Republic

It was indeed, said he, a strange potion for a man in that condition. Not strange, said I, if you reflect that the former Asclepiads made no use of our modern coddling[*](This coddling treatment of disease, which Plato affects to reprobate here, he recommends from the point of view of science in the Timaeus (89 C): διὸ παιδαγωγεῖν δεῖ διαίταις, etc. Cf. Euripides Orestes 883; and even in the Republic 459 C.) medication of diseases before the time of Herodicus. But Herodicus[*](Cf. Protagoras 316 E, Phaedrus 227 D. To be distinguished from his namesake, the brother of Gorgias in Gorgias 448 B. Cf. Cope on Aristotle Rhet. i. 5, Wilamowitz-Kiessling, Phil. Unt. xv. p. 220, Juthner, Philostratus uber Gymnastik, p. 10.) was a trainer and became a valetudinarian, and blended gymnastics and medicine, for the torment first and chiefly of himself and then of many successors. How so? he said. By lingering out his death, said I; for living in perpetual observance of his malady, which was incurable, he was not able to effect a cure, but lived through his days unfit for the business of life, suffering the tortures of the damned if he departed a whit from his fixed regimen, and struggling against death by reason of his science he won the prize of a doting old age.[*](Cf. Macaulay on Mitford’s History of Greece: It (oligarchical government) has a sort of valetudinarian longevity; it lives in the balance of Sanctorius; it takes no exercise; it exposes itself to no accident; it is seized with a hypochondriac alarm at every new sensation; it trembles at every breath; it lets blood for every inflammation; and this, without ever enjoying a day of health or pleasure, drags out its existence to a doting and debilitated old age. That Macaulay here is consciously paraphrasing Plato is apparent from his unfair use of the Platonic passage in his essay on Bacon. Cf. further Euripides Supp. 1109-1113; Seneca on early medicine, Epistles xv. 3 (95) 14 ff., overdoes both Spencer and Macaulay. Cf. Rousseau, Emile, Book I.: Je ne sais point apprendre à vivre à qui ne songe qu’à s’empêcher de mourir; La Rochefoucauld (Max. 282): C’est une ennuyeuse maladie que de conserver sa santé par un trop grand régime.) A noble prize[*](The pun γήρας and γέρας is hardly translatable. Cf. Pherecydes apud Diogenes Laertius i. 119 χθονίῃ δὲ ὄνομα ἐγένετο Γῆ, ἐπειδὴ αὐτῇ Ζὰς γῆν γέρας διδοῖ (vol. i. p. 124 L.C.L.). For the ironical use of καλόν cf. Euripides Cyclops 551, Sappho, fr. 53 (58).) indeed for his science, he said. The appropriate one, said I, for a man who did not know that it was not from ignorance or inacquaintance with this type of medicine that Aesculapius did not discover it to his descendants, but because he knew that for all well-governed peoples there is a work assigned to each man in the city which he must perform, and no one has leisure to be sick[*](Cf. Plutarch, De sanitate tuenda 23, Sophocles, fr. 88. 11 (?), Lucian, Nigrinus 22, differently; Hotspur’s, Zounds! how has he the leisure to be sick?) and doctor himself all his days. And this we absurdly enough perceive in the case of a craftsman, but don’t see in the case of the rich and so-called fortunate. How so? he said. A carpenter, said I, when he is sick expects his physician to give him a drug which will operate as an emetic on the disease, or to get rid of it by purging[*](For ἢ κάτω cf. Chaucer, Ne upward purgative ne downward laxative.) or the use of cautery or the knife. But if anyone prescribes for him a long course of treatment with swathings[*](Cf. Blaydes on Aristophanes Acharnians 439.) about the head and their accompaniments, he hastily says that he has no leisure to be sick and that such a life of preoccupation with his illess and neglect of the work that lies before him isn’t worth living. And thereupon he bids farewell to that kind of physician, enters upon his customary way of life, regains his health, and lives attending to his affairs—or, if his body is not equal to strain, he dies and is freed from all his troubles.[*](This alone marks the humor of the whole passage, which Macaulay’s Essay on Bacon seems to miss. Cf. Aristophanes Acharnians 757;Apology 41 D.) For such a man, he said, that appears to be the right use of medicine.

And is not the reason, I said, that he had a task and that life wasn’t worth acceptance on condition of not doing his work? Obviously, he said. But the rich man, we say, has no such appointed task, the necessity of abstaining from which renders life intolerable. I haven’t heard of any. Why, haven’t you heard that saying of Phocylides,[*](The line of Phocylides is toyed with merely to vary the expression of the thought. Bergk restores it δίζησθαι βιοτήν, ἀρετὴν δ’ ὅταν ᾖ βίος ἤδη, which is Horace’s (Epistles i. 1. 53 f.): Quaerenda pecunia primum est; Virtus post nummos!) that after a man has made his pile he ought to practice virtue? Before, too, I fancy, he said. Let us not quarrel with him on that point, I said, but inform ourselves whether this virtue is something for the rich man to practise, and life is intolerable if he does not, or whether we are to suppose that while valetudinarianism is a hindrance to single-minded attention to carpentry and the other arts, it is no obstacle to the fulfilment of Phocylides’ exhortation. Yes, indeed, he said, this excessive care for the body that goes beyond simple gymnastics[*](In the Gorgias (464 B) ἰατρική is recognized as co-ordinate in the care of the body with γυμναστική. Here, whatever goes beyond the training and care that will preserve the health of a normal body is austerely rejected. Cf. 410 B.) is the greatest of all obstacles. For it is troublesome in household affairs and military service and sedentary offices in the city. And, chief of all, it puts difficulties in the way of any kind of instruction, thinking, or private meditation, forever imagining headaches[*](As Macaulay, Essay on Bacon, puts it: That a valetudinarian . . . who enjoyed a hearty laugh over the Queen of Navarre’s tales should be treated as a caput lupinum because he could not read the Timaeus without a headache, was a notion which the humane spirit of the English schools of wisdom altogether rejected. For the thought cf. Xenophon Memorabilia iii. 12. 6-7.) and dizziness and attributing their origin to philosophy. So that wherever this kind of virtue is practiced[*](Literally virtue is practiced in this way. Cf. 503 D for a similar contrast between mental and other labors. And for the meaning of virtue cf. the Elizabethan: Virtue is ever sowing of her seeds.) and tested it is in every way a hindrance.[*](There is a suggestion of Stoic terminology in Plato’s use of ἐμπόδιος and similar words. Cf. Xenophon Memorabilia i. 2. 4. On the whole passage cf. again Macaulay’s Essay on Bacon, Maximus of Tyre (Duebn.) 10, and the diatribe on modern medicine and valetudinarianism in Edward Carpenter’s Civilization, Its Cause and Cure.) For it makes the man always fancy himself sick and never cease from anguishing about his body. Naturally, he said. Then, shall we not say that it was because Asclepius knew this—that for those who were by nature and course of life sound of body but had some localized disease, that for such, I say, and for this habit he revealed the art of medicine, and, driving out their disease by drugs and surgery, prescribed for them their customary regimen in order not to interfere with their civic duties, but that, when bodies were diseased inwardly and throughout, he did not attempt by diet and by gradual evacuations and infusions to prolong a wretched existence for the man and have him beget in all likelihood similar wretched offspring? But if a man was incapable of living in the established round[*](Cf. Thucydides i. 130.) and order of life, he did not think it worth while to treat him, since such a fellow is of no use either to himself or to the state. A most politic Asclepius you’re telling us of,[*](There is a touch of comedy in the Greek. Cf. Eupolis, fr. 94 Kock ταχὺν λέγεις μέν.) he said.

Obviously, said I, that was his character. And his sons too, don’t you in see that at Troy they approved themselves good fighting-men and practised medicine as I described it? Don’t you remember[*](Cf. the Homeric ἦ οὐ μέμνῃ;) that in the case of Menelaus too from the wound that Pandarus inflicted

They sucked the blood, and soothing simples sprinkled?

But a judge, mark you, my friend, rules soul with soul and it is not allowable for a soul to have been bred from youth up among evil souls and to have grown familiar with them, and itself to have run the gauntlet of every kind of wrong-doing and injustice so as quickly to infer from itself the misdeeds of others as it might diseases in the body, but it must have been inexperienced in evil natures and uncontaminated by them while young, if it is to be truly fair and good and judge soundly of justice. For which cause the better sort seem to be simple-minded in youth and are easily deceived by the wicked, since they do not have within themselves patterns answering to the affections of the bad.That is indeed their experience, he said. Therefore it is, said I, that the good judge must not be a youth but an old man, a late learner[*](ὀψιμαθῆ: here in a favorable sense, but usually an untranslatable Greek word for a type portrayed in a charater of Theophrastus.) of the nature of injustice, one who has not become aware of it as a property in his own soul, but one who has through the long years trained himself to understand it as an alien thing in alien souls, and to discern how great an evil it is by the instrument of mere knowledge and not by experience of his own. That at any rate, he said, appears to be the noblest kind of judge. And what is more, a good one, I said, which was the gist of your question. For he who has a good soul is good. But that cunning fellow quick to suspect evil,[*](For this type of character cf. Thucydides iii. 83, and my comments in T.A.P.A. vol. xxiv. p. 79. Cf. Burke, Letter to the Sheriffs of Bristol: They who raise suspicions on the good on account of the behavior of ill men, are of the party of the latter; Stobaeus ii. p. 46 Βίας ἔφη, οἱ ἀγαθοὶ εὐαπάτητοι, Menander, fr. 845 Kock χρηστοῦ παρ’ ἀνδρὸς μηδὲν ὑπονόει κακόν.) and who has himself done many unjust acts and who thinks himself a smart trickster, when he associates with his like does appear to be clever, being on his guard and fixing his eyes on the patterns within himself. But when the time comes for him to mingle with the good and his elders, then on the contrary he appears stupid. He is unseasonably distrustful and he cannot recognize a sound character because he has no such pattern in himself. But since he more often meets with the bad than the good, he seems to himself and to others to be rather wise than foolish. That is quite true, he said. Well then, said I, such a one must not be our ideal of the good and wise judge but the former. For while badness could never come to know both virtue and itself, native virtue through education will at last acquire the science both of itself and badness.[*](Cf. George Eliot, Adam Bede, chap. xiv.: It is our habit to say that while the lower nature can never understand the higher, the higher nature commands a complete view of the lower. But I think the higher nature has to learn this comprehension by a good deal of hard experience.) This one, then, as I think, is the man who proves to be wise and not the bad man.[*](Cf. Theaetetus 176 D It is far best not to concede to the unjust that they are clever knaves, for they glory in the taunt. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, n. 21.) And I concur, he said.

Then will you not establish by law in your city such an art of medicine as we have described in conjunction with this kind of justice? And these arts will care for the bodies and souls of such of your citizens as are truly well born, but of those who are not, such as are defective in body they will suffer to die and those who are evil-natured and incurable[*](Only the incurable suffer a purely exemplary and deterrent punishment in this world or the next. Cf. 615 E, Protagoras 325 A, Gorgias 525 C, Phaedo 113 E.) in soul they will themselves[*](ultro, as opposed to ἐάσουσιν.) put to death.This certainly, he said, has been shown to be the best thing for the sufferers themselves and for the state. And so your youths, said I, employing that simple music which we said engendered sobriety will, it is clear, guard themselves against falling into the need of the justice of the court-room. Yes, he said. And will not our musician, pursuing the same trail in his use of gymnastics, if he please, get to have no need of medicine save when indispensable[*](Cf. 405 C. Plato always allows for the limitation of the ideal by necessity.)? I think so. And even the exercises and toils of gymnastics he will undertake with a view to the spirited part of his nature[*](The welfare of the soul is always the prime object for Plato. (Cf. 591 C) But he cannot always delay to correct ordinary speech in this sense. The correction of 376 E here is of course not a change of opinion, and it is no more a criticism of Isocrates, Antidosis 180-185, than it is of Gorgias 464 B, or Soph. 228 E, or Republic 521 E.) to arouse that rather than for mere strength, unlike ordinary athletes, who treat[*](μεταχειρίζονται: this reading of Galen is more idiomatic than the MS. μεταχειριεῖται. Where English says he is not covetous of honor as other men are, Greek says he (is) not as other men are covetous of honor.) diet and exercise only as a means to muscle. Nothing could be truer, he said. Then may we not say, Glaucon, said I, that those who established[*](Plato half seriously attributes his own purposes to the founders. Cf. 405-406 on medicine and Philebus 16 C on dialectics.) an education in music and gymnastics had not the purpose in view that some attribute to them in so instituting, namely to treat the body by one and the soul by the other? But what? he said. It seems likely, I said, that they ordained both chiefly for the soul’s sake. How so? Have you not observed, said I, the effect on the disposition of the mind itself[*](For the thought cf. Euripides Suppl. 882 f. and Polybius’s account of the effect of the neglect of music on the Arcadians (iv. 20).) of lifelong devotion to gymnastics with total neglect of music? Or the disposition of those of the opposite habit? In what respect do you mean? he said. In respect of savagery and hardness or, on the other hand, of softness and gentleness? I have observed, he said, that the devotees of unmitigated gymnastics turn out more brutal than they should be and those of music softer than is good for them. And surely, said I, this savagery is a quality derived from the high-spirited element in our nature, which, if rightly trained, becomes brave, but if overstrained, would naturally become hard and harsh. I think so, he said. And again, is not the gentleness a quality which the philosophic nature would yield? This if relaxed too far would be softer than is desirable but if rightly trained gentle and orderly? That is so. But our requirement, we say,[*](Cf. 375 C. With Plato’s doctrine of the two temperaments cf. the distinction of quick-wits and hard-wits in Ascham’s Schoolmaster. Ascham is thinking of Plato, for he says: Galen saith much music marreth men’s manners; and Plato hath a notable place of the same thing in his book De rep., well marked also and excellently translated by Tully himself.) is that the guardians should possess both natures. It is. And must they not be harmoniously adjusted to one another? Of course.

And the soul of the man thus attuned is sober and brave?Certainly.And that of the ill adjusted is cowardiy and rude?It surely is.Now when a man abandons himself to music to play[*](Cf. 561 C.) upon him and pour[*](Demetrius, Περὶ Ἑρμ. 51, quotes this and the following sentence as an example of the more vivid expression following the less vivid. For the image cf. Blaydes on Aristophanes Thesm. 18, Aeschylus Choeph. 451, Shakespeare, CymbelineIII. ii. 59 Love’s counsellor should fill the bores of hearing.) into his soul as it were through the funnel of his ears those sweet, soft, and dirge-like airs of which we were just now[*](Cf. 398 D-E, where the θρηνώδεις ἁρμονίαι are rejected altogether, while here they are used to illustrate the softening effect of music on a hard temperament. It is misspent ingenuity to harp on such contradictions.) speaking, and gives his entire time to the warblings and blandishments of song, the first result is that the principle of high spirit, if he had it, is softened like iron[*](For images drawn from the tempering of metals cf. Aeschylus Agamemnon 612 and Jebb on Sophocles Ajax 650.) and is made useful instead of useless and brittle. But when he continues[*](Cf. Theaetetus 165 E ἐπέχων καὶ οὐκ ἀνιείς, and Blaydes on Aristophanes Peace 1121.) the practice without remission and is spellbound, the effect begins to be that he melts and liquefies[*](Cf. Tennyson’s Molten down in mere uxoriousness (Geraint and Enid ).) till he completely dissolves away his spirit, cuts out as it were the very sinews of his soul and makes of himself a feeble warrior.[*](A familiar Homeric reminiscence (Iliad xvii. 588) quoted also in Symposium 174 C. Cf. Froissart’s un mol chevalier.)Assuredly, he said. And if, said I, he has to begin with a spiritless[*](Etymologically ἄθυμος = deficient in θυμός.) nature he reaches this result quickly, but if high-spirited, by weakening the spirit he makes it unstable, quickly irritated by slight stimuli, and as quickly quelled. The outcome is that such men are choleric and irascible instead of high-spirited, and are peevish and discontented. Precisely so. On the other hand, if a man toils hard at gymnastics and eats right lustily and holds no truck with music and philosophy, does he not at first get very fit and full of pride and high spirit and become more brave and bold than he was? He does indeed. But what if he does nothing but this and has no contact with the Muse in any way, is not the result that even if there was some principle of the love of knowledge in his soul, since it tastes of no instruction nor of any inquiry and does not participate in any discussion or any other form of culture, it becomes feeble, deaf, and blind, because it is not aroused or fed nor are its perceptions purified and quickened? That is so, he said. And so such a man, I take it, becomes a misologist[*](A hater of rational discussion, as explained in Laches 188 C, and the beautiful passage in the Phaedo 89 D ff. Cf. Minucius Felix, Octavius 14. 6 Igitur nobis providendum est ne odio identidem sermonum laboremus. John Morley describes obscurantists as sombre hierophants of misology.) and stranger to the Muses. He no longer makes any use of persuasion by speech but achieves all his ends like a beast by violence and savagery, and in his brute ignorance and ineptitude lives a life of disharmony and gracelessness. That is entirely true, he said.

For these two, then, it seems there are two arts which I would say some god gave to mankind, music and gymnastics for the service of the high-spirited principle and the love of knowledge in them—not for the soul and the body except incidentally, but for the harmonious adjustment of these two principles by the proper degree of tension and relaxation of each.Yes, so it appears, he said. Then he who best blends gymnastics with music and applies them most suitably to the soul is the man whom we should most rightly pronounce to be the most perfect and harmonious musician, far rather than the one who brings the strings into unison with one another.[*](For virtue as music Cf. Phaedo61 A, Laches 188 D, and Iago’s There is a daily music in his life. The perfect musician is the professor of the royal art of Politicus 306-308 ff. which harmonizes the two temperaments, not merely by education, but by elminating extremes through judicious marriages.) That seems likely, Socrates, he said. And shall we not also need in our city, Glaucon, a permanent overseer[*](This epistates is not the director of education of Laws 765 D ff., though of course he or it will control education. It is rather an anticipation of the philosophic rulers, as appears from 497 C-D, and corresponds to the nocturnal council of Laws 950 B ff. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 86, note 650.) of this kind if its constitution is to be preserved? We most certainly shall. Such would be the outlines of their education and breeding. For why[*](γάρ explains τύποι, or outlines. Both in the Republic and the LawsPlato frequently states that many details must be left to subsequent legislation. Cf. Republic 379 A, 400 B-C, 403 D-E, 425 A-E, Laws 770 B, 772 A-B, 785 A, 788 A-B, 807 E, 828 B, 846 C, 855 D, 876 D-E, 957 A, 968 C.) should one recite the list of the dances of such citizens, their hunts and chases with hounds, their athletic contests and races? It is pretty plain that they must conform to these principles and there is no longer any difficulty in discovering them. There is, it may be, no difficulty, he said. Very well, said I; what, then, have we next to determine? Is it not which ones among them[*](αὐτῶν τούτων marks a class within a class. Cf. Class. Phil . vol. vii. (1912) p. 485. 535 A refers back to this passage.) shall be the rulers and the ruled? Certainly. That the rulers must be the elder and the ruled the younger is obvious. It is. And that the rulers must be their best? This too. And do not the best of the farmers prove the best farmers? Yes. And in this case, since we want them to be the best of the guardians, must they not be the best guardians, the most regardful of the state? Yes. They must then to begin with be intelligent in such matters and capable, and furthermore careful[*](The argument proceeds by minute links. Cf. on 338 D.) of the interests of the state? That is so. But one would be most likely to be careful of that which he loved. Necessarily. And again, one would be most likely to love that whose interests he supposed to coincide with his own, and thought that when it prospered, he too would prosper and if not, the contrary. So it is, he said. Then we must pick out from the other guardians such men as to our observation appear most inclined through the entire course of their lives to be zealous to do what they think for the interest of the state, and who would be least likely to consent to do the opposite. That would be a suitable choice, he said. I think, then, we shall have to observe them at every period of life, to see if they are conservators and guardians of this conviction in their minds and never by sorcery nor by force can be brought to expel[*](Cf. Crito 46 B, Xenophon Memorabilia iii. 12. 7.) from their souls unawares this conviction that they must do what is best for the state. What do you mean by the expelling? he said.

I will tell you, said I; it seems to me that the exit of a belief from the mind is either voluntary or involuntary. Voluntary is the departure of the false belief from one who learns better, involuntary that of every true belief. The voluntary, he said, I understand, but I need instruction about the involuntary. How now, said I, don’t you agree with me in thinking that men are unwillingly deprived of good things but willingly of evil? Or is it not an evil to be deceived in respect of the truth and a good to possess truth? And don’t you think that to opine the things that are is to possess the truth? Why, yes, said he, you are right, and I agree that men are unwillingly deprived of true opinions.[*](Cf. on 382 A and Sophist. 228 C, Marcus Aurelius vii. 63.) And doesn’t this happen to them by theft, by the spells of sorcery or by force? I don’t understand now either, he said. I must be talking in high tragic style,[*](The preceding metaphors are in the high-flown, obscure style of tragedy. Cf. Thompson on Meno 76 E, Cratylus 418 D, Aristophanes Frogs, passim, Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 146.) I said; by those who have their opinions stolen from them I mean those who are over-persuaded and those who forget, because in the one case time, in the other argument strips them unawares of their beliefs. Now I presume you understand, do you not? Yes. Well, then, by those who are constrained or forced I mean those whom some pain or suffering compels[*](Cf. Dionysius ὁ μεταθέμενος, who went over from the Stoics to the Cyrenaics because of the pain in his eyes, Diogenes Laertius vii. 166.) to change their minds. That too I understand and you are right. And the victims of sorcery[*](Cf. 584 A γοητεία.) I am sure you too would say are they who alter their opinions under the spell of pleasure or terrified by some fear. Yes, he said: everything that deceives appears to cast a spell upon the mind. Well then, as I was just saying, we must look for those who are the best guardians of the indwelling conviction that what they have to do is what they at any time believe to be best for the state. Then we must observe them from childhood up and propose them tasks in which one would be most likely to forget this principle or be deceived, and he whose memory is sure and who cannot be beguiled we must accept and the other kind we must cross off from our list. Is not that so? Yes. And again we must subject them to toils and pains and competitions in which we have to watch for the same traits. Right, he said. Then, said I, must we not institute a third kind of competitive test with regard to sorcery and observe them in that? Just as men conduct colts to noises and uproar to see if they are liable to take fright, so we must bring these lads while young into fears and again pass them into pleasures, testing them much more carefully than men do gold in the fire, to see if the man remains immune to such witchcraft and preserves his composure throughout, a good guardian of himself and the culture which he has received, maintaining the true rhythm and harmony of his being in all those conditions, and the character that would make him most useful to himself and to the state.

And he who as boy, lad, and man endures the test and issues from it unspoiled we must establish as ruler over our city and its guardian, and bestow rewards upon him in life, and in death the allotment of the supreme honors of burial-rites and other memorials. But the man of the other type we must reject. Such, said I, appears to me, Glaucon, the general notion of our selection and appointment of rulers and guardians as sketched in outline, but not drawn out in detail. I too, he said, think much the same. Then would it not truly be most proper to designate these as guardians in the full sense of the word, watchers against foemen without and friends within, so that the latter shall not wish and the former shall not be able to work harm, but to name those youths whom we were calling guardians just now, helpers and aids for the decrees of the rulers? I think so, he replied. How, then, said I, might we contrive[*](The concept μηχανή or ingenious device employed by a superior intelligence to circumvent necessity or play providence with the vulgar holds a prominent place in Plato’s physics, and is for Rousseau-minded readers one of the dangerous features of his political and educational philosophy. Cf. 415 C, Laws 664 A, 752 C, 769 E, 798 B, 640 B.) one of those opportune falsehoods[*](Cf. 389 B.) of which we were just now[*](389 B f.) speaking, so as by one noble lie to persuade if possible the rulers themselves, but failing that the rest of the city? What kind of a fiction do you mean? said he. Nothing unprecedented, said I, but a sort of Phoenician tale,[*](As was the Cadmus legend of the men who sprang from the dragon’s teeth, which the Greeks believed οὕτως ἀπίθανον ὄν, Laws 663 E. Pater, who translates the passage (Plato and Platonism, p. 223), fancifully suggests that it is a miners’ story. Others read into it an allusion to Egyptian castes. The proverb ψεῦσμα Φοινικικόν (Strabo 259 B) probably goes back to the Phoenician tales of the Odyssey.) something that has happened ere now in many parts of the world, as the poets aver and have induced men to believe, but that has not happened and perhaps would not be likely to happen in our day[*](Plato never attempts a Voltairian polemic against the general faith in the supernatural, which he is willing to utilize for ethical ends, but he never himself affirms le surnaturel particulier.) and demanding no little persuasion to make it believable. You act like one who shrinks from telling his thought, he said. You will think that I have right good reason[*](καὶ μάλ’ here as often adds a touch of humorous colloquial emphasis, which our conception of the dignity of Plato does not allow a translator to reproduce.) for shrinking when I have told, I said. Say on, said he, and don’t be afraid. Very well, I will. And yet I hardly know how to find the audacity or the words to speak and undertake to persuade first the rulers themselves and the soldiers and then the rest of the city, that in good sooth[*](Perhaps that so it is that would be better. ὡς ἄρα as often disclaims responsibility for the tale. Plato’s fancy of men reared beneath the earth is the basis of Bulwer-Lytton’s Utopia, The Coming Race, as his use of the ring of Gyges (359 D-360 B) is of H. G. Wells’ Invisible Man.) all our training and educating of them were things that they imagined and that happened to them as it were in a dream; but that in reality at that time they were down within the earth being molded and fostered themselves while their weapons and the rest of their equipment were being fashioned. And when they were quite finished the earth as being their mother[*](The symbolism expresses the Athenian boast of autochthony and Plato’s patriotic application of it, Menexenus 237 E-238 A. Cf. Burgess, Epideictic Literature, University of Chicago Studies in Classical Philology, vol. iii. pp. 153-154; Timaeus 24 C-D, Aeschylus Septem 17, Lucretius ii. 641 f., and Swineburne, Erechtheus: All races but one are as aliens engrafted or sown,Strange children and changelings, but we, O our mother, thine own.) delivered them, and now as if their land were their mother and their nurse they ought to take thought for her and defend her against any attack and regard the other citizens as their brothers and children of the self-same earth. It is not for nothing,[*](οὐκ ἐτός is comic. Cf. 568 A, and Blaydes on Aristophanes Acharnians 411.) he said, that you were so bashful about coming out with your lie.

It was quite natural that I should be, I said; but all the same hear the rest of the story. While all of you in the city are brothers, we will say in our tale, yet God in fashioning those of you who are fitted to hold rule mingled gold in their generation,[*](Cf. 468 E, 547 A, and already Cratylus 394 D, 398 A. Hesiod’s four metals, Works and Days 109-201, symbolize four succcessive ages. Plato’s myth cannot of course be interpreted literally or made to express the whole of his apparently undemocratic theory, of which the biologist Huxley in his essay on Administrative Nihilism says: The lapse of more than 2000 years has not weakened the force of these wise words.) for which reason they are the most precious—but in the helpers silver, and iron and brass in the farmers and other craftsmen. And as you are all akin, though for the most part you will breed after your kinds,[*](The four classes are not castes, but are species which will generally breed true. Cf. Cratylus 393 B, 394 A.) it may sometimes happen that a golden father would beget a silver son and that a golden offspring would come from a silver sire and that the rest would in like manner be born of one another. So that the first and chief injunction that the god lays upon the rulers is that of nothing else[*](The phrasing of this injunction recalls Shakespeare’s Merchant of Venice, in fine: I’ll fear no other thingSo sore as keeping safe Nerissa’s ring. The securing of disinterested capacity in the rulers is the pons asinorum of political theory. Plato constructs his whole state for this end. Cf. Introduction p. xv. Aristotle, Politics 1262 b 27, raises the obvious objection that the transference from class to class will not be an easy matter. But Plato here and in 423 D-E is merely stating emphatically the postulates of an ideal state. He admits that even if established it will some time break down, and that the causes of its failure will lie beyond human ken, and can only be expressed in symbol. See on 546-547.) are they to be such careful guardians and so intently observant as of the intermixture of these metals in the souls of their offspring, and if sons are born to them with an infusion of brass or iron they shall by no means give way to pity in their treatment of them, but shall assign to each the status due to his nature and thrust them out[*](The summary in Timaeus 19 A varies somewhat from this. Plato does not stress the details. Cf. Introduction p. viii.) among the artisans or the farmers. And again, if from these there is born a son with unexpected gold or silver in his composition they shall honor such and bid them go up higher, some to the office of guardian, some to the assistanceship, alleging that there is an oracle[*](Plato’s oracle aptly copies the ambiguity of the bronze men’s answer to Psammetik (Herodotus ii. 152), and admits of both a moral and a literal physical interpretation, like the lame reign against which Sparta was warned. Cf. Xenophon Hellenica iii. 3. 3.) that the state shall then be overthrown when the man of iron or brass is its guardian. Do you see any way of getting them to believe this tale? No, not these themselves, he said, but I do, their sons and successors and the rest of mankind who come after.[*](Plato repeats the thought that since the mass of men can be brought to believe anything by repetition, myths framed for edification are a useful instrument of education and government. Cf. Laws 663 E-664 A.) Well, said I, even that would have a good effect making them more inclined to care for the state and one another. For I think I apprehend your meaning. XXII. And this shall fall out as tradition[*](φήμη, not any particular oracular utterance, but popular belief from mouth to mouth.) guides. But let us arm these sons of earth and conduct them under the leadership of their rulers. And when they have arrived they must look out for the fairest site in the city for their encampment,[*](The Platonic guardians, like the ruling class at Sparta, will live the life of a camp. Cf. Laws 666 E, Isocrates Archedamus.) a position from which they could best hold down rebellion against the laws from within and repel aggression from without as of a wolf against the fold. And after they have encamped and sacrificed to the proper gods[*](Partly from caution, partly from genuine religious feeling, Plato leaves all the details of the cult to Delphi. Cf. 427 B.) they must make their lairs, must they not? Yes, he said. And these must be of a character keep out the cold in winter and be sufficient in summer? Of course. For I presume you are speaking of their houses. Yes, said I, the houses of soldiers[*](For the limiting γε cf. 430 E.) not of money-makers.

What distinction do you intend by that? he said. I will try to tell you, I said. It is surely the most monstrous and shameful thing in the world for shepherds to breed the dogs who are to help them with their flocks in such wise and of such a nature that from indiscipline or hunger or some other evil condition the dogs themselves shall attack the sheep and injure them and be likened to wolves[*](Aristotle’s objection (Politics 1264 a 24) that the Platonic state will break up into two hostile camps, is plagiarized in expression from Plato’s similar censure of existing Greek cities (422 E) and assumes that the enforced disinterestedness, the higher education, and other precautions of the Platonic Republic will not suffice to conjure away the danger to which Plato first calls attention.) instead of dogs. A terrible thing, indeed, he said. Must we not then guard by every means in our power against our helpers treating the citizens in any such way and, because they are the stronger, converting themselves from benign assistants into savage masters? We must, he said. And would they not have been provided with the chief safeguard if their education has really been a good one? But it surely has, he said. That, said I, dear Glaucon, we may not properly affirm,[*](This is not so much a reservation in reference to the higher education as a characteristic refusal of Plato to dogmatize. Cf. Meno 86 B and my paper Recent Platonism in England, A.J.P. vol. ix. pp. 7-8.) but what we were just now saying we may, that they must have the right education, whatever it is, if they are to have what will do most to make them gentle to one another and to their charges. That is right, he said. In addition, moreover, to such an education a thoughtful man would affirm that their houses and the possessions provided for them ought to be such as not to interfere with the best performance of their own work as guardians and not to incite them to wrong the other citizens. He will rightly affirm that. Consider then, said I, whether, if that is to be their character, their habitations and ways of life must not be something after this fashion. In the first place, none must possess any private property[*](Plato’s communism is primarily a device to secure disinterestedness in the ruling class, though he sometimes treats it as a counsel of perfection for all men and states. Cf. Introduction p. xv note a.) save the indispensable. Secondly, none must have any habitation or treasure-house which is not open for all to enter at will. Their food, in such quantities as are needful for athletes of war[*](Cf. 403 E.) sober and brave, they must receive as an agreed[*](Cf. 551 B, Meno 91 B, Thucydides i. 108, G.M.T. 837.) stipend[*](They are worthy of their hire. Cf. on 347 A. It is a strange misapprehension to speak of Plato as careless of the welfare of the masses. His aristocracy is one of social service, not of selfish enjoyment of wealth and power.) from the other citizens as the wages of their guardianship, so measured that there shall be neither superfluity at the end of the year nor any lack.[*](This is precisely Aristophanes’ distinction between beggary and honorable poverty, Plutus 552-553.) And resorting to a common mess[*](As at Sparta. Cf. 458 C, Newman, Introduction to Aristotle’s Politics, p. 334.) like soldiers on campaign they will live together.

Gold and silver, we will tell them, they have of the divine quality from the gods always in their souls, and they have no need of the metal of men nor does holiness suffer them to mingle and contaminate that heavenly possession with the acquisition of mortal gold, since many impious deeds have been done about the coin of the multitude, while that which dwells within them is unsullied. But for these only of all the dwellers in the city it is not lawful to handle gold and silver and to touch them nor yet to come under the same roof[*](As if the accursed and tainted metal were a polluted murderer or temple-robber. Cf. my note on Horace, Odes iii. 2. 27 sub isdem trabibus, Antiphon v. 11.) with them, nor to hang them as ornaments on their limbs nor to drink from silver and gold. So living they would save themselves and save their city.[*](Cf. 621 B-C, and Laws692 A.) But whenever they shall acquire for themselves land of their own and houses and coin, they will be house-holders and farmers instead of guardians, and will be transformed from the helpers of their fellow citizens to their enemies and masters,[*](δεσπόται. Cf. Menexenus 238 E.) and so in hating and being hated,[*](Cf. Laws 697 D in a passage of similar import, μισοῦντες μισοῦνται.) plotting and being plotted against they will pass their days fearing far more and rather[*](more and rather: so 396 D, 551 B.) the townsmen within than the foemen without—and then even then laying the course[*](The image is that of a ship nearing the fatal reef. Cf. Aeschylus, Eumenides 562. The sentiment and the heightened rhetorical tone of the whole passage recalls the last page of the Critias, with Ruskin’s translation and comment in A Crown of Wild Olive.) of near shipwreck for themselves and the state. For all these reasons, said I, let us declare that such must be the provision for our guardians in lodging and other respects and so legislate. Shall we not? By all means, said Glaucon.