Institutio Oratoria

Quintilian

Quintilian. Institutio Oratoria, Volume 1-4. Butler, Harold Edgeworth, translator. Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Press, William Heinemann Ltd., 1920-1922.

Such arguments may also carry weight in deliberative oratory, as may those drawn from time, which I shall now proceed to discuss. Time may, as I have said elsewhere, [*](III. vi. 25.) be understood in two different senses, general and special. The first sense is seen in words and phrases such as

now,

formerly,

in the reign of Alexander,

in the days of the siege of Troy,

and whenever we speak of past, present or future. The second sense occurs when we speak either of definite periods of time such as

in summer,

in winter,

by night,

by day,

or of fortuitous periods such as

in time of pestilence,

in time of war,

during a banquet.

Certain Latin writers have thought it a sufficient distinction to call the general sense

time,

and the special

times.

In both senses time is of importance in advisory speeches and demonstrative oratory, but not so frequently as in forensic.

For questions of law turn on time, while it also determines the quality of actions and is of great importance in questions of fact; for instance, occasionally it provides irrefragable

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proofs, which may be illustrated by a case which I have already cited, [*](v. v. 2.) when one of the signatories to a document has died before the day on which it was signed, or when a person is accused of the commission of some crime, although he was only an infant at the time or not yet born.

Further, all kinds of arguments may easily be drawn either from facts previous to a certain act, or contemporary or subsequent. As regards antecedent facts the following example will illustrate my meaning;

You threatened to kill him, you went out by night, you started before him.

Motives of actions may also belong to past time.

Some writers have shown themselves over-subtle in their classification of the second class of circumstances, making

a sound was heard

an example of circumstances combined with an act and

a shout was raised

an instance of circumstances attached to an act. As regards subsequent circumstances I may cite accusations such as

You hid yourself, you fled, livid spots and swellings appeared on the corpse.

The counsel for the defence will employ the same divisions of time to discredit the charge which is brought against him.

In these considerations are included everything in connexion with words and deeds, but in two distinct ways. For some things are done because something else is like to follow, and others because something else has previously been done, as for instance, when the husband of a beautiful woman is accused of having acted as a procurer on the ground that he bought her after she was found guilty of adultery, or when a debauched character is accused of parricide on the ground that he said to his father

You have rebuked me for the last time.

[*]( Both cases are clearly themes from the schools of rhetoric. ) For

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in the former case the accused is not a procurer because he bought the woman, but bought her because he was a procurer, while in the latter the accused is not a parricide because he used these words, but used them because lie intended to kill his father.

With regard to accidental circumstances, which also provide matter for arguments, these clearly belong to subsequent time, but are distinguished by a certain special quality, as for instance if I should say,

Scipio was a better general than Hannibal, for he conquered Hannibal

;

He was a good pilot, for he was never shipwrecked

;

He was a good farmer, for he gathered in huge harvests

; or referring to bad qualities,

He was a prodigal, for he squandered his patrimony

;

His life was disgraceful, for he was hated by all.

We must also consider the resources possessed by the parties concerned, more especially when dealing with questions of fact; for it is more credible that a smaller number of persons were killed by a larger, a weaker party by a stronger, sleepers by men that were wide awake, the unsuspecting by the well-prepared, while the converse arguments may be used to prove the opposite.

Such considerations arise both in deliberative and forensic oratory: in the latter they occur in relation to two questions, namely, whether some given person had the will, and whether lie had the power to do the deed; for hope will often create the will to act. Hence the well-known inference in Cicero: [*](pro Mil. x. 29. )

Clodius lay in wait for Milo, not Milo for Clodius, for Clodius had a retinue of sturdy slaves, while Milo was with a party of women; Clodius was mounted, Milo in a carriage, Clodius lightly clad, Milo hampered by a cloak.