Bellum Iugurthinum

Sallust

Sallust. Sallust, Florus, and Velleius Paterculus. Watson, J. S. (John Selby), translator. London: Harper and Brothers, 1899.

But I am assured that Metellus, in these difficult circumstances, no less than in his operations against the enemy, proved himself a great and wise man; so just a medium did he observe between an affectation of popularity and an excessive enforcement of discipline. His first measure was to remove incentives to idleness, by a general order that no one should sell bread, or any other dressed provisions, in the camp; that no sutlers should follow the army; and that no common soldier should have a servant, or beast of burden, either in a camp or on a march. He made the strictest regulations, too, with regard to other things.[*](XLV. With regard to other things] Cœteris. Cortius, whom Gerlach follows, considers this word as referring to the men or officers; but Kritzius and Dietsch, with better judgment, understand rebus.) He moved his camp daily, exercising the soldiers by marches across the country; he fortified it with a rampart and a trench, exactly as if the enemy had been at hand; he placed numerous sentinels[*](Numerous sentinels] Vigilias crebras. At short intervals, says Kritzius, from each other.) by night, and went the rounds with his officers; and, when the army was on the march, he would be at one time in the front, at another in the rear, and at another in the center, to see that none quitted their ranks, that the men kept close to their standards, and that every soldier carried his provisions and his arms. Thus by preventing rather than punishing irregularities, he in a short time rendered his army effective.

Jugurtha, meantime, having learned from his emissaries how Metellus was proceeding, and having heard, when lie was in Rome, of the integrity of the consul's character, began to despair of his plans, and at length actually endeavored to effect a capitulation. He therefore sent deputies to the consul with proposals of submission, stipulating only for his own life

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and that of his children, and offering to surrender every thing else to the Romans. But Metellus had already learned by experience, that the Numidians were a faithless race, of unsettled disposition, and fond of change; and he accordingly applied himself to each of the deputies separately, and after gradually sounding them, and finding them proper instruments for his purpose, prevailed on them, by large promises, to deliver Jugurtha into his hands; bringing him alive, if they could, or dead, if to take him alive was impracticable. In public, however, he directed that such an answer should be given to the king as would be agreeable to his wishes.

A few days afterward, he led the army, which was now vigorous and resolute, into Numidia, where, instead of any appearance of war, he found the cottages full of people, and the cattle and laborers in the fields, while the officers of Jugurtha came from the towns and villages[*](XLVI. Villages] Mapalibus. See c. xviii. The word is here used for a collection of huts, a village.) to meet him, offering to supply him with corn, to convey provisions for him, and to do whatever might be required of them. Metellus, notwithstanding, made no diminution in the caution with which he marched, but kept as much upon the defensive as if an enemy had been at hand; and he dispatched scouts to explore the country, thinking that these signs of submission were but pretense, and that the Numidians were watching an opportunity for treachery. He himself, with some light-armed cohorts, and a select body of slingers and archers, advanced always in the front; while Caius Marius, his lieutenant-general, at the head of the cavalry, had charge of the rear. The auxiliary horse, distributed among the tribunes of the legions and prefects of the cohorts, he placed on the flanks, so that, with the aid of the light troops mixed with them, they might repel the enemy whenever an approach should be made. For such was the subtlety of Jugurtha, and such his knowledge of the country and the art of war, that it was doubtful whether he was more formidable absent or present, offering peace or threatening hostilities.

There lay, not far from the route which Metellus was pursuing, a city of the Numidians named Vaga, the most celebrated place for trade in the whole kingdom, in which many Italian merchants were accustomed to reside and traffic. Here the consul, to try the disposition of the inhabitants, and,

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should they allow him, to take advantage of the situation of the place,[*](XLVII. Here the consul, to try the disposition of the inhabitants, and, should they allow him, to take advantage of the situation of the place, etc.] Huc consul, simul tentandi gratiâ, et si paterentur, opportuniatis loci, prœsidium imponit. This is a locus vexatissimus, about which no editor has satisfied himself. I have deserted Cortius and followed Dietsch, who seems to have settled the passage, on the basis of Havercamp's text, with more judgment than any other commentator. Cortius read, Huc consul simul tentandi gratiâ, si paterent opportunitates loci, etc., taking opportuniatates in the sense of munitiones, "defenses;" but would Sallust have said that Metellus put a garrison in the place, to try if its defenses would be open to him? Havercamp's reading is, simul tentandi gratiâ, et si paterentur opportunitates loci, etc. Palmerius conjectured simul tentandi gratiâ, si paterentur ; et opportunitate loci, which Gerlach and Kritsius adopt, except that they change the place of the et, and put it before si. Allen thinks that he has amended the passage by reading Huc consul, simul si paterentur tentandi, et opportunitatis loci, gratiâ; but this conjecture is liable to similar objection with that of Cortius. Other varieties of reading it is needless to notice. But it is observable that four manuscripts, as Kritzius remarks, have propter opportunitates, which led me long ago to suppose that the true reading must be simul tentandi gratiâ, simul propter opportunitates loci. Simul proper might easily have been corrupted into si paterentur.) established a garrison, and ordered the people to furnish him with corn, and other necessaries for war; thinking, as circumstances indeed suggested, that the concourse of merchants, and frequent arrival of supplies,[*](Frequent arrival of supplies] Commeatum. "Frumenti et omnium rerum quarum in bello usus est, largam copiam."Kritzius. I follow the text of Cortius (retaining the words juvaturum exercitum) which Kritzius sufficiently justifies. There is a variety of readings, but all much the same in sense,) would add strength to his army, and further the plans which he had already formed.

In the midst of these proceedings, Jugurtha, with extraordinary earnestness,[*](Extraordinary earnestness] Impensius modo. Cortins and Kritzius interpret this modo as the ablative case of modus; i.e. quàm modus erat, or supra modum; but Dietsch and Burnouf question the propriety of this interpretation, and consider the modo to be the same as that in tantummodo, dummodo, etc. The same expression occurs again in c. 75.) sent deputies to sue for peace, offering to resign every thing to Metellus, except his own life and that of his children. These, like the former, the consul first seduced to treachery, and then sent back; the peace which Jugurtha asked, he neither granted nor refused, but waited, during these delays, the performance of the deputies' promises.

Jugurtha, on comparing the words of Metellus with his actions, perceived that he was assailed with his own artifices; for though peace was offered him in words, a most vigorous war was in reality pursued against him; one of his

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strongest cities was wrested from him; his country was explored by the enemy, and the affections of his subjects alienated. Being compelled, therefore, by the necessity of circumstances, he resolved to try the fortune of a battle. Having, with this view, informed himself of the exact route of the enemy, and hoping for success from the advantage of the ground, he collected as large a force of every kind as he could, and, marching by cross-roads, got in advance of Metellus' army.

There was, in that part of Numidia, of which, on the division of the kingdom, Adherbal had become possessor, a river named Muthul, flowing from the south; and, about twenty miles from it, was a range of mountains running parallel with the stream,[*](XLVIII. Running parallel with the stream] Tractu pari. It may be well to illustrate this and the following chapter by a copy of the lines which Cortius has drawn, " to excite," as he says, "the imagination of his readers :" ) wild and uncultivated; but from the center of it stretched a kind of hill, reaching to a vast distance, covered with wild olives, myrtles, and other trees, such as grow in a dry and sandy soil. The plain, which lay between the mountains and the Muthul, was uninhabited from want of water, except the parts bordering on the river, which were planted with trees, and full of cattle and inhabitants.

On this hill, which I have just mentioned, stretching in a transverse direction,[*](XLIX. In a tranverse direction] Transverso itinere. It lay on the flank of the Romans as they marched toward the river, in dextero latere. c. 49, fin) Jugurtha took post with his line drawn out to a great length. The command of the elephants, and of part of the infantry, he committed to Bomilcar, and

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gave him instructions how to act. He himself, with the whole of the cavalry and the choicest of the foot, took his station nearer to the range of mountains. Then, riding round among the several squadrons and battalions, he exhorted and conjured them to call to mind their former prowess and triumphs, and to defend themselves and their country from Roman rapacity; saying that they would have to engage with those whom they had already conquered and sent under the yoke, and that, though their commander was changed, there was no alteration in their spirit. He added, that he had provided for his men every thing becoming a general; that he had chosen the higher ground, where they, being well acquainted with the country,[*](Well acquainted with the country] Prudentes. "Periti loci et regionis"Cortius. Or it may mean knowing what they were to do, while the enemy would be imperiti, surprised and perplexed.) would contend with adversaries ignorant of it; nor would they engage, inferior in numbers and skill, with a larger or more experienced force; and that they should, therefore, be ready, when the signal should be given, to fall vigorously on the Romans, as that day would either crown[*](Would crown] Confirmaturum. Would establish, settle, put the last hand to them.) all their labors and victories, or be a prelude to the most grievous calamities. He also addressed himself, individually, to any one whom he had rewarded with money or honors for military desert, reminding him of his favors, and pointing him out as an example to the rest; and finally he excited all his men, some in one way and some in another, by threats or entreaties, according to the different dispositions of each.

Metellus, who was still ignorant of the enemy's position, was now seen[*](Was seen] Conspicitur. This is the reading adopted by Cortius, Müller and Allen as being that of all the manuscripts. Havercamp, Kritzius, and Dietsch admitted into their texts, on the sole authority of Donatus ad Ter. Eun. ii. 3, conspicatur, i.e. (Metellus) catches sight of the enemy. The latter reading, perhaps, makes a better connection.) descending the mountain with his army. He was at first doubtful what the strange appearance before him indicated; for the Numidians, both cavalry and infantry, had taken post among the wood, not entirely concealing themselves, by reason of the lowness of the trees, yet rendering it uncertain[*](Rendering it uncertain] Incerti. Presenting such an appearance that a spectator could not be certain what they were.) what they were, as both themselves and their standards were screened as well by the nature of the ground

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as by artifice; but soon perceiving that there were men in ambush, he halted awhile, and, having altered the arrangement of his troops, he drew up those in the right wing, which was nearest to the enemy, in three lines ;[*](He drew up these in the right wing—in three lines] In dextero latere-triplicibus subsidiis aciem instruxit. In the other passages in which Sallust has the word subsidia (Cat. c. 59) he uses it for the lines behind the front. Thus he says of Catiline, Octo cohortes in fronte constituit; reliqua signa in subsidiis arctiùs collocat; and of Petreius, Cohortes veteranas—in fronte; post eas reliquum exercitum in subsidiis locat. But whether he uses the word in the same sense here: whether we might, as Cortius thinks (whom Gerlach and Dietsch follow), call the division of Metellus's troops quadruple instead of triple, or whether he arranged them, as De Brosses and others suppose, in the usual disposition of Hastati, Principes, and Triarii, who shall place beyond dispute? The probability, however, if Sallust is consistent with himself in his use of the word, lies with Cortius. Gerlach refers to Cæsar, De Bell, Civ., iii. 89: " Celeriter ex tertiâ acie singulas cohortes detraxit, atque ex his quartam instituit; but this does not illustrate Sallust's use of the word subsidia: Cæsar forms a fourth acies; Metellus draws up one acies "triplicibus subsidia.") he distributed the slingers and archers among the infantry, posted all the cavalry on the flanks, and having made a brief address, such as time permitted, to his men, he led them down, with the front changed into a flank,[*](With the front changed into a flank] Transversis principiis. He made the whole army wheel to the left, so that what was their front line, or principia, as they faced the enemy on the hill, became their flank as they marched from the mountain toward the river.) toward the plain.

But when he observed that the Numidians remained quiet, and did not offer to descend from the hill, he became apprehensive that his army, from the season of the year and the scarcity of water, might be overcome with thirst, and therefore sent Rutilius, one of his lieutenant-generals, with the light-armed cohorts and a detachment of cavalry, toward the river, to secure ground for an encampment, expecting that the enemy, by frequent charges and attacks on his flank, would endeavor to impede his march, and, as they despaired of success in arms, would try the effect of fatigue and thirst on his troops. He then continued to advance by degrees, as his circumstances and the ground permitted, in the same order in which he had descended from the range of mountains. He assigned Marius his post behind the front line,[*](L. Behind the front line] Post principia. The principia are the same as those mentioned in the preceding note, that is, the front line when the army faced that of Jugurtha on the hill, but which presented its flank to the enemy when the army was on its march. So that Marius commanded in the center ("in medio agmine," says Dietsch), while Metellus took the lead with the cavalry of the left wing. See the following note.) and took on himself the command of the

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cavalry on the left wing, which, on the march, had become the van.[*](Cavalry on the left wing-which, on the march, had become the van] Sinistrœ ulœ equitibus—qui in agmine principes facti erant. When Metellus halted (c. 49, fin.), and drew up his troops fronting the hill on which Jugurtha was posted, he placed all his cavalry in the wings; consequently, when the army wheeled to the left, and marched forward, the cavalry of the left wing became the van.)

When Jugurtha perceived that the rear of the Roman army had passed his first line, he took possession of that part of the mountain from which Metellus had descended, with a body of about two thousand infantry, that it might not serve the enemy, if they were driven back, as a place of retreat, and afterward as a post of defense; and then, ordering the signal to be given, suddenly commenced his attack. Some of his Numidians made havoc in the rear of the Romans, while others assailed them on the right and left wings; they all advanced and charged furiously, and every where threw the consul's troops into confusion. Even those of our men who made the stoutest resistance, were baffled by the enemy's versatile method of fighting, and wounded from a distance, without having the power of wounding in return, or of coming to close combat; for the Numidian cavalry, as they had been previously instructed by Jugurtha, retreated whenever a troop of Romans attempted to pursue them, but did not keep in a body, or collect themselves into one place, but dispersed as widely as possible. Thus, being superior in numbers, if they could not deter the Romans from pursuing, they surrounded them, when disordered, on the rear or flank, or, if the hill seemed more convenient for retreat than the plain, the Numidian horses, being accustomed to the brushwood, easily made their way among it, while the difficulty of the ascent, and want of acquaintance with the ground, impeded those of the Romans.

The aspect of the whole struggle[*](LI. Of the whole struggle] Totius negotii. That is, on the side of the Romans,) was indeed various, perplexing, direful, and lamentable; the men, separated from their comrades, were partly fleeing, partly pursuing; neither standards nor ranks were regarded, but wherever danger pressed, there they made a stand and defended themselves; arms and weapons, horses and men, enemies, and fellow-countrymen, were all mingled in confusion; nothing was done by direction or command, but chance ordered every thing. Though

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the day, therefore, was now far advanced, the event of the contest was still uncertain. At last, however, when all were faint with exertion and the heat of the day, Metellus, observing that the Numidians were less vigorous in their charges, drew his troops together by degrees, restored order among them, and led four cohorts of the legions against the enemy's infantry, of whom a great number, overcome with fatigue, had seated themselves on the high ground. He at the same time entreated and exhorted his men not to lose courage, nor to suffer a flying enemy to be victorious; adding that they had neither camp nor citadel to which they could flee, but that their only dependence was on their arms. Nor was Jugurtha, in the mean time, inactive; he rode round among his troops, cheered them, renewed the contest, and, at the head of a select body, made every possible effort for victory; supporting his own men, charging such of the enemy as wavered, and repressing with missiles such as he saw remaining unshaken.

Thus did these two commanders, both eminent men, maintain the contest against each other. In personal ability they were equal, but in circumstances unequal. Metellus had. resolute troops, but a disadvantageous position; Jugurtha had every thing in his favor except men. At last the Romans, seeing that they had no place of refuge, that the enemy allowed no opportunity for a regular engagement, and that the evening was fast approaching, forced their way, according to the orders which were given, up the hill. The Numidians were thus driven from their position, routed, and put to flight; a few of them were slain, but their speed, and the enemy's ignorance of the country,[*](LII. The enemy's ignorance of the country] Regio hostibus ignara. Ignara for ignota; a country unknown to the enemy.) saved the greater number of them.

Meanwhile Bomilcar, who, as I have said before, was appointed by Jugurtha over the elephants and a part of the infantry, having seen Rutilius pass by him, led down his men gradually into the plain, and while Rutilius hastened to the river, to which he had been dispatched, quietly drew them up in such order as circumstances required; not omitting, at the same time, to watch every movement of the enemy. When he learned that Rutilius had taken his position, and seemed free from apprehension of danger, and heard, at the same time, an increasing noise where Jugurtha was engaged, fearing lest the

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lieutenant-general, taking the alarm, should go to the support of his countrymen in difficulties, he, in order to intercept his march, increased the extent of his lines, which, from distrust of the bravery of his men, he had previously condensed, and advanced in this order toward Rutilius' camp.

The Romans, on a sudden, observed a vast cloud of dust, which, as the ground, thickly covered with brushes, obstructed their view, they at first supposed to be only sand raised by the wind; but at length, when they saw that it continued uniform, and approached nearer and nearer as the line advanced, they understood the real cause of it, and, hastily seizing their arms, drew up, as their commander directed, before the camp. When the enemy came up, both sides rushed to the encounter with loud shouts. But the Numidians maintained the contest only as long as they trusted for support to their elephants; for, when they saw the animals entangled in the boughs of the trees, and dispersed or surrounded by the enemy, they betook themselves to flight, and most of them, having thrown away their arms, escaped, by favor of the hill, or of the night, which was now coming on, without injury. Of the elephants, four were taken, and the rest, to the number of forty, were killed.

The Romans, though fatigued and exhausted[*](LIII. Fatigued and exhausted] Fessi lassique. I am once more obliged to desert Cortius, who reads lœtique. The sense, as Kritzius and Dietsch observe, shows that lœti can not be the reading, for there must evidently be a complete antithesis between the two parts of the sentence; an antithesis which would be destroyed by the introduction of lœti. Gerlach, though he retains lœti in his text, condemns it in his notes.) with their march, the construction of their camp, and the engagement, yet, as Metellus was longer in coming than they expected, advanced to meet him in regular and steady order. The subtlety of the Numidians, indeed, allowed them neither rest nor relaxation. But as the two parties drew together, in the obscurity of the night, each occasioned, by a noise like that of enemies approaching, alarm and trepidation in the other; and, had not parties of horse, sent forward from both sides, ascertained the truth, a fatal disaster was on the point of happening from the mistake. However, in place of fear, joy quickly succeeded; the soldiers met with mutual congratulations, relating their adventures, or listening to those of others, and each extolling his own achievements to the skies. For thus it is with human affairs; in success, even cowards may boast; while defeat lowers the character even of heroes.

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Metellus remained four days in the same camp. He carefully provided for the recovery of the wounded, rewarded, in military fashion, such as had distinguished themselves in the engagements, and praised and thanked them all in a public address; exhorting them to maintain equal resolution in their future labors, which would be less arduous, as they had fought sufficiently for victory, and would now have to contend only for spoil. In the mean time he dispatched deserters, and other eligible persons, to ascertain where Jugurtha was, or what he was doing; whether he had but few followers, or a large army; and how he conducted himself under his defeat. The prince, he found, had retreated to places full of wood, well defended by nature, and was there collecting an army, which would be more numerous indeed than the former, but inactive and inefficient, as being composed of men better acquainted with husbandry and cattle than with war. This had happened from the circumstance, that, in case of flight, none of the Numidian troops, except the royal cavalry, follow their king; the rest disperse, wherever inclination leads them; nor is this thought any disgrace to them as soldiers, such being the custom of the people.

Metellus, therefore, seeing that Jugurtha's spirit was still unsubdued; that a war was being renewed, which could only be conducted[*](LIV. Which could only be conducted, etc.] Quod, nisi ex illius lubidine, geri non posset. Cortius omits the non before posset, but almost every other editor, except Allen, has retained it, from a conviction of necessity.) according to the prince's pleasure; and that he was struggling with the enemy on unequal terms, as the Numidians suffered a defeat with less loss than his own men gained a victory, he resolved to manage the contest, not by pitched battles or regular warfare, but in another method. He accordingly marched into the richest parts of Numidia, captured and burned many fortresses and towns, which were insufficiently or wholly undefended, put the youth to the sword, and gave up every thing else as plunder to his soldiers. From the terror caused by these proceedings, many persons were given up as hostages to the Romans; corn, and other necessaries, were supplied in abundance; and garrisons were admitted wherever Metellus thought fit.

These measures alarmed Jugurtha much more than the loss of the late battle; for he, whose whole security lay in flight, was compelled to pursue; and he who could not defend his own

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part of the kingdom, was obliged to make war in that which was occupied by others. Under these circumstances, however,[*](Under these circumstances, however] Ex copiâ tamen. With copiâ we must understand consiliorum or rerum, as at the end of c. 39. All the manuscripts, except two, have inopiâ, which editors have justly rejected as inconsistent with the sense.) he adopted what seemed the most eligible plan. He ordered the main body of his army to continue stationary; while he himself, with a select troop of cavalry, went in pursuit of Metellus, and coming upon him unperceived, by means of night marches and by-roads, he fell upon such of the Roman as were straggling about, of whom the greater number, being unarmed, were slain, and several others made prisoners; not one of them, indeed, escaped unharmed; and the Numidians, before assistance could arrive from the camp, fled, as they had been ordered, to the nearest hills.

In the mean time great joy appeared at Rome when the proceedings of Metellus were reported, and when it was known how he was conducting himself and his army conformably to the ancient discipline; how, on adverse ground, he had gained a victory by his valor; how he was securing possession of the enemy's territory; and how he had driven Jugurtha, when elated by the weakness of Aulus, to depend for safety on the desert or on flight. For these successes, accordingly, the senate decreed a thanksgiving[*](LV. A thanksgiving] Supplicia. The same as supplicatio, on which the reader may consult Adam's Rom. Ant., or Dr. Smith's Dictionary.) to the immortal gods; the city, which had been full of anxiety, and apprehensive as to the event of the war, was now filled with joy; and the fame of Metellus was raised to the utmost height.

The consul's eagerness to gain a complete victory was thus increased; he exerted himself in every possible way, taking care, at the same time, to give the enemy no opportunity of attacking him to advantage. He remembered that envy is the concomitant of glory, and thus, the more renowned he became, the greater was his caution and circumspection. He never went out to plunder, after the sudden attack of Jugurtha, with his troops in scattered parties; when corn or forage was sought, a body of cohorts, with the whole of the cavalry, were stationed as a guard. He himself conducted part of the army, and Marius the rest. The country was wasted, however, more by fire than by spoliation. They had separate camps, not far from each other;

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whenever there was occasion for force, they formed a union; but, that desolation and terror might spread the further, they acted separately. Jugurtha, meanwhile, continued to follow them along the hills, watching for a favorable opportunity or situation for an attack. He destroyed the forage, and spoiled the water, which was scarce, wherever he found that the enemy were coming. He presented himself sometimes to Metellus, and sometimes to Marius; he would attack their rear upon a march, and instantly retreat to the hills; he would threaten sometimes one point, and sometimes another, neither giving battle nor allowing rest, but making it his great object to retard the progress of the enemy.

The Roman commander, finding himself thus harassed by artifices, and allowed no opportunity of coming to a general engagement, resolved on laying siege to a large city, named Zama, which was the bulwark of that part of the kingdom in which it was situate; expecting that Jugurtha, as a necessary consequence, would come to the relief of his subjects in distress, and that a battle would then follow. But the king, being apprised by some deserters of the consul's design, reached the place, by rapid marches, before him, and exhorted the inhabitants to defend their walls, giving them, as a reinforcement, a body of deserters; a class of men, who, of all the royal forces, were the most to be trusted, inasmuch as they dared not be guilty of treachery.[*](LVI. Dared not be guilty of treachery] Fallere nequibant. "Through dread of the severest punishments if they should fall into the hands of the Romans. Valerius Maximus, ii. 7, speaks of deserters having been deprived of their hands by Quintus Fabius Maximus; of others who were crucified or beheaded by the elder Africanus; of others who were thrown to wild beasts by Africanus the younger; and of others who were sentenced by Paulus Æmilius to be trampled to death by elephants. Hence it appears that the punishment of deserters was left to the pleasure of the general."Bernouf.) He also promised to support them, whenever it should be necessary, with his whole army.

Having taken these precautions, he retired into the deserts of the interior; where he soon after learned that Marius, with a few cohorts, had been dispatched from the line of march to bring provisions from Sicca,[*](Sicca] It stood on the banks of the Bagradas, at some distance from the coast, and contained a celebrated Temple of Venus. Val. Max., ii. 6. D'Anville thinks it the same as the modern Kef.) a town which had been the first to revolt from him after his defeat. To this place he hastened by night, accompanied by a select body of cavalry, and attacked

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the Romans at the gate, just as they were leaving the city; calling to the inhabitants, at the same time, with a loud voice, to surround the cohorts in the rear; adding, that Fortune had given them an opportunity for a glorious exploit; and that, if they took advantage of it, he would henceforth enjoy his kingdom, and they their liberty, without fear. And had not Marius hastened to advance the standards, and to escape from the town, it is certain that all, or the greater part of the inhabitants, would have changed their allegiance; so great is the fickleness which the Numidians exhibit in their conduct. The soldiers of Jugurtha, animated for a time by their king, but finding the enemy pressing them with superior force, betook themselves, after losing a few of their number, to flight.

Marius arrived at Zama. This town, built on a plain, was better fortified by art than by nature. It was well supplied with necessaries, and contained plenty of arms and men. Metellus, having made arrangements suitable for the time and the place, encompassed the whole city with his army, assigning to each of his officers his post of command. At a given signal, a loud shout was raised on every side, but without exciting the least alarm in the Numidians, who awaited the attack full of spirit and resolution. The assault was consequently commenced; the Romans were allowed to act each according to his inclination; some annoyed the enemy with slings and stones from a distance; others came close up to the walls, and attempted to undermine or scale them, desiring to engage in close combat with the besieged. The Zamians, on the other hand, rolled down stones, and hurled burning stakes, javelins,[*]( LVII. Javelins] Pila. This pilum may have been, as Müller suggests, similar to the falarica which Livy (xxi. 8) says that the Saguntines used against their besiegers. Falarica erat Saguntinis, missile telum hastili abieg no—id, sicut in pilo, quadratum stuppâ circumligabant, linebantque pice:—quod cum medium accensum mitteretur, etc. Of Sallust's other words, in the latter part of this sentence, the sense is clear, but the readings of different editors are extremely various. Cortius and Gerlach have sudes, pila prœterea picem sulphure et tœdâ mixtam ardentia mittere; but it can scarcely be believed that Sallust wrote picem—tœdâ mixtam. Havercamp gives pice et sulphure tœdam mixtam ardentia mittere, which has been adopted by Kritzius and Dietsch, except that they have changed ardentia, on the authority of some of the manuscripts, into ardenti.) and wood smeared with pitch and sulphur, on the nearest assailants. Nor was caution a sufficient protection to those who kept aloof; for darts, discharged from engines or by the hand, inflicted wounds

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on most of them; and thus the brave and the timid, though of unequal merit, were exposed to equal danger.

While the struggle was thus continued at Zama, Jugurtha, at the head of a large force, suddenly attacked the camp of the Romans, and, through the remissness of those left to guard it, who expected any thing rather than an attack, effected an entrance at one of the gates. Our men, struck with sudden consternation, acted each on his own impulse; some fled, others seized their arms; and many of them were wounded or slain. About forty, however, out of the whole number, mindful of the honor of Rome, formed themselves into a body, and took possession of a slight eminence, from which they could not be dislodged by the utmost efforts of the enemy, but hurled back the darts discharged at them, and, as they were few against many, not without execution. If the Numidians came near them, they displayed their courage, and slaughtered, repulsed, and dispersed them, with the greatest fury. Metellus, meanwhile, who was vigorously pursuing the siege, heard a noise, as of enemies, in his rear, and, turning round his horse, perceived a party of soldiers in flight toward him; a certain proof that they were his own men. He instantly, therefore, dispatched the whole of the cavalry to the camp, and immediately after-ward Caius Marius, with the cohorts of the allies, entreating him with tears, by their mutual friendship, and by his regard for the public welfare, to allow no stain to rest on a victorious army, and not to let the enemy escape with impunity. Marius soon executed his orders. Jugurtha, in consequence, after being embarrassed in the intrenchments of the camp, while some of his men threw themselves over the ramparts, and others, in their haste, obstructed each other at the gates, fled, with considerable loss, to his strongholds, Metellus, not succeeding in his attempt on the town, retired with his forces, at the approach of night, into his camp.