The six books of a common-weale

SEeing that nothing upon earth is greater or higher, next unto God,[*](Soueraigne princes God his lieutenants upon earth.) than the maiestie of kings and soueraigne princes; for that they are in a sort created his lieutenants for the welfare of other men: it is meet diligently to consider of their maiestie and power, as also who and of what sort they be; that so we may in all obedience respect and reuerence their maiestie, and not to thinke or speake of them otherwise than of the lieutenants of the most mightie and immortal God: for that he which speaketh euill of his prince unto whome he oweth all dutie, doth iniurie unto the maiestie of God himselfe, whose lively image he is upon earth. As God speaking unto Samuel, of whome the people of Israel had vnaduisedly asked a king, It is not thee (saith God) but me whome they haue despised.

Now to the end that one may know him that is such an one (that is to say a Soueraigne prince) we must know the markes, which are not common unto other subiects also: for if they were common vnto others, than should there be no soueraigne prince. And yet they which have writ best of or concerning a Commonweale, have not sufficiently and as it ought, manifested this point, than which none is more plentifull or more profitable in the discourse of a Commonweale▪ whether it were by them for flatterie, for feare, for hatred, or by forgetfulnesse omitted. For when Samuel had denounced him king whome God had before chosen, and consecrated him before the people, as if he had but come by chaunce; he is reported to have writ a booke of the power and Soueraigntie of a king, which the Hebrew priests have written to have bene by their kings suppressed and rent, that so they might more freely tyrannise over their subiects. Wherein Phi. Malancthon in mine opinion is deceiued, who hath[*](How Samuel his speech unto the people concerning the power of a king, by them demaunded, is to be vnderstood.) thought those things which Samuel spoke unto the people, concerning the crueltie or insolencie of tyrants, to belong unto the right of soueraigne maiestie: Whereas hee in that his Oration unto the people, would have reclaimed them from the alteration and innouation of the state, and to have beene better aduised. Will you (saith he) know the custome of tyrants? It is to take away the goods of their subiects, and to dispose of them at their pleasure; to take the tenth of their labours, to rauish other mens wiues, to take from them their children to abuse them, or to make of them their slaues: For the word --- which hee vseth, signifieth not lawfull rights in that place, but mens customes and manner of doing. For otherwise the good prince Samuel should in all his speech be contrarie unto himselfe: for in giuing of an account before the people, of the charge that God had giuen him over them; Which of you (saith he) is it amongst you that can accuse me of euill, or say that I have taken of him either gold or siluer, or other present whatsoeuer? Whereunto all the people with great applause and acclamation gaue him this prayse, That he had neuer done them wrong, nor taken any thing of any person whomsoeuer. Should then this good prince being of so great integritie, godlinesse, and iustice, as he is reported to have bene of, have pronounced the cruelties, insolencies, and adulteries of Tyrants, as lawes of Soueraigntie for princes to imitate? And amongst the

Greekes there are none, who have any thing written concerning the lawes of Soueraigntie, except Aristotle, Polybius, and Dionysius Halicarnasseus, who have writ with so great breuitie and obscuritie▪ as that they seeme rather to have propounded the question, than to have declared what was to be thought thereof, as not therein well resolued themselves. For there are (saith * Aristotle) three parts of a Commonweale, the[*](▪ Arist. li. 4. d Repub. ) one to take aduice and councell, the other to establish magistrats and officers, and euerie man in his charge, and the third to administer and execute iustice. Here (in mine opinion) or else no where he seemeth to speake of the right of Soueraigntie; for that a Commonweale can by no meanes receiue that diuision, as it were of the whole into parts, except the soueraigne government were also spoken of. Nether hath [*](Polyb. lib. 6▪ de militari ac domestica Rom. disciplina. ) Polybius▪ also determinatly defined or set downe the rights and marks of Soueraigntie: but in speaking of the Roman Commonwealth, he saith, That their estate was mixt of the Power royall, of the Aristocraticall government, and the Popular libertie: seeing (saith he) that the people made lawes and officers; the Senat▪ disposed of the prouinces and common treasure, receiued and dismissed ambassadours, and had the mannaging of the greatest affaires; the Consuls held the prerogative of honour, in royall forme and qualitie, but especially in warres, wherein they were all in all. Wherein it appeareth, that he hath touched the principall points of Soueraigntie, seeing that they vnto whom he attributeth the same, had the chiefe government of the Commonwealth. But Dionysius [*](* Dioys. Halycar lib. 4.) Halycarnasseus seemeth thereof to have written better, and more plainly than the other. For he saith, That king Seruius, to take away power from the Senat, gaue power to the people, to make and abolish lawes, to determine of peace and warre, to place and displace officers, to heare the appeales of all the magistrats. And in another place speaking of the third trouble which happened in Rome, betwixt the nobilitie and the people, he saith, That Marcus▪ Valerius the Consul showed unto the people, that it ought to[*](* Lib. 7.) content it selfe, to have the power to make lawes, to chuse officers, to receiue appeales from all the magistrats, and so to leaue the rest unto the Senat. Since which time the lawyers have amplified these rights, and they of later time, much more than they before them, in the treaties which the call The rights of Regaltie, which they have filled with an infinit number of particularities, such as are common unto dukes, counties, barons, bishops, officers, and other subiects of soueraigne princes: in such sort that they call dukes soueraigne princes, as the dukes of Milan, Mantua▪ Ferrara, and Sauoy: yea[*](A probable errour.) euen some counties also dukes subiects, being all or most part blinded with this errour; which hath in it a great appearance of truth. For who is there that would not deeme him to be a soueraigne, which giueth lawes unto his subiects, which maketh peace and warre, which appointeth all the officers and magistrats of his countrey, which imposeth tributes, and at his pleasure easeth whome he seeth good: which hath power of life and death, and in briefe to dispose of the whole Commonweale. All which they before rehearsed, have power to doe: and what more can a man desire in a Soueraigne prince? For all these are the markes of Soueraigntie. And yet neuerthelesse we haue[*](The dukes of Milan, Sauoy, Ferrara, and Florence▪ with such other like great princes no soueraigns: and the reasons why) before shewed that the dukes of Milan, of Sauoy, of Ferrara, of Florence, and of Mantua, hold all of the empire: and that the most honourable title that they haue, is to be princes and deputies of the empire: we have also said that they have their inuestiture from the empire: and that they yeeld their fealtie and homage unto the empire: in briefe that they are naturall subiects of the empire, and borne in the territories subiect vnto the empire. Then how can they be absolute soueraignes? For how should hee be a soueraigne, which acknowledgeth the iurisdiction of another greater then himselfe? of one which reuerseth his iudgements, which correcteth his lawes, which chastiseth himselfe, if he commit abuse? We have before shewed that Galeace the first, vicount of Milan▪ was accused, attainted, conuinced, and condemned of treason by the emperour, for hauing without leaue raysed taxes upon his subiects, and that hee therefore died in prison. And if any of them shall contrarie unto the lawes, by force; sufferance, or by vsurpation take upon them the soueraigntie; are they therefore soueraigns? or shall they prescribe against the fealtie and obedience which they owe unto their prince? Seeing that they confesse themselves but princes and deputies of the empire. They must then renouce the titles of princes and dukes, of Highnesse and Excellencie, & stile themselves kings, to vse the title of soueraigne maiestie, which they cannot doe, without reuolting from the empire; as did Galuagno vicount of Milan, who therefore endured the grieuous punishment of his rashnesse. We have also shewed that the cities of Lombardie were subiect vnto the empire. In briefe we had declared also the intollerable absurdities that should ensue, if the vassals should be soueraignes, especially when they have nothing but what they hold of another: and that this were nothing else but to make the subiect equall with his lord, the seruant with his maister: he that receiueth the law, with him that giueth the law, him that oweth his obedience unto him that is to commaund, which seeing they are things impossible, wee may well conclude that dukes, counties, and all they which hold of another man; or that receiue law or commaundement from another, be it by force, or otherwise by contract, are in no wise soueraignes.

The same opinion we have of the greatest magistrats, of kings Lieutenants general,[*](The greatest magistrats or lieutenants no soueraigns.) Gouernours, Regents, and Dictators; what power so euer they haue, if they be bound unto the lawes appeales, and commaund of an other man, they are not to be accounted soueraigns. For it behoueth that the markes and recognisances of soueraigntie be such, as that they cannot agree to any other, but to a soueraigne prince: for otherwise if they be to be communicated with subiects, a man cannot say them to be the true markes of soueraigntie. For as a crowne if it be broken in peeces or opened, looseth the name of[*](A fit comparison.) a crowne; so soueraigne maiestie looseth the greatnesse thereof, if any way bee opened to tread under foot any right thereof; as by communicating the same with subiects. And for this cause in the exchange made betwixt king Charles the fift, and the king of Nauarre, for the territories of Mante and Meullan, with Montpellier, wherin the royall rights are articulated, they are said all wholly and alone to belong unto the king. It is also by the common opinion of the lawyers manifest, that those royall rights cannot by the soueraigne be yeelded up, distracted, or any otherwise alienated; or by any tract of time be prescribed against: and therefore Baldus calleth them Sacra Saerorum, of Sacred things the most Sacred: and Cynus Indiuidua, things inseparable, or not to bee divided. And if it chance a soueraigne prince to communicat them with his subiect,[*](Soueraigntie admitteth no companion or pertaker therin.) he shall make him of his seruant, his companion in the empire: in which doing he shall loose his soueraigntie, and be no more a soueraigne: for that he onely is a soueraigne, which hath none his superiour or companion with himselfe in the same kingdome. For as the great soueraigne God, cannot make another God equall unto himselfe, considering that he is of infinit power and greatnes, and that there cannot bee two infinit things, as is by naturall demonstrations manifest: so also may wee say, that the prince whom we have set down as the image of God, cannot make a subiect equall unto himselfe, but that his owne soueraigntie must thereby be abased; which if it be so, it followeth that the administration of iustice, which Aristotle maketh the third part of a Commonweale, is not the true marke of soueraigntie; for that it indifferently agreeeth almost to all magistrats aswell as to the prince: neither in like sort to make or displace officers; for that the prince and the subiect have both this power; not only in appointing the officers seruants at home, and in time of warre, but euen of the officers,

and magistrats themselves, which commaund in peace or in warre. For we read that the Consuls, in auntient time created the militarie Tribunes, who were as marshals in the armie, and he whome they called the Interrex created the dictator, and the dictator appointed the collonel of the horsemen: & in every Commonweale where iustice is giuen with fees, the lord of the fee may at his pleasure appoint officers, and without cause displace them againe, if they have not their offices in recompence of some their deserts. The same opinion we have of punishments and rewards, which magistrats or captaines inflict or giue unto them that have deserued the same, aswell as the soueraigne prince. Wherefore it is no true marke of Soueraigntie to giue reward, or to inflict punishment unto such as have so deserued, sith it is common both to the prince and the magistrat: albeit that the magistrat haue this power of the prince. It is also no marke of Soueraigntie to have power to consult of the affaires of the state, which is the the proper charge of the priuie Councell, or Senat of a Commonweale; which is alwayes divided from him which is therein soueraigne; but especially in a popular estate where the soueraigntie lieth in the assemblie of the people, which is alwaies an enemy unto wisedome and good councell. Whereby it is to be perceiued, not any one thing of those three wherein Aristotle said a Commonweale to consist, to be the true marke of Soueraigntie.

As for that which Dionysius Halycarnasseus saith of Marcus Valerius the Consull, in the Oration which he made unto the people of Rome, for the appeasing of the troubles then risen betwixt the Senat and them; That the people ought to content themselves to have the power to make lawes and magistrats; that is not sufficient to declare a Soueraigntie of power in them, as I have before declared concerning the magistrats. Yea the power to make lawes is not the proper marke of Soueraigntie, except we vnderstand thereby the soueraigne princes lawes; for that the magistrat may also giue lawes unto them that are within the compasse of his iurisdiction, so that nothing be by him decreed contrarie to the edicts and lawes of his soueraigne prince. And to manifest this point, we must presuppose that this word Law, without any other addition, signifieth The right commaund of him or them, which have soueraigne power aboue others, without exception of person: be it that such commaundement concerne the subiects in generall, or in particular: except him or them which have giuen the law. Howbeit to speake more properly, A law is the commaund of a Soueraigne concerning all his [*](What lawe properly is.) subiects in generall: or els concerning generall things, as saith Festus Pompeius, as a priuilege concerneth some one, or some few: which law if it bee made by the priuie councel, or Senat of a Commonweale, it is called Senatus consultum, as the priuie councell:[*](The difference betwixt Senatus consultum, and Plebiscitum, a decree of the Senate and of the people.) or decree of the senat. But if the vulgar people made any such commaund, it was called Plebiscitum, that is to say, The commaund of the meniall people: which after many seditions and sturs, betwixt the Nobilitie and the common people, was in the end called a law. For the appeasing whereof all the people in the assemblie of the great estates, at the request of M. Horatius the Consull made a law, that the Nobilitie and the Senat in generall, and euerie one of the people in particular, should bee bound to keepe the decrees and lawes which the common people should make, without appealing therefrom; or that the Nobilitie should have any voyce therein. But forasmuch as the nobilitie and the Senat made small account of such the peoples decrees and ordinances; the aforesaid law was afterward renewed, and againe published, at the instance of Q. Hortentius and Pub. Philo Dictators: From which time forward such the peoples decrees were no more called Plebiscita, but simply laws, whether they concerned every man in particular, or all men in generall. As for the commaundements of the magistrates, they were not called lawes, but onely edicts. For an Edict (as

M. Varro defineth it) is the commaund of a Magistrat; which his commaund bound [*](What an edict is.) none, but them which were of his owne iurisdiction; prouided alwaies that such his cōmands were not contrary unto the ordinances of the great magistrats, or to the laws and commaundements of his soueraigne prince, and were no longer in force than the magistrat pleased, or had charge. And for that all the magistrats were annuall in the Roman Commonweale, there edicts had not force but for one yeare at the most. And therefore they which succeeded in the same office, were either to allow or reuoke the edicts, by their predecessors before made: & if so be that they were against the laws, or for longer time than the magistratie of him that made them, then were they to none effect: which when C. Verres did, he was in these words accused by Cicero, Qui plurimum (inquit) edicto tribuūt, legem annuam appellāt, tu plus edicto complecteris, quàm lege, They that attribute most (saith he) unto an edict, cal it but an annual law; but thou comprehendest more in an edict, than in a law. And for that the emperour Augustus, hauing oppressed the liberty of the cōmonweal, called himself but Imperator (that is to say chief captain & Tribune of the people) he called also his own decrees by the name of edicts: but such as the people made at his request, he called them Leges Iuliae; which maner of speech the other emperors after him used also; in such sort, that this word Edict, is by little & litle taken for a law, especially when it commeth out of the mouth of him which hath a soueraigne power; be it for one, or for al, be it an edict perpetual or onely prouisionall. Wherefore they abuse the words, which call edicts which are proper unto magistrats by the name of laws: but in what sort soeuer that it be, there are none but soueraigne princes, which can giue laws unto their subiects, without exception, be it in ge nerall or in particular. But here might some man obiect, That the Senat of Rome had[*](That the senate of Rome had no power to make lawes, but annuall decrees only.) power to make laws, & that the more part of the greatest affaires of estate, in peace or war, were in the power of the Roman Senat to determine of▪ But what the authority of a Senat is, or ought to be in every Commonweale, we shal in due place declare. But by the way to answere that that is obiected, I say, that the Senat of Rome, from the expulsion of the kings, vntill the time of the emperours▪ had neuer power to make law, but onely certaine decrees and ordinances: which were not in force past a yeare, wherewith for all that the common people were not bound, and so much lesse the whole body and estate of the people. Wherein many are deceiued and especially Conan, who saith, That the Senat had power to make a perpetuall law: for Dionysius Halycarnasseus, who had diligently read the Commentaries of Marcus Varro, writeth, That the decrees of the Senat had not any force, if they were not by the people confirmed: and albeit that they were so confirmed, yet if they were not published in forme of a law, they then had force but for one yeare. No more than the citie of Athens, where the decrees of the Senat were but annuall, as saith Demosthenes in the Oration which hee made against Aristocrates: and if it were a matter of importance, it was referred vnto[*](A pretie quip of Anacharsis.) the people to dispose thereof as they thought good: which Anacharsis the philosopher seeing merily said, The wise and graue propound matters at Athens, and fooles and mad men resolue thereof. And so the Senat in Rome did but consult, and the people commaund: For so Liuie oft times saith, Senatus decreuit, populus tussit, The Senat hath decreed, and the people commaunded. Yet true it is, that the magistrats, and namely the Tribunes, oft times suffered the decrees of the Senat, in a maner to have the force of lawes, if the matter seemed not to impare the power of the people, or to be preiudiciall unto the maiestie of the estates in generall. For so properly the auntient Romans said [*](Cicero pro Ra birio Perduellionis ro.) Imperium in magistratibus, auctoritatem in Senatu, potestatem in plebe, maiestatem in populo inesse dicebant, Commaund to be in the magistrats, authoritie in the senat, power in the meniall people, and maiestie in the people in generall. For the word Maiestie, is proper unto him which stirreth the helme of the soueraigntie of a Commonweale. [*](Maiestie proper only unto a soueraigne prince.) And albeit that the law Iulia concerning maiestie made by the people at the request of Augustus, hold him guilty (Laesaemaiestatis, or as we say) of treason, which striketh a magistrat in the execution of his office: and that sometime the Latine historiographers, yea and the lawyers themselves also giue the title of maiestie unto the Consull and Pretor; as in saying, Maiestatem consulis, maiestatem praetoris, The maiestie of the Consull, the maiestie of the Pretor: yet is it but improperly spoken, neither by our lawes is he guiltie laesae maiestatis, that hath hurt a prince, a duke, a countie, or a magistrat: but he onely that hath violated the person of a soueraigne prince. And so by the lawes of Sigismundus Augustus king of Polonia, made in the yeare 1588, it is set downe that the crime Laesae maiestatis, should take no place further than his owne person; which is according to the true signification of laesa maiestas. And for this cause it seemeth that the dukes of Saxonie, of Bauaria, of Sauoy, of Loraine, Ferrara, Florence, and Mantua, put not into their stiles of honour, this word Maiestie, contenting themselves with the title of Highnesse: and the duke of Venice with the addition of[*](The duke of Venice no soueraigne prince.) his Serenitie, who (to speake properly) is but a verie prince, that is to say, the first, for hee is nothing else but the first of the gentlemen of Venice: and hath no more aboue the rest of the Senators, than the chiefe place and dignitie of the Commonweale in all their assemblies, wherein he sitteth as chiefe; and the concluding voyce into what corporation[*](The order of the Venetian Commonweale.) or colledge he come, if there be any question of voyces. And as in Rome the edicts of the magistrats bound every man in particular (so that they were not contrary to the decrees of the Senat) and the decrees of the Senat in some sort bound the magistrats (if they were not contrarie to the ordinances of the common people) and the ordinances of the common people were aboue the decrees of the Senat; and the law of the whole bodie and estates of the people, was aboue all the rest: euen so in the Venetian Commonweale, the decrees of the magistrats bind euerie man in particular, according to the precinct and iurisdiction of euerie magistrat: but the corporation and colledge of the Decemuiriis aboue particular magistrats: the Senat is aboue the Decemuiri, and the great Councell (which is the assemblie of all the gentlemen of Venice) hath the power of soueraigntie, containing the Senat, and all the rest of the magistrats, within the power of the commaund thereof, in such sort, that if the Decemuiri bee divided with euen voyces, they appeale unto the councell of the Sages, consisting of xxii, who if they cannot agree, the Senat is assembled, and if the matter concerne the high points of soueraigntie, as is the maiestie of the Commonweale, then it is referred unto the great Councell. And therefore when any thing is decreed by the Decemuiri these words are ioyned unto the decree, In consiglio Di Dieci: whereunto if the colledge of Sages be ioyned, there is also commonly added, Con la Giunta, but if it be a decree of the Senat, it is declared in these words, In Pregaidi: but if it be in the great assemblie of the gentlemen of Venice, these words are commonly adioyned thereunto, In Consiglio Magiore. For in these three corporations or colleges, are almost all things dispatched which belong vnto their lawes, their customes, and Commonweale, except such matters which the Septemuiri (the most secret councell of the State) vse by themselves to determine. It is therefore but by sufferance that the Decemuiri or the Senat make decrees and ordinances, which for that they are found iust and reasonable, they passe sometime into the force of law, as did the edicts of the auntient Roman Pretors, which if they were equall and iust, their successours kept them: and so by tract of time were receiued as lawes; yet for all that was it alwayes in the power of the new Pretors to make others: neither were they bound to obserue or keepe them of their predecessors. But Iulian the lawyer gathered a great number of such of these edicts of the former Pretors, as he thought best, and after that he had interpreted them, and brought them [*](Magistrats edicts confirmed by him or them that have the soueraigntie become lawes▪) into ninetie bookes, he gaue the same vnto the emperour Adrian for a present; who in recompence of so great a worke, made him great Prouost of the citie of Rome, and thereby made way for his nephew Didius Iulianus, afterwards to aspire unto the Roman empire. Adrian himselfe also perswaded the Senat, that not onely the edicts which Iulian had gathered, but other his owne writings should bee taken for lawes, which he confirmed also by his authoritie, and yet neuerthelesse still held the name of edicts, which hath deceiued many, who have accounted those lawes as Pretors edicts. So also Iustinian the emperour, to the example of Adrian, by decree commaunded many things which the lawyers had after Iulian written unto the Pretors decrees (after they had bene by him as he thought good corrected) to be receiued for laws, the name of edicts still remaining, being yet indeed nothing lesse than edicts, but lawes aswell as those which every soueraigne prince in his owne Commonweale by the decrees of his lawyers and courts, hath commaunded to be receiued for lawes; as it oft commeth to passe in this realme, that the kings seeing diuers ordinances and decrees of parliament most equall and iust, have confirmed the same, and caused them to be published, and to passe in force of lawes; to show that the power of the law lyeth in him that hath the soueraigntie: and which giueth force vnto the law by these words, Sancimus Iubemus, We ordaine and commaund; which are words proper unto soueraigne maiestie, as saith the Consull Posthumius, in the oration which he made unto the people, Nego iniussu populi quicquam sanciri posse, quod populum teneat, I deny that any thing can bee ordayned without the peoples commaund, that can bind the people. The magistrat also presenting his request unto the people, for the enacting of a law, commonly began with these words, Quod bonum, faustum, foelixque sit vobis ac Reipub. velitis, Iubeatis, Will you, and commaund you, that which may be good, happie, and fortunat, to you, and the Commonweale. And in the end of the law are still these words, Si quis aduersus eafecerit, &c. If any man shall do against these things, &c. Which they called Sanctio, that is to say an ordaining or enacting, declaring the punishments or rewards due unto them that should keepe or breake the law: which are speciall formalities and proper unto the maiestie of them which had the power to make the law; but neuer used by the Senat in their decrees, nor by the magistrats in their edicts. Ioyne hereunto also, that the penaltie annexed unto the lawes of a soueraigne prince, is farre different from that which is ioyned unto the decrees or ordinances of magistrates, or of corporations and colledges, which have certaine limited penalties and fines, for the most part concluded by a mercement or forfeit of money, or with whipping chere: For there is none but the soueraigne prince, which can unto his edicts ioyne the paine of death, as it hath bene also forbidden by an auntient act of parliament, and the clause of arbitrarie punishment ioyned unto the ordinances and decrees of magistrats and gouernours, which euer inclusiuely extended unto death.

Wherefore let this be the first and chiefe marke of a soueraigne prince, to bee of[*](The first and cheife marke of soueraigntie.) power to giue lawes to all his subiects in generall, and to euerie one of them in particular, (yet is not that enough, but that we must ioyne thereunto) without consent of any other greater, equall, or lesser than himselfe. For if a prince be bound not to make any law without consent of a greater than himselfe, he is then a verie subiect: if not without his equall, he then hath a companion: if not without the consent of his inferiours, whether it be of his subiects, of the Senat, or of the people, hee is then no soueraigne. And as for the names of Lords and Senators, which wee oftentimes see ioyned unto lawes, they are not thereunto set as of necessitie to giue thereunto force or strength, but to giue unto them testimonie and weight, as made by the wisedome and discretion of

the chiefe men, so to giue them the better grace, and to make them to bee the better receiued; and not for any necessitie at all. For we find the most auntient edicts of Saint Denys in Fraunce, of Philip the first, and of Lewes the Grosse; whereunto the names and seales of the Queenes Anne and Adella, as also of Robert and Hugh are annexed: And namely in the twelft yeare of the raigne of Lewes the Grosse, and of Adella the sixt.

Now when I say that the first and chiefe marke of Soueraigntie is for the prince to[*](It belongeth only unto soueraigne princes to grant priuileges, and what a priuilege is.) be of power to giue lawes vnto all his subiects in generall, and to euerie one of them in particular: these last words concerne priuileges, which only belong unto soueraigne princes to graunt, and particularly to others, to whome they be graunted. A priuilege I call a l---w made for one, or some few particular men: whether it bee for the profit or disprofit of him or them for whome it is graunted. For so speaketh Cicero, Priuilegiam [*](▪ Cicero pro dom sua et post re ditum in Senaetu. ) de meo capite latum est, A priuilege was made concerning my life, he meaneth the law made against him by the common people at the motion and instigation of Clodias the Tribune, (to have him called to account for certaine citisens put to death contrarie to their appeale, about the conspiracie of Cateline) which he in many places calleth Lex Clodia, or a Law made by Clodius, whereof he oftentimes most grieuously complained, both in the Senat and before the people, saying, That by the law of the xij Tables it was forbidden any priuileges to be graunted, but Comitijs Centuriatis, that is to say, in the generall assembly of the whole bodie of the people. For so be the words of the law, Priuilegia nisi comitijs centuriatis ne irroganto; qui secus faxit capital esto, Priuileges let them not be graunted but in the greatest assemblies of the people; and hee that shall otherwise do, let it be unto him death. As for such priuileges as bring profit and commoditie to them to whome they be graunted, they are more truely called benefits. And in this all that have written of Royalties agree, that it belongeth not to any, but unto a Soueraigne, to graunt priuileges, exemptions, immunities, and to dispence with the edicts and ordinances of other former princes: howbeit that priuileges in monarchies have not bene vsed, but onely for the tearme of the life of the monarch himselfe that graunted them: as Tiberius the emperour made them all to know which had obtained any priuileges from the emperour Augustus, as Suetonius writeth. But now if any shall obiect vnto me, the magistrats themselves to discharge men oftentimes of the lawes: and the Senat of Rome to have so oftentimes done. I will aunswere him as did Papinian the lawyer, That we are not to consider what is done at Rome, but what ought indeed to be there done. For by the tribunitiall law Cornelia, the Senat is forbidden to discharge any Roman of the lawes, except there were two hundred of the Senators▪ present: which exemption from the laws seemeth also to have bene granted unto the Senat, by reason of the difficult assembling of the whole people.

But some man may say, that not onely the magistrats have power to make edicts and lawes, euerie one according to his authoritie and iurisdiction, but also that particular men make customes, both generall and particular. Which customes have almost the force of lawes, and yet depend not of the iudgement or power of the soueraigne prince, who as he is maister of the law, so are particular men maisters of the customes. Whereunto I answere, that custome by little and little take force; and in many yeres[*]( difference betwixt the beginning of customes and lawes: and that both of them depend of the power of the soueraign prince.) by the common consent of all or most part; but the law commeth forth in a moment and taketh strength of him which hath power to commaund all: custome creepeth in sweetly and without force, whereas the law is commaunded and published with power, yea and oftentimes contrarie to the good liking of the subiects. For which cause Dion Chrisostome compareth the law to a tyrant, and custome to a king. Moreover the power of the law is much greater than the power of custome: for customes

are by lawes abolished, but not lawes by customes; it beeing alwayes in the authoritie and power of the magistrat againe to put in execution such lawes as are by custome almost out of vse. Custome also propoundeth neither reward nor punishment, whereas the law alwayes carrieth with it either the one or the other, if it be not a law permissiue, which easeth the penaltie of another law: and in briefe custome hath no force but by sufferance, and so long as it pleaseth the soueraigne prince, who may make thereof a law, by putting thereunto his owne confirmation: whereby it is to be scene, that all the force of lawes and customes lieth in the power of him that hath the soueraigntie in a Commonweale.

This then is the first and chiefest marke of Soueraignty, to be of power to giue laws[*](That the power to make lawes cannot be vnto subiects communicated.) and commaund to all in generall, and to euerie one in particular; which cannot bee communicated unto subiects. For albeit that a soueraigne prince giue power to any one to make lawes, of such strength and vertue as if he himselfe had made them: as did the people of Athens to Solon, and the Lacedemonians to Lycurgus: yet were these lawes neither the lawes of Solon nor Lycurgus, who were but as commissioners and procurators for them which had giuen them that charge; but they were the lawes of the Athenians, and Lacedemonians: neither had these lawes had any force, had not the people by their consent authorised the same. They indeed wrot those lawes, but the people commaunded them; they composed them, but the people enacted them. And almost alwayes in a Popular or Aristocraticall state, the lawes tooke name of him which propounded or engrossed the same, who was nothing els but the simple procurer thereof: the confirmation of the same being from him which had the soueraigntie. So when the Decemuiri by the people created at Rome for the making of lawes without appeale, had sent ambassadours into Greece, to amplifie their lawes, and in xij tables comprehended the best of them, they commaunded all the people to bee called together, to behold and consider of those lawes publikely set up: and so at length after three Faire dayes (the vsuall time appointed for the establishing of laws) the people in their greatest and generall assembly, commaunded, or rather enacted them to stand for laws. But unto what power it belongeth to make a law, unto the same also it appertaineth to abrogat or derogat from the same. under this power of making & of abrogating of the law, is also comprised the declaration & correction of the same, when it is so obscure, that the magistrats upon the cases propounded find contratietie or intollerable absurdities, yet may the magistrat according unto right and reason also interpret the laws, & encline them either unto lenitie or seueritie: so that he beware that in bending them too much, he breake them not; yea although that they seeme unto him hard or vniust: but let him heare what Vlpian saith, Duralex, sic tamen scripta est, An hard law[*](What power the magistrate hath to interpret the lawe.) (saith he) but so it is written: which if the judge shall presume under the colour of equitie to breake, he is by the law condemned of infamie. So ought the law called Laetoria, (or rather Praetoria) to be vnderstood, which Papinian reciteth, without naming of the author. Wherby it is permitted unto the Great Praetor of the citie of Rome, to supply, to correct or amend the laws: which must (as we said) be moderatly & in a measure done: for if a man should otherwise vnderstand it, it should thereof follow, that a simple magistrat should be aboue the lawes, if hee might at his will and pleasure alter and infringe the same: and also that he might bind both the people and the prince unto his edicts; which we have before showed to be a thing impossible.

under this same soueraigntie of power for the giuing and abrogating of the law, are[*](All the other markes of soueraigntie contained vnder the first.) comprised al the other rights & marks of soueraignty: so that (to speak properly) a man may say, that there is but this only mark of soueraigne power, considering that all other the rights thereof are contained in this, viz. to have power to giue lawes unto all and

euerie one of the subiects, & to receiue none from them. For to denounce warre unto [*](Other the marks of Soueraigntie) the enemie, or to make peace with him, although it seeme to be a thing different from the name of the law, yet is it manifest these things to bee done by the law, that is to say by the commaundement of the soueraigne power. So also is it proper vnto soueraigne maiestie, to receiue the subiects appeales from other, and the greatest magistrats, to place and displace the greatest officers, charge or exempt the subiects from taxes and subsidies, to graunt pardons and dispensations against the rigour of the law, to have power of life and death, to encrease or diminish the valour and weight of the coyne, to giue it title, name, and figure: to cause all subiects and liegemen to sweare for the keeping of their fidelitie without exception, unto him to whome such oath is due: which are the true markes of soueraigntie, comprised under the power of being able to giue a law to al in generall, and to every one in particular, and not to receiue any law or commaund from any other, but from almightie God onely. For a prince or duke who hath power to giue lawes unto all his subiects in general, & to every one of them in particular, is yet no soueraigne, if he receiue his power from the emperour, the pope, or the king, or any other greater than himselfe: or yet have a companion in his government, a companion I say, for that he seemeth in a manner to have a superiour or maister, which hath a companion, without whose helpe and consent hee can commaund and doe nothing: much lesse is he a soueraigne, if hee bee another mans lieutenant or deputie.

But forasmuch as the word Law, is too general a marke, it is the more expedient particularly [*](The second marke of Soueraigntie.) to specifie the rights of Soueraigntie, comprised (as I have said) under that soueraigne law; as to denounce warre, or treat of peace, one of the greatest points of soueraigne maiestie: for that oftentimes it draweth after it the ruine, or assurance of a Commonweale; which is to be verified not onely by the law of the Romans, but of al other nations. And for that there was more daunger to be feared from warre, than from peace, it was lawfull for the common people of Rome, to commaund peace, but if question were for making of warre, it might not be decreed, but in the greatest assembly of all the states together, vntill such time as that the meniall people had also full power to make lawes. And therefore was it that warre was decreed against Mithridates by the law Manilia, against the pirats, by the law Gabinia, against Philip the second, king of Macedon, by the law Sulpitia: peace was also made with the Carthaginensians, by the law Martia. And for because Caesar had without commaund of the people made warres in Fraunce, Cato Vticensis was of opinion in the Senat, that the armie was to be called home, and Caesar for his presumption deliveted unto the enemie. In like case the estates of the people of Athens determined of warre and peace. As a man may see by the war by them decreed against the Megarians, against the Syracusians, and against the kings of Macedon. I here but briefly set downe certaine examples of two of the greatest and most famous popular Commonweales that euer yet were: For in a regall state there is none (as I suppose) which doubt all the power of peace and warre to be in the king: insomuch as that for any man to attempt euen the least thing therein without the kings commaund, is unto the dooer thereof dangerous, if the king might thereof have before bene aduertised: and what charge soeuer that they giue unto their deputies or commissioners, to entreat of peace or of alliance, yet consent they unto nothing, without the aduertising of the king; as was to be seene in the last treaty of Cambray, betwixt the French king & the king of Spain; the cōmissioners on the kings behalfe writ to him from howre to howre, the whole proceedings both of the one part and of the other. But in popular or Aristocraticall estate, we oft times see that after the warre is once denounced, it is then managed by the aduise of the Senat, or

priuie counsell onely: yea and sometimes by the aduice of one onely captaine also: [*](The greatest daunger in war.) for that nothing is more dangerous in warre, than to have the secret pollicies thereof reuealed: which must needes be, if the people have therein to doe. And therefore we read in the Greeke and Latine histories the designes and enterprises of warre to have beene still managed by the wisdome and direction of some one or other captaine, or in case that the matter were of greater importance and consequence, by the counsell of the Senate, without any more speaking thereof unto the people, after it was once by the peoples commaund denounced and proclaimed against this or that enemie. But if one should say, warre to have beene oftentimes denounced by the advice of the Senate, without the consent or commaund of the people: I confesse it to have sometimes indeed so happened and fallen out, but yet very seldome: and that the Senate in so doing did vsurpe the maiestie of the people: which was the cause, that the Tribunes of[*](The Senate in Rome had no power to denounce warre without the consent of the people.) the people, and faithfull keepers of their libertie, oftentimes interposed themselves to crosse the matter, as we see in Liuie, where he sayth: Controuersia fuit vtrum populi iussu indiceretur bellum, an satis esset S. C. peruicere Tribuni, vt Q. Consul de bello adpopulum ferret, omnes Centuriae iussere. Controuersie was (sayth he) whether war should be denounced by the commaundement of the people: or els that the decree of the Senate was sufficient, but the Tribunes preuailed; so that Quintus the Consull propounded the matter unto the people, which all the assembly of the people commaunded. Howbeit, that the Senat it selfe would not ordinarily denounce war, except the people had before so decreed, As T. Liuius speaking of the second Carthaginensian war, sayth, Latum inde adpopulum vellent iuberent, populo Carthaginensi bellum indici: It was afterward[*](Lib. 1▪ Dec. 3.) propounded unto the people, whether they willed and commaunded war to be denounced unto the people of Carthage. And in another place, Ex S. C. populi iussu bellum [*](Lib. 1. Dec. 2.) praenestinis indictū. By a decree of the Senat, by cōmandement of the people war was proclaimed against them of Praeneste. And againe, Ex authoritate patrum populus Palaepolitanis [*](Lib. 8. Dec. 1▪) bellum fieri iussit, The people following the authoritie of the Senat, commaunded[*](Lib. 9. Dec. 1.) warre to be made against them of Palaepolis. And afterward, Populus bellum fieri Aequis iussit, The people commaunded warre to be made against the Aequi. And at such time as warre was to be vndertaken against the Samnites, Patres solemni [*](Lib. 8. Dec. 1.) more indicto decreuerunt, vt ea de re adpopulum ferretur, The fathers after the solemne manner decreed, that concerning that matter it should bee referred unto the people: Where Liuie in calling it the solemne manner, declareth it to have bene a thing so used to be done. And so against the Herniques, * Populus hoc bellum frequens iussit, The[*](Lib. 5. Dec. 1.) people in great number commaunded this warre. And against the Vestines, * Bellum ex authoritate patrum populus aduersus vestinos iussit, The people following the authoritie of the Senators commaunded warre to be made against the Vestines. The like manner of denouncing warre was also amongst the Tarentines, so long as their popular state endured. For so saith Plutarch, Ex authoritate Senatus populum Tarentinum Romanis in ferri bellum iussisse, The people of Tarentum following the authoritie of the Senat, to have commaunded warre to bee made against the Romans. And Liuie speaking of the Aetolians, which were gouerned by a popular government, saith it to have bene by their lawes forbidden, that any thing should bee determined concerning peace and warre, but in the Panaetolian and Pylaican counsell. And for that the nobilitie of Polonia, Denmarke, and Sweden, pretend the right of Soueraigntie to belong unto them, it is not lawfull for their kings without their authoritie and consent either to denounce warre, or to vndertake it being denounced against them, except in case of urgent necessitie, according to the order of Casimire the great. True it is that in Rome concerning peace the Senate oftentimes determined thereof without the consent of the people; as we may see in all the treaties of peace betwixt the Romane and the Latines: and in the confederats warre the Senate passed all the treaties of peace and alliance without the people, viz. in the tumult and uprore of Italie: least the hard assembly of the people, and danger of delay, might have brought some detriment unto the Commonweale. Yea sometimes the generals and great commaunders in the warres, of themselves determined of peace and warre, without the commaundement of the[*](No peace by the Generall concluded with the enemie good without the confirmation of him or them that have the soueraigntie.) people or Senate, especially if the warres were in some countrey a farre off: as wee see in the second warre of Carthage, the three Scipioes made all the treaties of peace and alliance with the people and princes of Spaine and Affricke, without the aduise of the Senat. Yet true it is, that the Senate, yea and oft times the people authorised their actions, and ratified their treaties, after that they were made: and if they were in anie thing preiudiciall unto the estate, had ofthem no regard. In which case the hostages and captaines yeelded unto the enemie, were at their owne perill to answer the matter. As the Consull Mancinus, who for that the peace he had made with the Numantines, was reiected and not ratified by the Senate and the people, was himselfe delivered unto the[*](The Romains oftentimes disclaymed the peace by their ge nerals made with their enemies without the consent of the people.) enemie. And that is it which a certaine Senatour of Carthage, as Liuie reporteth by way of exprobration obiected unto the Romane embassadours, saying, Vos cum Luctatius Consul primò nobiscum fedus icit, quia neque authoritate Patrun, nec populi iuss--- ictum erat, negastis vos eo teneri. Itaque aliud foedus publico consilio ictum est. You at such time as Luctatius the Consull first made peace with vs; for that it was made without the authoritie of the Senat, or commaundement of the people, said you were not therunto bound: and therefore another peace was by your common councell made. And the same author speaking of Manlius the Proconsull of Asia saith, Gallograecis bellum illatum, non ex Senatus authoritate, non populi iussu: quod quis vnquam de sua sententia facere ausus est? Warre was made upon the Gallogrekes, neither by the authority of the Senat, nor the commaund of the people, which what man durst of himselfe euer do? But this was Orator like spoken by the aduersarie against Manlius being absent; for that it was sometime so done, we have by examples declared. Spurius Posthumius the Consull, also being himselfe with his armie shut up in the Straits and rockes of the Appennin mountaines, in daunger with hunger to perish, before hee could have heard from the Senat or the people, what they would have had him to have done; to deliver himselfe and the Roman armie out of those straites, of himselfe made peace with the enemie, though upon verie hard and dishonourable conditions. But when he with his armie disarmed, was returned to Rome; the Senat and the people reiected the peace with the conditions by him accepted. Yea Posthumius the Consull himselfe, in the assembly of the people said, Cùm me seu turpi, seu necessaria sponsione obstrinxi, qua tamen, quando iniussu populi facta est, non tene tur populus Romanus, nec quicquam ex ea praeter Corpora nostrae debentur Samnitibus, dedamur per faeciales nudi vinctique, Seeing that I have bound my selfe, whether it be with a shamefull or a necessarie promise and agreement, wherewith for all that the people of Rome is not bound, forasmuch as it was without their commaundement made, neither is there any thing thereby unto the Samnites due, more than our bodies; let vs naked and bound be so yeelded unto them. So the Consull called it not a treatie of peace, but a simple or necessarie promise. And in truth the enemies had caused the Consull and all the captaines and lieuetenants of the army to sweare, and further taken sixe hundred hostages, al which they might have put to death, if the people would not confirme the agreement taken; in which making they yet committed one grosse ouersight, in that they bound not all the souldiers in the armie by oath to returne into those straits and enclosures of the mountaines, and euen into the same state they were before, or els to yeeld themselves all prisoners, in case the people would not confirme the agreement by them made; which had they done, no doubt but that the Senat and the people would have sent them againe into the same state they were, as they did the Consull, with the sixe hundred sworne hostages, whom for all that, the Samnites refused to receiue of the herauld. For in like case after the great ouerthrow by the Romans receiued at Cannas, when Hanniball had sent eight thousand souldiers, there taken prisoners, to Rome, to redeeme their libertie with the ransome of a pound of gold for every head; and that the Senat would not agree thereunto, but decreed, that they should either become the enemies slaues, or die: the Consuls charged those souldiers, before the appointed day to returne unto the enemie; who all obeyed their commaund, but one, who by a craftie wile sought to delude the oath, before by him giuen unto the enemie for his returne; whome the Senat for all that sent bound hand and foot unto Hannibal. Or if it had seemed too hard a thing unto the Senat, to have yeelded the whole army being sworne unto the Samnites, they would vndoubtedly yet have confirmed those hard conditions of peace by them agreed upon. As did Lewes the xij, the French king, in the treatie made at Dijon by the lord Trimouille with the Swissers, giuing them hostages of the chiefest men of his army, with condition that the Swissers might put them to death, if the king should not ratifie the agreement with them made. As did the duke of Aniou unto the hostages which those which were besieged in the castle of Eruall had giuen him: when he saw that Robert Knolles, captaine of the castle, being arriued within the castle, after the agreement, would by no meanes suffer the castle to be surrendred, saying, That the besieged without him could couenant nothing: and so also caused the prisoners that he had taken to be beheaded▪ For otherwise, if it were lawful for captains to entreat or conclude of peace at their pleasure, without expresse commaundement or ratification, they might bind both people and soueraigne princes, unto the pleasure and appetite of their enemies, and such hard conditions as they pleased: a thing most absurd and vnreasonable, seeing that a common aduocat may not in the least matter of another mans, come to agreement, without expresse charge from him whome it concerneth.

But some may say, that these rules take no place in Venice, where the Senat doth wholly discerne and determine of peace and warre, neither amongst the customes of the Swissers and Grisons, which are popular estates. And in the conuersion of the Florentine Commonweale, from the nobilitie unto the popular estate, it is in one article especially prouided, that the people shall have to do with nothing, but with making of lawes, creating of magistrats, and the common treasure; as for peace and warre, and other things concerning the soueraigntie of the state, should be wholly in the power of the Senat. Whereunto we have before said, that Popular and Aristocraticall estates[*](Hard for the popular or Aristocraticall estats by the multitude well to mannage martiall affaires: and why.) cannot if they would, well manage martiall affaires, for the hard assembling together of the people: and in case that the people might be at all times assembled, yet were it a thing of great perill and daunger, to haue those things which ought of all others to bee most secret in a Commonweale, the councels (I say) of peace and warre, reuealed and made knowne unto the Vulgar people: which therfore were of necessitie to be left unto the Senat, yet the power of peace and warre cannot be taken from the nobilitie or people in either state, the soueraigne maiestie thereof saued. And albeit that the people giue the charge thereof unto the Senat, yet a man knoweth right well, that the commissions and mandats which are giuen out for such purpose, depend of the authority of the people, and under the peoples name are put in execution by the Senat, which is but the peoples procurator and agent, taking authoritie from the people, as all other their magistrats doe. As for monarchies, it is without any question that the resolution of peace and warre dependeth of the soueraigne prince, if the estate bee a pure monarchie,

For the kingdome of Polonia, Denmarke, Sweden, and Norway, as they are states changeable and vncertaine, as the nobilitie is stronger than the prince, or the prince than the nobilitie: the resolution of peace and warre so dependeth of the nobilitie, as that the state seemeth to be rather Aristocraticall than regall. And therefore the names of their dukes, marquesses, counties, gouernours, and councellors, commonly to be in their leagues expressed, and their seales thereto annexed: as the peace betwixt the Polonians and the Prussians, made by king Sigismundus Augustus was sealed with an hundred and three seales of the nobilitie of his countrey: neither was there fewer in the act of the lawfull creation of king Henry to be king of Polonia.

The third marke of Soueraigne maiestie is to be of power to create and appoint[*](The third mark of soueraigntie.) magistrats, than which no more certaine signe can be, especially the principall officers, which are not under the commaund of other magistrats. This was the first law that Tublius Valerius made after the expulsion of the kings out of Rome: that the magistrats should be chosen and appointed by the people. Which selfe same law was published also by the Venetians, at such time as they first assembled into the Gulfe, for the establishing of their state, as Contarenus writeth: than which law there is none more religiously kept by the Senat and the Venetian people. Yet much better is it kept in monarchies, where all is gouerned by one, and where the greatest, the meaner, yea and the least offices of all, as of Porters, Sergeants, Clarkes, Trumpeters, Criers, which in the Roman state were placed and displaced by the Roman magistrats are prouided for by order from the prince, euen vnto the meanest offices. I have said the appointing of princes officers, that is to say, of the chiefe magistrats, for there is no Commonweale, where it is not permitted unto greater magistrats, as also to many corporations and colledges, to make certaine meniall officers under them: as I have before showed of the Romans. But yet that they doe by vertue of the office, which they hold, and as proctours created with power, to substitute other their deputies under them. We see also that clients and vassals, albeit that they hold their iurisdiction of some soueraigne prince in fealtie and homage, have neuerthelesse power to establish judges and officers in their iurisdiction: but yet this power is giuen them by some soueraigne prince. For no doubt dukes, marquesses, counties, barons, and lieutenants of countries, were no other of their first institution but judges and officers; as we shall in due place declare. But sometimes in a popular estate power is giuen unto the greater magistrats to create the lesser; as we read that the people of Carthage had a custome to make fiue magistrats,[*](The lesser magistrates in a popular estate somtime created by the greater▪ but not without power from them which had the soueraigntie) for to make choyce of the hundred and foure magistrats of the Commonweale; as they do also at Nuremberg, where the Censors which are chosen of the great Councell, chose the new Senators, and that done, giue up their charge. The Senate which is of xxvj, making choyce of the eight Auntients: and afterward of the xiij of the seuen Burgamasters, and of the xij Iudges for civill causes, and five for criminall. Neither is this any new matter; but an old and auntient fashion. For Aristotle writeth, the people of Carthage to have used to chuse five men, who according to their discretion still made of the hundred and foure magistrates: which was also a thing ordinarie unto the Roman Censors, who by their discretion supplied the number of the Senators, which the Consuls did before by the sufferance of the people, who from the beginning made them, as Festus Pompeius saith. And sometime the dictators were for that purpose onely made to supply the number of the Senators. As Fabius Buteo named Dictator by the Consull Terentius, following the decree of the Senat, made choyce at one time of an hundred seuentie seuen Senators, in stead of them that were dead. Howbeit that to speake properly, a Senator is no magistrat, as we will show in the discourse concerning the Senat. But howsoever that it was, whether it were the

Consuls, the Dictators, or Censors, that made choice of the Senators, & so supplied the Senat, they did it not but by the power of the people, which was also to be reuoked at the peoples pleasure. So may we also say of the Turkes Cadelesquires, which are as the kings two great Chauncelours, who haue power to place and displace all the Cadies and Paracadies, that is to say, the judges and their deputies. And in Aegypt, in the time of the Sultans government, before it was by Selymus the first conquered, the great Edegnare, which was a Cunstable to the Sultan, had power to place all the other officers: as had in auntient time the Grand M. of the Pallace in Fraunce. And it is not long ago but that the chauncelour of Fraunce had power at his pleasure to bestow all offices which had none, or but some little fees, viz. of some three or foure crownes at the most: which was reuoked by king Francis the first. And albeit that alwaies the chauncelor, the great Edegnare, and the Grand M. of the pallace, had all their power from the kings and Sultans, as by them placed: yet was so great power verie daungerous vnto the former kings and Sultans, which by little and little have since beene cut so short, as that in the raigne of Charles the seuenth, the verie baylieffes and seneschals were placed by the prince, who before were wont to be placed by the maiors, whose lieutenants they were. Sometime also it may be that magistrats, corporations, or colleges, have power to nominat and chuse the principall magistrats: as we read in the records of the court of Paris, that by a law made in the yeare 1408, it was decreed that the officers of the high court of parliament should be made by election; and so thereupon commaundement was giuen unto the chauncelour to go into parliament for the election for the offices vacant. Which law was againe reuiued by king Lewes the xj, in the yeare 1465. And after him in the time of Charles the eight, not only the presidents, the kings councellors, and aduocats, were made by election, but euen the kings atturney generall (who is the onely man of all the body of the court, which oweth not oath but to the king alone: albeit that the atturneyes of other parliaments, which he calleth substitutes, take their oath in the court) was chosen also by the suffrages of the court: In the yeare 1496. But yet all their letters of prouision & confirmation of their elections into their offices, then were, and yet are, alwayes graunted by the king▪ without whose confirmation their election was to no purpose. Which may serue for aunswere to that which one might say, that Arthure duke of Bretaigne, was chosen Cunstable of Fraunce, by the voyces of all the princes, of the great Councell, and of the parliament in the yeare 1324. For albeit that the king Charles the sixt, was then distraught of his wits, & that the seales of France had in them not the image of the king, but of the queene onely: yet neuerthelesse the said new constable taking upon him the government of the kings sword, and of the French armie, being sworne to the keeping of the lawes, at the same instant acknowledged himselfe to hold his office and power in fealtie and homage of the king: so that all authoritie and power to commaund, may well seeme to flow and be deriued from the fountaine of the prince onely.

Yet may some say that the Great Palatine of Hungarie, who is the greatest magistrat[*](Great magistrats somtime chosen by the estats of the countrey, or otherwise: but still approued and confirmed by the king.) of that kingdome, and the kings lieutenant generall, is chosen by the estates of the countrey: it is true; but yet his prouision, institution, and confirmation, belongeth unto the king, who is the chiefe head and author of his power. Howbeit that the estates of the kingdome of Hungarie, yet pretend to have the right to make choyce of their kings; the house of Austria maintaining the contrarie. And it seemeth that the kings have by sufferance passed it ouer, that the estates should still have the chusing of the great Palatine, so to cause them to forget the election of the king. Whereunto for all that they have beene so obstinatly wedded, as that they have thosen under the colour of protection, to put themselves under the Turkes slauerie, rather than to have this

power for the choyce of their kings (by the house of Austria) wrested from them. It is not therefore the election of great officers which declareth the right of soueraigntie; but the princes approbation, ratification, and confirmation, without which the magistrat is of no power at all. Yet if such creation of magistrats were by the founders of Commonweales, and law makers, so giuen unto the people, or colleges, as that they could not from the people or colleges be taken, then truly the prince should not have the right of soueraigne maiestie or power: for that the magistrats power were not to be attributed unto the prince, but to the people; as by little and little it happened unto the kings of Polonia. For when as by a law made by Sigismundus Augustus, all the magistrats of euerie countrey, were to be chosen by the particular states of every government; the maiestie of the kings, who also raigned by the good liking of the people, was therby much impaired. Which confirmation of magistrats so chosen, is no new thing; for euen from the time of the Gothes we read in Cassiodorus, that Theodoricus king of the Gothes, gaue his letters of confirmation unto the officers whome the Senat had chosen; vsing these words in his letters directed unto the Senat, for one whom they had made a Senator, Iudicium vestrum P. C. noster Comitatur [*](* Cassiodorus. lib. 1. Epist. 6.) assensus, Our consent, Reuerent fathers, doth accompany your iudgement. Now seeing that power to commaund over all the subiects of a Commonweale belongeth unto him that holdeth therein the soueraigntie; it is good reason also that all magistrats should acknowledge their authoritie to proceed from him.

But now let vs speake of the fourth marke of Soueraignetie, that is to wit, of the Last [*](The fourth marke of soueraigntie.) Appeal, which is and alwayes hath beene one of the most principall rights of soueraignetie. As a man may see after that the Romaines had driuen out their kinges: not onely the last Appeal, but euen all Appeales from the Magistrates, were by the Law Valeria reserued unto the people. And for that the Consuls and other Magistrates oftentimes gaue small eare unto them that did appeal unto them, the same Law was often times* renewed: and by the Tribunitiall law Duillia the paine of death adioyned[*]( lib. 1. & 7. & 10.) there vnto, for him that should oppose himselfe against the same; which Law Liuie calleth the foundation of the popular libertie: albeit that it were euill executed. The same Law was yet more straitly kept in Athens, where the last Appeal was reserued unto the people, not onely from the Magistrates of the citie, but euen from the Magistrates of their allies and fellowes also: as the writings of Zenophon and Demosthenes do right well declare. The same Law Contarenus writeth to haue been the first that was by the Venetians made for the establishing of their Commonweale: viz. That all men might freely appeal from the Magistrates, vnto the Graund counsell of the people. Nether was Francis Valori Duke of Florence for any other cause slaine, then for not hauing giuen way unto the Appeal, made from him unto the Great counsell of the people, by three Florentines by him condemned to die, and so notwithstanding their appeal by him executed. But some may say, that not onely this Duke at Florence, but at Rome the Dictators, and other Magistrates also oftentimes put to death condemned citisens, notwithstanding their appeal made unto the people, as is in many histories to be seene. Whereof there was an heauie example made by the Senate of Rome, which caused the remainder of the Legion sent to Rhegium being taken and brought to Rome, to be whipped and afterward beheaded without regard of the appeales by them made unto the people: or to the intercessions of the Tribunes exclaiming, the sacred Lawes concerning Appeales to be violated, and troden under foote. Whereunto in briefe I aunswere, as did Papinian, That we ought not to rest our selues upon that they doe at Rome, but on that which ought to bee there done. For it is most certaine, that a man might appeale from the Senat unto the people: and that ordinarily

the opposition or intercession of one of the Tribunes, stayed the proceedings of the whole Senat; as we have before touched. And the first that gaue the power unto the Roman Senat to iudge without appeale, was Adrian the emperour, for the edict of Caligula, whereby he gaue power to all magistrats to iudge without appeale, tooke no place. And albeit that Nero decreed, that they which without cause had appealed unto the Senat, should be punished with like punishment, as if they had appealed unto his owne person: yet forbad he not men to appeale from the Senat unto himselfe, although he had referred the appeales from all the magistrats unto the Senat. But this aunswere seemeth directly contrary unto that we haue before said. For if no appeale were to be made from the Senat unto the emperour, but that the last appeale was unto the Senat, then was not the last appeale the true marke of soueraigntie. Ioine also hereunto, that the Great master of the Pallace, whome they called Praefectum Praetorio, gaue iudgement without appeale, receiuing also the appeales of all the magistrats and gouernours of the empire, as sayth Flauius Vopiscus: as in every Commonweale[*](* Flauius Volpiscus in Florian. ) we see certaine courts and parliaments which gaue iudgement without appeale; as the eight parliaments in Fraunce, the foure courts in Spaine, the imperiall chamber in Germanie, the councell at Naples; the fortie at Venice, the Rota at Rome, the Senat at Milan; and so the greater courts of other cities, who heare and decide either all or most part of causes, both publike and priuat, without appeale: and in all the imperiall townes, duchies, and counties, depending of the empire, no appeale is to be made unto the imperiall chamber, in criminall causes once iudged by the magistrats of the prince, or of the imperiall cities: whereby it appeareth the last appeale not to belong onely unto the right of soueraigne maiestie. Whereunto I aunswere, under the name of Appeale, to be also contained requests made unto the prince, which the law call civill Supplications: so that when we may not appeale from the sentence of the greater magistrats, yet may we by way of request put up our supplications unto the prince, which hath moued many of our late lawyers to say, civill supplications to belong unto the right of soueraigne maiestie: and albeit that almost alwaies the decrees are againe iudged by the same judges, as oft as request is made unto the prince concerning a iudgement giuen▪ yet is it in his wil & power either to receiue or reiect the request▪ and oftentimes hee calleth the cause unto himselfe therof to determine, or to reuerse that which hath bene done; or else remitteth it unto other judges, which is the true marke of soueraigntie and last appeale, wherein the maiestie of the prince or people doth most appeare: forasmuch as it is not lawfull for any magistrat or judge to chaunge or amend their iudgement once giuen or recorded, without leaue of their soueraigne prince, and that upon paine of false iudgement. And if so bee that the soueraigne prince would[*](A soueraigne prince cannot by any edict prohibit his subiects to appeale from his magistrates or to prefer their humble requests unto himselfe.) make an edict, that none of his subiects should appeale from any of his magistrats, or preferre any request unto himselfe against their iudgements, as the emperour Caligula was about to have done: yet neuerthelesse should it alwaies be lawfull for the subiects to appeale, or to exhibit their requests unto the prince: For that the prince cannot so bind his owne hands, or make such a law unto himselfe; either prohibit his grieued subiects from comming unto him with their humble supplications and requests: For that such edicts concerning appeales and iudgements, are but civill decrees and lawes wherewith the prince cannot be bound, as we have before said. For which cause it seemed a new and absurd thing unto the Senat of France, and especially unto Michael del' Hospital, that the commissioners appointed to proceed against the president of Allemand, forbid him by a decree made against him, to come within twentie leagues of the court, so to cut him off from the meanes to preferre his petitions; which the king himself could not of right take from his subiect, althogh it were in his power to grant or reiect his request being once made unto him knowne. We see also, that in all graunts of publike lands by way of pention, with power and iurisdiction unto the children or neere kinsmen of the house of Fraunce, and generally in the erection of duchies, marquisats, counties, and principalities, fealtie and homage, appeale and soueraigntie, are still reserued: that sometime there is onely reseruation made of appeale and soueraigntie: as in the declaration made by king Charles the fift, to Iohn duke of Berrie, bearing date the third of March, in the yeare 1374: wherein is also fealtie and homage comprised. For it is certaine that the duchie of Berrie was then the portion giuen unto the duke of Berry with the charge of rights royall, and reuersion to the crowne for want of heires male: as I have learned by the letters of graunt, which are yet in the treasurie of Fraunce. We see also the like declaration of Philip Archduke of Austria, (Charles the fifts father) made to king Lewes the twelft, and another of him the same, in the yeare 1505: wherein he acknowledgeth and professeth himselfe readie to obey the decrees of the parliament of Paris, in regard of the countries of Artois and Flaunders, and of other lands which he held of the king; and not to forbid them of those countries to appeale unto the court at Paris. And in the treatie of Arras, made betwixt▪ king Charles the seuenth, and Philip the second, duke of Burgondy, there is expresse reseruation made of fealtie and homage, appeale and soueraigntie, for those lands which he and his auncestors held in fee of the crowne of Fraunce. Neither did Charles the fift the French king take any other occasion to make warre against the English men, than for that their English magistrats and gouernors which had the government of Aquitaine, under the fealtie of the French, would not heare the subiects appeales. At which time the court of Paris commaunded the king of England to be summoned, and for default of appearance pronounced sentence against him: whereby the duchie of Aquitaine was for that cause confifcated unto the king, as is to bee seene by the decree of the parliament of Paris, giuen the xiiij of May, in the yeare 1370. For otherwise if a soueraigne prince shall remit unto his vassall the right of appeale and soueraigntie; which is unto himselfe due, he maketh him of a subiect a soueraigne prince; as did king Francis the first, discharging the duke of Loraine of all fealtie and homage, appeale and soueraigntie, for the castle of Chasteler upon the Maze in the yeare 1517. But when hee suffered the same duke in soueraigne manner without appeale to gouern in the duchie of Bar; and that the dukes, officers, and magistrats afterward abused their permissiue authoritie, as in absolute soueraigntie, the kings atturney generall thereof complained unto the king, aduising him not to suffer the rights of his soueraigne maiestie to be so impaired. Which thing Anthonie then duke of Loraine understanding, and after him Francis his sonne, by recognisance in autentique manner declared, that their purpose was not in any thing to derogat from the fealtie and homage, appeale and soueraigntie that they ought unto the crowne of Fraunce, by reason of the said duchie; and that they had not therein used soueraigne iustice but by sufferance: which letters of recognisance are in the publique records to be seene, and were afterward exhibited unto the priuie councell, in the yeare 1564, in the raigne of Charles the ninth, who by all means sought by a most gratious and large charter to have giuen unto Charles then duke of Loraine, the soueraigntie of the duchie of Bar: but all in vaine, forasmuch as the king can by no meanes alienat from himselfe, the rights belonging unto his soueraigntie, no not the high court of Paris assenting thereunto, although the power and authoritie of that court may where the king is, seeme to be nothing; in the presence of whom all the power and authoritie of all magistrats cease.

Wherfore the best & most expedient way, for the preseruation of a state is, neuer to giue any marke or right of soueraigntie unto a subiect, and much lesse unto a straunger:

for that is one step and degree to mount unto his soueraigne maiestie. And therefore [*](No marke or right of soueraigntie is by the prince to be bestowed upon his subiect or a stranger.) it was long doubted in the councell, whether power and authoritie without appeale, should be graunted vnto Francis duke of Alencon (who had made mee master of the requests and one of his councell) in that his dukedome; as had before bene graunted unto the auntient dukes there. And although he were the kings best and most louing brother, yet one of the atturneyes generall was so bold as to say in full councell, That it were better to bring in twelue courts of parliament, than to suffer that, albeit that that iurisdiction was for a short time granted, and extraordinarie judges by the king appointed; with reseruation of appeales, in many cases and causes, as also with exception of fealtie and homage. Wherein our auncestors much offended, who with too much facilitie (should I say, or necessitie) graunted the same iurisdiction unto the dukes of Normandie. For by this meanes the dukes of Britaigne and Burgundie reuolted from our kings unto the kings of England; for that such judges were denied them, as had bene granted unto the dukes of Alencon: taking it grieuously themselves, in the name of their magistrats to be summoned unto the court at Paris, there to have those things reuersed which their magistrats had vniustly determined; althogh sometime they were things of right small weight and importance; whereof the dukes of Britaigne complained both unto king Philip the Faire, and Philip the Long, who by their letters patents sent unto the court of parliament in February 1306, and in October 1316, declared that their meaning was not, that the duke of Britaigne or his officers, should bee called before them into the court; but in question of soueraigntie, or in case they should deny to doe iustice, or els had giuen false iudgement.

The same we are to thinke of all the princes and cities of Germanie, from whome euen in priuat iudgements men may iustly appeale unto the imperiall chamber, if the matter exceed the summe of 50 crowns, or if any controuersie be betwixt the cities and princes themselves. Whereby it is to be vnderstood, neither the German princes, nor cities to have in them the right of soueraigntie: For that it is a capitall crime, euen treason it selfe, to appeale from a soueraigne prince, except he appeale as did that Greeke (whosoeuer he was) who appealed from Philip king of Macedon euill aduised, unto himselfe being better aduised. Whice manner of appeale Lewes of Burbon, prince of Conde used also from the interlocutorie sentence of Francis the second, the French king, which he hauing vnderstood the cause, is said to haue giuen against him in the priuie councel: Which manner of appeale Baldus the great lawyer alloweth as good▪ and to be receiued. And well it would beseeme the maiestie of soueraigne princes to behold and follow the example of that Macedonian king, who receiued the appeale; or if they would needs that their decrees whatsoeuer should stand fast and irremouable, because they would not seeme vnconstant or variable, that then they should do as did the same king to Machetas, who of his owne goods recompensed him, for that hee had vniustly condemned him in, without chaunging of his former decree and iudgement.

From this marke of Maiestie, and benefit of supreame Appeale, dependeth also the [*](The fift marke of soueraigntie) power to grant grace and pardon unto the condemned, contrarie to iudgement giuen, and to the rigour of the lawes; be it for life, be it for goods, be it for honour, or recalling from banishment: for it is not in the power of the magistrats or judges, how great soeuer that they be, to graunt the least of these things unto the condemned person, or of themselves, to alter any thing of the iudgements by them once giuen. And albeit that the Proconsuls and gouernours of prouinces, had as much power in their iurisdiction, as had all the magistrats of Rome together: yet so it was, that it was not lawfull for them so much as to restore him whome they had but for a time banished (as wee

read in the letters of Plinie the younger, gouernor of Asia unto Traian the emperor) and much lesse giue pardon unto men condemned to die: which is most straitly forbidden all magistrats in every Commonweale, be it well or euill ordered or gouerned. And albeit that Papirius Cursor, the dictator, may seeme at the request of the people to have giuen pardon to Fabius Max. collonell of the horsemen, for hauing giuen battle contrarie to his commaund, although he had slaine xxv thousand of the enemies: yet neuerthelesse in effect it was the people which gaue the pardon: albeit that they most instantly besought the dictator to pardon the fault: Which they themselves might at the same time have done, but yet had rather to request it of Papirius, than to take the guiltie person from him against his will. For Fabius understanding himselfe in his absence to be by the dictator condemned, appealed unto the people: before whom Papirius defended his iudgement, as iustly giuen against Fabius: which a man of his vertue and seueritie would not have done, if an appeale might not have bene made from the dictator, unto the people: and that in it was the power of life and death. Sergius Galba the Orator also, in like iudgement by Cato the Censor, attainted of treason, tooke his refuge unto the people, who moued with his teares, and embracing of his children, pardoned him. Whereupon Cato said, That Galba had beene well whipped, had hee not taken himselfe unto his teares and his children. The same power of life and death had also the people of Athens, as appeareth by Demosthenes, and Alcibiades, who both condemned, were afterward by the people pardoned, and againe restored both unto their goods and honour. And amongst the Venetians it is not lawfull for any their magistrats, no not for the duke himselfe, the Senat, or the Decemuiri, to graunt pardon unto the condemned: for that is left unto the discretion of the great councel of the Venetian gentlemen onely. The Decemuiri before abusing their power by sufferance, graunted pardons, and neuerthelesse was order taken in the yeare 1523, that the counsell of the Sages, which are in number xxij, should therein be assisting unto them: and that the pardon should take no place, without the generall consent of them all: but at length in the yeare 1562, the councell was forbidden at all to meddle, or to have to doe in that matter. And albeit that the emperour Charles the fift, in the erection of the Senat at Milan, graunted thereunto all the markes of soueraigntie, as unto his lieutenant and deputie in his absence, comming verie neere unto absolute soueraigntie: yet so it is, that hee still reserued unto himselfe the power to graunt pardon and mercie unto the condemned; as I have learned by the letters patents by him graunted: which hath bene a thing right straitly obserued and kept in all Monarchies. And although that in Florence during the popular state, the eight men without all right had vsurped the power to graunt pardons: yet was that power againe restored unto the people by Sodorin, after the chaunge of the state. As for other kings they have still thought nothing more royall, than to deliver the condemned from death: neither do they suffer the judges or magistrats of other dukes and princes, to examine the letters graunted by the king for the restoring of the condemned: although that they examine the pardon graunted. And albeit that king Francis the first had giuen unto his mother power to graunt pardon unto the condemned: yet for all that the court of Paris, hauing taken order to have it showed unto the king, that it was one of the fairest markes of soueraigntie, which could not be communicated unto a subiect without impairing of his maiestie: the Queene mother thereof aduertised, renounced this[*](Things properly belonging unto the soueraigntie of a prince can in no wise be imparted unto a subiect.) priuilege, and restored the letters patents unto the king, before they were of her requested. For indeede that prerogative could not of right bee graunted unto the French Queene, neither any other the proper markes of Soueraigntie.

And albeit that the Roman lawes say that the empresse is dispensed with from all

edicts and lawes: yet that taketh no place in this realme of Fraunce; yea there is found a decree in the records of the court, in the yeare 1365, in Iuly: whereby the queene was condemned to lay downe in the court the money of her demaunded, whilest the matter was in tryall; that the creditor might demaund it so laid downe uppon good caution giuen: which by the Roman law is a meere iniurie, so to begin sute of execution. I find also that king Charles the sixt, gaue power to M. Arnald de Corbie, chauncelour of Fraunce, by letters pattents, the xiij of March, in the yeare 1401, to grant pardons unto the condemned, some of the great Councell being present with him▪ but that was at such time as the chauncelours were almightie, hauing all in their owne hands: and that king Charles the sixt was then not in the power of himselfe but of others, by reason of his maladie. [*](Priuileges wrongfully wrested from kings cannot by any new confirmation be made good.)

Now if any man shall obiect and say, That in auntient times the gouernours of prouinces gaue pardons, as we yet may see by the custome of Henault, and of Daulphinie: as also that the bishop of Ambrun, by autentique charters pretended this power. Hereunto I aunswere, that such customes and priuileges, wrongfully wrested and exported from our kings, were of good right abrogated by an edict of king Lewes the twelft. And if such priuileges be of no force: so may we also say their confirmations to bee of no more strength. For the confirmation is neuer any thing worth, if the priuilege bee of it selfe naught. Now must it needes be naught, for that it cannot bee seperated from the crowne. For as wee have before said, that the priuileges by princes euen lawfully graunted, cannot stand good for euer: so the rightes of Soueraigntie, which cannot by the kings themselves bee graunted unto any, without giuing away of ther Scepter and kingdome, can much lesse being granted, bee by them confirmed.

As for Gouernours, Deputies, Lieutenants generall of Soueraigne princes, it is another reason; for that they have not that power by priuilege, or by office, but by commission, as the deputies or lieutenants of their princes. But in the state of a well ordered Commonweale, this power of Soueraigntie ought not to bee giuen to any, neither by commission, neither by title of office, except it bee for the establishing of a Regent in his government, for the great distance of places; or for the captiuitie of Soueraigne princes: or for that they are furious; or else in their infancie▪ As it was done by Lewes the ninth, who for his tender yeares, was by the estates of Fraunce committed to the tuition of his mother Blanche of Castile; after that she had giuen certaine princes for assurance that shee should not giue the tuition of him to any other person. So the government of the kingdome was committed unto Charles the fift, as Regent during the captiuitie of his father king Iohn. And in the captiuitie of Francis the first, Louise of Sauoy his mother, tooke uppon her the protection of the kingdome committed unto her by the king her sonne▪ with all the royalties thereof, in the title of Regent. And the duke of Bedford Regent in Fraunce, king Charles the sixt being there distraught of his wits.

But heer may one say unto mee, that notwithstanding the decree of Lewes the xij. [*](The great priuilege of the chapiter of the church of in granting pardon unto the condemned.) the chapiter of the church of Roan pretendeth alwaies to have priuiledge to graunt pardon in the favour of S. Romane: the day before whose feast, it forbiddeth all the judges, yea and the parlament of Roan it selfe, to execute or put to death any one of such as then be condemned; (as I have seene it put in practise being in commission for the Prince, for the generall reformation of Normandie) and for that the court notwithstanding the chapiters pardon, had after the feast caused to bee put to death one, which it had before the feast condemned: the chapiter thereof greeuously complayned unto the king; hauing to friend one of the princes of the blood▪ the parlament

sent also their deputies, amongst whom Bigot the kings attourney was verie earnest in his oration in the Senat for the abuse, and encroaching upon the kings maiestie: but the favour of the great bishops more preuailing then reason, that priuilege was for all that he could say or do with the publike shame and losse continued: but was since taken away by king Henry the third. This priuilege had great affinitie with that which[*](A great priuilege granted unto the Vestall Virgines and the Cardinalls in Rome.) was giuen unto the Vestall virgins at Rome, which was to giue pardon unto him that was going to execution, if any one of the Vestal virgins by chaunce happened to meete him, as saith Plutarke in the lyfe of Numa. The like custome whereof is yet kept in Rome, for if a condemned man there meet a Cardinall, he is thereby delivered from punishment. But I deeme that to bee most pernitious in the priuilege of S. Romane, that no man could enioy the benefit thereof which had but lightly offended: but he onely that had done the most execrable villanies that were possible to be found, such as the king used not to pardon, that such offences as could nether by the lawes of God nor man, nor by the favour of Princes be pardoned, might yet under the colour of S. Romanes priuilege be remitted and forgiuen. But that is ioyned with the greatest impietie to thinke the pardon to be so much the more acceptable to Cod, by how much the fact committed is the more haynous or detestable. But I am of opinion (sauing alwaies the better iudgement) that no soueraigne Prince, nether yet any man[*](What is by the lawe of God death, ought not by the prince to be in any wise pardoned.) a▪ live can pardon the punishment due unto the offence which is by the law of God death, no more then he can dispence with the law of God, whereunto he is himselfe subiect. And if it be so, that the magistrat deserue capitall punishment, which dispenseth with the law of his king▪ how shall it be lawfull for a soueraigne prince, to dispence with his subiect from the law of God? And further if the Prince him selfe cannot giue away the least civill interest of his subiect, or pardon the wrong done unto an other man: how can he than pardon the wrong done vnto almightie God? or the murther wilfully committed; which by the law of God is death, for all the pardon he can giue. But then wherein (might a man say) should the princes mercie show it selfe or appeare? if it could not show grace unto the punishment appointed by the law of God? Wherunto I aunswere, that there are meanes plentie, as in pardoning bloodshed committed by chaunce, or in defence of a mans selfe, or in mitigating the rigour of the positiue civill lawes: as if the prince should upon paine of death forbid a man to beare armes, or to carrie victuals unto the enemie; pardon shall yet well be bestowed upon him that hath borne armes for the defence of himselfe onely; or on him which constrained by pouertie, hath sold victuals deere unto the enemie, to releeue his owne great necessitie. Or whereas by the law the punishment for theft is death, the good prince may conuert that punishment into the restitution of foure fold, which is the punishment by the law * of God appointed. But the wilfull murderer You shall take him [*](Deut 19. & 21.) (saith the law) from my sacred altar, neither shalt thou haue pitie on him, but cause him to dye the death: and afterwards I will stretch forth my great mercies upon you. Neuerthelesse the Christian kings on that day which they commaund to bee most holy kept, as on Good Friday, vse for most part to pardon some one man or other, condemned of [*](Whie grieuous offences are to be seuerely punished and not in any wise pardoned.) most horrible and notorious crime. Now pardons graunted to such villaines drawe after them plagues, famine, warres, and ruines of Commonweales; and that is it for which the law of God saith, That in punishing them that have deserued to dye, they shall take away the cause from among the people: for of an hundred villaines there commeth scarce two of them into the triall of iustice: and of those that come, the one halfe of them for want of proofe and of witnesses escape vnpunished: and then if when they are proued princes graunt unto them pardon, what exemplarie punishment shall there be for offences and villanies committed in the Commonweale? And many offendors, when they cannot of their owne prince obtaine grace and pardon, interpose the favour of some other forren prince, who becommeth an intercessour for them. Whereof the States of Spaine complained unto king Philip, presenting unto him a request, to the end he should aduertise his ambassador in Fraunce, no more in the behalfe of the French king, to request pardon of the king of Spaine, for the condemned men which had retired themselves out of Spayne into Fraunce: for that hauing obtained pardon, they many times slew the judges, who had before condemned them. But of[*](The most gratious and commendable pardon that a prince can giue.) all the graces and pardons that a prince can giue, there is none more commendable, than when he pardoneth the iniurie done against his owne person: and of all capitall punishments none is more acceptable unto God, than that which with most seueritie is executed, for the wrong done unto the maiestie of himselfe. But what then are we for to hope for of the prince, which most cruelly revengeth his owne iniuries, and pardoneth the wrong done to others; and especially those which are directly done to the dishonour of almightie God.

Now that which we have said concerning the grace and pardon graunted by a soueraigne prince unto men condemned, is to the vttermost to be extended, euen unto the preiudice of the great lords, unto whome the confiscation of the offendours lands or goods by law or custome belong, who are not to be receiued to debate or impugne the pardon graunted by the prince; as by decree of parliament hath bene adiudged. Now many there be, which draw the grace of the princes gracious restitutions unto priuat iudgements: as when a man is for want of councell deceiued or cosoned; or requesteth the benefit of his minoritie, which in many cities and Commonweals are proper unto soueraigne princes: but yet are not the markes of soueraigne maiestie, except only the legitimating of bastards, of fees, and such like: for why the rest were partly by the magistrats hauing vnderstood the cause, and partly by the lawes and customes vsually graunted. For in the lawes of Charles the vij and Charles the viij, it is expresly commaunded unto the judges, in deciding of causes, not to have any regard of the decrees of forraine courts, further than they should with equitie agree: which by this common clause unto all decrees in this realme commonly annexed (Si satis superque apparet, If it shall sufficiently, and more than sufficiently appeare) is declared. Which clause if it be not ioyned unto the decree, the magistrat hath but to vnderstand of the fact; the punishment thereof being reserued unto the law, and the pardon unto the soueraigne prince. And that is it for which Cicero crauing pardon of Caesar for Ligarius saith, I have oftentimes pleaded with thee before the iudges, but I neuer said, for him whom I defended, Pardon him my lords, he was deceiued, he thought it not, if euer hee do so againe, &c. So children vse to say unto their parents, of whome they craue pardon: But before the iudges we say, That the crime is for euill will forged, the accusor is a slanderer, the witnesses false and subborned. In which words he plainely shewed▪ that Caesar hauing soueraigne power, had also the power of life and death, (and so to graunt pardon) which the judges had not.

Now as for liege fealtie and homage, it appeareth, that it is one of the greatest rights [*](The sixt marke of soueraigntie) of soueraigntie; as we have before declared: in respect of him to whom it is due, with out exception.

As for the right and power to coyne money, it is of the same nature with the law,[*](The seuenth marke of soueraigntie.) and there is none but he which hath power to make a law, which can appoint the value, weight, and stampe of the coyne: which is well to be vnderstood by the Greeke and Latine worde; for the Latine word Nummus▪ seemeth well to have beene de---iued of the Greek word ---. For nothing is in a Commonweale of greater consequence next unto the law, than the value, weight, and stampe of the coyne; as we have in a spe▪

ciall treatise declared: and in euerie well ordered Commonweale, none but the soueraigne prince hath power to appoint the same. As we read they did in Rome, when the value of the Victoriat was appointed and set downe, it was done by an expresse law of the people. And albeit that the Senat by decree to ease the publike necessitie, made the halfe pound of copper as much worth as the pound; and a while after the quarter, as much worth as the pound, vntill that the ounce was valued as much worth as the pound: yet all this was done by the consent of the Tribunes, without which nothing that the Senat had therein decreed was of any force. And after that, Constantine the emperour made a law, That they which had coyned false money should be punished as men guiltie of high treason: which law all princes have most straitly kept, taking unto themselves the confiscations of false coynes, excluding all others, which have any claime thereto. With like punishment also are they to be punished, which without the princes leaue coyne good money. And albeit that many particular men in this realme, had in auntient time priuilege to coyne money, as the countie of Touraine, the[*](The right and power to coine monie the inseperable marke of soueraigntiec to be granted vnto subiects.) bishops of Meaux, Cahors, Agde, and Ambrun, the counties of S. Paule, of Marche, Neuers, Blois, and others: yet for all that king Francis the first, by a generall edict took away all those priuileges: which could not indeed be graunted: but beeing graunted, were by the law made void: ioyning hereunto also, that they were not to endure, but for the life of them that graunted them, as we have before showed in the nature of priuileges: howbeit that this marke and right of soueraigntie ought not in any sort to be at all communicated unto a subiect. As it was well declared to Sigismundus Augustus, king of Polonia, who in the yeare 1543, hauing giuen priuilege unto the duke of Prusse, to coyne money: the estates of the countrey made a decree, wherein it was comprised, that the king had no power to giue away that right, as beeing inseparable from the crowne. For which selfe same reason the Archbishop of Gnesne in Polonia, and the Archbishop of Canterburie in England, both chauncelours, hauing obtained the same right and priuilege from their kings, were thereof againe depriued. And for this cause all the cities of Italie holden of the empire, which had of the former emperours obtained this priuilege of coyning of money; in the treatie at Constance gaue up the same unto the emperour, excepting them of Luca, unto whom in fauor of pope Lucius the third, their countrey man; the emperour at his request graunted that priuilege. We read also, that the principall occasion that Peter king of Arragon tooke hold of, to driue Iames king of Maiorque out of his kingdome was, for hauing coined money; pretending that he had no right nor power so to doe. Which was also one of the occasions that Lewes the xj tooke hold of, to make warre upon Francis duke of Britaigne, for that hee had stamped a coyne of gold, contrarie to the treatie made in the yeare 1465. And the Romans when as they suffered money of Brasse, and siluer to be coyned in all their prouinces, yet did they forbid any to be there coyned of gold, reseruing that still unto themselves. Howbeit that Iohn duke of Berry had priuilege of Charles the fift, the French king, to coyne money of both mettals; who because hee would not any thing therein offend, caused peeces of gold to bee coyned with the figure of a sheepe upon them, of the finest and purest gold that euer was either before or since coyned in this realme.

Yet is it not to be omitted, that though the prince contrarie unto the law, shall giue to any man power to stampe money, that the worth and valour thereof stil dependeth of the soueraigne prince; in such sort, that they which so coyne the same, have no other profit thereby but the stampe onely; where of princes do wonderfully vaunt and glorie. But of auntient time in the Roman Commonweale, whilest it was a popular state, the Triumuiri Monetales, or masters of the mint, coyned the money with such a stamp

or marke as they themselves thought good, with their names & these letters thereuppon, III Viri, A. A. A. FF. which Caulis baileiffe of the mountaines interpreteth, Aere, Argento, Auro, Flauo, Ferunto: but more truely thus, Trium viri, Auro, Argento, [*](King Seruius the first that coined monie in Rome.) Aere, Flando, Feriundo. And truely Seruius king of the Romans was the first that there stamped an heauy coyne of brasse, with the figure or impression of an Oxe upon it, to the imitation of Theseus king of Athens, who had coyned money with the[*](Plutarch in Theseo.) same figure or marke, and the figure of an Owle. Whereby it appeareth the Greeke and Latine princes of old, not to have bene touched with that vaine desire of glorie, wherewith other princes were tormented: and wherafter the kings of Asia and Affrike most greedily longed. The first that coyned money in Greece with his owne image[*](Philip of Macedon the first that coined monie in Grece with his owne image thereon.) thereon, was Philip king of Macedon: which peeces of money were therof called Philippaei; therein imitating the Persean kings, who called their peeces of gold first stamped with the image of Darius, by the name of Dariques. Whereof king Darius was so ielous (as Herodotus writeth) as that he caused Ariander gouernour of Aegypt to bee beheaded, for hauing stamped the money with his owne image. As for the same cause also the emperour Commodus beheaded his minion Pecenninus. And also king Lewes the xij hauing left all the power and right of Soueraignty unto the Genowayes, whom he had ouercome, forbad them neuerthelesse to stampe their money with any other marke or figure, than with his owne image, in stead of the forme of a Gibbet, which they before gaue, and yet giue upon their money, as the marke of iustice.

Now if the power of coyning money be one of the rights and markes of Soueraigntie; [*](The eight marke of soueraigntie.) then so is also the power to appoint measures and weights; although that by the customes receiued there is none so pettie a lord, which pretendeth not to have this right. Whereby it commeth to passe, that by the infinit varietie of weights and[*](The great varietie of waights and measures hurtfull to a commonweale.) measures, the Commonweale taketh no small harme. Which was the cause that the kings Philip the Faire, Philip the Long, and Lewes the xj had resolued, that there should be in this kingdome but one manner of weight and measure: and now the commissioners appointed for that purpose, by comparing them together, had made euen all the measures and weights of this realme, and brought the matter to good effect, had not king Lewes by death bene taken away, before it was fully perfected: yet the booke whereby the same might more easily be brought to passe, is yet extant in the court of accounts: howbeit that the execution thereof proued more difficult than was thought it would have done, by reason of the great contention, and sutes that thereof arise. Neuerthelesse we read in Polybius, that the same was wel executed in all the cities of Achaia,[*](Lib. 3.) and Morea, where they had not but like money, like weights, like measures, customes, lawes, religion, officers, and government.

As for the right to impose taxes, or imposts upon the subiects, is as proper unto soueraigne[*](The ninth marke of soueraigntie.) maiestie, as is the law it self: not for that a Commonweale cannot stand without taxes and tallages, as the President the M. hath well noted, that taxes were not leuied in this realme, but since the time of Saint Lewes the king. But if it must needs be that they must for the publike necessitie be leuied or taken away; it cannot bee done but by him that hath the soueraigne power; as it hath bene iudged by a decree of parliament, against the duke of Burgundie; and many times since, aswell in the high court of parliament, as also in the priuie Councell. And for that diuers particular lords, cities, and corporations, under show of the common good, have imposed diuers taxes and payments upon their people: king Charles the ninth, by a generall edict by him made in the parliament at Orleans, expresly forbiddeth them so to doe without leaue: albeit that for the common necessitie they be borne withall in so doing without commission, so that they exceed not the summe of twentie five pounds. And afterward

the same edict was more straitly againe renewed at Moulins, well agreeing both with law and equitie. And although that the Roman Senat in time of warres, yea and the Censors themselves imposed certaine taxes and payments, which could hardly have bene extorted from the bodie of the whole commonaltie: yet so it was, that that still passed by the sufferance of the Tribunes of the people, who ost times also opposed themselves against the same. Yea and that in such sort, that they presented a request unto the people, that from that time forward no man upon paine of his head should bee so hardie, as to cause any law to be passed in the campe: for that the Senat by subtill meanes had there in the campe at Sutrium, caused to be published that notable imposition, which they called Vicesima Manumissorū, that is to say, the twentith part of the goods of them that were manumised; under colour that it was to pay the armie withall: which thereunto right willingly agreed: and so suffered the law to passe. And in[*](The Romaine commonweale greatly relieued by the great riches by Paulus Emilius brought to Rome, after the ouerthrowe of king Perseus) the second Carthaginensian warre, at such time as there was great want of coyne in the common treasurie; there was by a law made a taxe generally imposed uppon every man, which was by another contrarie law againe repealed, after the returne of Paulus Aemylius, who with the spoyles of Perseus king of Macedon, so filled the citie, and euerie priuat man also with wealth, as that the people was from that time discharged of all taxes and payments, vntill the Triumuirat civill warre, about an hundred yeares after, vntill that such new taxes and tributes as by the power or couetousnes of former tyrants had bene imposed upon the people, were by the good [*](Herodianus.) emperour Pertinax againe eased and taken away.

But here might some say, diuers particular lords here and there, to exact not onely customes, but tributes also, not onely in Fraunce, where (as Caesar hath most truly written) nothing is more contemptible than the vulgar people: but in England and Germanie, and much more straitly in Denmarke, Polonia, and Norway: which impositions and tributes, are confirmed and growne strong, both by long prescription of time, and vse of iudgements: yea and that to be lawfull, euen unto such as have neither soueraigntie, nor any iurisdiction at all, the court of Paris hath adiudged. Whereunto I aunswere, that the thing hauing begun by abuse, and by long continuance of time inueterat, hath well some colour of prescription: but yet an abuse can neuer be so ouergrowne, but that the law shall euer be of greater force than it; whereby the abuse is to be reformed: and for that cause it was forbidden by an edict of Moulins, that any tribute should be exacted of the subiects, under the colour of prescription: for that many lawyers and judges have exposed all the strength and force of iudgements onely in prescription alone: not regarding whether that which is in question can of right bee prescribed or not.

Now if Pompeius hath denied, that the common high way can by any continuance of time be prescribed upon: why then should these men thinke the rights of customes and tributes, or of soueraigne maiestie to be prescribed against; and yet the common high way belongeth not unto the right of Soueraigntie. Wherefore it were better to confesse (which yet without deadly wrong cannot bee done) those aforesaid things which we have spoke of, not at all to belong unto the right of soueraigne maiestie: or else to say that the kingdome it selfe, and in briefe the royall crowne and scepter might be prescribed upon. The same we are to thinke also of the exemptions from the payment of taxes and tributes, which no man can graunt unto another man, but hee which hath the soueraigne power in a Commonweale: which is also prouided for in an article of the edict at Moulins: neither is that enough, but that the charters of such immunities graunted, must be also enrolled in the records of the court of accounts, and be allowed of by the judges of the court of Aydes. But what kind of taxes and tributes

there be, and how farre they are to be exacted, shall in due place be declared: let it now for the present suffice, it to appeare, that right and power to belong only vnto Soueraigne maiestie.[*](To lay an imposition upon salt, no marke of soueraigntie.)

Now many there be that thinke also, that to have power to lay an imposition upon salt, is a more proper marke of Soueraigntie than the rest: and yet therof giue no good reason. For almost in every Commonweale we see salt pits and mines both to be, & alwayes to have bene in priuat mens possession, not onely upon the sea coasts towardes the South (for toward the north it hardeneth not with the Sunne) but also in the mediterranean regions, wherein mines of salt, and wels of salt water are found. As in Spaine, in Italie, Fraunce, and the countrey of Cracouia, is found salt in great aboundance. Yea euen at Rome we read, some priuat men to have had salt mines. Yet true it is, that manie soueraigne princes have of auntient time imposed tribute upon salt; as did Lysimachus [*](The kings which layed the first imposition upon salt.) king of Thrace, Ancus Martius king of Rome, Philip Valois king of France, who were the first that exacted tribute upon salt, every one in his owne kingdome. And albeit that by the law Valeria the people of Rome were freed from such customes & tributes, as had by their kings bene brought in and imposed upon them: yet Liuius the Censor thought no imposition in the Commonweale lighter or fitter, than that which was laid upon salt; who thereof surnamed Liuius Salinator, (or Liuius the Salter.) For why that imposition little or nothing impaireth the right of priuat men: but that they still remaine lords and owners of their salt pits, aswell as of their other mines, sauing unto the Soueraigne prince his rights and customs.

But forasmuch as the sea it selfe cannot be proper unto any priuat man, the rights[*](How farre of a soueraign prince may lay impositi ons upon the sea, from his owne coast.) thereof belonging unto such soueraigne princes as dwell thereby, who may lay impositions thereupon thirtie leagues off from their owne coast, if there bee no other soueraigne prince neerer to let them, as it was adiudged for the duke of Sauoy. Neither can any but a soueraigne prince giue them letters of safe conduct; which the Italians call Guidage; nor yet of right take any wracke: as is expresly prouided for by the decree of the emperour Fredericke the second. A thing truely most barbarous, and not in auntient[*](Wrackes by what small right they belong to soueraigne princes.) time of soueraigne princes vsed, shamefully to suffer the reliques of the goods and fortunes of such as have by shipwracke miserably perished, and whome we ought with some part of our owne to releeue, being cast upon our coast, and which ought with good faith to be againe restored, to be most shamefully I say spoyled. Yet such is the manner of all that have ports upon the sea, in this case to show such extremitie aswell unto their owne people, as to straungers. But by what right doe you aske? The common errour maketh the right: or if the wrong be done not by errour, but by knowledge, then it is meere wickednesse, masked with the vaile of errour. For I have heard that at such time as the emperours ambassadours complayned unto Henry the second, the French king, in the yeare 1556, that two gallies which had suffered wracke upon the coast of Corcyca, were taken by Iordan Vrsin, requesting to have the same gallie againe restored: he was aunswered by Anne Mommerance then constable of Fraunce, that wracks by the law of all nations belonged unto such princes as ruled upon the coasts whereon they were cast. Which law was so strong, as that Andrew Doria neuer so much as complained of the losse of two of his gallies, confiscated by the prior of Capona the French Admyrall, for casting anchor onely uppon the land without leaue, which of antient time men by the law of nations might right lawfully do. And wheras by the Roman law it was lawfull for any man to seise uppon things lost, or uppon goods or lands vacant and forbidden: now it is onely lawfull unto them which have the soueraigne power, or some other iurisdiction by law or custome confirmed unto them, to take unto themselves things lost or forsaken, and that after a certaine determinat

time: which in a thing moueable is defined to be fortie dayes after the publication of the thing lost or forsaken: except it be in the meane time by the right owner chalenged. And as for vacant possessions, the Roman emperours have decreed, That they may at any time within foure yeares be againe recouered by the prince: but that after foure yeares once expired, a man may prescribe euen against the common receipt. But forasmuch as these things are also graunted unto priuat men, they no more belong unto the right of Soueraigntie, than it doth to have a receipt of his owne: which is not a thing common unto priuat men onely, but euen the prince himselfe hath his owne receipt divided from the publike receipt; and his owne possessions seperat apart from the possessions of the Commonweale: and so diuers officers were by the Roman emperours appoynted unto both. So Lewes the xij the French king, hauing obtained the crowne, erected the chamber at Blois, for his particular demaines of Blois, Montfort, and Cousi, which he commaunded to be divided from the dukedome of Orleans, and the other publike possessions; and the accounts thereof to be kept apart by themselves. But amongst the rights of receipt, there be some that belong not, but unto the soueraigne prince onely: as the confiscation of goods or lands in cases of high treason, under which are comprehended also such as be conuicted of impietie against God, which we call Heresie; or of offence against the Commonweale, as in coyning false money. Howbeit if our late lawyers haue with two much learned and curious subtiltie in an hundred and fiftie chapters found out the lawes and rights of the receipt: but yet so as that of one they make ten, that so they may seeme the moe: so confounding and mingling the rights of soueraigntie with the rights of receipt (which are also common unto priuat men) and publike things with things priuat. The other rights of receipt are almost all common unto the soueraigne prince, with other lords iusticiaries, as to have right vnto treasure found: and the power to graunt Faires, which was in auntient time a marke of Soueraigntie; as now it is at this present comprised under the case of priuileges.

As for the right of Marque, or of Reprisall, which soueraigne princes haue proper[*](To grant letters of Marque, or of reprisall now to belong only unto the soueraign prince.) unto themselves from all others, it was not of auntient time proper unto a soueraigne prince; but permitted unto every man without leaue, either of magistrat or of prince to take reprisall, which the Latines called Clarigatio: howbeit that the princes by little and little gaue this power unto magistrats and gouernours; and in the end reserued this right unto their owne soueraigntie, for the better assurances of their peaces and truces, which were oftentimes broken by the rashnesse of some particular men, abusing this right of Marque or Reprisal. In this realme the parliament graunted letters of Marque, as we find by the decree of the xij of Februarie 1392, vntill that Charles the eight by an especiall edict, reserued that power unto himselfe, in the yeare 1485. It is also of our men properly called a royaltie or right of soueraigntie, whereby the prince, a bishop being dead, taketh unto himselfe the profits of the bishopricke, in the meane time whilest another bishop is chosen by the chapter, or by the prince himselfe appointed: and so being sworne, is put into possession thereof: but forasmuch as that in all places is not obserued: and few there be that have that right, it is not to bee accounted among the markes of soueraigntie.

There be many other right small things, which are accounted proper vnto princes,[*](Small things and yet proper only unto soueraign princes.) as things concerning their greater reputation and dignitie, as in their edicts, mandats, and commissions to vse these words, Dei Gratia, by the grace of God; which wordes Lewes the xj, the French king, forbad the duke of Britaigne to vse in his life; although we read them to have bene used almost in all auntient leagues; and attributed not unto great princes and commaunders onely, but euen to the least magistrates and deputies

also. The kings of Fraunce have also reserued unto themselves the right to seale with yellow waxe, a thing forbidden their nobilitie and other their iusticiaries; which Lewes the xj by speciall priuilege and letters patents graunted as a great favour unto Renate [*](To seale with yealowe wax graunted unto a great prince as a favour.) of Aniou, king of Naples and Sicilie, that in fealing he might vse yellow waxe: with like priuilege unto his heires also, confirmed in parliament the 28 of Iune 1465. He which copied the Comentaries of Tillet, calleth it white waxe, which I find our kings neuer to have vsed.

But much more it belongeth unto the royaltie of soueraigne maiestie, to be able to[*](To be able to chang the subiects language a marke of soueraigntie.) compell the subiects to vse the language and speech of him that ruleth over them: which the Romans so commaunded their subiects, that euen yet at this day they seeme farre and wide to raigne over a great part of Europe. But the king of the Hetruscians, who last was by the Romans ouercome in all other things yeelded unto them, but in that he could in no wise be perswaded to yeeld, to chaunge his countrey language, and to receiue the Latine tongue, as Cato Censorius writeth. But France for that it swarmed[*](The cause whie the French tounge is somuch confounded with latine.) as it were with citisens of Rome, did so confound the Latine tongue, with the naturall countrey speech, as that the auntient writers called our countrey men Romans; yea the iudgements and decrees of the higher court of parliament, viz. of Paris were set downe in Latine (which the presidents and gouernours were commaunded to doe) vntill that Francis the first had giuen order that they should vse their owne countrey language: as by like edict Edward the third commaunded the judges and magistrats of England, to giue iudgements in their owne countrey language, when as before they used the French. And at such time as the Sarasins had subdued the greatest part of Asia, and Afrike: they withall most farre spred their language and religion euen into the farther part of Spaine: which when Philip king of Spaine would gladly have suppressed, yet could he by no meanes effect it.

Some amongst the markes of Soueraigntie, have put also the power to iudge and[*](A soueraigne prince may according to his cōscience discide matters beyond either lawe, or custome.) decide matters, according to their conscience; a thing common to all iudges, if they be not by expresse law or custome prohibited so to doe. And that is it for which wee oftentimes see in the edicts upon the articles committed to the arbitratarie iudgement of the judges, this clause added, Wherewith we haue charged our conscience. For if there be either custome or law to the contrarie, it then is not in the power of the judge, to passe beyond the law, or to dispute against the receiued law. For that was a thing forbidden by the most politique lawes of Lycurgus: and also by the most auntient lawes of Florence, whereas a soueraigne prince may do both, if he be not by the law of God forbidden; whereunto we have before showed him to be still subiect.

As for the title of Maiestie it selfe, it sufficiently appeareth, that it onely belongeth to[*](The title of maiestie proper to soueraigne princes.) him that is a soueraigne prince: so that for him that hath no soueraigntie to vsurpe the same, were a verie absurd thing: but to arrogat unto himselfe the addition of most excellent and sacred maiestie, is much more absurd▪ the one being a point of lightnes, and[*](Titles dewe to God beseeme not princes.) the other of impietie: for what more can we giue unto the most mightie and immortall God, if we take from him that which is proper unto himselfe? And albeit that in auntient time neither emperours nor kings used these so great addition or titles: yet the German princes neuerthelesse have oft times giuen the title of Sacred Maiestie unto the kings of Fraunce; aswell as unto their emperour. As I remember my selfe to have seene the letters of the princes of the empire, written unto the king, for the deliverance of countie Mansfeld, then prisoner in Fraunce: wherein there was sixe times V. S. M. that is to say, Vestra, Sacra, Maiestas, or Your Sacred Maiestie▪ an addition proper unto God, apart from all worldly princes. As for other princes which are not soueraignes some vse the addition of His Highnesse, as the dukes of Loraine, Sauoy, Mantua, Ferrara,

and Florence: some of Excellencie, as the princes of the confines; or else of Serenitie, as the duke of Venice.

I omit here many other meaner rights which Soueraigne princes every one of them pretend in their own countries, in number infinit, which yet are no marks of soueraign[*](Markes of soueraigntie ought to be such as are proper to all soueraign princes in generall.) ty, such as ought to be proper to all soueraigne princes in generall, apart from all other lords, iusticiaries, magistrats, and subiects, and which are of their owne nature incessible and not to be alienated from the soueraigntie: nor by any course of time to be prescribed. And if the soueraigne prince shall giue or grant any lands or lordship of the publique possessions, unto any, with iurisdiction and power to vse the same, in such sort as he himselfe might: albeit that the royall rights properly belonging unto soueraigntie, be not in the charter or writings expresly excepted: yet are they alwayes by the verie [*](Soueraign rights cannot by the prince be alienated neither by any other be prescribed against.) law it selfe thought to be excepted, which by an old decree of the counsell of France was decreed not only for graunts made unto priuat men, but also for such gifts or grants as were made unto the princes themselves descended of the royall blood and familie: which royall rights can by no tract of time whatsoeuer, be prescribed against or vsurped upon. For if publique place, or the publique possessions of the Commonweale cannot be got by any prescription: how much lesse then can the royalties proper unto soueraigne maiestie be prescribed upon. But it is certaine by the edicts and lawes concerning the publike demaine, that it is not to bee alienated, neither by any tract of time to be gained. Which is no new thing: For it is two thousand yeares agoe since that Themistocles, making seisure of certaine lands belonging unto the publike demaine, vsurped by some priuat men; said in the oration which hee made unto the people of Athens, That mortall men could nothing prescribe against the immortall God: neither could priuat men in any thing prescribe against the Commonweale. The selfe same speech Cato the Censor used also in the Oration which he made unto the people of Rome, for the reuniting of some part of the publike demain, vsurped upon by certaine priuat men. How then can a man prescribe upon the rights and markes of Soueraigntie? And that is it, for which in law he is guiltie of death, that in any sort vseth the markes properly reserued unto the maiestie of a Soueraigne prince. And thus much concerning the principall points of Soueraigne maiestie, in as briefe manner as I possibly could, hauing handled this matter more at large in my booke De Imperio. And forasmuch as the forme and estate of a Commonweale dependeth of them that have the Soueraigntie therein: Let vs now see how many sorts of Commonweales there be.

Finis Lib. Primi.