Pro P. Quinctio
Cicero, Marcus Tullius
Cicero. The Orations of Marcus Tullius Cicero, Volume 1. Yonge, Charles Duke, translator. London: Bell, 1903.
But if you, being the judge, shall appear to be no protection to a desolate and helpless condition against power and influence; if before this tribunal the cause is found to depend on interest, not on truth; then indeed there is nothing any longer holy and uncontaminated in the state—no hope that the firmness and virtue of the judge may counterbalance the lowly condition of any one. But undoubtedly before you and your colleagues truth will prevail, or else, if it be driven from this place by power and influence, it will not be able to find any place where it can stand. I do not say this, O Caius Aquillius, because I have any doubt of your own good faith and constancy, or because Publius Quinctius ought not to have the greatest hopes from those whom you have called in as your assessors, being, as they are, among the most eminent [*](Their names were Lucius Lucilius, Publius Quintilius, and Marcus Marcellus; “The judex was generally aided by advisers learned in the law, (jurisconsulti,) who were said in concilio adesse, but the judex alone was empowered to give judgment.” Smith, Dict. Ant. v. Judex.) men in the state.
What then? In the first place, the magnitude of the danger causes a man the greatest fear, because he is staking all his fortunes on one trial; and while he is thinking of this, the recollection of your power does not occur to his mind less frequently than that of your justice; because all men whose lives are in another's hand more frequently think of what he, in whose power and under whose dominion they are, can do, than of what he ought to do,—
Secondly, Publius Quinctius has for his adversary, in name indeed, Sextus Naevius, but in reality, the most eloquent, the most gallant, the most accomplished men of our state, who are defending Sextus Naevius with one common zeal, and with all their power: if, indeed, defending means so to comply with the desire of another, that he may the more easily be able to overwhelm whomsoever he chooses by an unjust trial;
for what, O Caius Aquillius, can be mentioned or spoken of more unjust or more unworthy than this, that I who am defending the liberties, [*](The Latin has caput, which in a legal sense expresses not only a man's life, but also his status or civil condition; to be registered in the census was caput habere; to change one's rank, capite, &c. diminuere. And so a trial which affected not only a citizen's life, but his rank or liberty, was called judicium capitale.) the fame, and fortunes of another should be compelled to open the cause, especially when Quintus Hortensius, who in this trial fills the part of the accuser, is to speak against me; a man to whom nature has given the greatest possible fluency and energy in speaking? Matters are so managed, that I, who ought rather to ward off the darts of our adversary and to heal the wounds he has inflicted, am compelled to do so now, even when the adversary has cast no dart; and that that time is given to them to attack us when the power of avoiding their attacks is to be taken from us; and if in any particular they should (as they are well prepared to do) cast any false accusation like a poisoned arrow at us, there will be no opportunity for applying a remedy.