring back results equal to this beginning, then look to us for consulships and triumphs and

every possible reward.” As they passed the Citadel and the Capitol and other temples, their friends prayed to each deity, whose statue or whose shrine they saw, that they would send that band

with all favourable omens to success, and in a short time restore them safe to their country and their kindred. In vain were those

prayers sent up! They proceeded on their ill-starred way by the right postern of the Carmental gate, and reached the banks of the Cremera. This seemed to them a suitable position for a fortified post. L. Aemilius and C. Servilius were the next consuls. As long as it was only a question of forays and raids, the Fabii were quite strong enough not only to protect their own fortified post, but, by patrolling both sides of the border-line between the Roman and Tuscan territories, to make the whole district safe for themselves and dangerous

for the enemy. There was a brief interruption to these raids, when the Veientines, after summoning an army from Etruria, assaulted the fortified post

at the Cremera. The Roman legions were brought up by the consul L. Aemilius and fought a regular engagement with the Etruscan troops. The Veientines, however, had not time to complete their formation, and during the confusion, whilst the men were getting into line and the reserves were being stationed, a squadron of Roman cavalry suddenly made a flank attack, and gave them no chance of commencing a battle or even of

standing their ground. They were driven back to their camp at the Saxa Rubra, and sued for peace. They obtained it, but their natural inconstancy made them regret it before the Roman garrison was recalled from the Cremera.

The conflicts between the Fabii and the State of Veii were resumed without any more extensive military preparations than before. There were not only forays into each other's territories and surprise attacks upon the foragers, but sometimes they fought regular engagements, and this single Roman house often

won the victory over what was at that time the most powerful city in Etruria.

This was a bitter mortification to the Veientines, and they were led by circumstances to adopt the plan of trapping their daring enemy in an ambuscade; they were even glad that the numerous successes of the Fabii had increased their confidence.

Accordingly[*](The Annihilation of the Fabii.) they drove herds of cattle, as if by accident, in the way of the foraying parties, the fields were abandoned by the peasants, and the bodies of troops sent to repel the raiders fled in a panic more often assumed than genuine. By this time the Fabii had conceived such a contempt for their foe as to be convinced that under no circumstances of either time or place could their invincible arms be resisted.

This presumption carried them so far that at the sight of some distant cattle on the other side of the wide plain stretching from the camp they ran down to secure them although but few of the enemy were visible.[*](although but few of the enemy were visible —Andtherefore they should have suspected a ruse.)

Suspecting no danger and keeping no order they passed the ambuscade which was set on each side of the road, and whilst they were scattered in trying to catch the cattle, which in their fright were rushing wildly about, the enemy suddenly rose from their concealment and attacked them on all

sides. At first they were startled by the shouts round them, then javelins fell on them from every direction. As the Etruscans closed round them, they were hemmed by a continuous ring of men, and the more the enemy pressed upon them, the less the space in which they were forced to form their ever-narrowing

square. This brought out strongly the contrast between their scanty numbers and the host of Etruscans, whose ranks were multiplied through being

narrowed. After a time they abandoned their plan of presenting a front on all sides; facing in one direction they formed themselves into a wedge and by the utmost exertion of sword and muscle forced a passage

through. The road led up to gentle eminence, and here they halted. When the higher ground gave them room to breathe freely and to recover from the feeling of despair, they repelled those who mounted to the attack, and through the advantage of position the little band were beginning to win the day, when some Veientines who had been sent round the hill emerged on the

summit. So the enemy again had the advantage. The Fabii were all cut down to a man, and their fort taken. It is generally agreed that three hundred and six men perished, and that one only, an immature youth, was left as a stock for the Fabian house to be Rome's greatest helper in her hour of danger both at home and in the field.

When[*](The Etruscans threaten Rome.) this disaster occurred, C. Horatius and T. Menenius were consuls. Menenius was at once sent against the Tuscans, flushed with their recent victory. Another unsuccessful action was fought, and the enemy took possession of the Janiculum.

The City, which was suffering from scarcity as well as from the war, would have been invested —for the Etruscans had crossed the Tiber —had not the consul Horatius been recalled from the Volsci. The fighting approached so near the walls that the first battle, an indecisive one, took place near the temple of Spes, and the second at the Colline gate.

In the latter, although the Romans gained only a slight advantage, the soldiers recovered something of their old courage and were better prepared for future campaigns.

The next consuls were A. Verginius and Sp. Servilius. After their defeat in the last battle, the Veientines declined an engagement. There were forays. From the Janiculum as from a citadel they made raids in all directions on the Roman territory; nowhere were the cattle or the country-folk safe.

They were ultimately caught by the same stratagem by which they had caught the Fabii. Some cattle were purposely driven in different directions as a decoy; they followed them and fell into an ambuscade; and as their numbers were greater, the slaughter was greater.

Their rage at this defeat was the cause and commencement of a more serious one. They crossed the Tiber by night and marched up to an attack on Servilius' camp, but were routed with great loss, and with great difficulty reached the Janiculum.

The consul himself forthwith crossed the Tiber and entrenched himself at the foot of the Janiculum. The confidence inspired by his victory of the previous day, but still more the scarcity of corn, made him decide upon an immediate but precipitate move.

He led his army at daybreak up the side of the Janiculum to the enemies' camp; but he met with a more disastrous repulse than the one he had inflicted the day before. It was only by the intervention of his colleague that he and his army were saved.

The Etruscans caught between the two armies, and retreating from each alternately were annihilated. So the Veientine war was brought to a sudden close by an act of happy rashness.