Ab urbe condita

Some soldiers were concealed in these and cattle were driven past the place in full view of the Roman outposts, who were under the command of a staff-officer, Cnaeus Fulvius. As not a single man left his post to take the bait, one of the drovers, coming up close to the Roman lines, called out to the others who were driving the cattle somewhat slowly away from the ruined cottages to ask them why they were so slow, as they could drive them safely through the middle of the Roman camp.

Some Caerites who were with Fulvius interpreted the words, and all the maniples were extremely indignant at the insult, but they did not dare to move without orders.

He then instructed those who were familiar with the language to notice whether the speech of the herdsmen was more akin to that of rustics or to that of towndwellers. On being told that the accent and personal appearance were too refined for cattle-drovers, he said, “Go and tell them to unmask the ambush they have tried in vain to conceal; the Romans know all, and can now no more be trapped by cunning than they can be vanquished by arms.”

When these words were carried to those who were lying concealed, they suddenly rose from their lurking-place and advanced in order of battle on to the open plain, which afforded a view in all directions.

The advancing line appeared to Fulvius to be too large a body for his men to withstand, and he sent a hasty message to the Dictator to ask for help; in the meantime he met the attack single-handed.

When the message reached the Dictator, he ordered the standards to go forward and the troops to follow.

But everything was done almost more rapidly than the orders were given. The standards were instantly snatched up, and the troops were with difficulty prevented from charging the enemy at a run. They were burning to avenge their recent defeat, and the shouts, becoming continually louder in the battle that was already going on, made them still more excited.

They kept urging each other on, and telling the standard-bearers to march more quickly, but the more haste the Dictator saw them making the more determined was he to check the column and insist upon their marching deliberately.

The Etruscans had been present in their full strength when the battle began. Message after message was sent to the Dictator telling him that all the legions of the Etruscans were taking part in the fight and that his men could no longer hold out against them, whilst he himself from his higher ground saw for himself in what a critical position the outposts were.

As however, he felt quite confident that their commander could still sustain the attack, and as he was himself near enough to save him from all danger of defeat, he decided to wait until the enemy became utterly fatigued, and then to attack him with fresh troops.

Although his own men were advancing so slowly there was now only a moderate distance over which to charge, at all events for cavalry, between the two lines. The standards of the legions were in front, to prevent the enemy from suspecting any sudden or secret manoeuvre, but the Dictator had left intervals in the ranks of infantry through which the cavalry could pass.

The legions raised the battle-shout, and at the same moment the cavalry charged down upon the enemy, who were unprepared for such a hurricane, and a sudden panic set in.

As the outposts, who had been all but cut off, were now relieved at the last moment, they were all allowed a respite from further exertions. The fresh troops took up the fighting, and the result did not long remain in doubt.

The routed enemy sought their camp, and as they retreated before the Romans who were attacking it, they became crowded together in the furthest part.

In trying to escape, they became blocked in the narrow gates, and a good many climbed on to the mound and stockade in the hope of defending themselves on higher ground, or possibly of crossing ramparts and fosse and so escaping.