The six books of a common-weale

FOrasmuch as we have before sufficiently spoken of Soueraigntie, and of the rights and markes thereof; now it behoueth vs to consider who they bee which in every Commonweale hold that Soueraigntie; thereby to iudge what the estate is: as if the Soueraigntie consist in one onely prince, wee call it a Monarchie: but if all the people bee therein interressed, we call it a Democracie, or Popular estate: So if but some part of the people have the Soueraigne commaund, we account that state to be an Aristocracie. Which words we will vse, to auoide the obscuritie and confusion which might otherwise arise, by the varietie of gouernours good or bad: which hath giuen occasion unto many, to make moe sorts of Commonweales than three. But if that opinion should take place, and that we should by the foot of vertues & vices, measure the estate of Commonweales; we should find a world of them, and them in number infinit. Now it is most certaine, that to attaine unto the true definitions and resolutions of all things, wee must not rest uppon the externall accidents which are innumerable, but rather upon the essentiall and formall differences: for otherwise a man might fall into an infinit and inextricable labyrinth, whereof no knowledge is to bee had, or certaine precept to be giuen. For so a man should forge and fashion infinit numbers of Commonweales, not onely according to the diuersitie of vertues and vices; but euen according to the varietie of things indifferent also. As if a Monarch were to bee chosen for his strength, or for his beautie, for his stature, or for his nobilitie, or riches, which are all things indifferent; or for his martial disposition, or for that he is more giuen to peace, for his grauitie, or for his iustice, for his beautie, or for his wisdom, for his sobrietie, or his humilitie, for his simplicitie, or his chastitie; and so for all other qualities, a man should so make an infinitie of Monarchies: and in like sort in the Aristocratique state, if some few of many should have the soueraigntie aboue the rest, such as excelled others in riches, nobilitie, wisedome, iustice, martiall prowesse, or other like vertues, or vices, or things indifferent, there should thereof arise infinit formes of Commonweales: a thing

most absurd, and so by consequent the opinion whereof such an absurditie ariseth, is to be reiected. Seeing therefore that the accidentall qualitie chaungeth not the nature of things: let vs say that there are but three estates or sorts of Commonweales; namely a Monarchie, an Aristocratie, and a Democratie. We call it a Monarchie, when[*](That there are but three sorts of commonweales viz: a Monarchie a Democratie: and an Aristocratie.) one man alone hath the soueraigntie in a Commonweale, in such sort as wee haue aforesaid. And a Democratie, or Popular estate, when all the people, or the greater part thereof hath in it the soueraigne power and commaund, as in one bodie. The Aristocratie is, when the lesser part of the people hath the Soueraigntie, as in one bodie, and giueth lawes unto the rest of the people, whether it be in generall, or in particular: all which things are of themselves more cleerer than the day. And true it is, that the writers of auntient time do therein well agree, that there can be no lesse then three kindes or sortes of Commonweales: Whereunto some others haue ioyned a fourth, composed of all three: and some other a fift, diuers from all the rest.

Plato hath unto these three well adioyned a fourth kind, that is to wit, where some few of the better sort excelling the rest in vertue, have the soueraignetie: which for all[*](The diuers opinions of the auntient writers concerning diuers sorts of commonweals.) that in proper tearmes, is nothing else but a pure Aristocratie: how be it, he hath not receiued the mixture of the aforesaid three states, for an other diuers forme of a Commonweale. Aristotle beside these three kinds of Commonweales which we have spoken of: and the fourth also named by Plato, setteth downe a fift kind of Common weale, by confounding together the three former states, and so maketh fiue sorts of states or Commonweales. But Polybius reckneth up seauen sorts; three commendable: three faultie: and the seauenth compounded of the mixture of the three first. Dionysius Halycarnasseus, Marcus Tullius, Thomas More, Gaspar Contarenus, Frauncis Machiauell, and many other following Polybius, have as it were with one consent approoued his opinion, which in deed is most auntient, and tooke not beginning from Polybius, although he would seeme to be the authour thereof, neither from Aristotle, but aboue foure hundred yeares before Aristotle. Herodotus (the father of antiquitie) writeth, that fourth kind of a Commonweale, confused of the three other, to have be--- commended of many, and yet for all that contenting himselfe with the three former kinds, reiecteth the rest as imperfect: And were it not that I were not onely by probable arguments, but euen by forcible reasons drawne from that opinion of Polybius, Tullie, and the rest, I could easilie have suffered my selfe to have been ouercome by the authoritie of so great and graue men. It behoueth vs therefore by lively reasons to shew them to have erred and been deceiued, which have brought in that fourth kind of Commonweale composed of the mixture of the other three: which I trust the more plainly to bring to passe, if I shall vse the same examples in refelling of them, that they themselves have before vsed. For they them selues have set downe the Lacedemonian, Roman, and Venetian Commonweales to have been compounded and sweetely mingled with the three kind of states, that is to say, with the Monarchie, Aristocratie, and Democratie. But when Plato said, the best kind of a Commonweale ---o be composed of the mixture of a Monarchie and Democratie, he was therefore forthwith reprehended by his scholler Aristotle, saying, that of these two could no commendable state be made, and that therefore it was better of all three estates to make a fourth: wherein Aristotle reasoneth also against himselfe; for if he confesse no good thing possiblie to be made of two extreames; what shall then bee made of three confounded amongst them selues? And for that this opinion for the making of a fourth[*](No fourth estate of a commonweale to be made of a confusion of a Monarchie, a Democratie and an Aristocratie.) estate of the confusion of the rest, may moue great troubles in Commonweales, and therein worke maruelous effects, it is requisite for vs well to examine the same: For when states of Commonweales are in them selues contrarie, as a Monarchie and a

Democratie, they are by contrarie lawes and ordinances to be gouerned. The Florentins throughly perswaded of that opinion of the auntients for the mingling of the three estates together, as the best forme of a Commonweale; when they moued with the seditious sermons of P. Soderin, and Hierome Sauanarola, had translated the soueraignetie or chiefe power of the Commonweale unto the people: thought it best to keepe the rout of the vulgar and common people from bearing of offices and rule, and altogether from the affaires of state: that so the chiefe managing of matters might be reserued unto the more auntient sort of the citizins, and such as were of greater wealth and abilitie then the rest: who yet had not power to dispose of all matters, but onely of such things as were the chiefest, viz. the making of lawes, the creating of magistrats, and disposing of the common treasure: reseruing the rest unto the Senat and magistrats, that so they might inioy that moderat state of a Commonweale, whereof they had so strongly dreamed. And certes if of the three estates moderately mixed might a fourth state arise, it should have a certein power by nature diuers from the rest: as we see in Harmonicall consent, composed of Arithmeticall and Geometricall proportion artificially confused; yet quite differing from them both: so as if the mixture of things of diuers and contrarie natures, ariseth a third all together differing from the things so together mixed. But that state which is made of the mixture of the three kinds of Commonweales, differeth in deede nothing from a meane popular state; For if three cities, whereof one of them is gouerned by a king, and so a Monarchie; the second by the nobilitie, and so an Aristocratie; the third by the people, and so a Democratie; should be confounded, and so thrust together into one and the same forme of a Commonweale, and so the chiefe power and soueraignetie communicated unto all: who is there that can doubt but that that state shall be all together a state popular? except the soueraignetie should by turnes be giuen; first to the king, then to the nobilitie, and afterwards to the people; As in the vacancie of the Roman kingdome, the king being dead, the Senators ruled by turnes: yet must they needes againe fall unto one of these three kinds of a Commonweale which we have spoken of: nether could this alternatiue manner of gouernement be of any long continuance, either yet more profitable to the Commonweale, then as if in an euill gouerned familie, the wife should first commaund the husband; then the children them both; and the seruants after them to dominier over all.

But to confound the state of a monarkie, with the Popular or Aristocratical estate, is a thing impossible, and in effect imcompatible, and such as cannot be imagined. For i--- soueraignetie be of it selfe a thing indivisible, (as wee have before showed) how can it then at one and the same time be divided betwixt one prince, the nobilitie, and the people in common? The first marke of soueraigne maiestie is, to be of power to giue lawes, and to commaund over them unto the subiects, and who should those subiects bee that should yeelde their obedience unto that law, if they should also have the power to make the lawes? who should he be that could giue the law? being himselfe constrained to receiue it of them unto whom he him selfe gaue it? So that of necessitie we must conclude, that as no one in particular hath the power to make the law in such a state, that then the state must needs be a state popular. Now if we shall giue power unto the people to make lawes, and to creat magistrats, and not to meddle in the rest; we must yet needs confesse that such power giuen unto the magistrats belonged unto the people, and that it is not giuen but as in trust unto the magistrats: whom the people may againe displace, euen aswell as they placed them, in such sort as that the state should alwaies be popular.

And to proue that which wee have said to be true, let vs take the same examples that

Polybius, Contarenus, and the rest have left vs; They say that the state of the Lacedemonians was composed of all the three kinds of states which we spoke of: For that in that Commonweale they had two kings representing a Monarchie; eight and twentie Senators representing an Aristocratie; and five Ephori figuring and patronizing the popular estate. But what will these men then say to Herodotus, who bringeth the[*](That the Lacedemonian commonweale was meare aristocraticall, and not composed of the confusion or mixture of the three sorts of commonweals.) Lacedemonian estate for an example of a most pure Aristocratie? what will they also aunswere unto Theucidides, Xenophon, Aristotle, and Plutarche? who speaking of the warres of Peloponnesus (which continued twentie yeres betwixt the Popular and the Aristocratique Commonweals) say, that the whole drift of the Athenians and their allies was to chaunge the Aristocraties into Democraties, as they did in Samos, Corfu, and all the other cities by them subdued. Whereas contrariewise the Lacedemonians purpose and intention was to chaunge the Popular states into Aristocraties, as in deede they did in all the cities of Greece after the victorie of Lysander; yea euen in the citie of Athens it selfe, where after he had layed the wals euen with the ground, he tooke the soueraignetie from the people, and gaue the same unto thirtie citizens, (who are therefore of the Athenians called the thirtie Tyrants) to rule and gouerne in such sort and manner as they did amongst the Lacedemonians, where so many, and no moe had the gouernement of the state. But among the citizens of Samos, the Siaeyons, the Aeginits, the Mylesians, and other cities of Ionia and the lesser Asia, they gaue the soueraignetie unto Tenne principal men, with one chiefe Captaine over them, for the managing of the warres; calling hoame againe such as had bene banished for holding with the Aristocratie, and driuing into exile them that were chiefe of the popular factions.

What will they also say to Maximus Tyrius, who reckning up the States which held the pure Aristrocratie first of all nameth the Lacedemonians, and after them the Thessalians, the Pellenians, the Cretentians, and the Mantineans. We must first conuince these so many and so famous authours of vntruth, before we can thrust the Lacedemonians from their Aristocratie: which writers liuing almost in the same time wherein the Athenian and Lacedemonian Commonweales flourished, and beeing[*](Gasper Contareus, Nicholas Machiauel, Sir Thomas Moore. The cause that induced Polybius and others to say that the Lacedemonian estat was a state composed of the mixture of the three states and forms of a commonweale. The historie of a Lacoedemonian commonweale.) themselves Grecians, were like more certainly and truely to know these things, than a Venetian Senator, a Florentine, or an English man.

What was it then that deceiued Polybius, who was himself a Megalopolitan, borne neere unto the Lacedemonians? Truely it was euen the name of the Lacedemonian kings. For Lycurgus hauing altered the state of the Commonweale, and by the good will and consent of the kings themselves (who deriued their pedegree from Hercules) hauing translated the soueraigntie unto the people, left unto the kings, but the bare name and title onely, and to be the generals in warres. For why the regall power was now before alreadie sore shaken and weakned: after that Aristodemus king of Lacedemonia, had at once left his two sonnes to raigne together over the Lacedemonians (to the imitation of the Messenians, over whome Amphareus and Leucippus together raigned) who whilest they would both be kings and commaund over all, could neither of them so be, but by their ielous conceits and contentions, drawing the state into factions, gaue occasion to Lycurgus, being descended also of the same stocke with them, to ouerthrow their royall power, leauing unto them and their house nothing els but the name and show of kings, giuing the rest unto the Senat and the people. But as in Athens and Rome, after the kings were thence driuen out, they yet left the name of a king unto a certaine priest, whome they called King of the Sacrifices, to doe a certaine sacrifice, which the king himselfe onely had in former time done: Which priest for all that was himselfe subiect unto the great bishop, and could not (as Plutarch saith) have

any estate, or beare any office as the other priests might: euen so did Lycurgus unto the two kings of Lacedemonia, who upon the matter were nothing but Senators, hauing but their voyces with the rest, without any power at all to commaund; but to the contrarie were themselves constrayned to obey the commaundements of the Ephori, who oftentimes put them to their fines, yea and condemned them to death also, as they did the kings Agis and Pausanias, the soueraigntie still resting with the people, in whose power it was to confirme or infirme the acts and decrees of the Senat. Thucidides also himselfe reiecteth the opinion of them which thought the kings each of them to have had two voyces. But about an hundred yeares after the popular state, ordayned, was againe chaunged by the kings Polydorus and Theopompus; seeing it to bee an hard matter to call the people together, and a great deale harder to rule them by reason, being assembled; oftentimes at their pleasure reuersing the most wholesome and religious decrees of the Senat. Wherefore they chaunged that popular government into an Aristocratie, subtilly wresting an Oracle of Apollo to that purpose: whereby the God (as they said) commaunded that from thenceforth the government of the Commonweale should be in the power of the Senat: and yet to please the people so grieued to have left their power, they gaue them leaue to draw out of themselves five judges, called Ephori, as Tribunes or patrons of the people, who should examine the sayings, doings, and deuises of the kings, and by all meanes let them from the exercising of tyranny. And these Ephorie, euerie ninth yeare once, upon some cleere night gazing upon the firmament (as Plutarch saith) if they then saw any starre, as it were, sparkle or shoot, they thereupon committed their kings to prison, who might not thence be delivered, vntill the Oracle of Apollo had so declared. In like manner the Phylactes or Gailor, euerie yeare had the king of Cumes in prison, vntill the Senat had determined what should be done with him. Now this state of the Lacedemonian Commonweale endured about five hundred yeares, vntill the time of Cleomenes, who hauing slaine the Ephori and the Senatours, and so oppressed the Commonweale, tooke uppon himselfe the soueraigntie, and so held it vntill such time as he was ouercome by Antigonus king of Macedon; who hauing vanquished him, restored that Commonweale into the state it was before: howbeit that twentie yeares after, being fallen againe into the power of Nabis the tyrant, who was afterward slaine by Philopomenes, that Commonweale was vnited unto the state of the Achaeans, whereof it was a prouince, vntill that about thirty yeares after, it was by Gallus the Roman Proconsull taken from the Achaeans, and by Roman emperours set at libertie. Thus in few words you may see the true historie of the the Lacedemonian Commonweale, for most part taken from Xenophon, Thucidides, Liuy, & Polybius, whereof yet no man hath more curiously written than Plutarch, who out of the Lacedemonian acts and publike records, hath corrected such things as of others have bene but slightly or falsly set downe and reported: which hath giuen occasion to many to be deceiued, and to thinke that state to have bene mingled of the three diuers kindes of Commonweales. Which is plainly to be gathered out of Liuie, where he bringeth in Nabis the first tyrant of Lacedemonia, thus speaking to Titus Flaminius, Noster legulator Lycurgus, non in paucorum manu Rempub---esse voluit, quem vos Senatum appellatis, nec eminere vnum aut alterum ordinem in ciuitate, sed per aequationem fortunae & dignitatis fore credidit, vt multi essent qui propatria arma ferrent, Our lawgiuer Lycurgus (saith he) would not the state of our Commonweale to bee in few mens hands, which you call the Senat, neither would have any one or other order to excell the rest in our citie; but by the making equall of mens fortune and dignitie, thought it would come to passe, that there should be many which would beare armes for their countrey. Thus he couereth his tyrranny with the show of a popular state, when as then there was no popular estate at all; yet in that he said most truely, that Lycurgus at the beginning gaue the soueraigntie unto the people.

But let vs see the rest. They also have put for example the Roman Commonweale, which they said to have bene mingled of the three kinds of Commonweales: For so saith Polybius (who was maister to Africanus the Great) Wee see (saith hee) the regall power in the Consuls, the Aristocratie in the Senat, and the Democratie in the people.[*](The Romaine commonweale a meare popular state and not composed of the three formes of commoweals.) unto whome do plainely assent Dionysius Halycarnasseus, Cicero, Contarenus, Sir Thomas More, and many others: which opinion for all that is neither grounded uppon truth not reason. For where is this Monarchie, that is to say, the soueraigne government of one man? which in the two Consuls cannot bee imagined. But soueraigne maiestie, if it were in the consuls could not possibly be divided betwixt two, for the indiuisible nature thereof, which it seemeth more probable and reasonable to attribute the same unto the dukes of Genua or Venice. But what regall power could there bee in the two Roman Consuls? who could neither make law, nor peace, nor warre, neither[*](No soueraigntie in the Romaine Consulls) any great officer, neither graunt pardon, neither take a peny out of the common treasure, neither so much as to whip a citisen, if it were not in time of warre, without leaue of the people: which hath bene a power alwaies giuen to all gouernours of armies, whome we also may so call kings, and with greater appearance than the Consuls, who had not power but the one of them after the other, and that but for the space of one yeare onely. The constable of Fraunce, the chiefe Bassa of the Turkes, the Bethudere in Aethiopia, the Edegnare in the kingdome of Afrike, have ten times more power than had the two Consuls together, & yet for all that they are but subiects & slaues to other princes, as were the Consuls subiects and seruants vnto the people. And to what purpose say they, that the Consuls had such royall authoritie, seeing that the least of the Tribunes of the people might imprison them. As did Drusus the Tribune, who by a sergeant tooke Philip the Consull by the coller, and cast him in prison, for that hee had interrupted him, as he was speaking unto the people: and that he might lawfully so doe, shall hereafter be declared. The power of the Consuls was to lead the armies, war being before denounced, to assemble the Senat, to present the letters of the captaines and allies unto the Senat, to giue audience unto ambassadours before the people or the Senat, to call together the great estate, and to demaund the aduise of the people, about the election of officers, or promulgation of lawes; who yet standing, spake unto the people sitting, and their mases downe, in token of their subiection unto the people. The same authoritie with the Consuls had the chiefe gouernour of the citie in their absence. Ioyne hereunto also, that the Consuls had power but for one yeare: wherefore I leaue this opinion as scarce worthy the refuting.

Now as concerning the Senat, which they say to have had the forme and power of[*](The smal power of the Romaine Senate: and that therein was no resemblance of an Aristocratie) an Aristocratie, it was so farre there from, as that there was neuer priuie councell, which had not more authoritie: for it had no power to commaund either particular men, or magistrats: yea the Senators might not assemble themselves, except it so pleased the Consuls, or the Praetor in the absence of the Consuls: insomuch that Caesar a popular man, perceiuing himselfe not gratious with the Senat, oftentimes called the people together in the yeare of his Consulship: but the Senat in all that yeare he assembled but once or twice, still presenting his request unto the people when he would obtaine any thing: which was no great noueltie, for the Consull for his pleasure to doe, contrarie to the good liking and mind of the Senat. For we read (that the Senat at such time as it was in greatest authoritie that euer it was) in the daungerous time of the Commonwealth, hauing requested the Consuls to name a dictatour, the Consuls would therein doe nothing: insomuch that the Senat hauing no power to commaund them, neither

any sergeant or like officer, which are the true markes of them which haue the power to commaund, sent Seruilius Priscus with their request unto the Tribunes in this sort, * Vos (inquit) Tribuni plebis Senatus appellat, vt in tanto discrimine Reipublicae dictatorem [*](Liuius lib. 4.) dicere, Consules pro vestra potestate cogatis: Tribuni pro collegio pronunciant, placere Consules Senatui dicto audientes esse, aut in vinculase duci iussuros, The Senat (saith he) appealeth unto you the Tribunes of the people, that in so great daunger of the Commonweale, you for the great authoritie you haue, would compell the Consuls to nominat a Dictator: whereupon the Tribunes pronounced for their whole societie, that their pleasure was, that the Consuls should be obedient unto the Senat, or els that they would commaund them to prison. And in another * place the same author saith, That[*](Liuius lib. 27.) the Senat was of aduise, that the Consull should present the request unto the people, for the commaunding of him whom they would have Dictator: which if the Consull should refuse to doe, that then the Praetor of the citie should do it: who if he should refuse also, that then the Tribunes of the people should propound the matter. Consul negauit se populum rogaturum, Praetoremque rogare vetuit: Tribuni plebis rogarunt, The Consull denied to request the people, and forbad the Praetor also to request them, the Tribunes made the request. Wherby it euidently appeareth, that the Senat could not so much as commaund the lesser magistrats, the greater magistrats forbidding them. And as for that which Polybius saith, That the Senat had power to iudge of cities and prouinces, and to take punishment of conspirators against the state: * Liuie [*](Liuiu. lib. 26. ) showeth it to have bene otherwise, as when question was made for the chastising of the traitors of Campania, who after the battell at Cannas had ioyned themselves unto Hannibal, an auntient Senator said in full Senat, Per Senatum agi de Campanis iniussu populi non video posse, I see not that any thing can by the Senat bee done concerning the Campanians without the commaundement of the people. And a little after, Rogatio ferator ad populum, qua Senatui potestas fiat statuendi de Campanis, Let request bee made unto the people, wherby power may be giuen unto the Senat, to determine concerning the Campanians. And upon the request to that purpose presented unto the people, the people gaue them commission, and commaunded the Senat to proceed[*](The people of Rome in their assemblies did e in token of the soueraigntie.) against them in this sort, Quod Senatus maxima pars censeat, qui assident id volumus iubemusque, What the greatest part of the Senat shall agree uppon, wee that here sit will and commaund the same. Neither is Polybius ---sse deceiued, in saying, That the Senat at pleasure disposed of the prouinces and governments: whereas Liuie the best author of the Roman antiquities, is of contrarie opinion, writing thus, Qui---tus Fuluius postulauit a Consule vt palam in Senatu diceret, permitteret ne Senatui vt de prouincijs decerneret, staturusque eo esset quod censuisset, an ad populum laturus: Scipio respondit se quode Republica esset facturum. Tum Fuluius a vobis peto Tribuni plebis vt mihi auxilio sitis. Quintus Fuluius requested of the Consul, that hee should openly say in the Senate whether hee gaue leaue or not unto the Senat, to determine of the prouinces, and whether he would stand to that it should decree, or els would referre the matter unto the people: Whereunto Scipio answered, That hee would do that which should be for the good of the Commonweale. Then said Fuluius, I request you the Tribunes of the people to aid and helpe me. So that it plainely appeareth, the Senat to haue had no power at all, neither the decrees thereof to have bene of any force, without the consent of the Tribunes of the people: and that the rest they had by the sufferance of the same people. Now he that hath nothing but by sufferance, hath indeed nothing of his owne, as we have before said. Yea such decrees of the Senat, as were confirmed by the consent of the Tribunes of the people, unto whome they were to be communicated, could not yet be put in execution, except that either the Consuls did so command; or that the Consuls refusing so to do, the Tribunes themselves propounded the same unto the people. So that in briefe all matters of estate, and namely all the councels and decrees of the Senat were of no force or vertue, if the people did not so command: or if the Tribunes of the people consented not thereunto, as wee have before touched, and shall more at large declare in speaking of a Senat. Wherefore in the Roman state, the government was in the magistrats, the authoritie and councell in the Senat, but the soueraigne power and maiestie of the Commonweale was in the people. Excepting that time wherein the Decemuiri contrarie to the law, kept in their hands longer than a yeare, the soueraigne power to make lawes committed unto them; from which they were shortly after by force of armes remoued: for then it might of right have bene called an Aristocracie, or more properly to say an Oligarchie. Now as we have before said, that the power of magistrats (how great soeuer it be) is not of themselves, neither theirs, but as committed unto them in trust: so at the first, after the driuing out of the kings, the Senators were chosen by the people; who to discharge themselves of that labour, committed that charge to the Censors, who were also chosen by the people, so that upon the matter all the authoritie of the Senat depended of the people, who at their pleasure used to confirme or infirme, to ratifie or disanull the decrees of the Senat.

The same opinion hath Contarenus of the Venetian Commonweale, saying it to be[*](The Venetian estate a pure Aristocratie and not composed of the three formes of commonweals) also mixt of the three formes of Commonweales, as were those of Rome and Lacedemonia: For, saith he, the royall power is in a sort in the duke of Venice, the Aristocracie in the Senat, and the popular estate in the Grand Councell. But Ianot after him hath most curiously brought to light the true estate of the Venetian Commonweale; wherein he sheweth by most euident testimonies, drawne out of the most auntient and true Venetian records, That Contarenus in so saying was much deceiued. He sheweth plainely, that not past three hundred yeares ago, before the time of Sebastian Cyanee duke of Venice, the Venetian estate was a pure monarchie. Howbeit that Contarenus writeth it to have bene established in the state it now is eight hundred yeares: and Pau. Manutius, saith it to have so stood twelue hundred yeares: all which Ianot proueth out of the publike records, and certaine historie to be vntrue. But howsoever that be, plaine it is, at this day to be a pure Aristocracie: For by the view of the citie and the [*](A viewe taken of the Citizens and gentlemen of Venice.) citisens, which was taken about thirtie yeares ago, were reckoned nine and fiftie thousand three hundred fortie nine citizens, beside children under seuen yeares old, but of Gentlemen, in whome resteth the soueraigne power of that state, betwixt foure and five thousand yong and old: yet had the church men and gentlemen under five and twentie yeares old, nothing to do with the state, more than to looke on, neither had they accesse into the Grand Councell, but by way of request: the young gentlemen beeing so upon request receiued at the age of thirtie yeares, according as discretion was to be seene more in some one, than in some others: and yet hath it not bene found this hundred yeare, that the Grand Councell assembled, to decide the great affaires of that state, hath exceeded the number of fifteene hundred, as is to be seene in the histories of Sabellicus, and of cardinall Bembus, the rest being absent. It is therefore the least[*](The soueraigntie of the Venetian estate to be in the grand counsel.) part of the Venetians that have the soueraigntie, and they also of certaine noble families, for all the gentlemen borne in Venice, are not receiued into the Grand Councell; but there are of one and the same stocke, of the same race, of the same name, whereof some are citisens, and come not into the councell, and the others come. I do not here set downe the reason why, which every man may see in Sabellicus. This great councel as Contarenus saith, hath soueraigne power to make and repeale lawes, to place or displace all officers, to receiue the last appeales, to determine of peace and warre, and to

giue pardon unto the condemned. Wherein Contarenus condemneth himselfe: for seeing it is (as he saith) it cannot be denied, but that the state of this Commonweale is Aristocratique. For were it that the Great Councell had no other power than to make lawes and magistrats, it were enough to proue it to be an Aristocraticall state, as we have before said: for if those officers have any power, they hold it of the Seigneurie: which sufficeth to show, that neither the Decemuiri, neither the Senat, neither the Sages, nor yet the duke with his sixe councellors, have any power but by sufferance, and so farre as it shall please the Great Councell. As for the duke himselfe he alone of all[*](The small authoritie and power the Duke of Venice hath.) other magistrats hath no command at all, as not hauing power to condemne any man before him, neither to stay or examine any man; which is the first marke of command, giuen euen unto the least magistrats, neither may he decide any cause whether it be in matters of state, or administration of iustice; either in the assembly of the sixe councellors, or of the Decemuiri, or of the Sages, or of the Senat, or of the fortie judges in civill or criminall causes, or of the Grand Councell. For albeit that he may enter into all their corporations and colleges, yet so it is, that he hath but his voice, as any one of them; but that he vseth to giue it to the last: neither dare he to open any letter directed unto the Seigneurie, or admit or discharge any ambassadours, but in the presence of his sixe councellors, or of the Decemuiri, or to go out of the citie without leaue. Yea Falerius the duke, for that he had without the consent of the councell married a straunger, was by the Decemuiri hanged. And beside him Sabellicus reckoneth up twelue dukes moe, either by the tumultuous people slaine, or otherwise put to death for abusing their authoritie. But he weareth a most pretious cap, a robe of gold, he is followed, honoured, and respected as a prince: and the coyne carrieth his name, albeit that the stampe of the Seigneurie be upon it, which are all tokens of a prince: all which royall magnificence we graunt him to haue, but yet all without power or commaund. Now if it were so that we should not according unto truth, but after showes and appearances iudge of the estate of Commonweales, there should be found none simple and pure, but all mixt and confused in such sort as they say. Yea the empire of Germanie should be much more mixt, than the Venetian state. For the emperour hath other markes and[*](The state of the Germaine empire and of the Swissers, Aristocraticall and not mixt.) more royall than hath the duke of Venice: then the seuen princes electors, with the other princes, have the show of an Aristocracie, or of an Oligarchie: and the ambassadours of the imperiall townes resemble a Democracie. And yet for all that most certaine it is, that the imperiall state of Germanie is a pure Aristocracie, composed of three or foure hundred persons at most, over whome one prince beareth rule, to put in execution the decrees of the councell, or els is to be forced to giue up his office, as wee shall in due place declare. In like manner they say also the states of the Swissers to be mixed of the three diuers formes of a Commonweale: Amongst whome the Burgamaister representeth the king, the Senat an Aristocracie, and the assemblies generall and particular, the state popular: and yet for all that men know might well, that all their states and Commonweales are either popular, as are they which inhabit the mountaines, or els Aristocratike, as are almost all the rest.

And this opinion of the mixed state hath so possessed the mindes of men, that many[*](The estate of France a pure Monarchie and not mixed.) have both thought and w---it this monarchie of Fraunce (than which none can bee imagined more royall) to be mixt and composed of the three kinds of Commonweals, and that the parliament of Paris hath the forme of an Aristocracie, the three estates of a Democratie, and the king to represent the state of a monarchie: which is an opinion not onely absurd, but also capitall. For it is high treason to make the subiect equall to the king in authoritie and power, or to ioyne them as companions in the soueraigntie with him. And what popular power appeareth, when the three states are

assembled? or the parliament called? or wherein is the soueraigne maiestie of a prince so much manifested, as when every man in particular, and all men in generall, aswel the noble as the meniall, with bended knee, and bare head, adore their king? offer unto him their requests, which he at his pleasure admitteth or reiecteth. What counterpoise of a popular power against the maiestie of a monarch can there be in the assembly of the three estates? yea of the whole people, if it could be gathered into one place, which[*](The power of a soueraign prince in nothing dimi nished by his parliament, but rather much the more therby manifested.) humbleth it selfe, requesteth and reuerenceth their king. So farre is it from that such an assembly in any thing diminisheth the power of a soueraigne prince, as that thereby his maiestie is the more encreased and augmented. For it cannot bee exalted into a more high degree of honour, of power, and of glorie, than to see an infinit number of great lords and princes, and people innumerable, of men of all sorts and qualitie, to cast themselves downe at his feet, and to doe homage unto his maiestie; seeing that the honour, glorie, and power of princes, consisteth not but in the obeysance, homage, and seruice of their subiects. If then no forme or fashion of a popular power can bee imagined in the assembly of the three estates, which they make in this realme, no more or haply lesse than in England and Spaine: much lesse shall there be an Aristocracie in the Court of Peeres, (who are so called, for that they bee equall one with another among themselves, but not with the prince, as some haue too rustically deemed) or in the assembly of all the officers of the realme, considering that the presence of the king doth make all power and authoritie of all corporations and colleges, and of all officers aswell in generall as in particular to cease: in such sort, as that no magistrat hath power to commaund any thing in his presence, as we will in d---e place declare. And albeit that the king sitting in his seat of iustice, the chauncelour first addresseth himselfe unto him, to know his pleasure, by commaundement from whome he goeth, gathering the aduise and opinions of the princes of the blood, and other great lords, the peeres and magistrats, which he reporteth againe unto him: yet is not that so done, to the intent to number the voyces, as in the consistorie among the judges, but that the king understanding their opinions, may as seemeth unto him good, receiue or reiect the same. And albeit that most times he follow the opinion of the greater part, yet to make it knowne, that it is not the judges or magistrats decree, but the decree of the prince onely, and that the rest of the magistrats have therein no power, the chauncelor pronounceth not this or that to be thought good unto the judges of the court, but with a lowd voice vseth these words, The king sayeth unto you. Wee see also that the court of parliament, writing unto the king, keepeth euen yet the auntient stile, which is this in the superscription of their letters, To our Soueraigne Lord the King. The beginning of[*](The forme the courtes of parliament in Fraunce hold in writing to the king.) which letters is on this sort, Our Soueraigne Lord in most humble wise, and so much as in vs is we recommend vs to your good grace, And the subscription placed as low as may be: Your most humble and obedient subiects and seruants, the men holding your court of Parliament. Which is not t--- th---anner of the lords of an Aristocracies speech: neither of such as are companions in Soueraigntie with the king, but of true and humble subiects. And for that I have touched this point before, I will now lightly passe it ouer. The state of Fraunce therefore is a pure Monarchie, no--- mingled with the popular power, and so lesse with the Aristocratique Seigneurie: which mixture of states is altogether impossible, and incompatible. And Aristotle most subtilly examining this opinion, for the mixture of states, truly calleth the state composed of an Aristocratic and a Democratie ---, that is to say a Commonweale: but showeth not how that may be done, neither giueth thereof example, as he vsually doth in others: but to the contrarie confesseth, that he knew none such in his time; or yet had found any such before, albeit that he is reported to have gathered an hundred Commonweales into one booke, which booke is now lost. And forasmuch as Aristotle seldome or neuer reporteth the true opinions of Plato, but to the contrarie alwaies disguiseth and obscureth them as the antient Academiques have right well noted; and namely where hee reiecteth his Commonweale; upon whose sayings many resting themselves have oftentimes deceiued both themselves and others. We not addicted to either, will in few words set downe the true opinion of Plato concerning his Commonweale, deseruing well to be knowne for the better understanding of the question we have in hand, which some which neuer read the same, call a diuine opinion: some others in the meane time treading the same under foot, and rayling thereat as fast.

Plato faigned unto himselfe onely two Commonweales, whereof the first hee attributed to Socrates, who neuer thought (as saith Xenophon) of that which Plato maketh him to say: and in his Commonwealth he taketh away these words, Mine, and Thine, as the source and fountaine of all euil, and would have al goods, yea wiues and children to be common. But seeing euerie man to find fault therewith, he quietly left it, as if he had so writ more for argument sake, than for that he so thought, or to have the same put in effect. The second is his owne, wherein hee taketh away the communitie of[*](Plato his commonweale a pure popular estate and not mixt.) goods, of women and children: as for the rest those Commonweales are both in all things alike. For both in the one and the other, he would not have aboue five thousand and fortie citisens, a number by him chosen to have 59 entire parts: in which Commonweales he also maketh three estates or degrees of men: viz. the Guardes, Souldiors, and Labourers: and after that diuideth the citisens into three degrees, according to the vnequall rate of their substance. As for the soueraigntie hee giueth it unto the whole multitude of the people; as to make and abrogat lawes, cause sufficient enough to iudge that he ment to make it a popular estate, if there were nothing else. But he passeth on farther, and giueth unto the whole assembly of the people power to place and displace all the officers: and not content with that, willeth also that the people should have all the power to iudge in criminall causes; for that they are (as he saith) all therein interessed. In briefe he giueth unto the people power of life and death, to condemne, and to graunt pardon; which are all euident arguments of a popular state. For he appointeth no soueraigne magistrat, which might represent the state royall, and but a little of the forme Aristocratique: for he willeth, that the Senat, or the counsel for the affaires of the state, which he calleth Guards or keepers should consist of foure hundred citisens, to be chosen of the people. Whereby it is most euidently to bee vnderstood, that Plato his Commonwealth is the most popular that euer was, yea then that of his owne countrey of Athens, which Xenophon thought to have bene the most popular state in the world. I omit the 726 lawes set downe by Plato, in the twelue books for the government of his Commonweale: sufficeth it mee to have showed Plato his imagined Commonweale not to have bene made of a mixture of an Aristocracie, and Democracie, as Aristotle said, whose errour Cicero, Contarenus, and others, one after another following, led the rest that followed them into errour also.

Let vs therefore conclude, neuer any Commonwealth to have beene made of an Aristocracie and popular estate; and so much lesse of the three states of Commonweales, and that there are not indeed but three estates of Commonweales, as Herodotus first most truely said amongst the Greekes, whome Tacitus amongst the Latins imitating, saith, Cunctas nationes & vrbes, populus, aut primores, aut singuli regunt, The people, the nobilitie, or one alone, do rule all nations and cities.

But some man will say, May there not be a Commonweale, wherein the people hath the power to create the magistrats, to dispose of the common reuenew, and power of life and death; which are three markes of soueraigntie, & the nobilitie to have power

to make lawes, to dispose of peace and warre, and of the impositions and taxes; which are also markes of soueraigntie: and besides all these to have one royall magistrat aboue all, unto whome all the people in generall, and euerie one in particular should yeeld their faith and liege loyaltie, and from whose iudgement none might appeale or present any civill request. For so the rights and markes of soueraigntie should seeme to be divided in three parts: the people chalenging one part thereof, the nobilitie another, and the king the third: whereby in that state a mixture might seeme to bee made of the royall Aristocratique and popular state together. Whereunto I aunswere, that such a state was neuer found, neither that such a state can bee made, or yet well imagined,[*](That it is impossible to compose one commonweale of the mix ture of the three formes of commonweals.) considering that the markes of soueraigntie are indiuisible. For the nobilitie which should haue the power to make the lawes for all: (which is as much as to say to commaund and forbid what them pleased, without power to appeale from them, or for a man to oppose himselfe against their commaunds) would by their lawes at their pleasure forbid others to make peace or warre, or to leuie taxes, or to yeeld fealtie and homage without their leaue: and he againe to whome fealtie and homage is due, would bind the nobilitie and people not to yeeld their obedience unto any other, but unto himselfe. And admit that euerie one would seeke to defend his owne right, and not suffer any thing to be taken from him that he thought belonged to himselfe: yet that doth most differ from the nature of a Monarchie, that he which hath the soueraigntie, should himselfe bee enforced to obey any other but especially his subiect. Whereby it commeth to passe, that where the rights of soueraigntie are divided betwixt the prince and his subiects: in that confusion of the state, there is still endlesse sturres and quarrels, for the superioritie, vntill that some one, some few, or all together have got the soueraigntie. Whereof as there be many examples of old, so is there none fitter in our time, than the example of the kings of Denmarke, whome the nobilitie euer since Christiern the great grandfather of Frederike which now raigneth, hath almost made subiect unto the lawes. Christiern they thrust out of his kingdome, and set up his cosen in his place, with condition that he should neither make peace nor warre, without the leaue of the senat: nor that he should have any power to condemne any gentleman to death; with many other like articles, which I will in their place set downe: which the kings since that time have sworne to keepe: which that they should not go against, but that they might be the more firmly kept, the nobilitie will in no case that the king should of himselfe make any peace; and yet have themselves made a league with the king of Polonia, and them of Lubec, against the king, for the defence of their libertie. So indeed are the rights of Soueraigntie divided betwixt the king and the nobilitie, but so as that they both liuing in perpetuall feare and distrust; do seeke for the alliance and fellowship of their neighbour princes and people, so to receiue the lesse harme one of them from another. With like surges and tempests is the kingdome of Sweden also tossed, the king whereof lived in such distrust with his nobilitie, as that king Henry was[*](To diuide the rights of soueraigntie daungerous to all commonweals.) glad to take a German for his Chauncelour, and one Var---nnes a Norman for his high Constable: and yet at length was by his nobilitie thrust out of his royall seat, and by them cast in prison, wherein hee lived seuenteene yeare. Wherefore such states as wherein the rights of soueraigntie are divided, are not rightly to bee called Commonweales, but rather the corruption of Commonweales, as Herodotus hath most briefly, but most truely written. For as bodies by nature well framed, if they begin to change, with wonderfull stinke and contagion annoy all that come neere them, vntill they bee quite altered, and become new things; as when egges are set upon, which before they were set, and after they be hatched also have a good smell and taste, though in the verie alteration of them not so: so also Commonweales which chaunge their state, the soueraigne right and power of them being divided, find no rest from civill warres and broiles, vntill they againe recover some one of the three formes, and that the soueraigntie be wholie in one of the states or other.

Yet might one say, that in the estate of the Romans the lesse part of the people chosen out of the richer sort made the lawes, and greatest officers; namely the Consuls▪ the Praetors, the Censors, had both soueraigne power of life and death: and disposed of warre, and that the greater sort of the people made the lesser officers and magistrats, to wit, the Tribuns of the people; the foure and twentie militarie Tribunes; the two Aediles or Sherifes; the Treasourers; the Scout, and mynt masters, and gaue also all benefices vacant, and more then that the greater part of the people iudged of the great criminall processes before Sylla, if it tended not to the naturall or civill death of any. And by this meane it seemeth that that Commonweal was composed of an Aristocracie, and of a popular estate: Whereunto I answere, that it had well some appearance, but yet neuerthelesse was in effect a true popular estate: for albeit that the great estate of the people was divided into sixe degrees, or companies, according to every ones abilitie, and that the knights, and the greatest part of the Senators, and of the nobilitie, and richer sort of the people were of the first companie: who agreeing among themselves, the lawes by them made were published, and the great magistrats by them chosen receiued to take their oath: yet neuerthelesse true it is that the five companies that remayned, had tenne times as many citizens in them: and in case that all the Centuries of the first companie agreed not upon the matter, they then came to the second companie, and so by order even to the sixt and last, which in deede seldom times or neuer happen. Matters being still so agreed upon, as that they came not alwayes unto the second companie, but seldom to the third, and most seldom to the fourth, scarcely at all unto the fift, and neuer unto the sixt: wherein was all the rabble of the poore and base people, in number farre exceeding all the rest: yet sufficeth it for our purpose, that all the people had thein part, to shew it to have beene a popular state: albeit that the most noble and richer sort were first called. And yet for all that the meniall people, (that is to say, the greater sort of the people) without the nobilitie, seeing them selues sometime deceiued of their voices (after that the kings were driuen out) and little or no regard to be had of them, began tumultuously to arise: whereof grew the three departures of the people into the mount Auentine, whither the people in armes had retired them selues for the defence of their libertie and power against the nobilitie: which could not bee appeased vntill it was lawfull for them to chuse unto them selues their owne sacred magistrats, and that in their owne assemblies, from which the nobilitie was excluded: and then the Commonweal seemed in a maner to have beene mixt of the nobilitie and the people. But if a man will consider the shortnes of the time, and the turmoyles where with the Commonweal was in the meane time afflicted, he shall confesse that it could scarce have stood in that state, although most miserable twentie or thirtie yeares: neither yet so long, had it not on every side beene beset with enemies. For shortly after the people tooke unto them selues the power to make lawes, wherein the maiestie of the Commonweal is contained; and so by little and little wrested from the nobilitie (much against their will & long strugling therefore) the other soueraigne rights also: in somuch that the nobilitie scarce made twelue lawes in the space of foure or five hundred; And yet at the same time that the people chose the greater magistrats by their greatest assemblies, the vulgar people was there present, and enrolled in the sixt companie, which although it most seldom gaue suffrage or voice, yet might it so do, if the other companies should have disagreed among them selues: a reason sufficient to showe the state even at that time also to have

beene a popular state.

Yet for all that a man may say that it followeth not hereof that there are not but three sorts of Commonweals, although they cannot be amongst them selues mixed: for it may be that of threescore thousand citizens in a citie, fortie thousand may have the soueraigntie, and twentie thousand be excluded: where, for that the greater part beareth the sway, it shal be a popular state: and contrarie wise if but an hundred of that multitude shall have the soueraigntie, it shall be an Aristocracie; for that the lesse part of the citizens gathered together hath the soueraigne power: what then, if of the same number of citizens five and twentie thousand shall hold the chiefe power? Truely, it may be doubted whether such a state be an Aristocracie, although the lesse part of the citizens enioy the soueraigntie, the rest being reiected: for why, it differeth much whether an hundred citizens, or five and twentie thousand beare rule, and much more if of an hundred thousand citizens five and fortie thousand have the soueraigntie: or of so great a multitude thirtie onely should beare the sway, the rest excluded, as among the Lacedemonians: yet I alwaies deeme it to be an Aristocracie, if the lesser part of the[*](In what state soeuer the lesser number beareth rule over th grea ter it is to be accounted an Aristocratie.) citizens beare rule over the rest: for otherwise if the diuersitie of the number should make the diuersitie of Commonweals, there should be of them a million, yea an infinite of diuers kinds of Commonweals: for the number of them which should have part in the state encreasing or diminishing, should make an infinite diuersitie, whereof no knowledge is to be had; suffiseth it the soueraigne power to be with the greater or[*](What a principa litie is.) lesser part of the people, for the making of an Aristocracie or Democracie. The rest of the difficulties which might be moued concerning the nature of every Common weal shall hereafter be in due place declared.

Yet one thing remayneth in the question we have in hand to be discussed, which is that the Roman Commonweal under the emperour Augustus, and the other emperours after him, unto the time of Flauius Vespatianus, was called a principalitie, of which sort of Commonweal, neither Herodotus, neither any of the Greek or Latine writers, except Tranquillus, seemeth to make any mention: for he writeth that the emperour Caligula, seeing diuers kings at his table to enter into the tearmes of honour, and the antiquitie of their houses among themselves; with a loude voice brought forth that verse of Homer which Agamemnon vseth against Achilles, who would needs make himselfe equall and companion with him.

---.

An euill thing it is to be ruled by many:

one prince, and one king, where there is any.

And much it missed not but that hee had euen than taken upon him the imperiall crowne, and chaunged the forme of the Roman principalitie into a kingdome; and thus much he. whereby it is to be vnderstood the Roman state under Augustus after the battell at Actium, to have beene neither a Popular state, an Aristocracie, nor a Monarchie. Now a principalitie is nothing else then an Aristocracie, or a Democratie,[*](What a Principalitie is.) in which one chiefe commaunded every man in particular, and it is but the first in generall: for this word (Prince) to speake properly signifieth no other thing but him that is first. So the Iewes complained Aristobulus the first of the house of the Amoneans, to have chaunged the principalitie which was Aristocratique, into two kingdomes, at such time as he tooke one crowne to himselfe, and sent an other to his brother. The like wee find, that the auncient cities of Tuscanie made alliance with Tarquinius Priscus king of the Romans; upon condition that hee should not have

power over them of life and death: neither to put garrisons into their townes, nor to impose upon them any taxes or tallages; or to chaunge any of their customes or laws, Sed vt ciuitatum principatus penes regem Romanum esset, but that the principalitie of their cities onely should be with the Roman king: for so saith Florus. Now all those cities were of a popular state. Wherefore Tarquinius was but the first and chiefe in the assemblies of those cities, who might gouerne the multitude no otherwise than doth the emperour in the German empire, or the duke in Venice, or Genua, who may most rightly be called princes, as in the same sence in antient time the chief magistrat among the Athenians, was called ---, or prince: yet was that Commonweale of all other most popular.

But if there be two chiefe magistrats of like power, as in Rome; or three, as in many cities of the Swissers; or foure, as amongst them of Geneua; it cannot there be called a principalitie, for that none is there chiefe or principall. But in the Roman Commonweale, Augustus by a crafty deuise hauing made himselfe but great Generall of the armie (by the name of Imperator) and Tribune of the people for defence of their profit, (from whome for all that he had taken their libertie) and as it seemed almost enforced by the Senat, had taken upon him the charge of the Commonweale for ten yeares, made that state in show and false semblant but a principalitie, when as before hee had placed in all the prouinces fortie legions, and taken three for the safetie of his person, and put sure garrisons into all the castles and strong fortresses of the empire: so inuading the royal power without a Scepter, without a Diadem, or a Crowne; whose successors [*](In matter of state he that is maister of the forces, is master of the men, of the▪ lawes, and of all the commonweale.) (excepting some few) some more, some lesse, exercised most cruell tyranny. For Tiberius in the beginning of his raigne, rise upon the Consuls, and meeting them gaue them way, (as sayth Tranquillus) but afterwards oppressed the Commonweale with most filthy seruitude and slauerie. But here is to be considered what was in deed done, and was not made show of: for he that beareth greatest sway in the Commonweale, him men thinke to have the soueraigntie: but if question be made of the right, then are we to looke not what is indeed done, but what ought to be done. Wherfore it appeareth a principalitie to be nothing els, but an Aristocratie, or a Democratie, hauing some one for chiefe or principall aboue the rest, the soueraigntie yet still remaining with the nobilitie or the people.