Institutio Oratoria

The question has been raised as to whether we should deal first with persons or motives, and different orators have given different answers: Cicero as a rule prefers to treat motives first. For my own part, if the circumstances of the case do not point strongly in either direction, I consider that the most natural course is to begin by dealing with persons. For the enquiry whether any crime can credibly be imputed to such a man as the accused is of a more general character than the question whether some one particular crime can be imputed, and in addition involves a greater correctness in division.

Still, in many cases expediency may make it desirable to reverse the order. Further, we have to seek not merely motives affecting the will, but also causes leading to error, such as drunkenness or ignorance. For just as such considerations lessen the guilt of a crime when regarded from the point of view of its quality, so they tell heavily against the criminal as

I should imagine that there could never be a case, or at any rate an actual case in the courts, in which neither side said anything about the character of the persons involved; but this is not true of causes and motives, for it is often wholly unnecessary to trouble ourselves about them, as, for example, in cases of theft or adultery, crimes which carry their motives on the face of them.

Next we must consider the intention, a term which involves a number of questions, such as whether it is probable that the accused hoped that he would be able to carry such a crime into effect, or that it would escape detection when committed, or that, even if detected, it would be pardoned or punished but lightly or after considerable lapse of time, or that the inconvenience involved by the penalty would be outweighed by the pleasure resulting from the crime: or again, whether it was worth while incurring the penalty;

and further, whether he could have done the deed at some other time and in some other way, or with greater ease or security, as Cicero says in the pro Milone, [*]( c. xiv. sqq. ) where he mentions the numerous occasions when his client could have killed Clodius with impunity. There is also the question why the accused should have chosen that particular place or time or means for the commission of the crime, a topic to which Cicero gives a thorough treatment in the same passage;

or whether, without having the least reason for the deed, he was carried away by the impulse of the moment and acted without deliberate purpose (for it is a common saying that crimes are irrational), or finally, whether he was led astray by the fact that crime had become a habit with him.