Republic

That is certainly the right way of looking at it, he said. But what do you understand by the greatest studies? You remember, I presume, said I, that after distinguishing three kinds[*](For the tripartite soul cf. Vol. I. on 435 A and 436 B, Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 42, What Plato Said, p. 526 on Phaedo 68 C, p. 552 on Phaedr. 246 B, and p. 563 on Rep. 435 B-C.) in the soul, we established definitions of justice, sobriety, bravery and wisdom severally. If I did not remember, he said, I should not deserve to hear the rest. Do you also remember what was said before this? What? We were saying, I believe, that for the most perfect discernment of these things another longer way[*](Cf. Vol. I. on 435 C, Phaedr. 274 A, Friedländer, Platon, ii. pp. 376-377, Jowett and Campbell, p. 300 Frutiger, Mythes de Platon, pp. 81 ff., and my Idea of Good in Plato’s Republic(Univ. of Chicago Studies in Class. Phil. vol. i. p. 190). There is no mysticism and no obscurity. The longer way is the higher education, which will enable the philosopher not only like ordinary citizens to do the right from habit and training, but to understand the reasons for it. The outcome of such an education is described as the vision of the idea of good, which for ethics and politics means a restatement of the provisional psychological definition of the cardinal virtues in terms of the ultimate elements of human welfare. For metaphysics and cosmogony the vision of the idea of good may means teleological interpretation of the universe and the interpretation of all things in terms of benevolent design. That is reserved for poetical and mythical treatment in the Timaeus. The Republic merely glances at the thought from time to time and returns to its own theme. Cf.also Introd. p. xxxv.) was requisite which would make them plain to one who took it, but that it was possible to add proofs on a par with the preceding discussion. And you said that that was sufficient, and it was on this understanding that what we then said was said, falling short of ultimate precision as it appeared to me, but if it contented you it is for you to say. Well, he said, it was measurably satisfactory to me, and apparently to the rest of the company. Nay, my friend, said I, a measure of such things that in the least degree falls short of reality proves no measure at all. For nothing that is imperfect is the measure of anything,[*](Cf. Cic. De fin. i. 1 nec modus est ullus investigandi veri nisi inveneris. Note not only the edifying tone and the unction of the style but the definite suggestion of Plato’s distaste for relativity and imperfection which finds expression in the criticism of the homo mensura in the Theaetetus, in the statement of the Laws 716 C, that God is the measure of all things (What Plato Said, p. 631), and in the contrast in the Politicus 283-294 between measuring things against one another and measuring them by an idea. Cf. 531 A.) though some people sometimes think that they have already done enough[*](Cf. Menex. 234 A, Charm. 158 C, Symp. 204 A, Epist. vii. 341 A. From here to the end of this Book the notes are to be used in connection with the Introduction, pp. xxiii-xxxvi, where the idea of good and the divided line are discussed.) and that there is no need of further inquiry. Yes, indeed, he said, many experience this because of their sloth. An experience, said I, that least of all befits the guardians of a state and of its laws. That seems likely, he said. Then, said I, such a one must go around[*](Cf. Phaedr. 274 A.) the longer way and must labor no less in studies than in the exercises of the body or else, as we were just saying, he will never come to the end of the greatest study and that which most properly belongs to him. Why, are not these things the greatest? said he; but is there still something greater than justice and the other virtues we described? There is not only something greater, I said, but of these very things we need not merely to contemplate an outline[*](i.e. sketch, adumbration. The ὑπογραφή is the account of the cardinal virtues in Bk. iv. 428-433.) as now, but we must omit nothing of their most exact elaboration. Or would it not be absurd to strain every nerve[*](For πᾶν ποιεῖν cf. on 488 C, for συντεινομένους Euthydem. 288 D.) to attain to the utmost precision and clarity of knowledge about other things of trifling moment and not to demand the greatest precision for the greatest[*](Such juxtaposition of forms of the same word is one of the most common features of Plato’s style. Cf. 453 B ἑνα ἕν, 466 D πάντα πάντῃ, 467 D πολλὰ πολλοῖς, 496 C οὐδεὶς οὐδέν, Laws 835 C μόνῳ μόνος, 958 B ἑκόντα ἑκών. Cf. also Protag. 327 B, Gorg. 523 B, Symp. 217 B, Tim. 92 b, Phaedo 109 B, Apol. 232 C, and Laws passim.) matters? It would indeed,[*](The answer is to the sense. Cf. 346 E, Crito 47 C, and D, Laches 195 D, Gorg. 467 E. See critical note.) he said; but do you suppose that anyone will let you go without asking what is the greatest study and with what you think it is concerned? By no means, said I; but do you ask the question.

You certainly have heard it often, but now you either do not apprehend or again you are minded to make trouble for me by attacking the argument. I suspect it is rather the latter. For you have often heard[*](Plato assumed that the reader will understand that the unavailing quest for the good in the earlier dialogues is an anticipation of the idea of good. Cf. Vol. I. on 476 A and What Plato Said, p. 71. Wilamowitz, Platon, i. p. 567, does not understand.) that the greatest thing to learn is the idea of good[*](Cf. 508 E, 517 C, Cratyl. 418 E. Cf. Phileb. 64 E and What Plato Said, p. 534, on Phaedo 99 A. Plato is unwilling to confine his idea of good to a formula and so seems to speak of it as a mystery. It was so regarded throughout antiquity (cf. Diog. Laert. iii. 27), and by a majority of modern scholars. Cf. my Idea of Good in Plato’s Republic, pp. 188-189, What Plato Said, pp. 72, 230-231, Introd. Vol. I. pp. xl-xli, and Vol. II. pp. xxvii, xxxiv.) by reference to which[*](Lit. the use of which, i.e. a theory of the cardinal virtues is scientific only if deduced from an ultimate sanction or ideal.) just things[*](The omission of the article merely gives a vaguely generalizing color. It makes no difference.) and all the rest become useful and beneficial. And now I am almost sure you know that this is what I am going to speak of and to say further that we have no adequate knowledge of it. And if we do not know it, then, even if without the knowledge of this we should know all other things never so well, you are aware that it would avail us nothing, just as no possession either is of any avail[*](For the idiom οὐδὲν ὄφελος Cf. Euthyph. 4 E, Lysis 208 E, 365 B, Charm. 155 E, etc.) without the possession of the good. Or do you think there is any profit[*](Cf. 427 A, Phaedr. 275 C, Cratyl. 387 A, Euthyd. 288 E, Laws 751 B, 944 C, etc.) in possessing everything except that which is good, or in understanding all things else apart from the good while understanding and knowing nothing that is fair and good[*](καλὸν δὲ καὶ ἀγαθόν suggests but does not mean καλοκἀγαθόν in its half-technical sense. The two words fill out the rhythm with Platonic fulness and are virtual synonyms. Cf. Phileb. 65 A and Symp. 210-211 where because of the subject the καλόν is substituted for the ἀγαθόν.)?No, by Zeus, I do not, he said. But, furthermore, you know this too, that the multitude believe pleasure[*](So Polus and Callicles in the Gorgias and later the Epicureans and Cyrenaics. Cf. also What Plato Said, p. 131; Eurip. Hippol. 382 οἱ δ’ ἡδονὴν προθέντες ἀντὶ τοῦ καλοῦ, and on 329 A-B. There is no contradiction here with the Philebus. Plato does not himself say that either pleasure or knowledge is the good.) to be the good, and the finer[*](κομψοτέροις is very slightly if at all ironical here. Cf. the American sophisticated in recent use. See too Theaet. 156 A, Aristot. Eth. Nic 1905 a 18 οἱ χαρίεντες.) spirits intelligence or knowledge.[*](Plato does not distinguish synonyms in the style of Prodicus (Cf. Protag. 337 A ff.) and Aristotle (Cf. Eth. Nic. 1140-1141) when the distinction is irrelevant to his purpose.) Certainly. And you are also aware, my friend, that those who hold this latter view are not able to point out what knowledge[*](Cf. Euthyd. 281 D, Theaet. 288 D f., Laws 961 E ὁ περὶ τί νοῦς. See Unity of Plato’s Thought, n. 650. The demand for specification is frequent in the dialogues. Cf. Euthyph. 13 D, Laches 192 E, Gorg. 451 A, Charm. 165 C-E, Alc. I. 124 E ff.) it is but are finally compelled to say that it is the knowledge of the good. Most absurdly, he said. Is it not absurd, said I, if while taunting us with our ignorance of the good they turn about and talk to us as if we knew it? For they say it is the knowledge of the good,[*](There is no the in the Greek. Emendations are idle. Plato is supremely indifferent to logical precision when it makes no difference for a reasonably intelligent reader. Cf. my note on Phileb. 11 B-C in Class. Phil. vol. iii. (1908) pp. 343-345.) as if we understood their meaning when they utter[*](φθέγξωνται logically of mere physical utterance (Cf. Theaet. 157 B), not, I think, as Adam says, of high-sounding oracular utterance.) the word good. Most true, he said. Well, are those who define the good as pleasure infected with any less confusion[*](Lit. wandering, the mark of error. Cf. 484 B, Lysis 213 E, Phaedo 79 C, Soph. 230 B, Phaedr. 263 B, Parmen. 135 E, Laws 962 D.) of thought than the others? Or are not they in like manner[*](καὶ οὗτοι is an illogical idiom of over-particularization. The sentence begins generally and ends specifically. Plato does not care, since the meaning is clear. Cf. Protag. 336 C, Gorg. 456 C-D, Phaedo 62 A.) compelled to admit that there are bad pleasures[*](A distinct reference to Callicles’ admission in Gorgias 499 B τὰς μὲν βελτίους ἡδονάς, τὰς δὲ χείρους cf. 499 C, Rep. 561 C, and Phileb. 13 C πάσας ὁμοίας εἶναι. Stenzel’s notion (Studien zur Entw. d. Plat. Dialektik, p. 98) that in the Philebus Plato ist von dem Standpunkt des Staates 503 C weit entfernt is uncritical. The Republic merely refers to the Gorgias to show that the question is disputed and the disputants contradict themselves.)? Most assuredly. The outcome is, I take it, that they are admitting the same things to be both good and bad, are they not? Certainly. Then is it not apparent that there are many and violent disputes[*](ἀμφισβητήσεις is slightly disparaging, Cf. Theaet. 163 C, 158 C, 198 C, Sophist 233 B, 225 B, but less so than ἐρίζειν in Protag. 337 A.) about it? Of course. And again, is it not apparent that while in the case of the just and the honorable many would prefer the semblance[*](Men may deny the reality of the conventional virtues but not of the ultimate sanction, whatever it is. Cf. Theaet. 167 C, 172 A-B, and Shorey in Class. Phil. xvi (1921) pp. 164-168.) without the reality in action, possession, and opinion, yet when it comes to the good nobody is content with the possession of the appearance but all men seek the reality, and the semblance satisfies nobody here? Quite so, he said. That, then, which every soul pursues[*](Cf. Gorg. 468 B τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἄρα διώκοντες, 505 A-B, Phileb. 20 D, Symp. 206 A, Euthyd. 278 E, Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1173 a, 1094 a οὗ πάντα ἐφίεται, Zeller, Aristot. i. pp. 344-345, 379, Boethius iii. 10, Dante, Purg. xvii. 127-129.) and for its sake does all that it does, with an intuition[*](Cf. Phileb. 64 A μαντευτέον. Cf. Arnold’s phrase, God and the Bible, chap. i. p. 23 approximate language thrown out as it were at certain great objects which the human mind augurs and feels after.) of its reality, but yet baffled[*](As throughout the minor dialogues. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 71.) and unable to apprehend its nature adequately, or to attain to any stable belief about it as about other things,[*](Because, in the language of Platonic metaphysics, it is the παρουσία τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ that makes them good; but for the practical purpose of ethical theory, because they need the sanction. Cf. Introd. p. xxvii, and Montaigne i. 24 Toute aultre science est dommageable à celuy qui n’a Ia science de la bonté.) and for that reason failing of any possible benefit from other things,— in a matter of this quality and moment, can we, I ask you, allow a like blindness and obscurity in those best citizens[*](As in the longer way Plato is careful not to commit himself to a definition of the ideal or the sanction, but postulates it for his guardians.) to whose hands we are to entrust all things?

Least of all, he said. I fancy, at any rate, said I, that the just and the honorable, if their relation and reference to the good is not known,[*](The personal or ab urbe condita construction. Cf. Theaet. 169 E.) will not have secured a guardian[*](the guardians must be able to give a reason, which they can do only by reference to the sanction. For the idea that the statesman must know better than other men. Cf. Laws 968 A, 964 C, 858 C-E, 817 C, Xen Mem. iii. 6. 8.) of much worth in the man thus ignorant, and my surmise is that no one will understand them adequately before he knows this. You surmise well, he said. Then our constitution will have its perfect and definitive organization[*](For the effect of the future perfect cf. 457 B λελέξεται465 A προστετάξεται, Eurip. Heracleidae 980 πεπράξεται.) only when such a guardian, who knows these things, oversees it. Necessarily, he said. But you yourself, Socrates, do you think that knowledge is the good or pleasure or something else and different? What a man it is, said I; you made it very plain[*](For the personal construction 348 E, Isoc. To Nic. I. καταφανής is a variation in this idiom for δῆλος. Cf. also Theaet. 189 C, Symp. 221 B, Charm. 162 C, etc.) long ago that you would not be satisfied with what others think about it. Why, it does not seem right to me either, Socrates, he said, to be ready to state the opinions of others but not one’s own when one has occupied himself with the matter so long.[*](Cf. 367 D-E.) But then, said I, do you think it right to speak as having knowledge about things one does not know? By no means, he said, as having knowledge, but one ought to be willing to tell as his opinion what he opines. Nay, said I, have you not observed that opinions divorced from knowledge[*](This is not a contradiction of Meno 97 B, Theaet. 201 B-C and Phileb. 62 A-B, but simply a different context and emphasis. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 47, nn. 338 and 339.) are ugly things? The best of them are blind.[*](Cf. on 484 C, Phaedr. 270 E.) Or do you think that those who hold some true opinion without intelligence differ appreciably from blind men who go the right way? They do not differ at all, he said. Is it, then, ugly things that you prefer to contemplate, things blind and crooked, when you might hear from others what is luminous[*](Probably an allusion to the revelation of the mysteries. Cf. Phaedr. 250 C, Phileb. 16 C, Rep. 518 C, 478 C, 479 D, 518 A. It is fantastic to see in it a reference to what Cicero calls the lumina orationis of Isocratean style. The rhetoric and synonyms of this passage are not to be pressed.) and fair? Nay, in heaven’s name, Socrates, said Glaucon, do not draw back, as it were, at the very goal.[*](Cf. Phileb. 64 C ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἤδη προθύροις, we are now in the vestibule of the good.) For it will content us if you explain the good even as you set forth the nature of justice, sobriety, and the other virtues. It will right well[*](καὶ μάλα, jolly well, humorous emphasis on the point that it is much easier to define the conventional virtues than to explain the sanction. Cf. Symp. 189 A, Euthydem. 298 D-E, Herod. viii. 66. It is frequent in the Republic. Ritter gives forty-seven cases. I have fifty-four! But the point that matters is the humorous tone. Cf. e.g. 610 E.) content me, my dear fellow, I said, but I fear that my powers may fail and that in my eagerness I may cut a sorry figure and become a laughing-stock.[*](Excess of Zeal, προθυμία, seemed laughable to the Greeks. Cf. my interpretation of Iliad i. in fine, Class. Phil. xxii. (1927) pp. 222-223.) Nay, my beloved, let us dismiss for the time being the nature of the good in itself;[*](Cf. More, Principia Ethica, p. 17 Good, then, is indefinable; and yet, so far as I know, there is only one ethical writer, Professor Henry Sidgwick, who has clearly recognized and stated this fact.) for to attain to my present surmise of that seems a pitch above the impulse that wings my flight today.[*](This is not superstitious mysticism but a deliberate refusal to confine in a formula what requires either a volume or a symbol. See Introd. p. xxvii, and my Idea of Good in Plato’s Republic, p. 212. τὰ νῦν repeats τὸ νῦν εἶναι (Cf. Tim. 48 C), as the evasive phrase εἰσαῦθις below sometimes lays the topic on the table, never to be taken up again. Cf. 347 E and 430 C.) But of what seems to be the offspring of the good and most nearly made in its likeness[*](Cf. Laws 897 D-E, Phaedr. 246 A.) I am willing to speak if you too wish it, and otherwise to let the matter drop. Well, speak on, he said, for you will duly pay me the tale of the parent another time.

I could wish, I said, that I were able to make and you to receive the payment and not merely as now the interest. But at any rate receive this interest[*](This playful interlude relieves the monotony of the argument and is a transition to the symbolism. τόκος means both interest and offspring. Cf. 555 E, Polit. 267 A, Aristoph. Clouds 34, Thesm. 845, Pindar, Ol. x. 12. the equivocation, which in other languages became a metaphor, has played a great part in the history of opinion about usury. Cf. the article Usury in Hastings’s Encyclopaedia of Relig. and Ethics. ) and the offspring of the good. Have a care, however, lest I deceive you unintentionally with a false reckoning of the interest. We will do our best, he said, to be on our guard. Only speak on. Yes, I said, after first coming to an understanding with you and reminding you of what has been said here before and often on other occasions.[*](Cf. 475 E f. Plato as often begins by a restatement of the theory of ideas, i.e. practically of the distinction between the concept and the objects of sense. Cf. Rep. 596 A ff., Phaedo 108 b ff.) What? said he. We predicate to be[*](The modern reader will never understand Plato from translations that talk about Being. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 605.) of many beautiful things and many good things, saying of them severally that they are, and so define them in our speech. We do. And again, we speak of a self-beautiful and of a good that is only and merely good, and so, in the case of all the things that we then posited as many, we turn about and posit each as a single idea or aspect, assuming it to be a unity and call it that which each really is.[*](ὃ ἔστιν is technical for the reality of the ideas. Cf. Phaedo 75 B, D, 78 D, Parmen. 129 B, Symp. 211 C, Rep. 490 B, 532 A, 597 A.) It is so. And the one class of things we say can be seen but not thought, while the ideas can be thought but not seen. By all means. With which of the parts of ourselves, with which of our faculties, then, do we see visible things? With sight, he said. And do we not, I said, hear audibles with hearing, and perceive all sensibles with the other senses? Surely. Have you ever observed, said I, how much the greatest expenditure the creator[*](Creator, δημιουργός, God, the gods, and nature, are all virtual synonyms in such passages.) of the senses has lavished on the faculty of seeing and being seen?[*](Cf. Phaedr. 259 D, Tim. 45 B.) Why, no, I have not, he said. Well, look at it thus. Do hearing and voice stand in need of another medium[*](This is literature, not science. Plato knew that sound required a medium, Tim. 67 B. But the statement here is true enough to illustrate the thought.) so that the one may hear and the other be heard, in the absence of which third element the one will not hear and the other not be heard? They need nothing, he said. Neither, I fancy, said I, do many others, not to say that none require anything of the sort. Or do you know of any? Not I, he said. But do you not observe that vision and the visible do have this further need? How? Though vision may be in the eyes and its possessor may try to use it, and though color be present, yet without the presence of a third thing[*](Lit. kind of thing, γένος. Cf. 507 C-D.) specifically and naturally adapted to this purpose, you are aware that vision will see nothing and the colors will remain invisible.[*](Cf. Troland, The Mystery of Mind, p. 82: In order that there should be vision, it is not sufficient that a physical object should exist before the eyes. there must also be a source of so-called light.) What[*](Plato would not have tried to explain this loose colloquial genitive, and we need not.) is this thing of which you speak? he said. The thing, I said, that you call light. You say truly, he replied.

The bond, then, that yokes together visibility and the faculty of sight is more precious by no slight form[*](The loose Herodotean-Thucydidean-Isocratean use of ἰδέα. Cf. Laws 689 D καὶ τὸ σμικρότατον εἶδος. Form over-translates ἰδέᾳ here, which is little more than a synonym for γένος above. Cf. Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 250.) that which unites the other pairs, if light is not without honor.It surely is far from being so, he said. Which one can you name of the divinities in heaven[*](Plato was willing to call the stars gods as the barbarians did (Cratyl. 397 D, Aristoph. Peace 406 ff., Herod. iv. 188). Cf. Laws 821 B, 899 B, 950 D, Apol. 26 D, Epinomis 985 B, 988 B.) as the author and cause of this, whose light makes our vision see best and visible things to be seen? Why, the one that you too and other people mean, he said; for your question evidently refers to the sun.[*](Cf. my Idea of good in Plato’s Republic pp. 223-225, Reinhardt, Kosmos und Sympathie, pp. 374-384. Mediaeval writers have much to say of Platos mysterious Tagathon. Aristotle, who rejects the idea of good, uses τἀγαθόν in much the same way. It is naive to take the language of Platonic unction too literally. Cf. What Plato Said, pp. 394 ff.) Is not this, then, the relation of vision to that divinity? What? Neither vision itself nor its vehicle, which we call the eye, is identical with the sun. Why, no. But it is, I think, the most sunlike[*](Cf. 509 A, Plotinus, Enn. i. 6. 9 οὐ γὰρ ἂν πώποτε εἶδεν ὀφθαλμὸς ἥλιον ἡλιοειδὴς μὴ γεγενημένος and vi. 7. 19, Cic. Tusc. i. 25. 73 in fine quod si in hoc mundo fieri sine deo non potest, ne in sphaera quidem eosdem motus Archimedes sine divino ingenio potuisset imitare, Manilius ii. 115: quis caelum posset nisi caeli munere nosse,et reperire deum nisi qui pars ipse deorum? Goethe's Wär’ nicht das Auge sonnenhaft,Die Sonne könnt es nic erblicken, and Goethe to Eckermann, Feb. 26, 1824: Hätte ich nicht die Welt durch Anticipation bereits in mir getragen, ich wäre mit sehenden Augen blind geblieben.) of all the instruments of sense. By far the most. And does it not receive the power which it possesses as an influx, as it were, dispensed from the sun? Certainly. Is it not also true that the sun is not vision, yet as being the cause thereof is beheld by vision itself? That is so, he said. This, then, you must understand that I meant by the offspring of the good[*](i.e. creation was the work of benevolent design. This is one of the few passages in the Republic where the idea of good is considered in relation to the universe, a thesis reserved for poetical or mythical development in the Timaeus. It is idle to construct a systematic metaphysical theology for Plato by identification of τἀγαθόν here either with god or with the ideas as a whole. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, p 512.) which the good begot to stand in a proportion[*](Cf. Gorg. 465 B-C, 510 A-B, 511 E, 530 D, 534 A, 576 C, Phaedo 111 A-B, Tim. 29 C, 32 A-B. For ἀνάλογον in this sense cf. 511 E, 534 A, Phaedo 110 D.) with itself: as the good is in the intelligible region to reason and the objects of reason, so is this in the visible world to vision and the objects of vision. How is that? he said; explain further. You are aware, I said, that when the eyes are no longer turned upon objects upon whose colors the light of day falls but that of the dim luminaries of night, their edge is blunted and they appear almost blind, as if pure vision did not dwell in them. Yes, indeed, he said. But when, I take it, they are directed upon objects illumined by the sun, they see clearly, and vision appears to reside in these same eyes. Certainly. Apply this comparison to the soul also in this way. When it is firmly fixed on the domain where truth and reality shine resplendent[*](Plato’s rhetoric is not to be pressed. Truth, being the good, are virtual synonyms. Still, for Plato’s ethical and political philosophy the light that makes things intelligible is the idea of good, i.e. the sanction, and not, as some commentators insist, the truth.) it apprehends and knows them and appears to possess reason; but when it inclines to that region which is mingled with darkness, the world of becoming and passing away, it opines only and its edge is blunted, and it shifts its opinions hither and thither, and again seems as if it lacked reason. Yes, it does, This reality, then, that gives their truth to the objects of knowledge and the power of knowing to the knower, you must say is the idea[*](No absolute distinction can be drawn between εἶδος and ἰδέα in Plato. But ἰδέα may be used o carry the notion of apprehended aspect which I think is more pertinent here than the metaphysical entity of the idea, though of course Plato would affirm that. Cf. 379 A, Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 35, What Plato Said, p. 585, Class. Phil. xx. (1925) p. 347.) of good, and you must conceive it as being the cause of knowledge, and of truth in so far as known.[*](The meaning is clear. we really understand and know anything only when we apprehend its purpose, the aspect of the good that it reveals. Cf. Introd. pp. xxxv-xxxvi. the position and case of γιγνωσκομένης are difficult. But no change proposed is any improvement.) Yet fair as they both are, knowledge and truth, in supposing it to be something fairer still[*](Plato likes to cap a superlative by a further degree of completeness, a climax beyond the climax. Cf. 405 B αἴσχιστον . . . αἴσχιον, 578 B, Symp. 180 A-B and Bury ad loc. The same characteristic can be observed in his method, e.g. in the Symposium where Agathon’s speech, which seems the climax, is surpassed by that of Socrates: similarly in the Gorgias and the tenth book of the Republic, Cf. Friedländer, Platon, i. p. 174, Introd. p. lxi. This and the next half page belong, I think, to rhetoric rather than to systematic metaphysics. Plato the idealist uses transcendental language of his ideal, and is never willing to admit that expression has done justice to it. But Plato the rationalist distinctly draws the line between his religious language thrown out at an object and his definite logical and practical conclusions. Cf. e.g. Meno 81 D-E.) than these you will think rightly of it.

But as for knowledge and truth, even as in our illustration it is right to deem light and vision sunlike, but never to think that they are the sun, so here it is right to consider these two their counterparts, as being like the good or boniform,[*](ἀγαθοειδῆ occurs only here in classical Greek literature. Plato quite probably coined it for his purpose.) but to think that either of them is the good[*](There is no article in the Greek. Plato is not scrupulous to distinguish good and the good here. cf. on 505 C, p. 89, note f.) is not right. Still higher honor belongs to the possession and habit[*](ἕξις is not yet in Plato quite the technical Aristotelian habit. However Protag. 344 C approaches it. Cf. also Phileb. 11 D, 41 C, Ritter-Preller, p. 285. Plato used many words in periphrasis with the genitive, e.g. ἕξις Laws 625 C, γένεσις Laws 691 B, Tim. 73 B, 76 E, μοῖρα Phaedr. 255 B, 274 E, Menex. 249 B,φύσις Phaedo 109 E, Symp. 186 B, Laws 729 C, 845 D, 944 D, etc. He may have chosen ἕξις here to suggest the ethical aspect of the good as a habit or possession of the soul. The introduction of ἡδονή below supports this view. Some interpreters think it = τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὡς ἔχει, which is possible but rather pointless.) of the good.An inconceivable beauty you speak of, he said, if it is the source of knowledge and truth, and yet itself surpasses them in beauty. For you surely[*](For οὐ γὰρ δήπου Cf. Apol. 20 C, Gorg. 455 A, Euthyph. 13 A.) cannot mean that it is pleasure. Hush, said I, but examine the similitude of it still further in this way.[*](i.e. not only do we understand a thing when we know its purpose, but a purpose in some mind is the chief cause of its existence, God’s mind for the universe, man’s mind for political institutions. this, being the only interpretation that makes sense o the passage, is presumably more or less consciously Plato’s meaning. Cf. Introd. pp. xxxv-xxxvi. Quite irrelevant are Plato’s supposed identification of the ἀγαθόν with the ἕν, one, and Aristotle’s statement, Met. 988 a, that the ideas are the cause of other things and the one is the cause of the ideas. the remainder of the paragraph belongs to transcendental rhetoric. It has been endlessly quoted and plays a great part in Neoplatonism, in all philosophies of the unknowable and in all negative and mystic theologies.) How? The sun, I presume you will say, not only furnishes to visibles the power of visibility but it also provides for their generation and growth and nurture though it is not itself generation. Of course not. In like manner, then, you are to say that the objects of knowledge not only receive from the presence of the good their being known, but their very existence and essence is derived to them from it, though the good itself is not essence but still transcends essence[*](It is an error to oppose Plato here to the Alexandrians who sometimes said ἐπέκεινα τοῦ ὄντος. Plato’s sentence would have made ὄντος very inconvenient here. But εἶναι shows that οὐσίας is not distinguished from τοῦ ὄντος here. ἐπέκεινα became technical and a symbol for the transcendental in Neoplatonism and all similar philosophies. cf. Plotinus xvii. 1, Dionysius Areop. De divinis nominibus, ii. 2, Friedländer, Platon, i. p. 87.) in dignity and surpassing power. And Glaucon very ludicrously[*](He is amused at Socrates’ emphasis. Fanciful is Wilamowitz’ notion (Platon, i. p. 209) that the laughable thing is Glaucon’s losing control of himself, for which he compares Aristoph. Birds 61. Cf. the extraordinary comment of Proclus, p. 265. The dramatic humor of Glaucon’s surprise is Plato’s way of smiling at himself, as he frequently does in the dialogues. Cf. 536 B, 540 B, Lysis 223 B, Protag. 340 E, Charm. 175 E, Cratyl. 426 B, Theaet. 200 B, 197 D, etc. Cf. Friedländer, Platon, i. p. 172 on the Phaedo. ) said, Heaven save us, hyperbole[*](What a comble! would be nearer the tone of the Greek. There is no good English equivalent for ὑπερβολῆς. Cf. Sir Thomas Browne’s remark that nothing can be said hyperbolically of God. The banter here relieves the strain, as is Plato’s manner.) can no further go. The fault is yours, I said, for compelling me to utter my thoughts about it. And don’t desist, he said, but at least[*](Cf. 502 A, Symp. 222 E, Meno 86 E.) expound the similitude of the sun, if there is anything that you are omitting. Why, certainly, I said, I am omitting a great deal. Well, don’t omit the least bit, he said. I fancy, I said, that I shall have to pass over much, but nevertheless so far as it is at present practicable I shall not willingly leave anything out. Do not, he said. Conceive then, said I, as we were saying, that there are these two entities, and that one of them is sovereign over the intelligible order and region and the other over the world of the eye-ball, not to say the sky-ball,[*](Cf. the similar etymological pun in Cratyl. 396 B-C. Here, as often, the translator must choose between over-translating for some tastes, or not translating at all.) but let that pass. You surely apprehend the two types, the visible and the intelligible. I do. Represent them then, as it were, by a line divided[*](The meaning is given in the text. Too many commentators lose the meaning in their study of the imagery. Cf. the notes of Adam, Jowett, Campbell, and Apelt. See Introd. p. xxi for my interpretation of the passage.) into two unequal[*](Some modern and ancient critics prefer ἀν’ ἴσα. It is a little more plausible to make the sections unequal. But again there is doubt which shall be longer, the higher as the more honorable or the lower as the more multitudinous. Cf. Plut. Plat. Quest. 3.) sections and cut each section again in the same ratio (the section, that is, of the visible and that of the intelligible order), and then as an expression of the ratio of their comparative clearness and obscurity you will have, as one of the sections of the visible world, images.

By images[*](Cf. 402 B, Soph. 266 B-C.) I mean, first, shadows, and then reflections in water and on surfaces of dense, smooth and bright texture, and everything of that kind, if you apprehend.I do.As the second section assume that of which this is a likeness or an image, that is, the animals about us and all plants and the whole class of objects made by man.I so assume it, he said. Would you be willing to say, said I, that the division in respect of reality and truth or the opposite is expressed by the proportion:[*](Cf. on 508 C, p. 103. note b.) as is the opinable to the knowable so is the likeness to that of which it is a likeness? I certainly would. Consider then again the way in which we are to make the division of the intelligible section. In what way? By the distinction that there is one section of it which the soul is compelled to investigate by treating as images the things imitated in the former division, and by means of assumptions from which it proceeds not up to a first principle but down to a conclusion, while there is another section in which it advances from its assumption to a beginning or principle that transcends assumption,[*](Cf. my Idea of good in Plato’s republic, pp. 230-234, for the ἀνυπόθετον. Ultimately, the ἀνυπόθετον is the Idea of Good so far as we assume that idea to be attainable either in ethics or in physics. But it is the Idea of Good, not as a transcendental ontological mystery, but in the ethical sense already explained. The ideal dialectician is the man who can, if challenged, run his reasons for any given proposition back, not to some assumed axioma medium, but to its relation to ultimate Good, To call the ἀνυπόθετον the Unconditioned or Absolute introduces metaphysical associations foreign to the passage. Cf. also Introd. pp. xxxiii-xxxiv.) and in which it makes no use of the images employed by the other section, relying on ideas[*](The practical meaning of this is independent of the disputed metaphysics. Cf. Introd. pp. xvi-xviii.) only and progressing systematically through ideas. I don’t fully understand[*](Cf. Vol. I. p. 79, note c on 347 A and p. 47, not f on 338 D; What Plato Said, p. 503 on Gorg. 463 D.) what you mean by this, he said. Well, I will try again, said I, for you will better understand after this preamble. For I think you are aware that students of geometry and reckoning and such subjects first postulate the odd and the even and the various figures and three kinds of angles and other things akin to these in each branch of science, regard them as known, and, treating them as absolute assumptions, do not deign to render any further account of them[*](Aristot. Top. 100 b 2-3 οὐ δεῖ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστημονικαῖς ἀρχαῖς ἐπιζητεῖσθαι τὸ διὰ τί, exactly expresses Plato’s thought and the truth, though Aristotle may have meant it mainly for the principle of non-contradiction and other first principles of logic. Cf. the mediaeval contra principium negantem non est disputandum. A teacher of geometry will refuse to discuss the psychology of the idea of space, a teacher of chemistry will not permit the class to ask whether matter is real.) to themselves or others, taking it for granted that they are obvious to everybody. They take their start from these, and pursuing the inquiry from this point on consistently, conclude with that for the investigation of which they set out. Certainly, he said, I know that. And do you not also know that they further make use of the visible forms and talk about them, though they are not thinking of them but of those things of which they are a likeness, pursuing their inquiry for the sake of the square as such and the diagonal as such, and not for the sake of the image of it which they draw[*](Cf. 527 A-B. This explanation of mathematical reasoning does not differ at all from that of Aristotle and Berkely and the moderns who praise Aristotle, except that the metaphysical doctrine of ideas is in the background to be asserted if challenged.)? And so in all cases. The very things which they mould and draw, which have shadows and images of themselves in water, these things they treat in their turn[*](i.e. a bronze sphere would be the original of its imitative reflection in water, but it is in turn only the imperfect imitation of the mathematical idea of a sphere.) as only images, but what they really seek is to get sight of those realities which can be seen only by the mind.[*](Stenzel, Handbuch, 118 das er nur mit dem Verstande (διανοίᾳ) sieht is mistaken. διανοίᾳ is used not in its special sense (understanding. See p. 116, note c), but generally for the mind as opposed to the senses. Cf. 511 c.)

True, he said. This then is the class that I described as intelligible, it is true,[*](For the concessive μέν cf. 546 E, 529 D, Soph. 225 C.) but with the reservation first that the soul is compelled to employ assumptions in the investigation of it, not proceeding to a first principle because of its inability to extricate itself from and rise above its assumptions, and second, that it uses as images or likenesses the very objects that are themselves copied and adumbrated by the class below them, and that in comparison with these latter[*](The loosely appended dative ἐκείνοις is virtually a dative absolute. Cf. Phaedo 105 A. Wilamowitz’ emendation (Platon, ii. p. 384) to πρὸς ἐκεῖνα, καὶ ἐκείνοις rests on a misunderstanding of the passage.) are esteemed as clear and held in honor.[*](The translation of this sentence is correct. But cf. Adam ad loc.) I understand, said he, that you are speaking of what falls under geometry and the kindred arts. Understand then, said I, that by the other section of the intelligible I mean that which the reason[*](λόγος here suggests both the objective personified argument and the subjective faculty.) itself lays hold of by the power of dialectics,[*](Cf. 533 A. Phileb. 57 E.) treating its assumptions not as absolute beginnings but literally as hypotheses,[*](τῷ ὄντι emphasized the etymological meaning of the word. Similarly ὡς ἀληθῶς in 551 E, Phaedo 80 D, Phileb. 64 E. For hypotheses cf. Burnet, Greek Philosophy, p. 229, Thompson on Meno 86 E. But the thing to note is that the word according to the context may emphasize the arbitrariness of an assumption or the fact that it is the starting-point—ἀρχή—of the inquiry.) underpinnings, footings,[*](Cf. Symp. 211 C ὥσπερ ἐπαναβάσμοις, like steps of a stair.) and springboards so to speak, to enable it to rise to that which requires no assumption and is the starting-point of all,[*](παντὸς ἀρχήν taken literally leads support to the view that Plato is thinking of an absolute first principle. But in spite of the metaphysical suggestions for practical purposes the παντὸς ἀρχή may be the virtual equivalent of the ἱκανόν of the Phaedo. It is the ἀρχή on which all in the particular case depends and is reached by dialectical agreement, not by arbitrary assumption. Cf. on 510 B, p. 110, note a.) and after attaining to that again taking hold of the first dependencies from it, so to proceed downward to the conclusion, making no use whatever of any object of sense[*](This is one of the passages that are misused to attribute to Plato disdain for experience and the perceptions of the senses. Cf. on 530 B, p. 187, note c. The dialectician is able to reason purely in concepts and words without recurring to images. Plato is not here considering how much or little of his knowledge is ultimately derived from experience.) but only of pure ideas moving on through ideas to ideas and ending with ideas.[*](The description undoubtedly applies to a metaphysical philosophy that deduces all things from a transcendent first principle. I have never denied that. The point of my interpretation is that it also describes the method which distinguishes the dialectician as such from the man of science, and that this distinction is for practical and educational purposes the chief result of the discussion, as Plato virtually says in the next few lines. Cf. What Plato Said, pp. 233-234.) I understand, he said; not fully, for it is no slight task that you appear to have in mind, but I do understand that you mean to distinguish the aspect of reality and the intelligible, which is contemplated by the power of dialectic, as something truer and more exact than the object of the so-called arts and sciences whose assumptions are arbitrary starting-points. And though it is true that those who contemplate them are compelled to use their understanding[*](διανοίᾳ here as in 511 A is general and not technical.) and not their senses, yet because they do not go back to the beginning in the study of them but start from assumptions you do not think they possess true intelligence[*](νοῦν οὐκ ἴσχειν is perhaps intentionally ambiguous. Colloquially the phrase means have not sense for its higher meaning Cf. Meno 99 C, Laws 962 A.) about them although[*](Unnecessary difficulties have been raised about καίτοι and μετά here. Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 345 mistakenly resorts to emendation. the meaning is plain. Mathematical ideas are ideas or concepts like other ideas; but the mathematician does not deal with them quiet as the dialectician deals with ideas and therefore does not possess νοῦς or reason in the highest sense.) the things themselves are intelligibles when apprehended in conjunction with a first principle. And I think you call the mental habit of geometers and their like mind or understanding[*](Here the word διάνοια is given a technical meaning as a faculty inferior to νοῦς, but, as Plato says, the terminology does not matter. The question has been much and often idly discussed.) and not reason because you regard understanding as something intermediate between opinion and reason. Your interpretation is quite sufficient, I said; and now, answering to[*](For ἐπί Cf. Polit. 280 A, Gorg. 463 B.) these four sections, assume these four affections occurring in the soul: intellection or reason for the highest, understanding for the second; assign belief[*](πίστις is of course not faith in Plato, but Neoplatonists, Christians, and commentators have confused the two ideas hopelessly.) to the third, and to the last picture-thinking or conjecture,[*](εἰκασία undoubtedly had this connotation for Plato.) and arrange them in a proportion,[*](Cf. on 508 C, p. 103, note b.) considering that they participate in clearness and precision in the same degree as their objects partake of truth and reality. I understand, he said; I concur and arrange them as you bid.