Ab urbe condita
Titus Livius (Livy)
Livy. History of Rome, Volumes 1-2. Roberts, Canon, Rev, translator. London, New York: J. M. Dent and Sons; E. P. Dutton and Co., 1912.
[*](The Consuls at Variance). Fabius and P. Decius were now entering their year of office, the former being consul for the fifth time, the latter for the fourth.
Twice before they had been consuls together, they had held the censorship together, and the perfect unanimity between them, quite as much as their discharge of its duties, made their tenure of office a distinguished one.
But this was not to last for ever; the conflict which broke out between them was, however, I think, due more to the antagonism of the two orders to which they belonged than to any personal feeling on their part.
The patrician senators were extremely anxious that Fabius should have Etruria assigned to him without going through the usual procedure; the plebeian senators urged Decius to insist upon the question being settled in the usual way by lot. There was, at all events, a sharp division of opinion in the senate, and, when it became apparent that the Fabian interest was the stronger, the matter was referred to the people.
As both were first of all soldiers, trusting more to deeds than to words, their speeches before the Assembly were brief.
Fabius declared that it would be an unworthy proceeding if another should gather up the fruit beneath the tree which he had planted; he had opened up the Ciminian forest and made a way through pathless jungle for the arms of Rome. Why had they troubled him at his time of life, if they were going to carry on the war under another general?
Then he turned to Decius: “Surely,” he said, “I have chosen an opponent, not a comrade, in office; Decius is annoyed at our three years of joint power having been so harmonious.”
Finally, he asserted that he desired nothing more than that if they thought him worthy of that command, they should send him there; he had bowed to the will of the senate and should accept the decision of the people.
P. Decius, in reply, protested against the injustice of the senate. The patricians, he said, had done their utmost to exclude the plebeians from the great offices of the State.
Since personal merit had so far won the day that it no longer failed of recognition in any class of men, their object was now not only to stultify the deliberate decisions of the people as expressed by their votes, but even to turn the judgments which Fortune is ever passing into so many reasons for retaining their power, small as their number was.
All the consuls before his time had drawn lots for their commands, now the senate was giving Fabius his province independently of the lot.
If this was simply as a mark of honour, then he would admit that Fabius had rendered services both to the republic and to himself and he would gladly consent to anything that would add to his reputation, provided it did not involve casting a slur upon himself.
But who could fail to see that when a peculiarly difficult and formidable war is entrusted to one consul without any resort to the lot, it means that the other consul is regarded as superfluous and useless?
Fabius pointed with pride to his achievements in Etruria; Decius wished to be able to do so too, and possibly he might succeed in totally extinguishing the fire which the other had only smothered, and smothered in such a way that it was constantly breaking out where one least expected in fresh conflagrations.
He was prepared to concede honours and rewards to his colleague out of respect to his age and position, but when it was a question of danger or of fighting he did not give way, and would not voluntarily.
If he gained nothing else from this dispute, he would at least gain this much, that the people should decide a question which was theirs to decide, rather than that the senate should show undue partiality. He prayed Jupiter Optimus Maximus and the immortal gods to grant to him the impartial chance of the lot with his colleague, if they were going to grant them each the same courage and good fortune in the conduct of the war.
It was, at all events, a thing eminently fair in itself, and an excellent precedent for all time, and a thing which touched the good name of Rome very closely, that both the consuls should be men by either of whom the Etruscan war could be conducted without any risk of failure.
Fabius' only reply was to entreat the people to listen to some despatches which had been sent by Appius before they proceeded to vote. He then left the Assembly. The people were no less strong in his support than the senate had been, and Etruria was decreed to Fabius without any casting of lots.
When[*](Preparations to meet the four Nations.) this decision was come to, all the men of military age flocked to the consul, and every one began to give in his name, so eager were they to serve under him as their general.
Seeing himself surrounded by this crowd, he called out: “I do not intend to enlist more than 4000 infantry and 6oo cavalry, and will take with me those of you who give in your names to-day and tomorrow.
I am more concerned to bring you all back wealthy men than to have a large number of men for my fighting force.”
With this compact army full of confidence and hope —all the more so because he felt no need of a great host —he marched to the town of Aharna, which was not far from the enemy, and from there went on to Appius camp.
He was still some miles distant from it when he was met by some soldiers sent to cut wood who were accompanied by an armed escort. When they saw the lictors marching in front of him, and heard that it was Fabius their consul, they were overjoyed and thanked the gods and the people of Rome for having sent him to them as their commander.
As they pressed round the consul to salute him, Fabius asked them where they were going, and on their replying that they were going to cut wood, “What do you say?”
he inquired; “surely you have a ramparted camp?” They informed him that they had a double rampart and fosse round the camp, and yet they were in a state of mortal fear.
“Well, then,” he replied, “go back and pull down your stockade, and you will have quite enough wood.” They returned into camp and began to demolish the rampart, to the great terror of those who
had remained in camp, and especially of Appius himself, until the news spread from one to another that they were acting under the orders of Q. Fabius, the consul. On the following day the camp was shifted, and Appius was sent back to Rome to take up his duties as praetor.
From that time the Romans had no standing camp. Fabius said that it was bad for the army to remain fixed in one spot; it became more healthy and active by frequent marches and change of position.
They made as long and frequent marches as the season allowed, for the winter was not yet over. As soon as spring set in, he left the second legion at Clusium, formerly called Camars, and placed L. Scipio in charge of the camp as propraetor.
He then returned to Rome to consult the senate as to future operations. He may have taken this step on his own initiative after finding from personal observation that the war was a bigger thing than he had believed it to be from the reports received, or he may have been summoned home by the senate; both reasons are assigned by our authorities.
Some want to make it appear that he was compelled to return, owing to the action of Appius Claudius, who had sent alarming despatches about the state of things in Etruria, and was now adding to the alarm by his speeches in the senate and before the Assembly.
He considered one general with only one army quite insufficient to cope with four nations; whether they combined their forces against him or acted separately, there was the danger of his being unable, single-handed, to meet all emergencies.
He had left only two legions there, and less than 5000 infantry and cavalry had arrived with Fabius, and he advised that P. Decius should join his colleague in Etruria as soon as possible.
Samnium could be handed over to L. Volumnius, or, if the consul preferred to keep to his own province, Volumnius should go to the support of Fabius with a full consular army.
As the praetor's representations were producing a considerable impression, we are told that Decius gave it as his opinion that Fabius ought not to be interfered with, but left free to act as he thought best until he had either himself come to Rome, if he could do so with safety to the State, or had sent some member
of his staff from whom the senate could learn the actual state of things in Etruria, what force would be necessary, and how many generals would be required.
Immediately on his arrival in Rome, Fabius addressed the senate and also the Assembly on the subject of the war. His tone was calm and temperate, he did not exaggerate, nor did he underrate the difficulties. If, he said, he accepted a colleague's assistance it would be more out of consideration for other people's fears than to provide against any danger either to himself or to the republic.
If, however, they did give him a coadjutor to be associated with him in the command, how could he possibly overlook P. Decius, who had been so frequently his colleague, and whom he knew so well?
There was no one in the world whom he would sooner have; if Decius were with him he should always find his forces sufficient for the work and never find the enemy too numerous for him to deal with.
If his colleague preferred some other arrangement they might give him L. Volumnius. The people, the senate, and his own colleague all agreed that Fabius should have a perfectly free hand in the matter, and when Decius made it clear that he was ready to go either to Samnium or to Etruria, there was universal joy and congratulation. Victory was already regarded as certain, and it looked as though a triumph, and not a serious war, had been decreed to the consuls.
I find it stated in some authorities that Fabius and Decius both started for Etruria immediately on entering office, no mention being made of their not deciding their provinces by lot, or of the quarrel between the colleagues which I have described.
Some, on the other hand, were not satisfied with simply narrating the dispute, but have given in addition certain charges which Appius brought against the absent Fabius before the people, and the bitter attacks he made upon him in his presence, and mention is made of a second quarrel between the colleagues caused by Decius insisting that each should keep the province assigned to him.
We find more agreement amongst the authorities from the time that both consuls left Rome for the scene of war. But before the consuls arrived in Etruria the Senonian Gauls came in immense numbers to Clusium with the intention of attacking the Roman camp and the legion stationed there.
Scipio was in command, and thinking to assist the scantiness of his numbers by taking up a strong position, he marched his force on to a hill which lay between his camp and the city.
The enemy had appeared so suddenly that he had had no time to reconnoitre the ground, and he went on towards the summit after the enemy had already seized it, having approached it from the other side.
So the legion was attacked in front and rear and completely surrounded. Some authors say that the entire legion was wiped out there, not a man being
left to carry the tidings, and that though the consuls were not far from Clusium at the time, no report of the disaster reached them until Gaulish horsemen appeared with the heads of the slain hanging from their horses' chests and fixed on the points of their spears, whilst they chanted war-songs after their manner.
According to another tradition they were not Gauls at all, but Umbrians, nor was there a great disaster; a foraging party commanded by L. Manlius Torquatus, a staff officer, was surrounded, but Scipio sent assistance from the camp, and in the end the Umbrians were defeated and the prisoners and booty recovered.
It is more probable that this defeat was inflicted by Gauls and not by Umbrians, for the fears of an irruption of Gauls which had been so often aroused were especially present to the minds of the citizens this year, and every precaution was taken to meet it.
The force with which the consuls had taken the field consisted of four legions and a large body of cavalry, in addition to 1000 picked Campanian troopers detailed for this war, whilst the contingents furnished by the allies and the Latin League formed an even larger army than the Roman army.
But in addition to this large force two other armies were stationed not far from the City, confronting Etruria; one in the Faliscan district, another in the neighbourhood of the Vatican. The propraetors, Cnaeus Fulvius and L. Postumius Megellus, had been instructed to fix their standing camps in those positions.
After[*](The Battle of Sentinum.) crossing the Apennines, the consuls descended into the district of Sentinum and fixed their camp about four miles distance from the enemy.
The four nations consulted together as to their plan of action, [*](This was a commanding position to take up, as Sentinum lay in Umbrian territory but close to the frontiers of the Gauls and Etruscans, and would therefore enable the consul to to strike, if opportunity offered, at any of the three.) and it was decided that they should not all be mixed up in one camp nor go into battle at the some
time. The Gauls were linked with the Samnites, the Umbrians with the Etrurians. They fixed upon the day of battle, the brunt of the fighting was to be reserved for the Gauls and Samnites, in the midst of the struggle the Etruscans and Umbrians were to attack the Roman
camp. These arrangements were upset by three deserters, who came in the secrecy of night to Fabius and disclosed the enemy's plans. They were rewarded for their information and dismissed with instructions to find out and report whatever fresh decision was arrived
at. The consuls sent written instructions to Fulvica and Postumius to bring their armies up to Clusium and ravage the enemy's country on their march as far as they possibly
could. The news of these ravages brought the Etruscans away from Sentinum to protect their own territory. Now that they had got them out of the way, the consuls tried hard to bring on an
engagement. For two days they sought to provoke the enemy to fight, but during those two days nothing took place worth mentioning; a few fell on both sides and enough exasperation was produced to make them desire a regular battle without, however, wishing to hazard everything on a decisive conflict.
On the third day the whole force on both sides marched down into the plain. Whilst the two armies were standing ready to engage, a hind driven by a wolf from the mountains ran down into the open space between the two lines with the wolf in pursuit. Here they each took a different direction, the hind ran to the Gauls, the wolf to the
Romans. Way was made for the wolf between the ranks; the Gauls speared the hind. On this a soldier in the front rank exclaimed: “In that place where you see the creature sacred to Diana lying dead, flight and carnage will begin; here the wolf, whole and unhurt, a creature sacred to Mars, reminds us of our Founder and that we too are of the race of
Mars.” The Gauls were stationed on the right, the Samnites on the left.[*](Where the Umbrians were and why they did not take part in this battle are questions to which our extant authorities vouchsafe no reply.) Q. Fabius posted the first and third legions on the right wing, facing the Samnites; to oppose the Gauls, Decius had the fifth and sixth legions, who formed the Roman
left. The second and fourth legions were engaged in Samnium with L. Volumnius the proconsul. When the armies first met they were so evenly matched that had the Etruscans and Umbrians been present, whether taking part in the battle or attacking the camp, the Romans must have been defeated.