Jugurtha, after he had lost the city of Capsa, and other strong and important places, as well as a vast sum of money, dispatched messengers to Bocchus, requesting him to bring his forces into Numidia as soon as possible, and stating that the time for giving battle was at hand. But finding that he hesitated, and was balancing the inducements to peace and war, he again corrupted his confidants, as on a previous occasion, with presents, and promised the Moor himself a third part of Numidia, should either the Romans be driven from Africa, or the war brought to an end without any diminution of his own territories. Being allured by this offer, Bocchus joined Jugurtha with a large force.
The armies of the kings being thus united, they attacked Marius, on his march to his winter quarters, when scarcely a tenth part of the day remained,[*](XCVII. When scarcely a tenth part of the day remained] Vix decimâ parte die reliquâ. A remarkably exact specification of the time.) expecting that the night, which was now coming on, would be a shelter to them if they were beaten, and no impediment if they should conquer, as they were well acquainted with the country, while either result would be worse for the Romans in the dark. At the very moment, accordingly, that Marius heard from various quarters[*](From various quarters] Ex multis. From his scouts, who came in from all sides.) of the enemy's approach, the enemy themselves were upon him, and before the troops could either form themselves or collect
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the baggage, before they could receive even a signal or an order, the Moorish and Getulian horse, not in line, or any regular array of battle, but in separate bodies, as chance had united them, rushed furiously on our men; who, though all struck with a panic, yet, calling to mind what they had done on former occasions, either seized their arms, or protected those who were looking for theirs, while some, springing on their horses, advanced against the enemy. But the whole conflict was more like a rencounter with robbers than a battle; the horse and foot of the enemy, mingled together without standards or order, wounded some of our men, and cut down others, and surprised many in the rear while fighting stoutly with those in front; neither valor nor arms were a sufficient defense, the enemy being superior in numbers, and covering the field on all sides. At last the Roman veterans, who were necessarily well experienced in war,
[*](The Roman veterans, who were necessarily well experienced in war] The reading of Cortius is, Romani veteres, novique, et ob ea scientes belli which he explains by supposing that the new recruits were joined with the veterans, and that both united were consequently well skilled in war, citing, in support of his supposition, a passage in c. 87: Sic brevi spatio novi veteresque coaluere, et virtus omnium œqualis facta. And Ascensius had previously given a similar explanation, quod etiam veterani adessent. But many later critics have not been induced to believe that Cortius's reading will bear any such interpretation; and accordingly Kritzius, Dietsch, and Orelli, have ejected novique; as indeed Ciacconius and Ursinus had long before recommended. Müller, Burnouf, and Allen, retain it, adopting Cortius's interpretation. Gerlach also retains it, but not without hesitation. But it is very remarkable that it occurs in all the manuscripts but one, which has Romani veteres boni scientes erant ut quos locus, etc.) formed themselves, wherever the nature of the ground or chance allowed them to unite, in circular bodies, and thus secured on every side, and regularly drawn up, withstood the attacks of the enemy.
Marius, in this desperate emergency, was not more alarmed or disheartened than on any previous occasion, but rode about with his troop of cavalry, which he had formed of his bravest soldiers rather than his nearest friends, in every quarter of the field, sometimes supporting his own men when giving way, sometimes charging the enemy where they were thickest, and doing service to his troops with his sword, since, in the general confusion, he was unable to command with his voice.
The day had now closed, yet the barbarians abated nothing of their impetuosity, but, expecting that the night would be
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in their favor, pressed forward, as their kings had directed them, with increased violence. Marius, in consequence, resolved upon a measure suited to his circumstances, and, that his men might have a place of retreat, took possession of two hills contiguous to each other, on one of which, too small for a camp, there was an abundant spring of water, while the other, being mostly elevated and steep, and requiring little fortification, was suited for his purpose as a place of encampment. He then ordered Sylla, with a body of cavalry, to take his station for the night on the eminence containing the spring, while he himself collected his scattered troops by degrees, the enemy being not less disordered,
[*](XCVIII. The enemy being not less disordered] Neque minus hostibus conturbatis. If the enemy had not been in as much disorder as himself, Marius would hardly have been able to effect his retreat.) and led them all at a quick march
[*](At a quick march] Pleno gradu. "By the militaris gradus twenty miles were completed in five hours of a summer day ; by the plenus gradus, which is quicker, twenty-four miles were traversed in the same time." Veget. i. 9.) up the other hill. Thus the kings, obliged by the strength of the Roman position, were deterred from continuing the combat; yet they did not allow their men to withdraw to a distance, but, surrounding both hills with a large force, encamped without any regular order. Having then lighted numerous fires, the barbarians, after their custom, spent most of the night in merriment, exultation, and tumultuous clamor, the kings, elated at having kept their ground, conducting themselves as conquerors. This scene, plainly visible to the Romans, under cover of the night and on the higher ground, afforded great encouragement to them.