De Amicitia
Cicero, Marcus Tullius
Cicero. De Senectute, De Amicitia, De Divinatione. Falconer, William Armistead, translator. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. London: William Heinemann Ltd. 1923 (printing).
I do not agree at all with any of these views. Certainly the first one is not true which holds that as a man feels towards himself, so should he feel towards his friend. For how many things we do for our friends that we never would do for ourselves! At one time we beg and entreat an unworthy man, and again we assail another too sharply or too loudly rail upon him—things not quite creditable in our own affairs, but exceedingly so in behalf of our friends; and there are numerous occasions when good men forgo, or permit themselves to be deprived of, many conveniences in order that their friends rather than themselves may enjoy them.
The second view limits friendship to an equal
interchange of services and feelings. It surely is calling friendship to a very close and petty accounting to require it to keep an exact balance of credits and debits. I think true friendship is richer and more abundant than that and does not narrowly scan the reckoning lest it pay out more than it has received; and there need be no fear that some bit of kindness will be lost, that it will overflow the measure and spill upon the ground, or that more than is due will be poured into friendship’s bin.But worst of all is the third limitation, which is that whatever value a man places upon himself, the same value should be placed upon him by his friends. For often in some men either the spirit is too dejected, or the hope of bettering their fortune is too faint. Therefore, it is not the province of a friend, in such a case, to have the same estimate of another that the other has of himself, but rather it is his duty to strive with all his might to arouse his friend’s prostrate soul and lead it to a livelier hope and into a better train of thought. Hence some other limitation of true friendship must be fixed, after I have first stated a view which Scipio used to condemn in the strongest terms. He often said that no utterance could be found more at war with friendship than that of the man who had made this remark: We should love as if at some time we were going to hate. And Scipio really could not, he said, be induced to adopt the commonly accepted belief that this expression was made by Bias,[*](Aristotle, Rhet. ii. 13 κατὰ τὴν βίαντος ὑποθήκην και φιλοῦσιν ὡς μισήσοντες καὶ μισοῦσιν ὡς φιλήσοντες.) who was counted one of the Seven Sages; but he thought that it was the speech of some abandoned wretch, or scheming politician, or of someone who regarded everything as an instrument
to serve his own selfish ends. For how will it be possible for anyone to be a friend to a man who, he believes, may be his foe? Nay, in such a case it will be necessary also for him to desire and pray that his friend may sin as often as possible and thereby give him, as it were, the more handles to lay hold of; and, again, he will be bound to feel grief, pain and envy at the good deeds and good fortune of his friends.Wherefore this maxim, whoever its author, really has the effect of destroying friendship: rather ought we to have been enjoined to exercise such care in forming friendships that we should never begin to love anyone whom we might sometime hate. Indeed, Scipio thought that, even if we had been unfortunate in our choice, we should endure it rather than plan an opportunity for a breach.