Ab urbe condita
Titus Livius (Livy)
Livy. History of Rome, Volumes 1-2. Roberts, Canon, Rev, translator. London, New York: J. M. Dent and Sons; E. P. Dutton and Co., 1912.
strife. This, they said, had proved to be the one poison, the one bane in powerful states which made great empires mortal. That mischief had been for a long time checked, partly by the wise policy of the senate, partly by the forbearance of the plebs, but now things had reached extremities. The one State had been severed into two, each with its own magistrates and its own
laws. At first the enrolments were the cause of the quarrel, but when actually on service the men obeyed their generals. As long as military discipline was maintained the evil could be arrested, whatever the state of affairs in the City, but now the fashion of disobedience to the magistrates was following the Roman soldier even into the
camp. During the last war, in the battle itself, at the crisis of the engagement, the victory was by the common action of the whole army transferred to the vanquished Aequi, the standards were abandoned, the commander left alone on the field, the troops returned against orders into
camp. In fact, if matters were pressed, Rome could be vanquished through her own soldiers, nothing else was needful than a declaration of war, a show of military activity, the Fates and the gods would do the rest.
Anticipations like these had given the Etruscans fresh energy after their many vicissitudes of defeat and victory. The Roman consuls, too, dreaded nothing but their own strength and their own arms. The recollection of the fatal precedent set in the last war deterred them from any action whereby they would have to fear a simultaneous attack from two armies.
They confined themselves to their camp, and in face of the double danger avoided an engagement, hoping that time and circumstances might perhaps calm the angry passions and bring about a more healthy state of mind.
The Veientines and Etruscans were all the more energetic in forcing an engagement; they rode up to the camp and challenged the Romans to fight.
At last, as they produced no effect by the taunts and insults levelled at the army and consuls alike, they declared that the consuls were using the pretext of internal dissensions to veil the cowardice of their men, they distrusted their courage more than they doubted their loyalty. Silence and inactivity amongst men in arms was a novel kind of sedition.
They also made reflections, true as well as false, on the upstart quality of their nationality and descent. They shouted all this out close up to the ramparts and gates of the camp. The consuls took it with composure, but the simple soldiery were filled with indignation and shame, and their thoughts were diverted from their domestic troubles.