Republic

There remains for consideration, said I, the tyrannical man himself—the manner of his development out of the democratic type and his character and the quality of his life, whether wretched or happy. Why, yes, he still remains, he said. Do you know, then, what it is that I still miss? What? In the matter of our desires I do not think we sufficiently distinguished their nature and number. And so long as this is lacking our inquiry will lack clearness. Well, said he, will our consideration of them not still be opportune[*](For ἐν καλῷ cf. Soph. El. 348, Eurip. Heracleid. 971, Aristoph. Eccl. 321, Thesm. 292.)? By all means. And observe what it is about them that I wish to consider. It is this. Of our unnecessary pleasures[*](Cf. on 558 D.) and appetites there are some lawless ones, I think, which probably are to be found in us all, but which, when controlled[*](For κολαζόμεναι cf. on 559 B, p. 293, note c.) by the laws and the better desires in alliance with reason, can in some men be altogether got rid of, or so nearly so that only a few weak ones remain, while in others the remnant is stronger and more numerous. What desires do you mean? he said. Those, said I, that are awakened in sleep[*](Cf. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 102 b 5 ff. ὁ δ’ ἀγαθὸς καὶ κακὸς ἥκιστα διάδηλοι καθ’ ὕπνον, etc.; also his Problem. 957 a 21 ff. Cic. De divin. i. 29 translates this passage. Cf. further Herod. vi. 107, Soph. O.T. 981-982. Hazlitt writes We are not hypocrites in our sleep, a modern novelist, In sleep all barriers are down. The Freudians have at last discovered Plato’s anticipation of their main thesis. Cf. Trotter, Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War. p. 74: It has been perhaps Freud’s most remarkable thesis that dreams are manifestations of this emergence of desires and memories from the unconscious into the conscious field. The barriers of the Freudian unconscious are less tightly closed during sleep sententiously observes an eminent modern psychologist. Cf. Valentine, The New Psychology of the Unconscious, p. xiii. and ibid. p. 93: Freud refers to Plato’s view that the virtuous man does in actual life, but I believe he nowhere shows a knowledge of the following passage in the Republic. . . . Cf. ibid. p. 95: The germ of several aspects of the Freudian view of dreams, including the characteristic doctrine of the censor, was to be found in Plato. The Freudian view becomes at once distinctly more respectable. Many of the ancients, like some superstitious moderns, exalted the unconscious which reveals itself in dreams, and made it the source of prophecy. Cf. commentators on Aesch. Eumen. 104, Pindar, fr. 131 (96) Loeb, p. 589: εὕδει δὲ πρασσόντων μελέων, ἀτὰρ εὑδόντεσσιν ἐν πολλοῖς ὀνείροις | δείκνυσι τέρπνων ἐφέρποισαν χαλεπῶν τε κρίσιν, but it sleepeth while the limbs are active; yet to them that sleep, in many a dream it giveth presage of a decision of things delightful or doleful. (Sandys, Loeb tr.) Cf. Pausan. ix. 23, Cic. De div. i. 30, Sir Thomas Browne, Religio Medici, pp. 105-107 (ed. J. A. Symonds). Plato did not share these superstitions. Cf. the irony of Tim. 71 D-E, and my review of Stewart’s Myths of Plato, Journal of Philos. Psychol. and Scientific Methods, vol. iii., 1906, pp. 495-498.) when the rest of the soul, the rational, gentle and dominant part, slumbers, but the beastly and savage part, replete with food and wine, gambols and, repelling sleep, endeavors to sally forth and satisfy its own instincts.[*](The Greeks had no good word for instinct, but there are passages in Plato where this translation is justified by the context for ἦθος, φύσις and such words.) You are aware that in such case there is nothing it will not venture to undertake as being released from all sense of shame and all reason. It does not shrink from attempting to lie with a mother in fancy or with anyone else, man, god or brute. It is ready for any foul deed of blood; it abstains from no food, and, in a word, falls short of no extreme of folly[*](For the idiom οὐδὲν ἐλλείπει cf. Soph. Trach. 90, Demosth. liv. 34. Cf. also 602 D and on 593 A, p. 200, note b.) and shamelessness. Most true, he said. But when, I suppose, a man’s condition is healthy and sober, and he goes to sleep after arousing his rational part and entertaining it with fair words and thoughts, and attaining to clear self-consciousness, while he has neither starved nor indulged to repletion his appetitive part, so that it may be lulled to sleep[*](Cf. Browning, Bishop Blougram’s Apology, And body gets its sop and holds its noise. Plato was no ascetic, as some have inferred from passages in the Republic, Laws, Gorgias and Phaedo. Cf. Herbert L. Stewart, Was Plato an Ascetic? Philos. Re., 1915, pp. 603-613; Dean Inge, Christian Ethics, p. 90: The asceticism of the true Platonist has always been sane moderate; the hallmark of Platonism is a combination of self-restraint and simplicity with humanism.) and not disturb the better part by its pleasure or pain, but may suffer that in isolated purity to examine and reach out towards and apprehend some of the things unknown to it, past, present or future;

and when he has in like manner tamed his passionate part, and does not after a quarrel fall asleep[*](Cf. Ephesians iv. 26 Let not the sun go down upon your wrath.) with anger still awake within him, but if he has thus quieted the two elements in his soul and quickened the third, in which reason resides, and so goes to his rest, you are aware that in such case[*](ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ: cf. 382 B, 465 A, 470 C, 492 C, 590 A, Lysis 212 C, Laws 625 D.) he is most likely to apprehend truth, and the visions of his dreams are least likely to be lawless.[*](This sentence contains 129 words. George Moore says, Pater’s complaint that Plato’s sentences are long may be regarded as Pater’s single excursion into humor. But Pater is in fact justifying his own long sentences by Plato’s example. He calls this passage Plato’s evening prayer.)I certainly think so, he said. This description has carried us too far,[*](Plato always returns to the point after a digression. Cf. 543 C, 471 C, 544 B, 568 D, 588 B, Phaedo 78 B, Theaet. 177 C, Protag. 359 A, Crat. 438 A, Polit. 287 A-B, 263 C, 302 B, Laws 682 E, 697 C, 864 C, and many other passages. Cf. also Lysias ii. 61 ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἐξήχθην, Demosth. De cor. 211, Aristot. De an. 403 b 16, also p. 193, note i, and Plato’s carefulness in keeping to the point under discussion in 353 C, Theaet. 182 C, 206 C, Meno 93 A-B, Gorg. 479 D-E, 459 C-D, etc.) but the point that we have to notice is this, that in fact there exists in every one of us, even in some reputed most respectable,[*](For the irony of the expression Cf. Laws 693 D, Aesch. Eumen. 373.) a terrible, fierce and lawless brood of desires, which it seems are revealed in our sleep. Consider, then, whether there is anything in what I say, and whether you admit it. Well, I do. Now recall[*](Cf. 559 D f.) our characterization of the democratic man. His development was determined by his education from youth under a thrifty father who approved only the acquisitive appetites and disapproved the unnecessary ones whose object is entertainment and display. Is not that so? Yes. And by association with more sophisticated men, teeming with the appetites we have just described, he is impelled towards every form of insolence and outrage, and to the adoption of their way of life by his hatred of his father’s niggardliness. But since his nature is better than that of his corrupters, being drawn both ways he settles down in a compromise[*](εἰς μέσον: cf. p. 249, note f.) between the two tendencies, and indulging and enjoying each in moderation, forsooth,[*](Ironical. δή. See p. 300, note a. Cf. modern satire on moderate drinking and moderate preparedness.) as he supposes,[*](ὡς ᾤετο is another ironical formula like ἵνα δή, ὡς ἄρα, etc.) he lives what he deems a life that is neither illiberal nor lawless, now transformed from an oligarch to a democrat. That was and is our belief about this type. Assume,[*](θές: Cf. Theaet. 191 C, Phileb. 33 D.) then, again, said I, that such a man when he is older has a son bred in turn[*](This is the αὖ of the succession of the generations. Cf. p. 247, note f.) in his ways of life. I so assume. And suppose the experience of his father to be repeated in his case. He is drawn toward utter lawlessness, which is called by his seducers complete freedom. His father and his other kin lend support to[*](Cf. 559 E.) these compromise appetites while the others lend theirs to the opposite group.

And when these dread magi[*](An overlooked reference to the Magi who set up the false Smerdis. Cf. Herod. iii. 61 ff.) and king-makers come to realize that they have no hope of controlling the youth in any other way, they contrive to engender in his soul a ruling passion[*](Cf. Symp. 205 D.) to be the protector[*](προστάτην: cf. 562 D and 565 C-D.) of his idle and prodigal[*](For τὰ ἕτοιμα cf. 552 B, Symp. 200 D and E, and Horace, Odes i. 31. 17 frui paratis.) appetites, a monstrous winged[*](Cf. Alc. I. 135 E ἔρωτα ὑπόπτερον and the fragment of Eubulus (fr. 41, Kock ii. p. 178): τίς ἦν ὁ γράψας πρῶτος ἀνθρώπων ἄρα ἢ κηροπλαστήσας Ἔρωθ’ ὑπόπτερον ) drone. Or do you think the spirit of desire in such men is aught else?Nothing but that, he said. And when the other appetites, buzzing[*](Cf. 564 D.) about it, replete with incense and myrrh and chaplets and wine, and the pleasures that are released in such revelries, magnifying and fostering it to the utmost, awaken in the drone the sting of unsatisfied yearnings,[*](Cf. Phaedrus 253 E.) why then this protector of the soul has madness for his body-guard and runs amuck,[*](For οἰστρᾷ Cf. Phaedr. 240 D.) and if it finds in the man any opinions or appetites accounted[*](For ποιουμένας in this sense cf. 538 C, 498 A, 574 D.) worthy and still capable of shame, it slays them and thrusts them forth until it purges[*](Cf. on 560 D, p. 299, note c.) him of sobriety, and fills and infects him with frenzy brought in from outside.[*](ἐπακτοῦ: cf. 405 B, Pindar, Pyth. vi. 10, Aesch. Seven against Thebes 583, Soph. Trach. 259.) A perfect description, he said, of the generation of the tyrannical man. And is not this analogy, said I, the reason why Love has long since been called a tyrant[*](Cf. 573 D, Eurip. Hippol. 538, Andromeda, fr. 136 (Nauck)θεῶν τύραννε . . . Ἔρως, and What Plato Said, p. 546 on Symp. 197 B.)? That may well be, he said. And does not a drunken man,[*](For drunkenness as a tyrannical mood Cf. Laws 649 B, 671 B, Phaedr, 238 B.) my friend, I said, have something of this tyrannical temper? Yes, he has. And again the madman, the deranged man, attempts and expects to rule over not only men but gods. Yes indeed, he does, he said. Then a man becomes tyrannical in the full sense of the word, my friend, I said, when either by nature or by habits or by both he has become even as the drunken, the erotic, the maniacal. Assuredly. Such, it seems, is his origin and character,[*](Cf. Adam ad loc., who insists it means his origin as well as that of others, and says his character is still to be described. But it has been in C and before.) but what is his manner of life? As the wits say, you shall tell me.[*](Cf. Phileb. 25 B and perhaps Rep. 427 E with 449 D. The slight jest is a commonplace today. Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 351, says it is a fragment of an elegy. He forgets the Philebus. ) I do, I said; for, I take it, next there are among them feasts and carousals and revellings and courtesans[*](Cf. Vol. I. p 160, note a on 373 A. Emendations are superfluous.) and all the doings of those whose[*](ὦν ἄν: cf. 441 D-E ὅτου, etc., 583 A ἐν ᾧ and my review of Jowett and Campbell, A.J.P. xvi. p. 237.) souls are entirely swayed[*](Cf. Phaedr. 238 B-C.) by the indwelling tyrant Eros. Inevitably, he said. And do not many and dread appetites shoot up beside this master passion every day and night in need of many things? Many indeed. And so any revenues there may be are quickly expended. Of course.

And after this there are borrowings and levyings[*](For παραιρέσεις cf. Thuc. i. 122. 1, Aristot. Pol. 1311 a 12, 1315 a 38.) upon the estate?Of course.And when all these resources fail, must there not come a cry from the frequent and fierce nestlings[*](ἐννενεοττευμένας Cf. Alc. I. 135 E, Laws 776 A, 949 C, Aristoph. Birds 699, 1108.) of desire hatched in his soul, and must not such men, urged, as it were by goads, by the other desires, and especially by the ruling passion itself as captain of their bodyguard—to keep up the figure—must they not run wild and look to see who has aught that can be taken from him by deceit or violence?Most certainly.And so he is compelled to sweep it in from every source[*](Cf. Aesch. Eumen. 544.) or else be afflicted with great travail and pain.[*](Cf. Gorg. 494 A ἢ τὰς ἐσχάτας λυποῖτο λύπας.)He is.And just as the new, upspringing pleasures in him got the better of the original passions of his soul and robbed them, so he himself, though younger, will claim the right to get the better[*](Cf. Vol. I. 349 B f.) of his father and mother, and, after spending his own share, to seize and convert to his own use a portion of his father’s estate.Of course, he said, what else? And if they resist him, would he not at first attempt to rob and steal from his parents and deceive them? Certainly. And if he failed in that, would he not next seize it by force? I think so, he said. And then, good sir, if the old man and the old woman clung to it and resisted him, would he be careful to refrain from the acts of a tyrant? I am not without my fears, he said, for the parents of such a one. Nay, Adeimantus, in heaven’s name, do you suppose that, for the sake of a newly found belle amie bound to him by no necessary tie, such a one would strike the dear mother, his by necessity[*](The word ἀναγκαῖαν means both necessary and akin. Cf. Eurip. Androm. 671 τοιαῦτα λάσκεις τοὺς ἀναγκαίους φίλους.) and from his birth? Or for the sake of a blooming new-found bel ami, not necessary to his life, he would rain blows[*](For the idiom πληγαῖς . . . δοῦναι Cf. Phaedr. 254 E ὀδύναις ἔδωκεν with Thompson’s note. Cf. 566 C θανάτῳ δέδοται. For striking his father cf. 569 B, Laws 880 E ff., Aristoph. Clouds 1375 ff., 1421 ff.) upon the aged father past his prime, closest of his kin and oldest of his friends? And would he subject them to those new favorites if he brought them under the same roof? Yes, by Zeus, he said. A most blessed lot it seems to be, said I, to be the parent of a tyrant son. It does indeed, he said. And again, when the resources of his father and mother are exhausted[*](For ἐπιλείπῃ cf. 568 E, 573 E.) and fail such a one, and the swarm[*](Cf. Meno 72 A, Cratyl. 401 E, Blaydes on Aristoph. Clouds 297.) of pleasures collected in his soul is grown great, will he not first lay hands on the wall[*](He becomes a τοιχωρύχος or a λωποδύτης (Aristoph. Frogs 772-773, Birds 497, Clouds 1327). Cf. 575 B, Laws 831 E.) of someone’s house or the cloak of someone who walks late at night, and thereafter he will make a clean sweep[*](νεωκορήσει is an ironical litotes. So ἐφάψεται in the preceding line.) of some temple, and in all these actions the beliefs which he held from boyhood about the honorable and the base, the opinions accounted just,[*](For ποιουμένας cf. 573 B. for the thought cf 538 C.) will be overmastered by the opinions newly emancipated[*](Cf. 567 E.) and released, which, serving as bodyguards of the ruling passion, will prevail in alliance with it—I mean the opinions that formerly were freed from restraint in sleep, when, being still under the control of his father and the laws, he maintained the democratic constitution in his soul.

But now, when under the tyranny of his ruling passion, he is continuously and in waking hours what he rarely became in sleep, and he will refrain from no atrocity of murder nor from any food or deed, but the passion that dwells in him as a tyrant will live in utmost anarchy and lawlessness, and, since it is itself sole autocrat, will urge the polity,[*](Cf. on 591 E.) so to speak, of him in whom it dwells[*](τὸν ἔχοντα: Cf. Phaedr. 239 C, Laws 837 B, Soph. Antig. 790 and also Rep. 610 C and E.) to dare anything and everything in order to find support for himself and the hubbub of his henchmen,[*](For the tyrant’s companions cf. Newman, i. p. 274, note 1.) in part introduced from outside by evil associations, and in part released and liberated within by the same habits of life as his. Is not this the life of such a one?It is this, he said. And if, I said, there are only a few of this kind in a city, and the others, the multitude as a whole, are sober-minded, the few go forth into exile and serve some tyrant elsewhere as bodyguard or become mercenaries in any war there may be. But if they spring up in time of peace and tranquillity they stay right there in the city and effect many small evils. What kind of evils do you mean? Oh, they just steal, break into houses, cut purses, strip men of their garments, plunder temples, and kidnap,[*](Cf. the similar lists of crimes in Gorg. 508 E, Xen. Mem. i. 2. 62.) and if they are fluent speakers they become sycophants and bear false witness and take bribes. Yes, small evils indeed,[*](So Shaw and other moderns argue in a somewhat different tone that crimes of this sort are an unimportant matter.) he said, if the men of this sort are few. Why, yes, I said, for small evils are relatively small compared with great, and in respect of the corruption and misery of a state all of them together, as the saying goes, don’t come within hail[*](οὐδ’ ἴκταρ βάλλει was proverbial, doesn’t strike near, doesn’t come within range. Cf. Aelian, N.A. xv. 29. Cf. also οὐδ’ ἐγγύς, Symp. 198 B, 221 D, Herod. ii. 121, Demosth. De cor. 97.) of the mischief done by a tyrant. For when men of this sort and their followers become numerous in a state and realize their numbers, then it is they who, in conjunction with the folly of the people, create a tyrant out of that one of them who has the greatest and mightiest tyrant in his own soul. Naturally, he said, for he would be the most tyrannical. Then if the people yield willingly—’tis well,[*](In the Greek the apodosis is suppressed. Cf. Protag. 325 D. Adam refers to Herwerden, Mn. xix. pp. 338 f.) but if the city resists him, then, just as in the previous case the man chastized his mother and his father, so now in turn will he chastize his fatherland if he can, bringing in new boon companions beneath whose sway he will hold and keep enslaved his once dear motherland[*](So also the Hindus of Bengal, The Nation,July 13, 1911, p. 28. Cf. Isoc. iv. 25 πατρίδα καὶ μητέρα, Lysias ii. 18 μητέρα καὶ πατρίδα, Plut. 792 E (An seni resp.) ἡ δὲ πατρὶς καὶ μητρὶς ὡς Κρῆτες καλοῦσι. Vol. I. p. 303, note e, on 414 E, Menex. 239 A.)—as the Cretans name her—and fatherland. And this would be the end of such a man’s desire.[*](Cf. the accidental coincidence of Swinburne’s refrain, This is the end of every man’s desire (Ballad of Burdens).) Yes, he said, this, just this.

Then, said I, is not this the character of such men in private life and before they rule the state: to begin with they associate with flatterers, who are ready to do anything to serve them, or, if they themselves want something, they themselves fawn[*](ὑποπεσόντες: cf. on 494 C ὑποκείσονται.) and shrink from no contortion[*](σχήματα was often used for the figures of dancing. Cf. Laws 669 D, Aristoph. Peace 323, Xen. Symp. 7. 5, Eurip. Cyclops 221. Isoc. Antid. 183 uses it of gymnastics.) or abasement in protest of their friendship, though, once the object gained, they sing another tune.[*](Cf. Phaedr. 241 A ἄλλος γεγονώς, Demosth. xxxiv. 13 ἕτερος ἤδη . . . καὶ οὐχ ὁ αὐτός.) Yes indeed, he said. Throughout their lives, then, they never know what it is to be the friends of anybody. They are always either masters or slaves, but the tyrannical nature never tastes freedom[*](Cf. Lucian, Nigrinus 15 ἄγευστος μὲν ἐλευθερίας, ἀπείρατος δὲ παρρησίαςAristot. Eth. Nic. 1176 b 19, 1179 b 15.) or true friendship. Quite so. May we not rightly call such men faithless[*](Cf. Laws 730 C, 705 A.)? Of course. Yes, and unjust to the last degree, if we were right in our previous agreement about the nature of justice. But surely, he said, we were right. Let us sum up,[*](Cf. Phaedr. 239 D ἓν κεφάλαιον ) then, said I, the most evil type of man. He is, I presume, the man who, in his waking hours, has the qualities we found in his dream state. Quite so. And he is developed from the man who, being by nature most of a tyrant, achieves sole power, and the longer he lives as an actual tyrant the stronger this quality becomes. Inevitably, said Glaucon, taking up the argument. And shall we find, said I, that the man who is shown to be the most evil will also be the most miserable, and the man who is most of a tyrant for the longest time is most and longest miserable[*](Cf. Gorgias 473 C-E.) in sober truth? Yet the many have many opinions.[*](Cf. the defiance of 473 A and 579 D κἂν εἰ μή τῳ δοκεῖ, Phaedr. 277 E οὐδὲ ἂν ὁ πᾶς ὄχλος αὐτὸ ἐπαινέσῃ, and Phileb. 67 B, also Gorg. 473 E you say what nobody else would say, and perhaps 500 D διαβολὴ δ’ ἐν πᾶσι πολλή. Cf. Schopenhauer’s The public has a great many bees in its bonnet.) That much, certainly, he said, must needs be true. Does not the tyrannical man, said I, correspond to the tyrannical state in similitude,[*](Cf. Tim. 75 D, Rep. 555 A, Parmen. 133 A. For the analogy of individual and state cf. on 591 E.) the democratic to the democratic and the others likewise? Surely. And may we not infer that the relation of state to state in respect of virtue and happiness is the same as that of the man to the man? Of course. What is, then, in respect of virtue, the relation of a city ruled by a tyrant to a royal city as we first described it? They are direct contraries, he said; the one is the best, the other the worst. I’ll not ask which is which, I said, because that is obvious. But again in respect of happiness and wretchedness, is your estimate the same or different? And let us not be dazzled[*](Cf. 577 A, 591 D, 619 A ἀνέκπληκτος, Crat. 394 B, Gorg. 523 D, Protag. 355 B. Cf. also Epictet. iii. 22. 28 ὑπὸ τῆς φαντασίας περιλαμπομένοις, and Shelley, . . . accursed thing to gaze on prosperous tyrants with a dazzled eye.) by fixing our eyes on that one man, the tyrant, or a few[*](εἴ τινες: Cf. Gorg. 521 B ἐάν τι ἔχω.) of his court, but let us enter into and survey the entire city, as is right, and declare our opinion only after we have so dived to its uttermost recesses and contemplated its life as a whole. That is a fair challenge, he said, and it is clear to everybody that there is no city more wretched than that in which a tyrant rules, and none more happy than that governed by a true king.[*](For the contrast of tyranny and kingdom cf. 587 B, Polit. 276 E. It became a commonplace in later orations on the true king. Cf. Dümmler, Prolegomena, pp. 38-39.)

And would it not also be a fair challenge, said I, to ask you to accept as the only proper judge of the two men the one who is able in thought to enter with understanding into the very soul and temper of a man, and who is not like a child viewing him from outside, overawed by the tyrants’ great attendance,[*](The word προστάσεως is frequent in Polybius. Cf. also Boethius iv. chap. 2. Cf. 1Maccabees xv. 32, When he saw the glory of Simon, and the cupboard of gold and silver plate, and his great attendance [παράστασιν]. Cf. also Isoc. ii. 32 ὄψιν, and Shakes. Measure for MeasureII. ii. 59 ceremony that to great ones ’longs,Henry V.IV. i. 280 farced title running ’fore the king.) and the pomp and circumstance which they assume[*](For σχηματίζονται cf. Xen. Oecon. 2. 4. σὸν σχῆμα ὁ σὺ περιβέβλησαι, Dio Cass. iii. fr. 13. 2 σχηματίσας . . . ἑαυτόν and σχηματισμός, Rep. 425 B, 494 D.) in the eyes of the world, but is able to see through it all? And what if I should assume, then, that the man to whom we ought all to listen is he who has this capacity of judgement and who has lived under the same roof with a tyrant[*](It is easy conjecture that Plato is thinking of himself and Dionysius I. Cf. Laws 711 A.) and has witnessed his conduct in his own home and observed in person his dealings with his intimates in each instance where he would best be seen stripped[*](Cf. Thackeray on Ludovicus and Ludovicus rex, Hazlitt, Strip it of its externals and what is it but a jest? also Gory. 523 E, Xen. Hiero 2. 4, Lucian, Somnium seu Gallus 24 ἢν δὲ ὑποκύψας ἴδῃς τὰ γ’ ἔνδον . . . , Boethius, Cons. iii. chap. 8 (Loeb, p. 255), and for the thought Herod. i. 99.) of his vesture of tragedy,[*](Cf. Longinus, On the Sublime 7 τὸ ἔξωθεν προστραγῳδούμενον, and Dümmler, Akademika p. 5.) and who had likewise observed his behavior in the hazards of his public life—and if we should ask the man who has seen all this to be the messenger to report on the happiness or misery of the tyrant as compared with other men? That also would be a most just challenge, he said. Shall we, then, make believe, said I, that we are of those who are thus able to judge and who have ere now lived with tyrants, so that we may have someone to answer our questions? By all means. Come, then, said I, examine it thus. Recall the general likeness between the city and the man, and then observe in turn what happens to each of them. What things? he said. In the first place, said I, will you call the state governed by a tyrant free or enslaved, speaking of it as a state? Utterly enslaved, he said. And yet you see in it masters and freemen. I see, he said, a small portion of such, but the entirety, so to speak, and the best part of it, is shamefully and wretchedly enslaved.[*](In Menex. 238 E Plato says that other states are composed of slaves and master, but Athens of equals.) If, then, I said, the man resembles the state, must not the same proportion[*](For τάξιν cf. 618 B ψυχῆς δὲ τάξιν.) obtain in him, and his soul teem[*](γέμειν: cf. 544 C, 559 C, Gorg. 522 E, 525 A.) with boundless servility and illiberality, the best and most reasonable parts of it being enslaved, while a small part, the worst and the most frenzied, plays the despot? Inevitably, he said. Then will you say that such a soul is enslaved or free? Enslaved, I should suppose. Again, does not the enslaved and tyrannized city least of all do what it really wishes[*](Cf. 445 B, Gorg. 467 B, where a verbal distinction is drawn with which Plato does not trouble himself here. In Laws 661 B ἐπιθυμῇ is used. Cf. ibid. 688 B τἀναντία ταῖς βουλήσεσιν, and Herod. iii. 80.)? Decidedly so. Then the tyrannized soul— to speak of the soul as a whole[*](Cf. Cratyl. 392 C ὡς τὸ ὅλον εἰπεῖν γένος.)—also will least of all do what it wishes, but being always perforce driven and drawn by the gadfly of desire it will be full of confusion and repentance.[*](Cf. Julian, Or. ii. 50 C. In the Stoic philosophy the stultus repents, and omnis stultitia fastidio laborat sui. Cf. also Seneca, De benef. iv. 34 non mutat sapiens consilium . . . ideo numquam illum poenitentia subit, Von Arnim, Stoic. Vet. Frag. iii. 147. 21, 149. 20 and 33, Stob. Ec. ii. 113. 5, 102. 22, and my emendation of Eclogues ii. 104. 6 W. in Class. Phil. xi. p. 338.) Of course. And must the tyrannized city be rich or poor? Poor.

Then the tyrant soul also must of necessity always be needy[*](Cf. Laws 832 A πεινῶσι τὴν ψυχήν, Xen. Symp. 4. 36 πεινῶσι χρημάτων, Oecon. xiii. 9 πεινῶσι γὰρ τοῦ ἐπαίνου, Aristot. Pol. 1277 a 24 Jason said he was hungry when he was not a tyrant, Shakes. Tempest I. ii. 112 so dry he was for sway. Cf. Novotny, p. 1902, on Epist. vii. 335 B, also Max. Tyr. Diss. iv. 4 τί γὰρ ἂν εἴη πενέστερον ἀνδρὸς ἐπιθυμοῦντος διηνεκῶς . . . ; Julian, Or. ii. 85 B, Teles (Hense), pp. 32-33. for the thought see also Gorg. 493-494. cf. also 521 A with 416 E, Phaedr. 279 C, and Epist. 355 C.) and suffer from unfulfilled desire.So it is, he said. And again, must not such a city, as well as such a man, be full of terrors and alarms? It must indeed. And do you think you will find more lamentations and groans and wailing and anguish in any other city? By no means. And so of man, do you think these things will more abound in any other than in this tyrant type, that is maddened by its desires and passions? How could it be so? he said. In view of all these and other like considerations, then, I take it, you judged that this city is the most miserable of cities. And was I not right? he said. Yes, indeed, said I. But of the tyrant man, what have you to say in view of these same things? That he is far and away the most miserable of all, he said. I cannot admit, said I, that you are right in that too. How so? said he. This one, said I, I take it, has not yet attained the acme of misery.[*](Cf. on 508 E, p. 104, note c.) Then who has? Perhaps you will regard the one I am about to name as still more wretched. What one? The one, said I, who, being of tyrannical temper, does not live out[*](Cf. Protag. 355 A, Alc. I. 104 E, 579 C.) his life in private station[*](Stallbaum quotes Plut. De virtut. et vit. p. 101 D, Lucian, Herm. 67 ἰδιώτην βίον ζῆν, Philo, Vit. Mos. 3.) but is so unfortunate that by some unhappy chance he is enabled to become an actual tyrant. I infer from what has already been said, he replied, that you speak truly. Yes, said I, but it is not enough to suppose such things. We must examine them thoroughly by reason and an argument such as this.[*](Adam ad loc. emends τῷ τοιούτῳ to τῶ τοιοῦτω, insisting that the MS. reading cannot be satisfactorily explained.) For our inquiry concerns the greatest of all things,[*](Cf. Vol. I. p. 71, note f on 344 D-E, and What Plato Said, p. 484, on Laches 185 A.) the good life or the bad life. Quite right, he replied. Consider, then, if there is anything in what I say. For I think we must get a notion of the matter from these examples. From which? From individual wealthy private citizens in our states who possess many slaves. For these resemble the tyrant in being rulers over many, only the tyrant’s numbers are greater.[*](Cf. Polit. 259 B. But Plato is not concerned with the question of size or numbers here.) Yes, they are. You are aware, then, that they are unafraid and do not fear their slaves? What should they fear? Nothing, I said; but do you perceive the reason why? Yes, because the entire state is ready to defend each citizen. You are right, I said. But now suppose some god should catch up a man who has fifty or more slaves[*](Plato’s imaginary illustration is one of his many anticipations of later history, and suggests to an American many analogies.) and waft him with his wife and children away from the city and set him down with his other possessions and his slaves in a solitude where no freeman could come to his rescue. What and how great would be his fear,[*](Cf. Critias, fr. 37 Diels ii.3 p. 324, on Sparta’s fear of her slaves.) do you suppose, lest he and his wife and children be destroyed by the slaves? The greatest in the world,[*](For ἐν παντί cf. 579 B, Symp. 194 A ἐν παντὶ εἴης, Euthyd. 301 A ἐν παντὶ ἐγενόμην ὑπὸ ἀπορίας, Xen. Hell. v. 4. 29, Thucyd. vii. 55, Isoc. xiii. 20 ἐν πᾶσιν . . κακοῖς. Cf. παντοῖος εἶναι (γίννεσθαι) Herod. ix. 109, vii. 10. 3, iii. 124, Lucian, Pro lapsu 1.) he said, if you ask me.

And would he not forthwith find it necessary to fawn upon some of the slaves and make them many promises and emancipate them, though nothing would be further from his wish[*](For the idiom οὐδὲν δεόμενος cf. 581 E, 367 A-B, 410 B, 405 C, Prot. 331 C, and Shorey in Class. Journ. ii. p. 171.)? And so he would turn out to be the flatterer of his own servants.He would certainly have to, he said, or else perish. But now suppose, said I, that god established round about him numerous neighbors who would not tolerate the claim of one man to be master of another,[*](For ancient denials of the justice of slavery cf. Newman, Aristot. Pol. i. pp. 140 ff., Philemon, fr. 95 (Kock ii. p. 508)κἂν δοῦλος ἐστί, σάρκα τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει, φύσει γὰρ οὐδεὶς δοῦλος ἐγενήθη ποτέ. ἡ δ’ αὖ τύχη τὸ σῶμα κατεδουλώσατο, and Anth. Pal. vii. 553 with Mackail’s note, p. 415.) but would inflict the utmost penalties on any such person on whom they could lay their hands. I think, he said, that his plight would be still more desperate, encompassed by nothing but enemies. And is not that the sort of prison-house in which the tyrant is pent, being of a nature such as we have described and filled with multitudinous and manifold terrors and appetites? Yet greedy[*](Cf. p. 360, note a. For the tyrant’s terrors cf. Menander,Ἀσπίς (fr. 74, Kock iii p. 24), Tacitus, Ann. vi. 6, 579 E and Xen. Hiero 6.8. The tyrant sees enemies everywhere.) and avid of spirit as he is, he only of the citizens may not travel abroad or view any of the sacred festivals[*](Cf. Xen. Hiero 1. 12 οἱ δὲ τύραννοι οὐ μάλα ἀμφὶ θεωρίας ἔχουσιν· οὔτε γὰρ ἰέναι αὐτοῖς ἀσφαλές. Cf. Crito 52 B ἐπὶ θεωρίαν.) that other freemen yearn to see, but he must live for the most part cowering in the recesses of his house like a woman,[*](Cf. Laws 781 C, Gorg. 485 D.) envying among the other citizens anyone who goes abroad and sees any good thing. Most certainly, he said. And does not such a harvest of ills[*](τοῖς τοιούτοις κακοῖς is the measure of the excess of the unhappiness of the actual tyrant over that of the tyrannical soul in private life. Cf. my review of Jowett, A.J.P. xiii. p. 366.) measure the difference between the man who is merely ill-governed in his own soul, the man of tyrannical temper, whom you just now judged to be most miserable, and the man who, having this disposition, does not live out his life in private station but is constrained by some ill hap to become an actual tyrant, and while unable to control himself[*](Cf. 580 C and What Plato Said, p. 506, on Gorg. 491 D.) attempts to rule over others, as if a man with a sick and incontinent body[*](For the analogy of soul and body cf. 591 B and on 564 D, p. 313, note g.) should not live the private life but should be compelled to pass his days in contention and strife with other persons? Your analogy is most apt and true,[*](Cf. Soph. 252 C ὅμοιόν τε καὶ ἀληθές.) Socrates, he said. Is not that then, dear Glaucon, said I, a most unhappy experience in every way? And is not the tyrant’s life still worse than that which was judged by you to be the worst? Precisely so, he said. Then it is the truth, though some may deny it,[*](Cf. on 576 C, p. 354, note b.) that the real tyrant is really enslaved to cringings and servitudes beyond compare, a flatterer of the basest men, and that, so far from finding even the least satisfaction for his desires, he is in need of most things, and is a poor man in very truth, as is apparent if one knows how to observe a soul in its entirety; and throughout his life he teems with terrors and is full of convulsions and pains, if in fact he resembles the condition of the city which he rules; and he is like it, is he not? Yes, indeed, he said.

And in addition, shall we not further attribute to him all that we spoke of before, and say that he must needs be, and, by reason of his rule, come to be still more than he was,[*](Cf. 576 B-C.) envious, faithless, unjust, friendless, impious, a vessel and nurse[*](πανδοκεύς is a host or inn-keeper; Cf. Laws 918 B.Here the word is used figuratively. Cf. Aristoph. Wasps 35 φάλαινα πανδοκεύτρια, an all-receptive grampus (Rogers).) of all iniquity, and so in consequence be himself most unhappy[*](On the wretched lot of the tyrant cf. Xen. Hiero passim, e.g. 4. 11, 6. 4, 8, 15. the Hiero is Xenophon’s rendering of the Socratico-Platonic conception of the unhappy tyrant. Cf. 1. 2-3. See too Gerhard Heintzeler, Das Bild des Tyrannen bei Platon, esp. pp. 43 ff. and 76 f.; Cic. De amicit. 15, Isoc. Nic. 4-5, Peace 112, Hel. 32 ff. But in Euag. 40 Isocrates says all men would admit that tyranny is the greatest and noblest and most coveted of all good things, both human and divine. In Epist. 6. 11. ff. he agrees with Plato that the life of a private citizen is better than the tyrant’s But in 2. 4 he treats this as a thesis which many maintain. Cf. further Gorg. 473 E, Alc. I. 135 B, Phaedr. 248 E, Symp. 182 C, Eurip. Ion 621 ff., Suppl. 429 ff., Medea 119 ff., I.A. 449-450, Herodotus iii. 80, Soph. Ajax 1350 not easy for a tyrant to be pious; also Dio Chrys. Or. iii. 58 f., Anon. Iambl. fr. 7. 12, Diels ii.3 p. 333, J. A. K. Thomson, Greek and Barbarian, pp. 111 ff., Dümmler, Prolegomena, p. 31, Baudrillart, J. Bodin et son temps, p. 292-293 Bodin semble . . . se souvenir de Platon flétrissant le tyran. . . . ) make all about him so?No man of sense will gainsay that, he said. Come then, said I, now at last, even as the judge of last instance[*](Adam has an exhaustive technical note on this.) pronounces, so do you declare who in your opinion is first in happiness and who second, and similarly judge the others, all five in succession, the royal, the timocratic, the oligarchic, the democratic, and the tyrannical man. Nay, he said, the decision is easy. For as if they were choruses I judge them in the order of their entrance, and so rank them in respect of virtue and vice, happiness and its contrary. Shall we hire a herald,[*](Cf. Phileb. 66 A ὑπό τε ἀγγέλων πέμπων, etc., Eurip. Alc. 737 κηρύκων ὕπο. Grote and other liberals are offended by the intensity of Plato’s moral conviction. See What Plato Said, p. 364, Laws 662-663, Unity of Plato’s Thought, p.25.) then, said I, or shall I myself make proclamation that the son of Ariston pronounced the best man[*](Plato puns on the name Ariston. For other such puns Cf. Gorg. 463 E, 481 D, 513 B, Rep. 600 B, 614 B, Symp. 174 B, 185 C, 198 C.) and the most righteous to be the happiest,[*](Cf. Laws 664 B-C. ) and that he is the one who is the most kingly and a king over himself;[*](Cf. on 570 C, p. 367, note a.) and declared that the most evil and most unjust is the most unhappy, who again is the man who, having the most of the tyrannical temper in himself, become, most of a tyrant over himself and over the state? Let it have been so proclaimed by you, he said. Shall I add the clause alike whether their character is known to all men and gods or is not known[*](Cf. 367 E, 427 D, 445 A, 612 B.)? Add that to the proclamation, he said. Very good, said I; this, then, would be one of our proofs, but examine this second one and see if there is anything in it. What is it? Since, said I, corresponding to the three types in the city, the soul also is tripartite,[*](Cf. 435 B-C ff.) it will admit,[*](Practically all editors reject τὸ λογιστικόν. But Apelt, p. 525, insists that δέξεται cannot be used without a subject on the analogy of 453 D ἔοικεν, 497 C δηλώσει and δείξει, hence we must retain λογιστικόν, in the sense of ability to reckon, and he compares Charm. 174 B and the double sense of λογιστικόν in Rep. 525 B, 587 D, 602 E. He says it is a mild mathematical joke, like Polit. 257 A.) I think, of another demonstration also. What is that? The following: The three parts have also, it appears to me, three kinds of pleasure, one peculiar to each, and similarly three appetites and controls. What do you mean? he said. One part, we say, is that with which a man learns, one is that with which he feels anger. But the third part, owing to its manifold forms,[*](Cf. Phileb. 26 C τὸ . . . πλῆθος. Cf. Friedländer, Platon, ii. p. 492, n. 2.) we could not easily designate by any one distinctive name,[*](Here again the concept is implied (Cf. on 564 B, p. 313, note e and Introd. pp. x-xi). Cf. Parmen. 132 C, 135 B, Phileb. 16 D, 18 C-D, 23 E, 25 C, Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1130 b 2 ἑνὶ ὀνόματι περιλαβεῖν, and εἰς ἓν κεφάλαιον ἀπερειδοίμεθα, 581 A, Schleiermacher’s interpretation of which, so würden wir uns in der Erklärung doch auf ein Hauptstück stützen, approved by Stallbaum, misses the point. For the point that there is no one name for it Cf. What Plato Said, p. 596, on Soph. 267 D.) but gave it the name of its chief and strongest element;

for we called it the appetitive part[*](Vol. I. 439 D.) because of the intensity of its appetites concerned with food and drink and love and their accompaniments, and likewise the money-loving part,[*](Cf. Vol. I. p. 380, note b.) because money is the chief instrument for the gratification of such desires.And rightly, he said. And if we should also say that its pleasure and its love were for gain or profit, should we not thus best bring it together under one head[*](Since there is no one specific name for the manifold forms of this part (580 D-E), a makeshift term is to be used for convenience’s sake. See also p. 371, note e.) in our discourse so as to understand each other when we speak of this part of the soul, and justify our calling it the money-loving and gain-loving part? I, at any rate, think so, he said. And, again, of the high-spirited element, do we not say that it is wholly set on predominance and victory and good repute? Yes, indeed. And might we not appropriately designate it as the ambitious part and that which is covetous of honor? Most appropriately. But surely it is obvious to everyone that all the endeavor of the part by which we learn is ever towards[*](Or is bent on, τέταται. Cf. 499 A ζητεῖν . . . τὸ ἀληθὲς συντεταμένως, Symp. 222 A and Bury ad loc., Symp. 186 B ἐπὶ πᾶν ὁ θεὸς τείνει. For the thought cf. also Phileb. 58 D.) knowledge of the truth of things, and that it least of the three is concerned for wealth and reputation. Much the least. Lover of learning[*](Cf. Phaedo 67 B τοὺς ὀρθῶς φιλομαθεῖς.) and lover of wisdom would be suitable designations for that. Quite so, he said. Is it not also true, I said, that the ruling principle[*](Cf. 338 D, 342 C.) of men’s souls is in some cases this faculty and in others one of the other two, as it may happen? That is so, he said. And that is why we say that the primary classes[*](Cf. my review of Jowett in A.J.P. xiii. p. 366, which Adam quotes and follows and Jowett and Campbell (Republic) adopt. For the three types of men cf. also Phaedo 68 C, 82 C. Stewart, Aristot. Eth. Nic. p. 60 (1095 b 17), says, The three lives mentioned by Aristotle here answer to the three classes of men distinguished by Plato (Rep. 581). . . . Michelet and Grant point out that this threefold division occurs in a metaphor attributed to Pythagoras by Heracleides Ponticus (apud Cic. Tusc. v. 3). . . . Cf. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1097 a-b (i. 5. 1), also Diog. L. vii. 130 on Stoics, Plutarch, De liber. educ. x. (8 A), Renan, Avenir de Ia science, p. 8. Isoc. Antid. 217 characteristically recognizes only the three motives, pleasure, gain, and honor. For the entire argument cf. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1176 a 31, 1177 a 10, and ibid, Introd. pp. liv-lv.) of men also are three, the philosopher or lover of wisdom, the lover of victory and the lover of gain. Precisely so And also that there are three forms of pleasure, corresponding respectively to each? By all means. Are you aware, then said I, that if you should choose to ask men of these three classes, each in turn,[*](For ἐν μέρει cf. 468 B, 520 C and D, 577 C, 615 A, Gorg. 496 B, Laws 876 B, 943 A, 947 C, Polit. 265 A; Contrasted with ἐν τῷ μέρει, Meno 92 E, Gorg. 462 A, 474 A. The two expressions, similar in appearance, illustrate how a slight change alters an idiom. So e.g. καινὸν οὐδέν (Gorg. 448 A) has nothing to do with the idiom οὐδὲν καινόν (Phaedo 100 B);τοῦ λόγου ἕνεκα (Rep. 612 C) is different from λόγου ἕνεκα (Theaet. 191 C—dicis causa);πάντα τἀγαθά (Laws 631 B) has no connection with the idiomatic πάντ’ ἀγαθά (Rep. 471 C, Cf. supra ad loc.); nor Pindar’s πόλλ’ ἄνω τὰ δ’ αὖ κάτω (Ol. xii. 6) with ἄνω κάτω as used in Phaedo 96 B, Gorg. 481 D, etc. Cf. also ἐν τέχνῃ Prot. 319 C with ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ317 C,νῷ ἔχειν Rep. 490 A with ἐν νῷ ἔχειν344 D, etc.,τοῦ παντὸς ἡμάρτηκεν Phaedr. 235 E with παντὸς ἁμαρτάνειν237 C. The same is true of words—to confuse καλλίχορος with καλλίχοιρος would be unfortunate; and the medieval debates about ὁμοουσία and ὁμοιουσία were perhaps not quite as ridiculous as they are generally considered.) which is the most pleasurable of these lives, each will chiefly commend his own[*](Cf. Laws 658 on judging different kinds of literature.)? The financier will affirm that in comparison with profit the pleasures of honor or of learning area of no value except in so far as they produce money. True, he said. And what of the lover of honor[*](Cf. p. 255, note f, on 549 A. Xenophon is the typical φιλότιμος. In Mem. iii. 3. 13 he says that the Athenians excel others in love of honor, which is the strongest incentive to deeds of honor and renown (Marchant, Loeb tr.). Cf. Epist. 320 A, Symp. 178 D, and also Xen. Cyrop. i. 2. 1, Mem. iii. i. 10.)? I said; does he not regard the pleasure that comes from money as vulgar[*](Cf. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1095 b 16, and on 528 E.) and low, and again that of learning, save in so far as the knowledge confers honor, mere fume[*](Cf. Blaydes on Aristoph. Clouds 920, and Turgeniev’s novel, Smoke. ) and moonshine? It is so, he said. And what, said I, are we to suppose the philosopher thinks of the other pleasures compared with the delight of knowing the truth[*](Cf. Phileb. 58 C on dialectic.) and the reality, and being always occupied with that while he learns? Will he not think them far removed from true pleasure,[*](Cf. 598 B, Epist. iii. 315 C, Marc. Aurel. viii. 1 πόρρω φιλοσοφίας. Hermann’s text or something like it is the only idiomatic one, and τῆς ἡδονῆς οὐ πάνυ πόρρω must express the philosopher’s opinion of the pleasurableness of the lower pleasures as compared with the higher. Cf. A.J.P. xiii. p. 366.) and call[*](For the infinitive cf. 492 C καὶ φήσειν, 530 B καὶ ζητεῖν.) them literally[*](τῷ ὄντι marks the etymological use of ἀναγκαίας. Cf. on 511 B and 551 E, p. 266, note a.) the pleasures of necessity,[*](Cf. 558 D f.) since he would have no use for them if necessity were not laid upon him?

We may be sure of that, he said. Since, then, there is contention between the several types of pleasure and the lives themselves, not merely as to which is the more honorable or the more base, or the worse or the better, but which is actually the more pleasurable[*](This anticipates Laws 663 A, 733 A-B, 734 A-B.) or free from pain, how could we determine which of them speaks most truly? In faith, I cannot tell, he said. Well, consider it thus: By what are things to be judged, if they are to be judged[*](i.e. what is the criterion? Cf. 582 D δι’ οὗ, Sext. Empir. Bekker, p. 60 (Pyrrh. Hypotyp. ii. 13-14) and p. 197 (Adv. Math. vii. 335). Cf. Diog. L. Prologue 21, and Laches 184 E. For the idea that the better judge cf. also Laws 663 C, Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1176 a 16-19.) rightly? Is it not by experience, intelligence and discussion[*](Cf. 582 D, On Virtue 373 D, Xen. Mem. iii. 3. 11.)? Or could anyone name a better criterion than these? How could he? he said. Observe, then. Of our three types of men, which has had the most experience of all the pleasures we mentioned? Do you think that the lover of gain by study of the very nature of truth has more experience of the pleasure that knowledge yields than the philosopher has of that which results from gain? There is a vast difference, he said; for the one, the philosopher, must needs taste of the other two kinds of pleasure from childhood; but the lover of gain is not only under no necessity of tasting or experiencing the sweetness of the pleasure of learning the true natures of things,[*](The force of οὐ extends through the sentence. Cf. Class. Phil. vi. (1911) p. 218, and my note on Tim. 77 a in A.J.P. p. 74. Cf. Il. v. 408, xxii, 283, Pindar, Nem. iii. 15, Hymn Dem. 157.) but he cannot easily do so even if he desires and is eager for it. The lover of wisdom, then, said I, far surpasses the lover of gain in experience of both kinds of pleasure. Yes, far. And how does he compare with the lover of honor? Is he more unacquainted with the pleasure of being honored than that other with that which comes from knowledge? Nay, honor, he said, if they achieve their several objects, attends them all; for the rich man is honored by many and the brave man and the wise, so that all are acquainted with the kind of pleasure that honor brings; but it is impossible for anyone except the lover of wisdom to have savored the delight that the contemplation of true being and reality brings. Then, said I, so far as experience goes, he is the best judge of the three. By far. And again, he is the only one whose experience will have been accompanied[*](For the periphrasis γεγονὼς ἔσται Cf. Charm. 174 D ἀπολελοιπὸς ἔσται.) by intelligence. Surely. And yet again, that which is the instrument, or ὄργανον, of judgement[*](Cf. 508 B, 518 C, 527 D.) is the instrument, not of the lover of gain or of the lover of honor, but of the lover of wisdom. What is that? It was by means of words and discussion[*](Cf. on 582 A, p. 376, note d.) that we said the judgement must be reached; was it not? Yes. And they are the instrument mainly of the philosopher. Of course. Now if wealth and profit were the best criteria by which things are judged, the things praised and censured by the lover of gain would necessarily be truest and most real. Quite necessarily. And if honor, victory and courage, would it not be the things praised by the lover of honor and victory? Obviously. But since the tests are experience and wisdom and discussion, what follows? Of necessity, he said, that the things approved by the lover of wisdom and discussion are most valid and true.

There being, then, three kinds of pleasure, the pleasure of that part of the soul whereby we learn is the sweetest, and the life of the man in whom that part dominates is the most pleasurable.How could it be otherwise? he said. At any rate the man of intelligence speaks with authority when he commends his own life. And to what life and to what pleasure, I said, does the judge assign the second place? Obviously to that of the warrior and honor-loving type, for it is nearer to the first than is the life of the money-maker. And so the last place belongs to the lover of gain, as it seems. Surely, said he. That, then, would be two points in succession and two victories for the just man over the unjust. And now for the third in the Olympian fashion to the saviour[*](The third cup of wine was always dedicated to Zeus the Saviour, and τρίτος σωτήρ became proverbial. Cf. Charm. 167 A, Phileb. 66 D, Laws 692 A, 960 C, Epist. vii. 334 D, 340 A. Cf. Hesychius s. v. τρίτος κρατήρ. Brochard, La Morale de Platon, missing the point, says, Voici enfin un troisième argument qui paraît à Platon le plus décisif puisqu’il l’appelle une vicoire vraiment olympique. For the idea of a contest Cf. Phileb. passim.) and to Olympian Zeus—observe that other pleasure than that of the intelligence is not altogether even real[*](Cf. Phileb. 36 C, 44 D ἡδοναὶ ἀληθεῖς. For the unreality of the lower pleasures Cf. Phileb. 36 A ff. and esp. 44 C-D, Unity of Plato’s Thought, pp. 23-25, What Plato Said, pp. 322-323 and 609-610, Introd. pp. lvi-lix, Rodier, Remarques sur le Philèbe, p. 281.) or pure,[*](Cf. Phileb. 52 C καθαρὰς ἡδονάς, and 53 C καθαρὰ λύπης.) but is a kind of scene-painting,[*](Cf. Laws 663 C, Phaedo 69 B, 365 C, 523 B, 602 D, 586 B, Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 266.) as I seem to have heard from some wise man[*](One of Plato’s evasions. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 513, on Meno 81 A, Phileb. 44 B. Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 266 misses the point and says that by the wise man Plato means himself.); and yet[*](For this rhetorical καίτοι cf. 360 C, 376 B, 433 B, 440 D, Gorg. 452 E, Laws 663 E, 690 C.) this would be the greatest and most decisive overthrow.[*](Cf. Phileb. 22 E, Aesch. Prom. 919, Soph. Antig. 1046.) Much the greatest. But what do you mean? I shall discover it, I said, if you will answer my questions while I seek. Ask, then, he said. Tell me, then, said I, do we not say that pain is the opposite of pleasure? We certainly do. And is there not such a thing as a neutral state[*](If any inference could he drawn from the fact that in the Philebus 42 D ff. and 32 E the reality of the neutral state has to be proved, it would be that the Philebus is earlier, which it is not.) There is. Is it not intermediate between them, and in the mean,[*](For ἐν μέσῳ Cf. Phileb. 35 E.) being a kind of quietude of the soul in these respects? Or is not that your notion of it? It is that, said he. Do you not recall the things men say in sickness? What sort of things? Why, that after all there is nothing sweeter than to be well,[*](Cf. perhaps Phileb. 45 B, Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1095 a 24, and Heracleit. fr. 111, Diels i.3 p. 99 νοῦσος ὑγιείην ἐποίησεν ἡδύ.) though they were not aware that it is the highest pleasure before they were Ill. I remember, he said. And do you not hear men afflicted with severe pain saying that there is no greater pleasure than the cessation of this suffering? I do. And you perceive, I presume, many similar conditions in which men while suffering pain praise freedom from pain and relief from that as the highest pleasure, and not positive delight. Yes, he said, for this in such cases is perhaps what is felt as pleasurable and acceptable—peace. And so, I said, when a man’s delight comes to an end, the cessation of pleasure will be painful. It may be so, he said. What, then,we just now described as the intermediate state between the two—this quietude—will sometimes be both pain and pleasure. It seems so Is it really possible for that which is neither to become both[*](Cf. Phileb. 43 E, Hipp. Maj. 300 B f.)? I think not. And further, both pleasure and pain arising in the soul are a kind of motion,[*](Aristotle attacks this doctrine with captious dialectic in his Topics and De anima. ) are they not? Yes.

And did we not just now see that to feel neither pain nor pleasure is a quietude of the soul and an intermediate state between the two?Yes, we did.How, then, can it be right to think the absence of pain pleasure, or the absence of joy painful?In no way.This is not a reality, then, but an illusion, said I; in such case the quietude in juxtaposition[*](Cf. 586 C, and Phileb. 42 B and 41 E.) with the pain appears pleasure, and in juxtaposition with the pleasure pain. And these illusions have no real bearing[*](For οὐδὲν ὑγιές in this sense cf. on 523 B.) on the truth of pleasure, but are a kind of jugglery.[*](Cf. Phileb. 44 C-D, Xen. Oecon. 1. 20 προσποιούμεναι ἡδοναὶ εἶναι, etc.) So at any rate our argument signifies, he said. Take a look, then, said I, at pleasures which do not follow on pain, so that you may not haply suppose for the present that it is the nature of pleasure to be a cessation from pain and pain from pleasure. Where shall I look, he said, and what pleasures do you mean? There are many others, I said, and especially, if you please to note them, the pleasures connected with smell.[*](For the idea that smells are not conditioned by pain Cf. Tim. 65 A, Phileb. 51 B and E, and Siebeck, Platon als Kritiker Aristotelischer Ansichten, p. 161.) For these with no antecedent pain[*](Cf. Gorg. 493-494, Phileb. 42 C ff., and Phaedr. 258 E, which Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 267 overlooks.) suddenly attain an indescribable intensity, and their cessation leaves no pain after them. Most true, he said. Let us not believe, then, that the riddance of pain is pure pleasure or that of pleasure pain. No, we must not. Yet, surely, said I, the affections that find their way through the body[*](Cf. Phaedo 65 A, Phaedr. 258 E, Vol. I. p. 8, note a, on 328 D, and p. 8, note b.) to the soul[*](Cf. Tim. 45 D (of sensations)μέχρι τῆς ψυχῆς, Laws 673 A, Rep. 462 C πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν τεταμένη. Cf. also Phileb. 33 D-E, 34, 43 B-C, and What Plato Said, p. 608.) and are called pleasures are, we may say, the most and the greatest of them, of this type, in some sort releases from pain.[*](Cf. Phileb. 44 B, 44 C λυπῶν . . . ἀποφυγάς, Protag. 354 B.)? Yes, they are. And is not this also the character of the anticipatory pleasures and pains that precede them and arise from the expectation of them? It is. Do you know, then, what their quality is and what they most resemble? What? he said. Do you think that there is such a thing in nature[*](For ἐν τῇ φύσει Cf. Parmen. 132 D.) as up and down and in the middle? I do. Do you suppose, then, that anyone who is transported from below to the center would have any other opinion than that he was moving upward[*](For the purposes of his illustration Plato takes the popular view of up and down, which is corrected in Tim. 62 C-D and perhaps by the ironical δή in Phaedo 112 C. Cf. Zeller, Aristotle(Eng.)i. p. 428.)? And if he took his stand at the center and looked in the direction from which he had been transported, do you think he would suppose himself to be anywhere but above, never having seen that which is really above? No, by Zeus, he said, I do not think that such a person would have any other notion. And if he were borne back, I said, he would both think himself to be moving downward and would think truly. Of course. And would not all this happen to him because of his non-acquaintance with the true and real up and down and middle? Obviously.

Would it surprise you, then, said I, if similarly men without experience of truth and reality hold unsound opinions about many other matters, and are so disposed towards pleasure and pain and the intermediate neutral condition that, when they are moved in the direction of the painful, they truly think themselves to be, and really are, in a state of pain, but, when they move from pain to the middle and neutral state, they intensely believe that they are approaching fulfillment and pleasure, and just as if, in ignorance of white, they were comparing grey with black,[*](Cf. Aristot. Met. 1011 b 30-31 and Eth. Nic. 1154 a 30 διὰ τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἐναντίον φαίνεσθαι.) so, being inexperienced in true pleasure, they are deceived by viewing painlessness in its relation to pain? No, by Zeus, he said, it would not surprise me, but far rather if it were not so. In this way, then, consider it.[*](The argument from the parallel of body and mind here belongs to what we have called confirmation. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 528, on Phaedo 78 B, The figurative use of repletion and nutrition is not to be pressed in proof of contradictions with the Philebus or Gorgias. Cf. Matthew v. 6 Hunger and thirst after righteousness.) Are not hunger and thirst and similar states inanitions or emptinesses[*](For κενώσεις Cf. Phileb. 35 B, 42 C-D, Tim. 65 A.) of the bodily habit? Surely. And is not ignorance and folly in turn a kind of emptiness of the habit of the soul? It is indeed. And he who partakes of nourishment[*](For the figure of nourishment of the soul Cf. Protag. 313 D, Phaedr. 248 B, and Soph. 223 E.) and he who gets, wisdom fills the void and is filled? Of course. And which is the truer filling and fulfillment, that of the less or of the more real being? Evidently that of the more real. And which of the two groups or kinds do you think has a greater part in pure essence, the class of foods, drinks, and relishes and nourishment generally, or the kind of true opinion,[*](Cf. What Plato Said, p. 517, on Meno 98 A-B.) knowledge and reason,[*](Different kinds of intelligence are treated as synonyms because for the present purpose their distinctions are irrelevant. Cf. 511 A, C, and D διάνοια. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 43 and p. 47, n. 339. Plato does not distinguish synonyms nor virtual synonyms for their own sake as Prodicus did. Cf. Protag. 358 A-B.) and, in sum, all the things that are more excellent[*](Cf. Symp. 209 A φρόνησίν τε καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετήν.)? Form your judgement thus. Which do you think more truly is, that which clings to what is ever like itself and immortal and to the truth, and that which is itself of such a nature and is born in a thing of that nature, or that which clings to what is mortal and never the same and is itself such and is born in such a thing? That which cleaves to what is ever the same far surpasses, he said. Does the essence of that which never abides the same partake of real essence any more than of knowledge? By no means. Or of truth and reality? Not of that, either. And if a thing has less of truth has it not also less of real essence or existence? Necessarily. And is it not generally true that the kinds concerned with the service of the body partake less of truth and reality than those that serve the soul? Much less. And do you not think that the same holds of the body itself in comparison with the soul? I do. Then is not that which is fulfilled of what more truly is, and which itself more truly is, more truly filled and satisfied than that which being itself less real is filled with more unreal things? Of course. If, then, to be filled with what befits nature is pleasure, then that which is more really filled with real things would more really and truly cause us to enjoy a true pleasure, while that which partakes of the less truly existent would be less truly and surely filled and would partake of a less trustworthy and less true pleasure. Most inevitably, he said.

Then those who have no experience of wisdom and virtue but are ever devoted to[*](For ξυνόντες see Blaydes on Aristoph. Clouds 1404.) feastings and that sort of thing are swept downward, it seems, and back again to the center, and so sway and roam[*](Cf. What Plato Said, p. 528, on Phaedo 79 C for πλανάω of error in thought. This is rather the errare of Lucretius ii. 10 and the post-Aristotelian schools.) to and fro throughout their lives, but they have never transcended all this and turned their eyes to the true upper region nor been wafted there, nor ever been really filled with real things, nor ever tasted[*](Cf. on 576 A ἄγευστος, and for the thought of the whole sentence cf. Dio Chrys. Or. xiii., Teubner, vol. i. p. 240.) stable and pure pleasure, but with eyes ever bent upon the earth[*](Cf. Milton, Comus, Ne’er looks to heaven amid its gorgeous feast, Rossetti, Nineveh, in fine, That set gaze never on the sky, etc. Cf. S. O. Dickermann, De Argumentis quibusdam ap. Xenophontem, Platonem, Aristotelem obviis e structura hominis et animalium petitis, Halle, 1909, who lists Plato’s Symp. 190 A, Rep. 586 A, Cratyl. 396 B, 409 C, Tim. 90 A, 91 E, and many other passages.) and heads bowed down over their tables they feast like cattle,[*](Cf. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1095 b 20 βοσκημάτων βίον. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 611, on Phileb., in fine.) grazing and copulating, ever greedy for more of these delights; and in their greed[*](Cf. 373 E, Phaedo 66 C ff., Berkeley, Siris 330 For these things men fight, cheat, and scramble.) kicking and butting one another with horns and hooves of iron they slay one another in sateless avidity, because they are vainly striving to satisfy with things that are not real the unreal and incontinent part[*](τὸ στέγον: Cf. Gorg. 493 B, Laws 714 A.) of their souls.You describe in quite oracular style,[*](Plato laughs at himself. Cf. 509 C and 540 B-C. The picturesque, allegorical style of oracles was proverbial. For χρησμῳδεῖν Cf. Crat. 396 D, Apol. 39 C, Laws 712 A.) Socrates, said Glaucon, the life of the multitude. And are not the pleasures with which they dwell inevitably commingled with pains, phantoms of true pleasure, illusions of scene-painting, so colored by contrary juxtaposition[*](Cf. on 584 A, p. 384, note a.) as to seem intense in either kind, and to beget mad loves of themselves in senseless souls, and to be fought for,[*](For περιμαχήτους cf. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1168 b 19, Eth. Eud. 1248 b 27, and on 521 A, p. 145, note e.) as Stesichorus says the wraith of Helen[*](For the Stesichorean legend that the real Helen remained in Egypt while only her phantom went to Troy Cf. Phaedr. 243 A-B, Eurip. Hel. 605 ff., Elect. 1282-1283, Isoc. Hel. 64, and Philologus 55, pp. 634 ff. Dümmler, Akademika p. 55, thinks this passage a criticism of Isoc. Helena 40. Cf. also Teichmüller, Lit. Fehden, i. pp. 113 ff. So Milton, Reason of Church Government, A lawny resemblance of her like that air-born Helena in the fables. For the ethical symbolism Cf. 520 C-D.) was fought for at Troy through ignorance of the truth? It is quite inevitable, he said, that it should be so. So, again, must not the like hold of the high-spirited element, whenever a man succeeds in satisfying that part of his nature—his covetousness of honor by envy, his love of victory by violence, his ill-temper by indulgence in anger, pursuing these ends without regard to consideration and reason? The same sort of thing, he said, must necessarily happen in this case too. Then, said I, may we not confidently declare that in both the gain-loving and the contentious part of our nature all the desires that wait upon knowledge and reason, and, pursuing their pleasures in conjunction with them,[*](Cf. Phaedo 69 B, and Theaet. 176 B μετὰ φρονήσεως.) take only those pleasures which reason approves,[*](ἐξηγῆται has a religious tone. See on ἐξηγητής427 C. Cf. 604 B.) will, since they follow truth, enjoy the truest[*](Cf. on 583 B, p. 380, note b.) pleasures, so far as that is possible for them, and also the pleasures that are proper to them and their own, if for everything that which is best may be said to be most its own[*](Cf. What Plato Said, p. 491, on Lysis 221 E.)? But indeed, he said, it is most truly its very own.

Then when the entire soul accepts the guidance of the wisdom-loving part and is not filled with inner dissension,[*](Cf. 352 A, 440 B and E, 442 D, 560 A, Phaedr. 237 E.) the result for each part is that it in all other respects keeps to its own task[*](Cf. What Plato Said, p. 480 on Charm. 161 B.) and is just, and likewise that each enjoys its own proper pleasures and the best pleasures and, so far as such a thing is possible,[*](For εἰς τὸ δυνατόν cf. 500 D, 381 C, Laws 795 D, 830 B, 862 B, 900 C.) the truest.Precisely so.And so when one of the other two gets the mastery the result for it is that it does not find its own proper pleasure and constrains the others to pursue an alien pleasure and not the true.That is so, he said. And would not that which is furthest removed from philosophy and reason be most likely to produce this effect[*](What follows (587 B-588 A) is not to be taken too seriously. It illustrates the method of procedure by minute links, the satisfaction of Plato’s feelings by confirmations and analogies, and his willingness to play with mathematical symbolism. Cf. 546 B f. and William Temple, Plato and Christianity, p. 55: Finally the whole thing is a satire on the humbug of mystical number, but I need not add that the German commentators are seriously exercised. . . . See however A. G. Laird in Class. Phil. xi. (1916) pp. 465-468.)? Quite so, he said. And is not that furthest removed from reason which is furthest from law and order? Obviously. And was it not made plain that the furthest removed are the erotic and tyrannical appetites? Quite so. And least so the royal and orderly? Yes. Then the tyrant’s place, I think, will be fixed at the furthest remove[*](Cf. Polit. 257 B ἀφεστᾶσιν ) from true and proper pleasure, and the king’s at the least. Necessarily. Then the tyrant’s life will be least pleasurable and the king’s most. There is every necessity of that. Do you know, then, said I, how much less pleasurably the tyrant lives than the king? I’ll know if you tell me,[*](Cf. Vil. I. p. 282, note a, on 408 D and p. 344, note b, on 573 D.) he said. There being as it appears three pleasures, one genuine and two spurious, the tyrant in his flight from law and reason crosses the border beyond[*](For εἰς τὸ ἐπέκεινα Cf. Phaedo 112 B and 509 B.) the spurious, cohabits with certain slavish, mercenary pleasures, and the measure of his inferiority is not easy to express except perhaps thus. How? he said. The tyrant, I believe, we found at the third remove from the oligarch, for the democrat came between. Yes. And would he not also dwell with a phantom of pleasure in respect of reality three stages removed from that other, if all that we have said is true? That is so. And the oligarch in turn is at the third remove from the royal man if we assume the identity of the aristocrat and the king.[*](Cf. Vol. I. p. 422, note b, on 445 D and Menex. 238 D.) Yes, the third. Three times three, then, by numerical measure is the interval that separates the tyrant from true pleasure. Apparently. The phantom[*](Cf. Phaedo 66 C εἰδώλων, where Olympiodorus (Norvin, p. 36) takes it of the unreality of the lower pleasures.) of the tyrant’s pleasure is then by longitudinal mensuration a plane number. Quite so. But by squaring and cubing it is clear what the interval of this separation becomes. It is clear, he said, to a reckoner. Then taking it the other way about, if one tries to express the extent of the interval between the king and the tyrant in respect of true pleasure he will find on completion of the multiplication that he lives 729 times as happily and that the tyrant’s life is more painful by the same distance.[*](Cf. Spencer, Data of Ethics, p. 14 Hence estimating life by multiplying its length into its breadth. For the mathematical jest Cf. Polit. 257 A-B.)

An overwhelming[*](Humorous as in 509 C ὑπερβολῆς.) and baffling calculation, he said, of the difference[*](Cf. Phileb. 13 A, 14 A, Parmen. 141 C, Theaet. 209 A and D.) between the just and the unjust man in respect of pleasure and pain! And what is more, it is a true number and pertinent to the lives of men if days and nights and months and years pertain to them. They certainly do, he said. Then if in point of pleasure the victory of the good and just man over the bad and unjust is so great as this, he will surpass him inconceivably in decency and beauty of life and virtue. Inconceivably indeed, by Zeus, he said. Very good, said I. And now that we have come to this point in the argument, let us take up again the statement with which we began and that has brought us to this pass.[*](Plato keeps to the point. Cf. 472 B, Phileb. 27 C, and p. 339 note e, on 572 B.) It was, I believe, averred that injustice is profitable to the completely unjust[*](Cf. 348 B, 361 A.) man who is reputed just. Was not that the proposition? Yes, that. Let us, then, reason with its proponent now that we have agreed on the essential nature of injustice and just conduct. How? he said. By fashioning in our discourse a symbolic image of the soul, that the maintainer of that proposition may see precisely what it is that he was saying. What sort of an image? he said. One of those natures that the ancient fables tell of, said I, as that of the Chimaera[*](Cf. Homer, Il. vi. 179-182, Phaedr. 229 D.) or Scylla[*](Od. xii. 85 ff.) or Cerberus,[*](Hesiod, Theog. 311-312.) and the numerous other examples that are told of many forms grown together in one. Yes, they do tell of them. Mould, then, a single shape of a manifold and many-headed beast[*](Stallbaum ad loc. gives a long list of writers who imitated this passage. Hesiod, Theog. 823 f., portrays a similar monster in Typhoeus, who had a hundred serpent-heads. For the animal in man c. Tim. 70 E, Charm. 155 D-E, Phaedr. 230 A, 246 A ff., Boethius, Cons. iv. 2-3, Horace Epist. i. 1. 76, Iamblichus, Protrept. chap. iii.) that has a ring of heads of tame and wild beasts and can change them and cause to spring forth from itself all such growths. It is the task of a cunning artist,[*](Cf. 596 C.) he said, but nevertheless, since speech is more plastic than wax[*](Cf. Cic. De or. iii. 45 sicut mollissimam ceram . . . fingimus. Otto, 80, says it is a proverb. For the development of this figure cf. Pliny, Epist. vii. 9 ut laus est cerae, mollis cedensque sequatur. For the idea that word is more precise or easy than deed Cf. 473 A, Phaedo 99 E, Laws 636 A, 736 B, Tim. 19 E.) and other such media, assume that it has been so fashioned. Then fashion one other form of a lion and one of a man and let the first be far the largest[*](Cf. 442 A.) and the second second in size. That is easier, he said, and is done. Join the three in one, then, so as in some sort to grow together. They are so united, he said. Then mould about them outside the likeness of one, that of the man, so that to anyone who is unable to look within[*](Cf. 577 A.) but who can see only the external sheath it appears to be one living creature, the man. The sheath is made fast about him, he said.

Let us, then say to the speaker who avers that it pays this man to be unjust, and that to do justice is not for his advantage, that he is affirming nothing else than that it profits him to feast and make strong the multifarious beast and the lion and all that pertains to the lion, but to starve the man[*](The whole passage illustrates the psychology of 440 B ff.) and so enfeeble him that he can be pulled about[*](Cf. Protag. 352 C περιελκομένης, with Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1145 b 24.) whithersoever either of the others drag him, and not to familiarize or reconcile with one another the two creatures but suffer them to bite and fight and devour one another.[*](Perhaps a latent allusion to Hesiod, Works and Days 278.)Yes, he said, that is precisely what the panegyrist of injustice will be found to say. And on the other hand he who says that justice is the more profitable affirms that all our actions and words should tend to give the man within us[*](Cf. the inward man, Romans vii. 22, 2 Cor. iv. 16, Ephes. iii. 16.) complete domination[*](Cf. Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, p. 10 Religion says: The kingdom of God is within you; and culture, in like manner, places human perfection in an internal condition, in the growth and predominance of our humanity proper, as distinguished from our animality.) over the entire man and make him take charge[*](Cf. Gorg. 516 A-B.) of the many-headed beast—like a farmer[*](Cf. Theaet. 167 B-C, and What Plato Said, p. 456, on Euthyphro 2 D.) who cherishes and trains the cultivated plants but checks the growth of the wild—and he will make an ally[*](Cf. 441 A.) of the lion’s nature, and caring for all the beasts alike will first make them friendly to one another and to himself, and so foster their growth. Yes, that in turn is precisely the meaning of the man who commends justice. From every point of view, then, the panegyrist of justice speaks truly and the panegyrist of injustice falsely. For whether we consider pleasure, reputation, or profit, he who commends justice speaks the truth, while there is no soundness or real knowledge of what he censures in him who disparages it. None whatever, I think, said he. Shall we, then, try to persuade him gently,[*](πράως: cf. the use of ἠρέμα476 E, 494 D.) for he does not willingly err,[*](Plato always maintains that wrong-doing is involuntary and due to ignorance. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 640 on Laws 860 D.) by questioning him thus: Dear friend, should we not also say that the things which law and custom deem fair or foul have been accounted so for a like reason— the fair and honorable things being those that subject the brutish part of our nature to that which is human in us, or rather, it may be, to that which is divine,[*](Cf. 501 B, Tennyson, Locksley Hall Sixty Years after, in fine, The highest Human Nature is divine.) while the foul and base are the things that enslave the gentle nature to the wild? Will he assent or not? He will if he is counselled by me. Can it profit any man in the light of this thought to accept gold unjustly if the result is to be that by the acceptance he enslaves the best part of himself to the worst? Or is it conceivable that, while, if the taking of the gold enslaved his son or daughter and that too to fierce and evil men, it would not profit him,[*](Cf. Matt. xvi.26, Mark viii. 36, What shall it profit a man if he shall gain the whole world and lose his own soul? A typical argumentum ex contrario. Cf. 445 A-B and Vol. I. p. 40, note c. On the supreme value of the soul Cf. Laws 726-728, 743 E, 697 B, 913 B, 959 A-B. Cf. 585 D.) no matter how large the sum, yet that, if the result is to be the ruthless enslavement of the divinest part of himself to the most despicable and godless part, he is not to be deemed wretched and is not taking the golden bribe much more disastrously than Eriphyle[*](Cf. Od. xi. 326, Frazer on Apollodorus iii. 6. 2 (Loeb). Stallbaum refers also to Pindar, Nem. ix. 37 ff, and Pausan. x. 29. 7.) did when she received the necklace as the price[*](For ἐπί in this sense cf. Thompson on Meno 90 D. Cf. Apol. 41 A ἐπὶ πόσῳ, Demosth. xlv. 66.) of her husband’s life?

Far more, said Glaucon, for I will answer you in his behalf. And do you not think that the reason for the old objection to licentiousness is similarly because that sort of thing emancipates that dread,[*](See Adam ad loc. on the asyndeton.) that huge and manifold beast overmuch? Obviously, he said. And do we not censure self-will[*](αὐθάδεια: Cf. 548 E.) and irascibility when they foster and intensify disproportionately the element of the lion and the snake[*](Not mentioned before, but, as Schleiermacher says, might be included in τὰ περὶ τὸν λέοντα. Cf. Adam ad loc. Or Plato may be thinking of the chimaera (Il. vi. 181 ).) in us? By all means. And do we not reprobate luxury and effeminacy for their loosening and relaxation of this same element when they engender cowardice in it? Surely. And flattery and illiberality when they reduce this same high-spirited element under the rule of the mob-like beast and habituate it for the sake of wealth and the unbridled lusts of the beast to endure all manner of contumely from youth up and become an ape[*](Cf. 620 C.) instead of a lion? Yes, indeed, he said. And why do you suppose that base mechanic[*](Cf. p. 49, note e.) handicraft is a term of reproach? Shall we not say that it is solely when the best part is naturally weak in a man so that it cannot govern and control the brood of beasts within him but can only serve them and can learn nothing but the ways of flattering them? So it seems, he said. Then is it not in order that such an one may have a like government with the best man that we say he ought to be the slave of that best man[*](For the idea that it is better to be ruled by a better man Cf. Alc. I. 135 B-C, Polit. 296 B-C, Democr. fr. 75 (Diels ii.3 p. 77), Xen. Mem. i. 5. 5 δουλεύοντα δὲ ταῖς τοιαύταις ἡδοναῖς ἱκετευτέον τοὺς θεοὺς δεσποτῶν ἀγαθῶν τυχεῖν, Xen. Cyr. viii. 1. 40 βελτίονας εἶναι. Cf. also Laws 713 D-714 A, 627 E, Phaedo 62 D-E, and Laws 684 C. Cf. Ruskin, Queen of the Air, p. 210 (Brantwood ed., 1891): The first duty of every man in the world is to find his true master, and, for his own good, submit to him; and to find his true inferior, and, for that inferior’s good, conquer him. Inge, Christian Ethics, p. 252: It is ordained in the eternal constitution of things, that men of intemperate minds cannot be free. Carlyle (apud M. Barton and O. Sitwell, Victoriana): Surely of all the rights of man the right of the ignorant man to be guided by the wiser, to be gently or forcibly held in the true course by him, is the indisputablest. Plato’s idea is perhaps a source of Aristotle’s theory of slavery, though differently expressed. Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1254 b 16 f., Newman i. pp. 109-110, 144 f., 378-379, ii. p. 107. Cf. also Polit. 309 A f., Epist. vii. 335 D, and Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, iii. p. 106.) who has within himself the divine governing principle, not because we suppose, as Thrasymachus[*](Cf. 343 B-C.) did in the case of subjects, that the slave should be governed for his own harm, but on the ground that it is better for everyone to be governed by the divine and the intelligent, preferably indwelling and his own, but in default of that imposed from without, in order that we all so far as possible may be akin and friendly because our governance and guidance are the same? Yes, and rightly so, he said. And it is plain, I said, that this is the purpose of the law, which is the ally of all classes in the state,