Institutio Oratoria

Quintilian

Quintilian. Institutio Oratoria, Volume 1-4. Butler, Harold Edgeworth, translator. Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Press, William Heinemann Ltd., 1920-1922.

Grant these points also and we can still raise the question whether the sum is due at all? On the other hand, no one will be so insane as to drop what he considers his strongest point and pass to others of minor importance. The following case from a scholastic theme is of a similar character.

You may not disinherit your adopted son. And if you may disinherit him quâ adopted son, you may not disinherit one who is so brave. And if you may disinherit one who is so brave, you may not disinherit him because he has
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not obeyed your every command; and if he was bound to obey you in all else, you may not disinherit him on the ground of his choice of a reward; and even if the choice of a reward may give just ground for disinheriting, that is not true of such a choice as he actually made. [*]( The adopted son has done some heroic deed, bringing him under the scholastic law vir fortis optet quod uolet, Let a hero choose what reward he will ( cp. v. x. 97). A scandalous choice might give ground for disinheriting him (cp. § 24 below), but the choice in question is not scandalous. )
Such is the nature of dissimilarity where points of law are concerned. Where, however, the question is one of fact, there may be several points all tending to the same result, of which some may be dropped as not essential to the main issue, as for instance if a man accused of theft should say to his accuser,
Prove that you had the property, prove that you lost it, prove that it was stolen, prove that it was stolen by me.
The first three can be dropped, but not the last. I used also to employ the following method.

I went back from the ultimate species (which generally contains the vital point of the case) to the first general question or descended from the genus to the ultimate species, [*](cp. v. x. 5, 6. The statement man is an animal is insufficient as a definition, animal being the genus. Man is mortal introduces a species, but one common to other animals. Man is rational introduces the ultima species. ) applying this method even to deliberative themes.

For example, Numa is deliberating whether to accept the crown offered him by the Romans. First he considers the general question,

Ought I to be a king?
Then,
Ought I to be king in a foreign state? Ought I to be king at Rome? Are the Romans likely to put up with such a king as myself?
So too in controversial themes. Suppose a brave man to choose another man's wife as his reward. The ultimate species is found in the question whether lie is allowed to choose another man's wife. The general question is whether he should be given whatever he chooses. Next come questions such as whether he can choose his reward from the property of private individuals, whether he
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can choose a bride as his reward, and if so, whether he can choose one who is already married.

But in our search for such questions we follow an order quite different from that which we employ in actual speaking. [*](cp. III. ix. 6. ) For that which as a rule occurs to us first, is just that which ought to come last in our speech: as for instance the conclusion,

You have no right to choose another man's wife.
Consequently undue haste will spoil our division of the subject. We must not therefore be content with the thoughts that first offer themselves, but should press our inquiry further till we reach conclusions such as that he ought not even to choose a widow: a further advance is made when we reach the conclusion that be should choose nothing that is private property, or last of all we may go back to the question next in order to the general question, and conclude that he should choose nothing inequitable.

Consequently after surveying our opponent's proposition, an easy task, we should consider, if possible, what it is most natural to answer first. And, if we imagine the case as being actually pleaded and ourselves as under the necessity of making a reply, that answer will probably suggest itself. On the other hand,

if this is impossible, we should put aside whatever first occurs to us and reason with ourselves as follows:

What if this were not the case?
We must then repeat the process a second and a third time and so on, until nothing is left for consideration. Thus we shall examine even minor points, by our treatment of which we may perhaps make the judge all the better disposed to us when we come to the main issue.

The rule that we should descend from the common to the particular is much the same, since

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what is common is usually general. For example,
He killed a tyrant
is common, while
A tyrant was killed by his son, by a woman or by his wife
are all particular.

I used also to note down separately whatever was admitted both by my opponent and myself, provided it suited my purpose, and not merely to press any admissions that he might make, but to multiply them by partition, as for example in the following controversial theme:—

A general, who had stood against his father as a candidate and defeated him, was captured: the envoys who went to ransom him met his father returning from the enemy. He said to the envoys, 'You are too late.' They searched the father and found gold in his pockets. They pursued their journey and found the general crucified. He cried to them, ' Beware of the traitor.' The father is accused.
What points are admitted by both parties?
We were told that there had been treason and told it by the general.
We try to find the traitor.
You admit that you went to the enemy, that you did so by stealth, that you returned unscathed, that you brought back gold and had it concealed about your person.

For an act of the accused may sometimes be stated in such a way as to tell heavily against him, and if our statement makes a real impression on the mind of the judge, it may serve to close his ears to all that is urged by the defence. For as a general rule it is of advantage to the accuser to mass his facts together and to the defence to separate them. I used also, with reference to the whole material of the case, to do what I have already mentioned [*](V. x. 66.) as being done with arguments, namely, after first

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setting forth all the facts without exception, I then disposed of all of them with the one exception of the fact which I wished to be believed. For example, in charges of collusion it may be argued as follows.

The means for securing the acquittal of an accused person are strictly limited. His innocence may be established, some superior authority may intervene, force or bribery may be employed, his guilt may be difficult to prove, or there may be collusion between the advocates. You admit that he was guilty; no superior authority intervened, no violence was used and you make no complaint that the jury was bribed, while there was no difficulty about proving his guilt. What conclusion is left to us save that there was collusion?

If I could not dispose of all the points against me, I disposed of the majority.

It is acknowledged that a man was killed: but he was not killed in a solitary place, such as might lead me to suspect that he was the victim of robbers; he was not killed for the sake of plunder, for nothing was taken from him; he was not killed in the hope of inheriting his property, for he was poor: the motive must therefore have been hatred, since you are his enemy.

The task not merely of division, but of invention as well, is rendered materially easier by this method of examining all possible arguments and arriving at the best by a process of elimination. Milo is accused of killing Clodius. Either he did or did not do the deed. The best policy would be to deny the fact, but that is impossible. It is admitted then that he killed him. The act must then have been either right or wrong. We urge that it was right. If so, the act must have either been deliberate or under

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compulsion of necessity, for it is impossible to plead ignorance.

The intention is doubtful, but as it is generally supposed to have existed, some attempt must he made to defend it and to show that it was for the good of the state. On the other hand, if we plead necessity, we shall argue that the fight was accidental and unpremeditated. One of the two parties then must have lain in wait for the other. Which was it? Clodius without doubt. Do you see how inevitably we are led to the right method of defence by the logical necessity of the facts?

We may carry the process further: either he wished to kill Clodius, who lay in wait for him, or he did not. The safer course is to argue that he did not wish to kill him. It was then the slaves of Milo who did the deed without Milo's orders or knowledge. But this line of defence shows a lack of courage and lessens the weight of our argument that Clodius was rightly killed.

We shall therefore add the words,

As every man would have wished his slaves to do under similar circumstances.
[*](pro Mil. x. 29. V. iv. 8. ) This method is all the more useful from the fact that often we can find nothing to say that really pleases us and yet have got to say something. Let us therefore consider every possible point; for thus we shall discover what is the best line for us to pursue, or at any rate what is least bad. Sometimes, as I have already said in the appropriate context, [*](pro Mil. x. 29. V. iv. 8. ) we may make good use of the statement of our opponent, since occasionally it is equally to the purpose of both parties. I am aware that some authors have written thousands of lines to show how we may discover which party ought to speak first. But in the actual
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practice of the courts this is decided either by some brutally rigid formula, or by the character of the suit, or finally by lot.

In the schools, on the other hand, such an enquiry is mere waste of time, since the prosecution and the defence are indifferently permitted to state a case and refute it in the same declamation. But in the majority of controversial themes it is not even possible to discover who should speak first, as for instance in the following:

A certain man had three sons, an orator, a philosopher and a physician. In his will he divided his property into four portions, three of which he distributed equally among his sons, while the fourth was to go to the son who rendered the greatest service to his country.

The sons dispute the point. It is uncertain who should speak first, but our course is clear enough. For we shall begin with the son whose role we assume. So much for the general rules by which we should be guided in making our division.

But how shall we discover those questions which present abnormal difficulty? Just as we discover reflexions, words, figures or the appropriate nuances of style, [*]( Or perhaps glosses, i. e. the giving of a special aspect to the case by skilful representation of facts. ) namely by native wit, by study and by practice. None the less it will be rare for anyone who is not a fool to fail to discover them, so long as he is content, as I have said, [*](§ 26.) to accept nature for a guide.

Many, however, in their passionate desire to win a reputation for eloquence are content to produce showy passages which contribute nothing to the proof of their case, while others think that their enquiry need not proceed further than that which meets the eye. To make my meaning clearer, I will cite a

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solitary example from the controversial themes of the schools; it is neither novel nor complicated.

The man who refuses to appear in defence of his father when accused of treason shall be disinherited: the man who is condemned for treason shall be banished together with his advocate. A father accused of treason was defended by one son who was a fluent speaker, while another son, who was uneducated, refused to appear for him. The father was condemned and banished with his advocate. The uneducated son performed some heroic act and demanded as a reward the restoration of his father and brother. The father returned and died intestate. The uneducated son claims a portion of his estate, the orator claims the whole for himself.