The six books of a common-weale

WEe have hitherto in my opinion discou---sed at large of all the parts of a Commonweale, it remaines for a conclusion to know the commodities and discommodities of every kind of State, and then to make choise of the best, the which was necessarie to reserue unto the end, after that we had discoursed both in generall & in particular of all the points of a Commonweale. Seeing then there are but three sorts of Commonweales, that is, when as the whole people, or the greatest part commaunds with absolute power, or else the least part of the citisens, or one alone; and that either of the three may be honest and commendable, or vicious, we must not only flie that which is most vicious, but also chuse the best. The tyrannie of one absolute prince is pernitious, & of many much worse: but there is no tyrannie so dangerous as that of a multitude; for so doth Cicero

call it: yet is it not so bad as Anarchia, where there is no forme of a Commonweale, no man commands, and no man obeyes. Let vs therefore she those that be vicious, and make choise of the best of these three lawfull governments: and to the end that all may be made plaine, I will set downe the commodities and discommodities of every one apart. First, some one may say, that a popular estate is the most commendable, as that which seekes an equalitie and indifferencie in all lawes, without favour or acception of[*](Reasons for a Popular estate.) persons, and which reduceth their civill constitutions to the lawes of nature: for euen as nature hath not distributed riches, estates and honors more to one than to another, so a popular estate tends to that end, to make all men equall, the which cannot be done, but by imparting riches, honors & iustice equally to al men without priuilege or prerogative whatsoeuer; as Licurgus did, hauing changed the royall estate into a popular, he burnt all obligations, banished gold and siluer, and divided the lands by equall lots; then tooke he great pleasure to see the shocks of corne equall in the field, thereby cutting off couetousnes and arrogancie, two of the most pernitious plagues of a Commonweale, and not only those, but he also banished rapine, theft, extorsion, slanders, partialities and factions, which can have no place when all are equall, and that one can have no preheminence over another. If then societie betwixt man and man cannot be maintained without friendship, and that the nurse of friendship is equalitie; seeing there is no equalitie but in a popular state, of necessitie that forme of Commonweale must be the best: in the which a naturall libertie and iustice is equally distributed to all men without feare of tyranie, crueltie, or exaction; and the sweernes of a sociable life seemes to draw men to the felicitie which nature hath taught vs. There is one point that seems very considerable, to shew that a popular estate is the goodliest, the most excellent, and the most perfect, which is, That in a Democraty there have alwaies been greater commanders in armes, and worthier men in lawes, greater orators, philosophers and handicrafts men than in the other two estates: whereas the faction of few great men among themselves, and the iealousie of a Monarke keepes the subiects from all noble attempts. And it seemes that the true marke of a Commonweale consists in a popular estate only, in the which the whole people inioyes the publick, diuiding the common treasure amongst them, with the spoiles, rewards, honors and conquests, whereas few noblemen in Aristocratia, and one in a Monarchie seeme to conuert all the publicke good to their owne priuate commodities. To conclude, if there be nothing more to be desired than to have the magistrates obedient to the lawes, and the subiects to the magistrates, it seemes it is best obserued in a popular state, whereas the law alone is ladie and mistres over all. These reasons are produced by popular men to maintaine a popular[*](Reasons against a Popular estate.) estate; they have a goodly shew, but in effect they are like unto spiders webs, the which are very subtill and fine, but have no great force: for first of all, there was neuer Commonweale where this equalitie of goods and honors was obserued, as we have shewed before concerning goods; and as for honors, they should do therein contrarie to the law of nature, which hath made some more iudicious and more ingenious than others, and by consequence hath ordained some to gouerne, and others to obey; some she hath made wise and discreet, others foolish and mad; to some she hath giuen excellencie of wit to gouerne and command, to others force of bodie to execute their commandements. And as for the naturall libertie they so much preach of in a popular estate, if that were of force, there should neither be magistrates, lawes, nor any forme of state whatsoeuer; else there should be no equalitie: and yet there is no forme of Commonweale which hath so many lawes, so many magistrates, nor so many comptrollers as a popular estare. And as for the publick reuenues and treasor, it is most certaine that there is no Commonweale where it is worse gouerned than by the people, as we have declared elsewhere. Whereof amongst many others, Xenophon is a worthy witnesse: I cannot (said he) allow of the Athenians estate, for that they have followed that for me of Commonweale, whereas the wicked are alwayes in greatest credit, and men of honour and vertue troden under foot. If Xenophon (who was one of the greatest captaines of his age, and who then carried away the prize to have happely ioyned the mannaging of affaires with armes and Philosophie) hath giuen such a censure of his Commonweale, which was the most popular, and amongst the popular the most esteemed, and best ordered; or to speake more properly, the least vicious (as Plutarch saith;) What iudgement would he have giuen of other Democraties, and Ochlocraties? Wherein Machiauel is much deceiued, to say, That a Popular estate is the best: and yet forgetting his first opinion, in anther place hee said, That the onely meanes to restore Italie to her libertie, is to have one prince, labouring to frame the most Tyrannicall estate in the world. And in another place he confesseth, That the estate of Venice is the goodliest of all, the which is more Aristocraticall: so as no man can iudge what this wicked and inconstant man meanes. If we shall beleeue Plato, wee shall find that he hath blamed a Popular estate, tearming it, A Faire where every thing is to bee sold. We have the like opinion of Aristotle, saying, That neither Popular nor Aristocraticall[*](A Popular estate condemned of many great men.) estate is good, vsing the authoritie of Homer, ---. And the Orator Maximus Tirius holds, That a Democraty is pernitious, blaming for this cause the estate of the Athenians, Syracusians, Carthagineans and Ephesians: for it is impossible (saith Seneca) that he shall please the people, that honours vertue. And therefore Phocion (one of the wisest, and most vertuous men that euer was) was alwaies opposit to the people of Athens, and the people to him: and as on a certaine day the Athenians allowed of his counsell, he turned to his companions, saying, Quid malū mihi accidit, vt populi sensus cum meis congruerent, What ill have I done, that the people concur with me in opinion? And how can a multitude, that is to say, a Beast with many heads, without iugemēt, or reason, giue any good councel? To aske councell of a multitude (as they did in oldtimes in Popular Commonweals) is to seeke for wisdome of a mad man. The which Anacharsis seeing, & that the magistrats and antients delivered their opinions in open assembly, and then the people concluded; he said, That in Athens wise men propounded, and fooles disposed. And admit one might draw a good resolution from a multitude, who is he so sencelesse, that would thinke it fit to publish a matter of state in an open assembly? Is it not to prophane holy things? and yet holy things beeing prophaned, may be purified: but a secret concerning affaires of estate, being once published and spred abroad, there can nothing be expected but preiudice and dishonour to the Commonweale. And for this cause especially the Commonweale of Athens, of Siracusa, and of Florence, have bene ruined. I omit the difficultie to assemble the people in one place, the disorder that is in a multitude, the varietie and inconstancie of people gathered together of all sorts: and yet (if it please not the magistrat) neither shall Senat nor people be assembled: as it happened in Caesars Consulship, who to preuaile in his attempts (hauing terrified Bibulus his companion, and drawne his sword upon him) he would not suffer the Senat to be assembled so long as his office continued. And if the Tribune were vnited with the Consull, neither there the Senat nor the people could be assembled: so as the authoritie of the Senat, and the soueraigne maiestie, was by this meanes subiect unto six or seuen: whereby the state was brought into great danger, in not resoluing speedily in vrgent affaires. For by the lawes of Solon, and of the twelue tables, the people must bee assembeld three times, before they should allow of any law that was published. Oftentimes it chaunced, that the flying of a bird on the right hand, or the crying of a rat, or the falling sicknesse (it may be of some drunken man) hindred the assembly; or at the least protestation of some stamering sooth-sayer, or the opposition of a magistrat, all was dissolued. Whereof Cicero and Cato himselfe complained verie much, for the power and favour of competitors (which were alwaies many in number) to have offices, and being enemies one to another, hindred the assembly of the people, or troubled it being assembled; and the magistrats which were in office supported them, to continue their power: so as sometimes a whole yeare was spent without the creation of a new magistrat: as it happened when as Pompey the Great was chosen Consull alone. And therefore the Grisons, who maintaine a Popular estate, assemble the people but every two yeares at Coire, for the creating of new magistrats, and[*](The Grisons assembled every two yeares.) the making of new lawes. For there is nothing more daungerous, nor more contrarie to a Popular estate, than to continue magistrats long in their office. What is more absurd, than to allow of the rashnesse of a light and inconstant multitude for a law, who in discerning and giuing of honours, are commonly carried away with a blind and inconsiderat violence, rather than with any setled iudgement? What is more foolish, than in the greatest extremities of a Commonweale, to seeke councell from a mad multitude? for the magistrat can do nothing without commaund, and if they might they would not; neither dare they, being terrified with the peoples furie, who impute all mischaunces, and their owne errours, unto the magistrats. So as Philip the first, king of Macedon, hauing inuaded and spoyled the confines of Attica, there was not any magistrat that durst assemble the estates, the people came to the place of assemblies vncalled,[*](A multitude is amazed in danger.) whereas they found no man that durst speake unto them, as Demosthenes writeth. The like happened at Florence, when as the emperours armie approached to besiege them, at the instance of pope Clement the seuenth, al the people were so amazed, as they knew not what to resolue: For by the lawes of Florence, all the citisens should assemble before the Towne house, to resolue upon the articles propounded by the chiefe magistrat, and then they were quite daunted. It is the weaknesse of a multitude (saith Titus Liuius) to waxe proud, and to insult with all licentiousnesse in prosperitie, and to be deiected and amazed with any aduersitie. And how is it possible that the soueraigne maiestie of an estate shall be maintained by a multitude, guided by a magistrat, who oftentimes must keepe them in awe by seueritie, Et in qua regenda plus poena, quam obsequium valet (said Titus Liuius) In the government whereof punishment more than obedience preuailes. So Phocion, seeing that the Athenians would not giue him audience, he cried out, O fustuarium Corcyraeum, quou---s talento pretio sius, O scourge of Corfu, more[*](A multitude cannot maintain a maiestie.) pretious than any talent: Which shewes the maiestie doth perish and decay in a multitude, whereon the chiefe ground of a Commonweale consists. But passing on, all men that haue written of estates, do hold, That the chiefe end of all Commonweales, is to flourish in pietie, iustice, valour, honour, and vertue; by the which humane society is preserued. But a Popular estate hath bene alwaies opposit, and an enemie to all good men. For the preseruation of a Popular estate (if we shall beleeue Xenophon) is to aduance the most vitious and vnworthy men to offices and dignities. And if the people should be so ill aduised, as to giue offices of honour unto vertuous men, they loose their [*](The end of Popular estates, is to banish vertue.) power: for that good men would favour none but the good, which are alwayes fewer in number: and the wicked and vicious (which is the greatest part of the people) should be excluded from all honour, and by little and little banished: so as in the end wise men should seize upon the estate, and take that from the people. The Athenians therefore (said Xenophon) gaue audience to the most wicked, knowing well, that they would speake pleasing things, and profitable to the vicious, as most of the people be. I cannot[*](Xenophon giues a true iudgement of a Popular estate.) (said Xenophon) but blame the Athenians, to have chosen the most vicious forme of a Commonweale: but hauing chosen it, I doe much esteeme them they doe so carefully maintaine it, in reiecting, chasing away, and banishing the noble, wise, and vertuous; & aduancing the impudent, wicked, & vicious: for the which vice thou so much blamest (saith he) is the preseruation of a Popular estate. And as for iustice, the people (saith hee) have no regard of it, so as they may get profit by their iudgements, which they sell to them that will giue most, seeking by all meanes to ruine the rich, the noble, and the vertuous, whome they torment continually, for the capitall hatred they beare against all good men, being contrarie to their naturall dispositions. And therefore a Popular state is the sinke and refuge of all turbulent spirits, mutines, seditions, and banished men, which giue councell, comfort, and aid, unto the people to ruine great men: For as for the lawes they have no respect of them, for that in Athens the peoples will is a law. This is Xenophons opinion, touching the Commonweale of Athens, who saith, it was the best ordered of al the Popular Commonweals in his time: neither would he have them to change any thing to maintain the people in their grea---nes. The like censure Marcellus the lawyer hath of a strumpet, saying, That shee hath not well done to have abandoned her honour; but hauing lo---t all modestie, it was not ill done, to get what she could by her trade. So Xenophon concludes, That a Popular estate is nothing worth, but to maintaine it so being once setled, they must banish all honor and vertue: that is to say, the greatest tyranny is not so daungerous, as a Popular estate thus gouerned.

But there is yet one plague more capitall in Popular estates, the which is, Impunitie[*](Impunitie of vice in a Popular estate.) to the wicked, so as they be citisens, that is to say, pettie kings: and euen in the Popular estate of Rome, it was forbidden to all magistrats upon paine of death, To condemne to death, or to banish any citisen, nor to depriue him of his libertie or priuilege of a citisen, nor to whip him with rods. For it is a setled law almost in all Popular estates, Ne ciuis quisquam quantumcumque scelus siue in deos, siue in homines admiserit, capite feriatur, That no citisen should die the death, what offence soeuer he had committed either against the gods, or men. Therefore Verres (omitting the rest) being accused and condemned of theft, and of a hundred thousand concussions, extortions, and false iudgements; was thought to be seuerely punished, for that hee was enioyned to depart out of Rome: and why, for that Popular states would haue their libertie defended with the lenitie of lawes, and not with the sharpnesse of punishments. And yet they banished Ruti---ius, Metellus, Coriolanus, the two Scipions, brethren, and Tully: as in Ephesus they banished the vertuous Hermodorus: in Athens they expelled Aristides the iust, Themistocles [*](The most vertuous are banished, and he wicked escape, in a Popular estate.) died in exile, Miltiodes in prison, Socrates by poyson. And although that Phocion the most iust and vertuous man of his age, had bene chosen Generall fortie and five times, without any reproach or blame, yet (without any accusation or information against him or his companions) a base pleader, of the scumme of the people, steps up before the multitude, and demaunds, If they would have Phocion and his companions put to death: wherewith all in generall did arise up, and holding up their hands, condemned him, not excluding any slaue, woman, nor straunger from this condemnation, for the which many ware garlands of flowers. Which Phocion hearing, said, Me quidam a vobis damnari facile patior: sed cur isti? For my part, I am contented to bee condemned by you: but why these men? To whome the people being mad, aunswered, Quoniam tibi sunt amici. Neither was the furie of this mad people pacified, vntill they were all without sentence, accusation, or cause, put to death. Neither is there any hope, if a multitude begin once to insult over the good, that either shame or reason shal reclaime them from their furie and madnesse. Yet notwithstanding the wicked do commonly escape the peoples hands: which Demosthenes seeing, and that they had absolued Antipaphon, a most capitall offender, he proceeded, and caused him to be condemned,

and afterwards put to death by a decree of the Areopagits, little regarding the people, for the which he was not blamed. Whereby it appeares, that there was neither iustice nor maiestie in a Popular estate. And as in a Popular Commonweale thus gouerned, all offices are sold to them that will giue most, so the magistrats sell by retaile that which they have bought in grosse. And euen Mar---us durst carrie bushels of siluer into the assemblies at Rome, to purchase the peoples voices: the like wee read of Pompey. It is no maruell then if we read of infinit corruptions and concussions in Rome: but it was more fowle and odious in Athens, whereas when Stratocles and Damoclides entred into their offices, they did openly brag▪ That they went to a golden haruest. If offices, lawes, iustice, and honours, were so vnworthily sold in these great Commonweales, being inriched with the spoyles of other people; what shall we iudge of Popular estates opprest with want and need? Wee have the example of the Megarences,[*](Popular estates exceed in all licentiousnesse.) who hauing expelled their prince Theagines, established a Popular estate so licentious, as it was lawfull for the poore to goe and spoyle the rich, as it is in Plato. Euen so wee read, that the Swissers did long after they had expelled the nobilitie. If they would have any one spoyled by the multitude, they did set the picture of a man with boughes under him at his doore, and then was he presently stript of all that he had, were he the richest or most innocent citisen. And they which doe so highly commend the Popular estate of the Romans, should rather have extolled the worthy deeds of noble and valiant men, than the cities forme: they should set before their eyes the seditions and civill warres, wherewith that citie had bene shaken, and represent the people of the one side of a mountaine, and the nobilitie of another, divided three times; and many times the furious Tribunes with their turbulent Orations, to threaten death or banishment to the best citisens: Sometime Saturnine the Tribune, with a rabble of rascals, slaues, and artisans, armed with staues and stones, to come into the open assembly of the people, and to expell the honester partie, and kill him that was chosen Consull by the peoples suffrages. The which the Tribunes alone did not, being enraged against the Consuls, but euen the Consuls among themselves. How many murthers of citisens have beene seene in the middest of the citie, in the field of Mars, in the court, in the temples of their gods, yea in Iupiters capitoll, Tiberius and Caius Gracehus, Drusus, Saturninus, and Sulpitius, were cruelly slaine: when as the Consull Cassius made a proclamation, That all the Latines, and Heniques, which had no houses within Rome, should depart the citie. Virginius his companion made a decree to the contrarie, not so much to crosse his companions authoritie, but to set the citisens and straungers together by the eares in the middest of the citie. What was more vnworthy, or more contrarie to civill societie, than to see a citisen under an innocent gowne, to come armed to the assembly, to sue for offices, as if they went to warre, and oftentimes the contrarie factions fell to blowes. And Tully saith, Lapidationes in foro saepe vidi---us, non saepe▪ sed tamen nimis saepe gladios, We have oftentimes seene stones cast in the assembly of the estates, and swords drawne, not so often, but yet too often. And a little after, Meministis (inquit) corporibus ciuium Tiberim compleri: cloacas refarciri, e foro spongijs effundi sanguinem, You remember (said he) that the riuer of Tibe--- hath bene filled with the bodies of citisens, that the common priuies have bene stuffed full, and the blood suckt up in the market place with sponges. To conclude, if we shall rip up all the Popular estates that euer were, we shall find, that either they have had warre alwayes with the enemie, or within the state: or else that they have bene gouerned in shew by the people; but in effect by some of the citisens, or by the wisest among them, who held the place of a prince and monarch. Whilest that the Commonweale of Athens did flourish, it was gouerned by the Senat of the Areopagits: and when as their power and authoritie was restrained, Pericles (saith Thucidides) was a very Monarch, although in shew it were Popular. And Peter Soderin (in an Oration hee made unto the people of Florence, to change the estate) said, That in the time of Laurence de Medius, the Commonweale[*](Pericles and Lau▪ rence de Medicis, Monarchs of Athens, and Florence.) in shew was Popular, but in effect a meere Tyranny, for that Laurence gouerned all alone: but he doth not say, that it was neuer more flourishing, and that before they were neuer ten yeares free from seditions, and the most bloody factions that euer were. In like sort the Popular estate of the Romans, which had bene afflicted with so many forren and intestine warres, was it not maintained and flourished both in armes, and laws, by the Senat, and was not the authoritie thereof supported, by Menenius Agrippa, Furius Camillus, Papirius Cursor, Fabius Maximus, Scipio, Cato, Scaurus, Pompey, and diuers others? who maintained the beautie of the Senat, and restrained the people, keeping them within the bounds of honour? We do also read, that Pelopidas, and Epaminondas, were as it were lords of the Popular estate of the Thebans, after whose death the people found presently, that they had lost their chiefe pilots: as it happened in the like case unto the Athenians, after the death of Pericles, Then (said Plutarch) the people did[*](A Popular estate is preserued by a few wisemen.) float up and downe, like a ship without a helme: and as every one would gouerne and commaund, some to set saile, others to go to harbrough, a storme came (saith Polybius) and the ship perished. And although the Athenians, after they had lost the soueraignrie of Greece, gouerned their citie & territorie popularly, yet Demosthenes spake plainely, and openly before the people, That the estate of Athens was under the power of Orators and Pleaders, of whome the captaines depended, who had at the least three hundred men bribed, to passe whatsoeuer they pleased for money. A common disease[*](Corruptions common in Popula estates.) (saith Plutarch) in all Popular estates. Liuius writeth thus of the Popular estates of the Tarentines, In potestate Iuniorum plebem, in manu plebis, rem Tarentinam esse, The estate of Tarentum was in the peoples hands, and the people in the power of the younger sort. And a little before the declining of the Popular estate of Rome, Crassus, Caesar, and Pompey, whome they called a triple head, gouerned and held all the Senat and people in their power and subiection: but two of them being slaine, the third became an absolute Lord. Whereby we may gather, that a Popular commaund cannot subsist without a wise pilat and gouernor, and leauing it to the most sufficient, in the end they make themselves masters, and the people serues but for a maske.

But some one will say, Doe we not see that the Cantons of the Swissers haue setled a[*](The reasons why the Swissers▪ maintaine their Popular estate.) goodly Popular estate, & have continued their government aboue three hundred and fiftie yeares, and by this meanes have not onely preserued themselves from tyranny, but have also chased away tyrants their neighbours? The aunswere hereunto is double: First, the situation of the countrey, and the disposition of the people agrees best with a Popular estate. Secondly, the most seditious, & mutinous, go to the seruice of other forren princes: and the rest of the common people being more mild & tractable, are easily kept in awe. Moreover all the heads of the Cantons & Popular states, hauing entred into an offensiue and defensiue league, are strictly tied and vnited together; like unto those that goe by night, or that are in a slipperie or daungerous way, holding one another by the hand: and in this sort they maintaine themselves against the power of Monarchs, as in old time the Athenians and Thebans did. Besides, the foundation of their Popular estate was built and cimented with the blood of the nobilitie, and of the chiefest, especially at the battaile of Sampac; then afterwards at that at Basil, when as king Lewes the 11 (beeing then but Daulphin) had the victorie: then all the nobilitie of the countrey, which had followed him, were banished, and the rest retired themselves willingly, after the treatie of the ten Cantons, made in the yeare 1510, and at the chaunge of religion in the yeare 1529: so as there remaines but a very few at Berne and

Zurich, whereas the estate is Aristocraticall. And not only the Cantons, but also those at Strausbourg, Lyndaw, Sienne, Genes, and Florence (to settle a popular libertie) slue or banished the nobilitie: as they have done in many townes of Germanie. After they of Florence had made away their nobilitie, they divided themselves into three factions, the greater, the meane, and the popular: and as the greater sort entred into factions, and slue one another, the meaner thought to become maisters, who were so incensed one against another, as the whole citie was nothing but fire and blood, murthering one another, vntill that the scumme of the people tooke upon them the government, they alwayes hated them that looked like gentlemen, or that ware a sword, or that had gotten to any degree of honour, in what Commonweale soeuer, or that had gathered together more riches than the rest: which made them of Strausbourg (after they had slaine all the nobilitie, to settle a Popular estate) to decree, That whosoeuer did aspire to be Grand Bourgmaster, should proue that his grandfather was a day labourer, an artificer, a butcher, or of some such like condition. And the auntients (to assure Popular estates) did striue to equall all citisens in goods, honours, power, and rewards: and if any one were more vertuous, more iust, or more wise, than the rest, he was banished, as I have shewed before, seeking to make an equalitie, if it were possible: and euen Plato did wish, That wiues and children should be common to all, to the end that no man might say, This is mine, or, That is thine: for those words of Meum, and Tuum (said he) were the breeders of discord, and the ruine of states. By the which there will grow many absurdities: for in so doing, a citie shall be ruined, and become a houshold (as Aristotle said) although that a houshold or familie (which is the true image of a Commonweale) hath but one head. And for this cause an auntient [*](Bias.) lawmaker, beeing importuned by some one, to make his country a Popular estate: Make it (saith he) in thine owne house. And if they say, That it is a goodly thing so to vnite citisens and a citie, as to make one houshold of it, they must then take away the pluralitie of heads and commaunders, which are in a Popular estate, to make a Monarch, as the true fathers of a familie; and to cut off this equalitie of goods, power, honour, and commaundement, which they seeke to make in a Popular estate: for that it is incompatible in a familie. But the greatest inconuenience is, that in taking away these words of Mine, and Thine, they ruine the foundation of all Commonweales, the which were chiefly established, to yeeld vnto[*](Taking away the proprietie of goods, we ouerthrow a Commonweale.) every man that which is his owne, and to forbid theft; as it is commaunded by the word of God, who will have every man to enioy the proprietie of his owne goods: and we may not say, that nature hath made all things common, for the law of the mother is not contrarie to the commaundement of the father (as Salomon said) figuring by an Allegorie the commaundements of God, and the law of nature. But the true popular libertie consisteth in nothing else, but in the enioying of our priuat goods sincerely, without feare to be wronged, in honour, life, wife or familie, the which euen theeves & robbers labour to keepe. And as for the power of commaund, which popular men would make equall, there is lesse reason than in goods: for discretion and wisedome is not equally giuen to all men, and in a Popular estate they must of necessitie chuse the[*](Wisdome is not equll in all men, to impart offices equally.) most sufficient magistrats, to commaund, and to administer iustice. Moreouer, whereas there is no forme of soueraigntie, nor of a Commonweale, yet a---e the people constrained to chuse a magistrat or captaine to commaund them, and to doe iustice: as in the countrey of Gusula in Affrike, where there is neither king, nor any forme of a Commonweale, the people on their Faire day chuse a captaine to doe iustice, and to assure the course of traffique. And on the frontiers of the kingdome of Fez, the inhabitants of the mountaine of Magnan (who in like sort have no forme of a Commonweale) if they see any straunger to passe by, which seemes to excell the rest in wisedome, him they stay by force, to administer iustice unto them. It is a maxime in Popular states, [*](A rule in Popular states.) That when as the persons are equall which are to vndergo a charge, to cast lots: and if one exceeds another, then they chuse the most sufficient. And who doth not see the great difference among men, that some have lesse iudgement than bruit beasts; and others have such cleere marks of diuine light, as they seeme rather angels than men? and[*](An error in equalitie.) yet those which seeke equalitie, will have the soueraigne power of life, honour, and goods, giuen unto furious, ignorant, and mad men, as well as unto iudicious and wise men: for the voices in all assemblies are numbred, without any due consideration of euerie mans worth: and alwayes the number of fooles, wicked and ignorant men, doth farre exceed the good, if that be true which Salomon saith, That there is not one among a thousand: the which is confirmed by the Poet,

A good man and a wise, one such as out of all mankind,

Though Apollo sought and searcht himselfe, yet could he scarcely find.

And yet there is a naturall reason, which doth teach vs, that the equalitie they seeke, doth ruine the grounds of all loue and amitie, the which can hardly subsist among equals, for that there are neuer more quarrels & dissentions, than among them that are equall; either for that the one seekes to supplant the other, or for that the one may live[*](All nations have need one of another.) without the other. And it seemes that God hath imparted his benefits and graces, to countries and nations, in such a measure, as there is no man but hath need of another: to the end that through mutuall courtesie and good offices, euerie nation in particular, and all in generall, should be constrained to contract alliances and friendships together: as it is seene in a mans bodie, the which is the figure of a wel ordered Commonweale, there is no member but receiues helpe and succour from the rest, and that which seems most idle, disgests the nourishment for all the rest: as Menenius Agrippa a Roman Senator,[*](Equalitie and friendship are incompatible.) did wisely shew unto the common people, which were fallen from the nobilitie, & did seeke to equall themselves unto them in power and authoritie. Popular governments in the beginning seeme pleasing and goodly, contrarie to Monarchies: the which are like unto great riuers, which at their first springs have small and weake currents, but increasing by their long course, their streames grow bigger, & more rough, and run with more spacious chanels, the farther they are from their heads and springs. But Popular states are like unto the wind, the which is most vehement where it riseth, but at the length it is broken and groweth weake. I have discoursed hereof the more at large, to shew the inconueniences which follow a Popular estate, to the end I might reduce them to reason which seeke to withdraw the subiect from the obedience of their naturall[*](A Popular estate a pernitious tyranny, i not wisely gouerned.) prince, through a false hope of libertie, in framing of Popular states: the which in effect is nothing else, but the most pernitious tyranny that can be imagined, if it bee not gouerned by wise and vertuous men. And therefore among the Cantons of the Swissers (those which are best ordered) although they have established a forme of Popular Commonweale, yet they gouerne themselves Aristocratically, hauing two or three councels, to the end the people deale not in affaires of state as little as may be; assembling seldome but by quarters, or parishes, which they call Schaffes (as in old time the inhabitants of Mantinea a Popular state did) fearing the tumults and rebellions which[*](Generall assemblies are dangerous in Popular estates.) fall out commonly when they are altogether. But seeing it is not in the power of good citisens, nor of wise polititians, to change a Popular estate into a Monarchie: the chiefe grounds then of a Popular estate consists in the strict obseruation of lawes and ordinances, being of it selfe quite different and disagreeing from the lawes and order of nature, which giues the commauud unto the wisest: a thing verie incompatible with the

people: for if a multitude (being impatient of command) have not good lawes and statutes before their eyes, as lights to guide them, the estate will be soone ruined. And therefore the Swissers do obserue their lawes verie seuerely, else their estate had not bene so durable: for euen as weake & crased bodies fall soone into diseases, if they leaue the good diet and order prescribed them by the Physitian; so is it in a Popular state, if they doe not obserue their laws and ordinances. And thus much to satisfie them which are not contented, although the greatest men that euer were, have disallowed of a Popular estate.

Let vs see now if an Aristocraticall government bee any thing better than the rest, as many hold opinion: for if a mediocratie be commendable in all things, and that we[*](Reasons for an Aristocraticall estate.) must flie all vicious extreames; it followes then, that these two vicious extreams being reiected, we must hold the meane, which is an Aristocritie, or a certaine number of the most apparant citisens: as if there were ten thousand citisens, let them make choyce of an hundred; the which were a iust proportionable number betwixt one & a thousand: increasing or diminishing the number according to the multitude of the subiects, wherin they shall hold that commendable & desired mediocritie betwixt a Monarchy and a Democratie. There is yet another argument of no lesse efficacie, to proue that an Aristocraticall estate is the best, which is, That the power of soueraigne commaund, by naturall reason, is to be giuen to the most worthy: and dignitie cannot consist but in vertue, in nobilitie, or in riches, or in all three together. If then wee desire to chuse one of the three, or to ioyne them all together, the estate shall bee alwaies Aristocraticall: for the noble, rich, wise, and valiant men, make alwayes the least part of the citisens, in what place soeuer; by naturall reason then that government must bee Aristocraticall, when as the least part of the citisens commaund the state, or whereunto the best and most vertuous men are admitted.

A man may also say, that the soueraigntie should be giuen onely to the most rich, as[*](The government of a Commonweale must be giuen to them that have the most interest in the preseruation thereof.) to them that have most interest in the preseruation of the whole state. Without doubt the most rich have the greatest interest, and beare a greater charge than the poore, who hauing little to loose, abandon the Commonweale at need. And therefore Q. Flaminius did wisely commit the government of the cities of Thessalie, to the most rich, as to them that had most interest in the preseruation of the state. Moreover it seems that necessitie doth guide vs to an Aristocraticall estate: for although that in a Popular estate, and in a Monarchy, the monarch or the people in shew have the soueraigntie, yet in effect they are forced to commit the government to the Senat, or priuie Councell, who consult, and many times determine of greatest affaires: so as it is alwaies an Optimacie. And if the monarch, or people, be so ill aduised as to gouerne otherwise than by a wise councell, there can nothing bee expected but an ineuitable ruine of the state. I omit other reasons lesse necessarie, as every one may coniecture, to conclude, that an Aristocratie is the most commendable state. And yet I say, that all together are not sufficient to proue it: for as for that commendable mediocritie which we seeke, it is not reall, diuiding things in the middest, but consists in reason: as liberalitie a mea---e betwixt two vicious extreames, yet doth it approach neerer unto prodigali---e than unto couetousnesse. The meane which they seeke betwixt one and all in generall, is reall; neither can it euer be alike, for that there are some cities which have not a thousand citisens, and others that have aboue three hundred thousand: so as an Aristocraticall estate shall be alwaies mutable and variable, for the vncertaintie of the number: and it will often fall out, that a great Aristocraticall estate shall have more commaunders, than a Popular state in a small citie shall have citisens: as if there be foure hundred thousand citisens, to obserue a true Geometricall proportion, there must be foure thousand gouernours or

commaunders: so as by a necessarie consequence, the inconueniences which are incident to a Popular estate, will also fall out in an Aristocratie, by reason of the multitude[*](Many commanders, cause many factions.) of lords: for the more gouernours there be, the more factions will grow, their consultations will be more hard to determine, and are sooner discouered. And therefore those[*](Those Aristocraticall estates most durable, that have fewest lords.) Aristocraticall estates are more durable and assured, that have fewest lords: as the Lacedemonians, who had but thirtie gouernours, and the Pharsalians twentie; they did long maintaine their estates, whereas others decaied soone. It is not then the middle number betwixt one and all, which makes that commendable meane, seeing that there be as many kinds of vicious Commonweales, as of commendable and vertuous.

As for the other point, That they must giue the soueraigntie unto the most worthy, It is true; but the argument makes more for a Monarchy, than for an Aristocratie: for among the most noble, the most wise, the most rich, and the most valiant, there is alwayes some one that doth excell the rest, to whome by that reason the soueraigntie doth belong: For it is impossible to find them all equall in all respects. And as for the Senat, or Councell, we have shewed before, that it is divided from maiestie, and hath no power to commaund, in what estate soeuer: else doth it loose the name and marke of a[*](No councell in any estate hath any power to command.) Senat, the which is ordained to no other end, but to giue councell to them that have the soueraigntie, to whome belong the resolution & decision of the councell. But Plato had another argument for an Aristocratical estate, saying, That it was verie hard to find any one man so wise and vertuous, as was requisit for the government of an estate, and by that meanes a Monarchie were not sure. But this argument is captious, and may be [*](Platoes argument captious.) used against himselfe: for if it be hard to find any one prince so wise as he desireth, how shall they find out so great a number as is needfull in a Seigneurie. And Peter Soderin Gonfalonier of Florence, speaking unto the people against an Aristocraticall estate, he used the same argument which Maecenas did before Augustus against Marcus Agrippa, [*](The estate of few lords, is the estate of ew tyrants.) saying, That the government of few lords, is the government of few tyrants: and that it was better at all euents to have but one tyrant. For if any one will say, that among many there will haply be some number of good men, we must then rather chuse a Popular estate, for that in a great number there will be found more vertuous than in a lesse. But both the one and the other is vnprofitable: for as well in all Aristocraticall and Popolar estates, as in all corporations and colledges, the greatest part doth still ouer-rule the sounder and the better: and the more men there be, the lesse effects are there of vertue and wisedome (euen as a little salt cast into a great lake, looseth his force:) so as the good men shall be alwayes vanquished in number by the vicious, and ambitious: and[*](In all colledges, corporations, & states, the greatest number carries it.) for one tyrant there shall be a hundred which will crosse the resolution of the lesser but of the sounder part: as it is alwaies seene as well in the diets and assemblies of the princes of Germanie, whereas the spirituall princes of the empire, being the greatest number, have alwaies crost the princes temporall: so as by their means the emperour Charls the fift, caused the empire to declare it selfe an enemie to the house of France, the which had not bene so in many ages: to the end the temporall princes should have no hope of any succours from Fraunce in their necessities, whereinto they soone after fell. And [*](Anno. 1543. The princes spirituall of the empire, are more in number than the temporall.) to make short, it hath bene alwayes seene, that the more heads there be in a Seigneurie, the more controuersies arise, and lesse resolution. And therefore the Seigneurie of Venice to auoid these inconueniences, commits all affaires of state to the mannaging of a dozen persons, and most commonly to seuen, especially to keepe their affaires secret, whererein consists the health and preseruation of an estate.

But let vs suppose, that a priuie Councell in an Aristocraticall estate, bee so secret, as nothing is discouered; yet is it a difficult thing for few commaunders to maintaine their estate against a multitude, which hath no part in honourable charges: for that most

commonly the lords scorne and contemne the popular, and the poore carrie alwaies a capital hatred against the great: so as upon the least dissention among the nobles (the which is ineuitable if they be men of faction, and giuen to armes) the most factious and[*](The cause that doth most ruine Aristocraticall estates.) ambitious flieth vnto the multitude, and ruines the state: as I have noted before of the Seigneuries of Gènes, Florence, Cologne, Zurich, Strausbourg, Lindaw, and the auntient Phocians, Samians, Therenecians, Amphipolites, Corcyrians, Cnidians, Mytelenians, and Hostienses; in the which the multitude hath expelled, banished, spoyled, and slaine the nobles. And what guard soeuer they keepe, yet do they live in continuall distrust, and sometimes in such feare, as they doe not assemble together but in places of[*](The commanders in an Aristocraticall estate are in continuall feare and distrust) strength: as in the citie of Benize---e, lying in the realme of Telesin in Barbarie, all the lords and commaunders keepe themselves in forts, fearing the people should mutine against them, or that one of them should murther the rest. So in old time the inhabitants of Miletum, after they had expelled their two tyrants, they fell cruelly ---o armes among themselves, the nobles against the people: but in the end the rich hauing vanquished the poore, they framed an Aristocraticall estate, where they lived in such feare, and distrust, as they went into ships to hold their councels, fearing (saith Plutarch) to be surprised and slaine by the people: like unto the lords of the Samiens, who were all massacred by the multitude, at such time as they were in councell. So as in an Aristocraty the lords dare not traine the people up to arms, nor put weapons into their hands: neither can they go to the warre, but they are in daunger to loose the estate, if they bee once defeated: neither can they assure themselves of straungers, fearing they should bee subiected by them. To which daungers a Popular estate is not subiect, euerie one hauing a part in the state. An Aristocraticall estate then, is not onely in daunger of forraine enemies, but of the people, whome they must content or keepe in awe by force: to content them without making them partakers of the government, were very hard; & to admit them to charges of honour, without alteration of the state, from an Aristocratie to a Popular, were impossible: to keepe them in subiection by force, that were not safe, although it might be done, for that were to shew an open feare and distrust of them whome they must win by loue and courtesie: else upon any forraine war against the state, or among the gouernours themselves, the people will bee easily drawne to armes, and to shake off their yoake. And therefore the Venetians to maintaine their[*](How the estate of Venice bene preserued.) Aristocraticall estate, impart some small offices unto the people, contract alliances with them, borrow of them to bind them to the maintenance of the state; and disarme them quite: and to make them more mild and pliable, they giue them full scope and liber---ie to all sorts of pleasures: and sometimes they make their richest citisens bourgesses. If they have any warre against the straunger, they soone compound it at what price soeuer: and aboue all things they labour to quench and pacifie all partialities and hatred among the gentlemen: so as the rich being drunke with delights, and the poore hauing meanes to traffique, and to exercise themselves in mechanike arts, with the commoditie of the place, lying upon the sea, being by nature strong, they have no great occasion, & lesse power to rebell. By these meanes the Venetians (next under God) have maintained their estate, and not by the forme of an Aristocraticall government, as many do hold. And although the nature of the situation of Venice, the honour of the people, the wisedome of the Seigneures, and the lawes, be fit for an Aristocraticall estate, yet is it not aboue foure hundred yeares, that they have instituted this forme of Commonweale, neither could they auoid many seditions and civill warres; as of the Bochonians,[*](Gianot. Donat. de Repub. Vene.) Faleriennes, Topoliennes, Baiamontaines, and the cruell factions of the Iustinians, the Sceuoles, Seliens, Bassiens; the murther of eighteene dukes, and of a great number of Senators, as we may read in their histories. Wherein Paulus Iouius was deceiued, who held, That the estate of Venice had continued eight hundred yeares: and Paulus Manutius, and du Moulin, haue erred more, saying, That it had bene of twelue hundred yeares standing: for it is well verified by the auntient registers of their Seigneurie, that before Cebastian Cian duke of Venice, in the yeare 1175, it was a meere Monarchy: and yet there hath not bene any Aristocraticall estat, to our knowledge, that hath so long continued, but have bene for the most part chaunged into cruell Tyrannies, or bloodie Popular estates, as we have shewed elsewhere. And to make it more apparant, I will produce for a new example the state of Genes, who hauing peace with the Venetians, by meanes of the protection of Fraunce, soone after the Adornes, and Fregoses, divided the state (the which at that time was Aristocraticall) into two factions, whence ensued many murthers of the chiefe men: so as the people fell to armes, freed themselves from subiection, and tooke the government of the state from the gentlemen: and in succession of time made a law, whereby none might bee duke of Genes, vnlesse[*](Anno. 1506. The estate of Genes, and the change thereof.) hee were a Plebeian: and since they have published another law, prohibiting the nobles to have aboue a third part of all other officers. And soone after in a sedition they expelled all their gentlemen, chusing eight Tribunes, and after they had reiected the protection of Fraunce, they chose a Dyer of silke for their duke, whome king Lewes the twelft caused to bee hanged▪ after that hee had taken the citie: but when as Andrew Doria reuolted, and that hee had power to dispose of the state at his pleasure, hee made choyce of all such as had six houses within the citie, and of some others of name and marke, which were not so rich, and divided them all into eight and twentie tribes, the which they called Alberghi, making them gentlemen, and giuing them the government of the state, and debarred the rest of the common people, onely with this exception, To haue libertie euerie yeare to make ten of the Plebeians gentlemen, and to receiue them into the number of the nobilitie: the which notwithstanding was not well executed. So of foure and twentie thousand citisens, there were not aboue twelue hundred, or thereabouts, that had any part in the state: and of this number it was decreed, That every yeare there should be a great Councell made of foure hundred, the which should chuse the Duke and the eight Gouernours, which they call the Seigneurie, to manage all affairs of state for the space of two yeres that they should be in charge, vnlesse matter were of great importance, then to assemble the Senat of an hundred gentlemen. And as for the duke, hee might not bee chosen but out of the noblest families, with a guard of 500 Lansquenets, besides the generall of the armie, and the fortie centiners. I omit other officers, as the Procurators of the Seigneurie, the Podestat, or Maior, the Iudges of the Rota, the seuen extraordinarie Iudges, the five Syndiks, the Censors, and the officers of Saint George. The estate of Genes hath continued in this sort 43 yeares, under the protection of the house of Austria. From the yeare 1528, unto the yeare 1549, that Iohn Flisco beeing chosen duke of Genes after Benedict Gentil, would haue made his power perpetuall, and to effect it, he laboured to subiect the Seigneurie of Genes unto the crowne of France, hauing alreadie defeated Andrew Dories armie, & slain his nephew, he fell into the seal leaping from one gally to another, the which ouerthrew all his desseins. Since the seigneury hath taken again the forme established by Andrew Doria, the which was cōtinued unto the yere 1574, that it was divided into two factions; the one of the antient, the other of the new gentlemen, who are yet at civill war: and the antient seeing themselves expelled by the new, have ceized upon the places of strength, and forts without the citie, being in danger to be quite ruined, or at the least to fall into a Popular estate, as they did in the yeare 1506. The sedition happened for the qualitie of their nobilitie: for after that Andrew Doria had setled the state (as I have said) & excluded the Plebeians from being dukes of Genes, the gentlemen of the antient houses (which were but foure, the Dorias, the Spinolas, the Grimoaldes, and the Fiesques) [*](The cause of factions at Genes.) caused their genealogies to be drawne and registred in publicke acts, diuiding themselves by this meanes from the Plebeians that were newly ennobled; who disdaining thereat, and finding themselves the greater number and the stronger, they haue chased away the antient houses, and if they be not soone reconciled, the people in the end will expell them all.

I have shewed before, that the great Councell or Senat in an Aristocraticall estate, ought to be perpetuall, to the end there may be some firme ground, or foundation whereon the annuall change of all officers may relie. And as for the Duke, it were strange if he should not ceaze upon the Soueraigntie, hauing fiue hundred men for his guard, seeing that he hath two yeares to remaine in charge: considering the factions that are made to attaine unto this dignitie of honour. We see then that the chiefe[*](The ground and support of an Optimacie.) ground and support of an Aristocratie, consists in the mutuall loue of the commanders: for if they agree and be of one mind, they will maintaine themselves, and gouerne much better than the people: But if there be any factions among them, then there is no State so difficult to maintaine, for the reasons before mentioned; especially, if the Commanders be martiall men: for souldiers hate nothing more than peace. And we may not marueile if the Aristocratie of the Venetians, Rhagusians and Luquois, have continued some ages: for they are not giuen to armes, neither have they any thing in greater recommendation than their trafficke and commoditie. And to conclude [*](The best kind of Optimacie.) briefly, there is no forme of Aristocratie more perfect and goodly, nor more assured, than whereas they make choise of men of vertue and reputation to commaund; or at the least that they be not infamous: and if any one dies, to substitute another in his place by election, as they do vse at Geneua. If any one of the Councell of 25 dies, the most antient of the 60 succeeds him most commonly, although it be done by election: and the most antient of the great Councell of 200 comes into the Councell of 60, and the two hundred chuse one of the honestest Burgesses or citisens that is without reproch. Whereby few command and gouerne the state, and yet every man hopes to attaine unto it, not by mony nor ambition, but by honour and vertue. This may properly be called an Aristocratie, the which is least subiect unto dangers, and to the rebellion of Lords or subiects.

Such a Seigneurie will obserue the lawes duly, and administer iustice uprightly: if they be contented with their estate, and seeke not ambitiously to wrest from another, as the Lacedemonians did. For it is impossible that a Seigneurie of few Lords and Commanders, should get and maintaine a great Empire, as a Monarke may: also the ruine and change of so great a Seigneurie is not so much to be feared, as of a great and mightie Monarchie, which draweth after it the ruine of the greatest familes, and oftentimes of allies and of neighbour States that are in his protection: Like unto a great building which raised on high, blind the sight of others, and falling, ruines with her weight those that are neere it, with a fearefull noyse to them that heare it. Behold the commodities and discommodities of a popular and Aristocraticall estate. Now we[*](The discommodities of a Monarchie.) are to speake of a Monarchie, which all great men have preferred before all other Commonweales: yet we find it is subiect vnto many dangers, whether the change of the Monarke be from bad to good, or from good to better: although there were no[*](Plato lib. 4. de Legib. Mutatines in republica putat esse . ) other thing but the change of him that hath the Soueraigntie: yet is it much to be feared in all states: for we commonly see in the change of Princes, new desseines, new lawes, new officers, new friends, new enemies, new habits, and a new forme of liuing: for most commonly all Princes take a delight to change and alter all things, that they may be spoken of; the which doth many times cause great inconueniences, not only

to the subiects in particular, but also to the whole bodie of the state. But if this were not, and the Prince were as wise and vertuous as might be desired, yet the leagues and treaties made with his Predecessor end with him: whereupon alliances being ended, Princes fall to armes, and the stornger assailes the weaker, or prescribes him a law. The which cannot chance in popular and Aristraticall estates, when as they make perpetuall leagues, for that the people dies not; so as other Princes and priuat men desire rather to contract with a Seigneurie than with a Prince, for the assurance of treaties and bonds, wherunto the successors of Princes are not tied, vnlesse they be their heires, as manie maintaine and practise. The other inconuenience in a Monarchie is, the danger to fall into civill warre, by the diuisions and factions of such as aspire unto the crowne, especially if it be electiue, the which doth oftentimes draw after it the ruine of the state: Yea, in a successiue right there is no small danger, if there be many in one degree, who many times kill one another, or at the least diuide the subiects. We have too many examples before our eyes: and oftentimes the lawfull successour is expelled by an vsurper. But admit there were no contention for the Monarchie, yet if the Monarke be a child, there will be some diuision for the gouernement, betwixt the mother and the Princes, or betwixt the Princes themselves. And God (to be revenged of his people) threatens to giue them for Princes children and women. And although the[*](Isaie. cap. 5.) infant have a tutor by the appointment of his predecessour, or by the custome, yet is it to be feared, that he will make himselfe absolute Lord▪ as Triphon did, who cruelly[*](The tutors to Monarchs do oftentimes make thmselues absolute Lords.) slue his pupill the king of Siria, to make himselfe king. The which is more to be feared, if the tutor marrieth the pupils mother, as Lewis Sforce did, who by that meanes murthered the young prince, and made himselfe duke of Milan. And although for the auoiding of this danger, they giue the gouernement to the neerest of kinne, and the nourishment of the infant to the mother; yet haue there bene murthering mothers since, who have not onely sold and betrayed the state, but euen the lives of their children, as the mother of Charilaus king of Lacedemon did. And sometimes the tutor[*](Plutar. in Licur.) continues his government, and leaues nothing unto the king but the title, as the duke of Northumberland did to Edward the sixt king of England: and Appelles to young Philip king of Macedon, who could not inioy his estate, vntill he had slaine his tutor.[*](Poib. lib. 7.) And if the prince comes to the crowne being yong and out of government, there is no lesse danger: for then when as he should have a dozen wise maisters to restraine his licentious appetits, the which are then most violent, he is altogether free and at liberty: so as commonly the courts of yong princes abound in follies, maskes, and licentiousnesse, and the subiects follow the princes humor; so as for one vice there multiplies ten, as I have said before. If the prince be warlike, he will hazzard his subiects, his estate, and his person, to make proofe of his valour. And although he come unto the state being of a competent age and wise, the which is rare, and the greatest gift which a people can craue at Gods hands: yet soueraigntie hath his mischiefe, most commonly the wise become foolish, the valliant cowards, and the good grow wicked. It were[*](Soueraigntie altereth the h mors of princes.) time lost to repeat examples, the which are too ordinarie. To conclude, if the prince be subtill and wicked, he will plant a tyrannie: if he be cruell, he will make a butcherie of the commonweale; or a brothell house if he be licentious, or both together if hee be couetous, he will pull both haire and skinne from his subiects: if he be prodigall, he will sucke their bloud and marrow to glut some dosaine of horseleeches that are about his person. And yet he will do worse than all this, if he be a sot and ignorant, as we have sayd elsewhere. Yea, so much the more is a tyrannie to be feared, for that a tyrant hath no maister nor companion to oppose against him. These bee the dangers of a Monarchie, the which in truth are great, but there is greater perill in an Aristocraticall estate, and much more in a Popular: for the dangers which we have set downe for the most part cease, when as the Monarchie comes by right of succession, as we will shew hereafter. But seditions, factions, and civill warre, are in a manner continuall: yea,[*](Comparison of dangers.) sometimes greater for the attaining unto offices, in Aristocraticall and Popular commonweales, than for the state in a Monarchie; the which admits no sedition for offices, nor for the state, but after the death of the prince, and that very seldome. But the chiefe point of a commonweale, which is the right of soueraigntie, cannot be, nor subsist (to speake properly) but in a Monarchie: for none can be soueraigne in a commonweale[*](Commodities of a Monarchie.) but one alone: if they be two, or three, or more, no one is soueraigne, for that no one of them can giue or take a law from his companion. And although we imagin a bodie of many lords, or of a whole people to hold the soueraigntie; yet hath it no true ground, nor support, if there bee not a head with absolute and soueraigne power, to vnite them together: the which a simple magistrat without soueraigne authoritie cannot do. And if it chance that the lords, or the tribes of the people be divided (as it often fals out) then must they fall to armes one against another. And although the greatest part be of one opinion, yet may it so happen, as the lesser part hauing many legions, and making a head, may oppose it selfe against the greater number, and get the victorie. We see the difficulties which are, and alwayes have bene in Popular states and seigneuries, whereas they hold contrary parts, and for diuerse magistrats: some demaund peace, others warre, some will have this law, others that; some will have one commander, others another; some will treat a league with the king of France, others with the king of Spaine, corrupted or drawne some one way some another, making open warre: as it hath bene seene in our age among the Grisons. Moreouer, sometimes it happens by the custome of the countrey, that a law, the prince, or a magistrat, is not admitted, if all that have voices giue not their consent: as in Polonia whereas the lesser part must change their opinion, and ioyne with the greater number, either by loue or force, and for this cause they come armed to the field to chuse their king, and to force the lesser part to consent: the which cannot happen where there is a soueraigne head, of whom depends the resolution of all things. Moreouer, in a Popular and Aristocraticall estate, alwayes the greater number will bee beleeued,[*](In Popular and Aristocraticall estates the lesser part is always ouerruled by the geater, the which is contrarie in a Monarchie.) although the wiser and the most vertuous bee fewest in number; so as most commonly the sounder and the better part is forced to yeeld unto the greater, at the appetite of an impudent Tribune, or a brasen faced Orator. But a soueraigne Monarch may ioyne with the sounder and the better part, and make choise of wise men, and well practised in matters of state: whereas necessitie doth force them in other commonweales to admit wise men and fooles and altogether to offices and councell. It is also impossible for a Popular state, or an Aristocratie, to command with soueraigne power, or to do any act which cannot bee done but by one person onely: as to conduct an armie and such like things: but they must create magistrats and commissaries to that end, who have neither the soueraigne power, authoritie, nor maiestie of a Monarch. And what power soeuer they have by vertue of their places, yet Popular and [*](Liuie lib. 3. Lib. 2. Lib. 7. Lib. 4.) Aristocraticall commonweales, finding themselves imbarked in any dangerous warre, either against the enemie, or among themselves, or in difficultie to proceed criminally against some mightie citisen, or to giue order for the plague, or to create magistrats, or to do anie other thing of great consequence, did vsually create a Dictator, as a soueraigne Monarch: knowing well that a Monarchie was the anckor whereunto of necessitie they must have recourse, Trepid--- patres, saith Titus Liuius, ad summum anxilium decurrunt, Dictatorem dici placet, The fearefull fathers flie unto their last refuge, they thought it best to name a Dictator. And when as Hanniball made all Italie to tremble, Ad Dictatorem dicendum remedium iamdiu desideratum Ciuit as confugit, The citie fled [*](Liis lib. 22.) vnto the remedie so long desired, which was to name a Dictator. And the reason was, for that they held the Dictator for a god, and his commandements for oracles, Dict---toris Edictum pro numine semper obseruatum, The Dictators Edict was alwayes religiously[*](Lib. 6.) obserued. And euen the enemies besieging the citie of Rome, abandoned the siege, hearing that they had created a Dictator, Tantus erat Dictatoris terror apud hostes, vt eo creato statim a menibus disceserint, So great was the feare of a Dictator with the enemies, as he was no sooner created, but they departed from the wals. For[*](Lib. 5.) oftentimes euen the Consuls and their commaundements were neglected and troden under foote: and such as had offended retired to their companions, that is to say, to the people, to whom they might appeale. The which Appius the Consull seeing, hee [*](Lie lib. 2.) sayd, Minas esse Consul---m non imperium, vbi ad eos qui vna peccauer unt prouocare liceat agedum, Dictatorem a quo prouocatio non est creemas, They were but the threats, sayd he, of Consuls without any commanding power, seeing they might appeale unto them who had offended in the like manner, Go to then, let vs create a Dictator from whom there is no appeale. The impunitie of vices, and the contempt of magistrats in a Popular estate, doth sufficiently shew that Monarchs are necessarie for the preseruation of the societie of mankind, seeing that the Romans who for the error of one Prince, had all kings in hatred, made a Dictator for the conduct of all their great affaires. So did the Lacedemonians in their extremities create a magistrat with power like unto the Dictator, whom they called Harmoste: and the Thessaliens, him whom they called [*](Dionys. Hali. lib. 6.) Archus: as in the like case the Mityleniens their great Aezimnere; to whom the great Prouidador of the Venetians may be in some sort compared: finding by experience that an absolute power vnited in one person, is more eminent and of greater effect▪ and that the same power imparted to two, three, or many lords, or to a whole communaltie, declines and looseth his force, like unto a ---agot vnbound and divided into manie parts. And therefore Tacitus saith, that for the execution of great exploits the power of commanding must be restrained to one alone: the which is confirmed by Titus Liuius, who sayd, that three Tribunes created with Consularie power, gaue a sufficient testimonie that the force of command imparted to manie, is fruitlesse: and especially in millitarie causes, the which Hanniball did find, hauing against him an armie of 60000 [*](Plurium bell vtil.) men, commanded by two Consuls, Paulus Aemilius, and Terentius Varro, whom hee defeated: and Amurath against the Christian Princes at the battell of Nicopolis: and the emperour Charles the fift against the two commaunders of the protestants. And we may not marueile if the duke of Vrbin with a few hierlings made head against so mightie an armie, led by the chiefe commanders or generals, the which depended not one of another, that is to say, Rance Vitelli, and Laurence de Medicis: for euen Leo writes in his historie, that the people of Affricke hold it for an infallible Maxime, that a prince[*](An antient opinion of the Affric.) which is but weake in forces, shall alwayes defeate a stronger armie that hath two generals. For whilest that Cleomenes king of Lacedemon did gouerne absolutely alone, he obtained great and goodly victories, and was neuer vanquished: but after that hee had called home the king which was banished to impart his soueraigne authoritie unto him, soone after he was ouerthrowne and put to flight. And for this cause Aristides the iust, being chosen generall with Miltiades to commaund the armie either of them[*](Plut. in Aristid.) his daie, (as the Romane Consuls were wont to do) he resigned all his power and authoritie to his companion, who gaue the Persians a great ouerthrow. There are a thousand such like examples, which do shew vs the necessitie to have one head or commander, not onely in warre (where there is greatest danger) but also to obey one soueraigne[*](One soueraigne commander most necessarie.) prince in a Commonweale: for euen as an armie is ill led, and most commonly defeated that hath many Generals; euen so is a Commonweale that hath manie lords, either by diuision, or a diuersitie of opinions, or by the diminution of power giuen to manie, or by the difficultie there is to agree and resolue upon any thing, or for that the subiects know not whom to obey, or by the discouerie of matters which should be kept secret, or through altogether. And therefore whereas we sayd before, that in a well ordered state, the soueraigne power must remaine in one onely, without communicating any part thereof unto the state (for in that case it should be a Popular government and no Monarchie) and that all wise Politicians, Philosophers, Diuines, and Historiographers have highly commended a Monarchie aboue all other Commonweales, it is not to please the prince, that they hold this opinion, but for the safetie and happinesse of the subiects: And contrariwise, when as they shall limit and restraine the soueraigne power of a Monarch, to subiect him to the generall estates, or to the councell, the soueraigntie hath no firme foundation, but they frame a popular confusion, or a miserable Anarchie, which is the plague of all states, & Commonweales; the which must be duly considered, not giuing credit to their goodly discourses, which perswade subiects, that it is necessarie to subiect Monarchs, and to prescribe their prince a law; for that it is not onely the ruine of the Monarch, but also of the subiects. It is yet more strange, that many hold an opinion that the prince is subiect to his lawes, that is to say, subiect to his will, whereon the civill lawes (which he hath made) depend; a thing impossible by nature. And under this colour and ill digested opinion, they make a mixture and confusion of civill lawes with the lawes of nature, and of both ioyntly with the lawes of God: so as they suppose, when as the prince forbids to kill, to steale, or to commit adulterie, that it is the princes law. But for that we have layd open this poynt at large, I will now passe it ouer. It shall suffice that we have made apparant demonstration, that a pure absolute Monarchie is the surest Commonweale, and without comparison the best of all. Wherein many are abused, which maintaine that an Optimacie is the best kind of government: for that many commanders have more[*](Aliud est consulere aliud imprare.) iudgement, wisedome, and councell then one alone; But there is a great difference betwixt councell and commandement: The aduice and councell of many graue and wise men may be better than of one, as they say commonly that many men see more than one alone: but to resolue, to determine and to command, one will alwayes performe it better than many: and then he which hath aduisedly digested all their opinions, will soone resolue without contention, the which many cannot easily performe: Besides ambition is so naturall among commanders that are equall in power, as some will rather see the ruine of the Commonweale, than acknowledge any one to be wiser than themselves: Others know what is good, but shame keepes them from changing of their opinions, fearing to loose the least point of their reputations: So as it is necessarie to have a soueraigne prince, which may have power to resolue and determine of the opinions of his councell.

If then a commonweale be but one body, how is it possible it should haue manie[*](One body cannot have many heads.) heads, but that it must proue a monster, as the emperour Tiberius sayd unto the Senate, else it were no bodie, but a hideous monster with many heads. But some one will say that new princes make new lawes, new institutions, new ordinances: we will confesse that it happens in some, who to shew their power make lawes sometimes without any reason, but this is more frequent and usuall without comparison in Popular and Aristocraticall estates: For new magistrats so often created, and which play the pettie kings in their Commonweales, would bee loth the yeare should passe away without giuing some cause to speake of them, either for good, or euil: for proofe whereof we find more lawes published at Rome and at Athens, then throughout all the world:

For alwayes through iealousie one vndid what another had made: and all, as they said, was to make themselves famous, and to rob the honour of their companions, with the preiudice of the Commonweale. But to auoid these inconueniences, and insatiable ambitions in an Optimacie, or Popular state, you must not in any sort suffer the law or ordinance to carrie the name of the magistrat, as they used in Rome and Athens, which was the cause of so many lawes. And to say that treaties and leagues die with the Prince, that happens not alwayes, for most commonly they are continued and prorogued by an expresse clause, some yeares after the death of the prince, as it hath bene alwayes obserued betwixt the house of France and the Cantons of the Suissers, the which have beene for the kings life, and five yeares after. Moreouer, we haue formerly shewed, that it is expedient allyances and leagues should not bee perpetuall; and for this cause states and commonweales do oftentimes limit their treaties to a certaine time. And as for bonds and treaties of peace, they are accustomed for their better assurance to have them confirmed by the estates, or published in soueraigne courts, and oftentimes they bind in particular the greatest noblemen: although there bee farre greater assurance in matter of obligation and promises made by a prince than by a multitude: and the rather for that the lawes of honour are in much more recommendation to a soueraigne prince, than to a multitude of artisans or marchants, who are kings in a[*](The lawes of honour are in greater recommendatiō to a Monarch than to a multitude.) name collectiue, and nothing in particular. And as for the troubles which the gouernement of a young king do cause, that happens rarely, and is more incident at the election of magistrats: For at the chusing of a Gonfalonier of Genes for two yeares onely, the Commonweale is euer in combustion. There is no reason to ballance the cruelties and extorsions of a tyrant, with the actions of good princes: we know wel that a peaceable Optimacie and wisely gouerned, if it may be, is better than a cruell tyrannie. But the question is, whether it be better to have a iust and upright king, or manie good lords: and whether a tyrannie of fiftie tyrants be not more dangerous, than of one tyrant alone: And if there be not much more danger in Popular and Aristocraticall estates, than in a Monarchie. Yea it is most certaine that a tyrannicall Monarchie is sometimes more to be desired than a Democratie or Optimacie, how good soeuer:[*](Many gouernors hinder on another.) For if many wise and skilfull pilots hinder one another in striuing to gouerne the helme; euen so will many lords do, every one seeking to gouerne the Commonweale, be they neuer so wise and vertuous. Although it be not needfull to insist much upon this proofe, that a Monarchie is the most sure, seeing that a familie which is the true image of a Commonweale can have but one head, and that all the lawes of nature[*](A Monarchie is naturall.) guide vs unto a Monarchie, whether that we behold this little world which hath but one bodie, and but one head for all the members, whereon depends the will, mouing and feeling: or if we looke to this great world which hath but one soueraigne God: or if we erect our eyes to heauen, we shall see but one sunne: and euen in sociable creatures, we see they cannot admit many kings, nor many lords, how good soeuer. Solyman emperour of the Turkes used this example, hearing the great cries and acclamations[*](Anno. 1552.) of ioy which the whole armie made unto Sultan Mustapha his son returning out of Persia, he put him to death through iealousie, causing him to be strangled in his withdrawing chamber, and his dead body to be cast out before the whole armie: then he made a proclamation, that there was but one God in heauen, and one Sultan upon earth: Two dayes after he put Sultan Gobe to death, for that he had wept for his brother; and Sultan Mehemet the third brother, for that he fled for feare; leauing but one sonne liuing, to auoid the danger of many lords. We also see that all nations of the earth from all antiquitie, euen when they were guided by a naturall instinct, had no other forme of gouernement than a Monarchie, that is to say, the Assirians, Medes, Persians, Aegyptians, Indians, Parthians, Macedonians, Celtes, Gauls, Scythians, Arabians, [*](Examples of the greatest Monarchies of the world.) Turks, Moscouits, Tartars, Polonians, Danes, Spaniards, English, Affricans, and Perusians, where there is no mention of any Optimacie, or Popular estate. Yea all the auntient people of Greece and Italie, before they were corrupted with ambition, had none but kings and monarches, as the Athenians, Lacedemonians, Corinthians, Acheans, Sicyonians, Candiots, Sicilians, Ethiopians, Latines, and Hetrusques, the which have flourished in arms & laws, foure, fiue, six, & seuen hundred yeres; yea some have continued eight or nine hundred yeares, others twelue or thirteen hundred yeres. And yet some wonder that the Popular estate of the Romans▪ or the Seigneuries of Lacedemon, and Venice, had continued foure hundred yeres, or thereabouts, after they had expelled their kings doubtlesse they have reason to maruel, to see two or three Cōmonweales among a hundred, able to continue any time, beeing instituted against the order of nature: but no man is amazed to see many great & mightie Monarchies continue a thousand, or twelue hundred yeares, for that it is according to the right lawes of nature. And although the name of a king were hatefull unto the Romans, yet many of the--- in particular affect to be soueraignes: for not many moneths before Augustus his birth, it was found out by oracles, that nature should soone bring forth a great Monarch[*](Sueton. in August) of the Romans. For this cause the Senat decreed, That all infants should bee slaine that were to be borne that yeare: but every one in particular did hinder the carrying of this decree into Saturnes temple, for that every one (saith the historie) did hope his sonne should be a Monarch. In like sort the princes of Persia being assembled together to consult which forme of gouerment were the better, they concluded a Monarchy. The same argument was called in question by Augustus among his friends, being desirous to live at rest, and to leaue the state, after that hee had p---t the nauie of Mare Anthonie to flight: but it was resolued, That a Monarchy was the most safe without all comparison, and the effects did verifie it: for in former times the Romans could not live ten yeares together without civill warres, or some sedition: and Augustus maintained them quietly in peace almost fiftie yeares, the which continued long after his death. Experience is the mistresse of all things, and as the touchstone, resolues all doubts. Therefore the Capadocians hauing lost their king, they were persuaded by the Romans, to take a Popular estate: but they refused it, and demaunded a king: so as the Romans gaue them power to chuse one, and they aduanced Ariobarzanes; finding the calamities of Popular states▪ To conclude, if we seeke authoritie, we shall find that the greatest schollers that euer were, have held a Monarchy to be the best: as Homer, Herodotus, Plato, Aristotle, Xenophon, Plutarch, Philon, Apolonius, Saint Ierosme, Cyprian, Maximus Tirius, and many others. And euen in the law of God, it is said, When as the people shall chuse a king, like unto other nations, he shall not take a straunger: Wherby he not onely sheweth, that God approueth a Monarchy, teaching a king how hee should gouerne, but also that other nations in those dayes had nothing but Monarchies, as Samuel saith. He also made Moyses king over his people, for so hee is called [*](Sam. 1. 12. Deut. 33.) in the law of God. And although that God gouerned his people ---or a time without a king, sending them alwaies by an especial fauor certaine captains, as princes & judges to free them from the subiection of their neighbors, whome the holy Scripture calls Messies, and Sauiours: yet was there neuer any Optimacie, or Popular estate among them,[*](Nehem. 10.) but contrariwise they were a long time without either prince or magistrat, beeing guided[*](Sam. 2. c. 12.) onely by the grace of God, who for this cause is called their king. And after their returne out of Babilon, they were still subiect to the kings of Persia, or of Aegypt, or of[*](A Monarchy allowed by the law of God.) Syria: vntill that Iudas Machabeus of the familie of the Azmoneans, descended from Aaron (hauing rebelled against Antiochus the Noble, king of Syria) brought the office of high priest, and the soueraigntie unto his house, who were afterwards subdued by the Romans. For as for their Senat, which consisted of seuentie one, the king making the seuentie two, and the most part of the line of Dauid; they busied not themselves in any thing else, but in iudging of causes of great consequence, as of the high priest, or of some tribe, or of crimes of high treason, or of false prophets: & for this cause they were onely called Iudges, whome by the corrupt Greeke word they called Sanedrim. The Caldean interpretor saith, That although they had power to make lawes, euen under kings, yet was it no soueraigne authoritie. True it is, that Rabin Magmon calling them Doctors or Informers, saith, That they had also power to create twentie three criminal Iudges, whome they called Iudges of soules; and seuen Iudges for civill causes, whom they tearmed Iudges of goods in euerie citie; and ten Iudges for gouenment, among the which there was one priest, or as Ioseph saith, two Leuites assistant to every magistrat: and three other Arbitrators, whereof either of the parties did chuse one, and the two that were chosen did name a third. The which I have particularly set downe, to confute their opinion, which maintaine with Ioseph the Historian, That the Hebrewes[*](Lib.. c. 6. antiq. ) have used a kind of Aristocraticall government, taking the Senat of seuentie one for soueraigne lords: all whome Herod, the eldest sonne of captaine Antipater put to death, for that they had condemned him, and had executed him, but for the favour of Hircanus king and high priest, who gaue him his pardon, or at the least staied the decree of the Senat; and afterwards he murthered his sauiour. Which sheweth plainely, that the Senat had no soueraigne power, and that it was no Optimacie: although that Iosephus [*](Ioseph. de antiq. lib.4. c. 5.) brings in the Iewes complaynig, Quod Hircanus & Aristobulus formam Reipub▪ in regnum mutarent, That Hircanus, and Aristobulus, had chaunged the forme of the Commonweale into a Monarchy. In my opinion these reasons, with many others (which are not needfull to be here particularly exprest) are sufficient to shew, that of the three kinds of lawfull governments, a perfect Monarchy is the most excelleu---: and among the disordered, the Democratie the most vicious. A lawfull Monarchy (as a strong and able bodie) may easily be maintained: but Popular states, and Aristocraties, as feeble and weake, and subiect to many infirmities, must be preserued by diet and good government. And for that it is not alwayes in the power of wise and politike states-men, to chuse the best kind of government, nor to alter and change the worst, they must in this case doe like vnto skilfull ship maisters, which yeeld unto the tempest; they strike their sailes, and cast forth euen their most pretious marchandise, to attaine unto a safe port. Euen so a wise man that seekes to change a state from bad to good, or from good to better; he must first insinuat with the greatest, and by obsequious obseruation draw them to his will. But if he be not assured to effect it, let him not attempt it: as Dion did, who ruined the Tyranny of Siracusa, suddenly to erect an Optimacie, by the councell and aduice of Plato: and not able to effect it, he was slaine: so as it became an estate of a turbulent multitude, much more miserable without all comparison than any tyranny. As also the Pithagorians did, who laboured suddenly to change all the Popular estates of Italie, into meere Optimacies, hauing not force sufficient to effect it, but they were all slaine, or banished. But if this Popular infirmitie cannot be cured by any physicke, it must bee borne withall, beeing better to have a bad Commonweale than none at all; and attend the time vntill the tyranny of one, of few, or of many, be mounted to the highest precipice or downfall, from whence at the first storme they may be cast downe, or fall of themselves. Else if the tyrant be but shaken, and not quite ouerthrowne, he will commit horrible murthers of the best citisens, to fortifie and[*](A tyrant is insupportable that hath escaped any nspiracie.) settle his tyranny. For a tyrant that hath once escaped the hands of such as had conspired against him, he becomes mad and furious, like unto a wild beast that sees his owne blood. We have too many examples, and without any further search, we have seene Cosmo de Medicis (whome the banished men of Florence called Tyrant, although hee were esteemed of many others to be a good and a wise prince) build forts, & increased his Monarchy with the ruines of such as had conspired against his life and state, and yet neuer any one conspiracie tooke effect. Besides, a Tyrannie is much more insupportable, if the tyrant hath no large limits and great territories: for being poore and hungry, he oppresseth and deuours his subiects continually; & if he be cruell, he soone attaines to his desire: whereas a rich and mightie Monarch hath wherewithall to glut his appetite,[*](The subiects are happy under a great Monarch.) and if he be cruell hee will stand in feare that some one in so great a multitude will take revenge. Euen then as the subiects are happie under a great and mightie Monarch, if he have any sparke of iustice before his eyes: so a small estate is best befitting an Aristocraticall government, who will maintaine their subiects more happily than a poore tyrant should do. We see eighteene Cantons of the Swissers, besides the Grisons, whose governments are Popular, and Aristocraticall, hauing in length from Geneua unto Constance but two hundred and fiftie thousand paces, and a hundred and threescore in bredth from the Alpes unto mount Iura, most of which countrey is full of rockes, and very barren; yet have they maintained their subiects a long time in great happinesse: but if they should enuie and desire their neighbors estate, they should soone loose their owne. And contrariwise the greater the Monarch is, the more goodly and flourishing it is, and the subiect more happie, liuing in an assured peace. But if it chance to be divided into Democraties, or Optimacies, or into many tyrannies, the people are either tyrannised, or in sedition among themselves, or in continuall warre against their neighbours. Seeing then a Monarchy is the most sure of all Commonweales, and amongst all Monarchies a Royall is the goodliest: let vs say, whether it bee better to have it by a successiue right, or by election.