Republic

Plato

Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 5-6 translated by Paul Shorey. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1930-37.

I[*](Socrates narrates in the first person, as in the Charmides and Lysis; see Introduction p. vii, Hirzel, Der Dialog, i. p. 84. Demetrius, On Style, 205, cites this sentence as an example of trimeter members. Editors give references for the anecdote that it was found in Plato’s tablets with many variations. For Plato’s description of such painstaking Cf. Phaedrus 278 D. Cicero De sen.. 5. 13 scribens est mortuus.) went down yesterday to the Peiraeus[*](Cf. 439 E; about a five-mile walk.) with Glaucon, the son of Ariston, to pay my devotions[*](Plato and Xenophon represent Socrates as worshipping the gods, νόμῳ πόλεως. Athanasius, Contra gentes, 9, censures Plato for thus adoring an Artemis made with hands, and the fathers and medieval writers frequently cite the passage for Plato’s regrettable concessions to polytheism—persuasio civilis as Minucius Felix styles it. Cf. Eusebius Praep. Evang. xiii. 13. 66.) to the Goddess,[*](Presumably Bendis (354 A), though, as the scholiast observes, Athena is ἡ θεός for an Athenian. For foreign cults at the Peiraeus see Holm, History of Greece , iii. p. 189.) and also because I wished to see how they would conduct the festival since this was its inauguration.[*](See Introduction.) I thought the procession of the citizens very fine, but it was no better than the show, made by the marching of the Thracian contingent. After we had said our prayers and seen the spectacle we were starting for town when Polemarchus, the son of Cephalus, caught sight of us from a distance as we were hastening homeward[*](Headed homeward is more exact and perhaps better.) and ordered his boy[*](A Greek gentleman would always be so attended. Cf. Charmides 155 A, Meno 82 B, Protagoras 310 C, Demosthenes xlvii. 36.) run and bid us to wait[*](The bounder in Theophrastus, Char. xi. (xvii.), if he sees persons in a hurry will ask them to wait.) for him, and the boy caught hold[*](Charmides 153 B, Parmenides 126 A, 449 B.) of my himation from behind and said, Polemarchus wants you to wait. And I turned around and asked where his master[*](Ipse, Cf. Protagoras 314 D; ipse dixit; Now you are not ipse, for I am he.—Shakes.) was. There he is, he said, behind you, coming this way. Wait for him. So we will, said Glaucon, and shortly after Polemarchus came up and Adeimantus, the brother of Glaucon, and Niceratus, the son of Nicias, and a few others apparently from the procession. Whereupon Polemarchus said, Socrates, you appear to have turned your faces townward and to be going to leave us. Not a bad guess, said I. But you see how many we are? he said. Surely. You must either then prove yourselves the better men[*](Cf. the playful threat in Philebus 16 A, Phaedrus 236 C, Horace, Satire i. 4. 142.) or stay here. Why, is there not left, said I, the alternative of our persuading[*](For the characteristic Socratic contrast between force and persuasion cf. 411 D, and the anecdote in Diogenes Laertius vii. 24.) you that you ought to let us go? But could you persuade us, said he, if we refused to listen? Nohow, said Glaucon. Well, we won’t listen, and you might as well make up your minds to it.

Do you mean to say, interposed Adeimantus, that you haven’t heard that there is to be a torchlight race[*](See Sterrett in AJP xxii. p. 393. The torch was passed down the lines which competed as wholes. Cf. Swinburne, Hymn of Man: Where the runners outwear each other, but running with lampless hands,No man takes light from his brother, till blind at the goal he stands. For the metaphorical transmission of the torch of life cf. Plato, Laws, 776 B, Lucretius ii. 79.) this evening on horseback in honor of the Goddess? On horseback? said I. That is a new idea. Will they carry torches and pass them along to one another as they race with the horses, or how do you mean? That’s the way of it, said Polemarchus, and, besides, there is to be a night festival which will be worth seeing. For after dinner we will get up[*](Rise from the table. This is forgotten.) and go out and see the sights and meet a lot of the lads there and have good talk. So stay and do as we ask.[*](In American, the colloquial Greek means be a sport.) It looks as if we should have to stay, said Glaucon. Well, said I, if it so be, so be it. So we went with them to Polemarchus’s house, and there we found Lysias and Euthydemus, the brothers of Polemarchus, yes, and[*](The particles single out Thrasymachus for ironical emphasis. Proclus in Tim. 3 E preserves them in his enumeration of the dramatis personae.) Thrasymachus, too, of Chalcedon, and Charmantides of the deme of Paeania, and Kleitophon the son of Aristonymus. And the father of Polemarchus, Cephalus, was also at home. And I thought him much aged, for it was a long time since I had seen him. He was sitting on a sort of couch with cushions and he had a chaplet[*](A companion picture to the fair vision of the youthful Lysis (Lysis, 207 A). The wreath was worn at the sacrifice.) on his head, for he had just finished sacrificing in the court. So we went and sat down beside him, for there were seats there disposed in a circle.[*](For the seats compare Protagoras 317 D-E, Cicero Laelius 1. 2 in hemicyclio sedentem.) As soon as he saw me Cephalus greeted me and said, You are not a very frequent[*](The language recalls the Homeric formula, πάρος γε μὲν οὔτι θαμίζεις, Iliad xviii. 386, Odyssey v. 88, Jebb on O.C. 672. Cephalus’ friendly urgency to Socrates is in the tone of Laches 181 C.) visitor, Socrates. You don’t often come down to the Peiraeus to see us. That is not right. For if I were still able to make the journey up to town easily there would be no need of your resorting hither, but we would go to visit you. But as it is you should not space too widely your visits here. For I would have you know that, for my part, as the satisfactions of the body decay,[*](Plato characteristically contrasts the transitory pleasures of the body with the enduring joys of the mind. Phaedrus 258 E. Anaximenes imitates and expands the passage, Stobaeus, 117. 5. Pleasures are not strictly speaking of the body, but in or relating to it. See my Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 45.) in the same measure my desire for the pleasures of good talk and my delight in them increase. Don’t refuse then, but be yourself a companion to these lads and make our house your resort and regard us as your very good friends and intimates. Why, yes, Cephalus, said I, and I enjoy talking with the very aged. For to my thinking we have to learn of them as it were from wayfarers[*](Much of this passage, including the comparison of old men to travellers, is copied by Cicero, De sen. 3 ff.) who have preceded us on a road on which we too, it may be, must some time fare—what[*](Cf. Horace, Epistles i. 11 Quid tibi visa Chios? The vague neuter and the slight anacoluthon give a colloquial turn to the sentence.) it is like—is it rough[*](Hesiod, Works and Days 290, says that the path of virtue is rough at first and then grows easy.) and hard going or easy and pleasant to travel. And so now I would fain learn of you what you think of this thing, now that your time has come to it, the thing that the poets call the threshold[*](This, whatever its precise meaning, was a familiar phrase like our One foot in the grave. Cf. Leaf on Iliad xxii. 60, xxiv 487; Hyperides (i. xx. 13) employs it without apology in prose.) of old age. Is it a hard part of life to bear or what report have you to make of it?

Yes, indeed, Socrates, he said, I will tell you my own feeling about it. For it often happens that some of us elders of about the same age come together and verify[*](Lit. preserving. For the reverse Cf. Symposium 174 B. Cicero renders, similes cum similibus veteri proverbio facile congregantur. The proverb is ἧλιξ ἥλικα τέρπει Phaedrus 240 C, or, as in Lysis 214 A, Protagoras 337 D, Symposium 195 B, the reference may be to Homer’s ὡς αἰεὶ τὸν ὁμοῖον ἄγει θεὸς ὡς τὸν ὁμοῖον, Odyssey xvii. 218. Milton, Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce, x., The ancient proverb in Homer . . . entitles this work of leading each like person to his like, peculiarly to God, himself.) the old saw of like to like. At these reunions most of us make lament, longing for the lost joys of youth and recalling to mind the pleasures of wine, women, and feasts, and other things thereto appertaining, and they repine in the belief that the greatest things have been taken from them and that then they lived well and now it is no life at all.[*](The sentiment of the sensualist from Mimnermus to Byron; cf. also Simonides fr. 71, Sophocles Antigone 1165, Antiphanes, in Stobaeus 63. 12. For the application to old age Cf. Anth. Pal. ix. 127, Horace Epistles ii. 2. 55, and the ψόγος γήρως in Stobaeus, 116.) And some of them complain of the indignities that friends and kinsmen put upon old age and thereto recite a doleful litany[*](For such a litany cf. Sophocles O. C. 1235.) of all the miseries for which they blame old age. But in my opinion, Socrates, they do not put the blame on the real cause.[*](This suggests Aristotle’s fallacy of the false cause, Soph. El. 167 b 21. Cf. Philebus 28 A and Isocrates xv. 230.) For if it were the cause I too should have had the same experience so far as old age is concerned, and so would all others who have come to this time of life. But in fact I have ere now met with others who do not feel in this way, and in particular I remember hearing Sophocles the poet greeted by a fellow who asked, How about your service of Aphrodite, Sophocles—is your natural force still unabated? And he replied, Hush, man, most gladly have I escaped this thing you talk of, as if I had run away from a raging and savage beast of a master.[*](Allusions to the passage are frequent. Theon, Progymn. ii. 66 (Spengel), turns to the anecdote in an edifying χρεία. Ammianus Marcellinus xxv. 4. 2 tells us that the chastity of the emperor Julian drew its inspiration hence. Schopenhauer often dwelt on the thought, cf. Cicero Cato M. 14, Plutarch, De cupid. divit. 5, An seni p. 788, Athen. xii. p. 510, Philostr. Vit. Apoll. 1. 13.) I thought it a good answer then and now I think so still more. For in very truth there comes to old age a great tranquillity in such matters and a blessed release. When the fierce tensions[*](Cf. Phaedo 86 C, Philebus 47 A, Laws 645 B, 644 E σπῶσι.) of the passions and desires relax, then is the word of Sophocles approved, and we are rid of many and mad[*](Cf. Euripides I. A. 547 μαινομένων οἴστρων.) masters. But indeed in respect of these complaints and in the matter of our relations with kinsmen and friends there is just one cause, Socrates—not old age, but the character of the man. For if men are temperate and cheerful[*](For Sophocles as εὔκολος cf. Aristophanes Frogs 82, and on this quality, Laws 791 C.) even old age is only moderately burdensome. But if the reverse, old age, Socrates, and youth are hard for such dispositions. And I was filled with admiration[*](Cephalus prefigures the old age of the righteous, infra 612-613. There is then no parody of Antisthenes as Joel fancies.) for the man by these words, and desirous of hearing more I tried to draw him out and said, I fancy, Cephalus, that most people, when they hear you talk in this way, are not convinced but think that you bear old age lightly not because of your character but because of your wealth. For the rich, they say, have many consolations.[*](Cf. Teles. (Hense, pp.9-10), Philemon in Plutarch p. 358, Musonius, Stobaeus 117. 8. A fragment of Anaxandrides in Stobaeus Florileg. 68. 1 is almost a paraphrase of this passage. Thucydides ii. 44 says that honour, not money, is the consolation of old age.)

You are right, he said. They don’t accept my view and there is something in their objection, though not so much as they suppose. But the retort of Themistocles comes in pat here, who, when a man from the little island of Seriphus[*](Lit. the Seriphean of the anecdote, which, however, Herodotus (viii. 125) tells of another. Cicero Cato M. 8 Seriphio cuidam.) grew abusive and told him that he owed his fame not to himself but to the city from which he came, replied that neither would he himself ever have made a name if he had been born in Seriphus nor the other if he had been an Athenian. And the same principle applies excellently to those who not being rich take old age hard; for neither would the reasonable man find it altogether easy to endure old age conjoined with poverty, nor would the unreasonable man by the attainment of riches ever attain to self-contentment and a cheerful temper. May I ask, Cephalus, said I, whether you inherited most of your possessions or acquired them yourself? Acquired, eh? he said. As a moneymaker, I hold a place somewhere halfway between my grandfather and my father. For my grandfather and namesake[*](Cephalus, Lysanias, Cephalus, and so frequently.) inherited about as much property as I now possess and multiplied it many times, my father Lysanias reduced it below the present amount, and I am content if I shall leave the estate to these boys not less but by some slight measure more than my inheritance. The reason I asked, I said, is that you appear to me not to be over-fond of money. And that is generally the case with those who have not earned it themselves.[*](Aristotle makes a similar observation, Eth. Nic. iv. 1.20, Rhet. i. 11. 26, ii. 16. 4. For nouveaux riches, γενναῖοι ἐκ βαλλαντίου, see Starkie on Aristophanes Wasps, 1309.) But those who have themselves acquired it have a double reason in comparison with other men for loving it. For just as poets feel complacency about their own poems and fathers about their own sons,[*](Cf. Theaetetus 160 E, Symposium 209 C, Phaedrus 274 E, with Epaminondas’ saying, that Leuctra and Mantineia were his children.) so men who have made money take this money seriously as their own creation and they also value it for its uses as other people do. So they are hard to talk to since they are unwilling to commend anything except wealth. You are right, he replied. I assuredly am, said I. But tell me further this. What do you regard as the greatest benefit you have enjoyed from the possession of property? Something, he said, which I might not easily bring many to believe if I told them.[*](Cf. Walter Scott’s Be a good man, my dear; nothing else will give you any comfort, when you come to lie here. Perhaps the earliest positive expression of faith in future life and judgement for sin is Pindar’s Second Olympian. See Rohde’s Psyche and Adam in Cambridge Praelections. The Epicureans and sometimes the Stoics unfairly reprobated Plato’s appeal here to this motive, which he disregards in his main argument and returns to only in the tenth book. Cf. 363 C-D, 386 B, 613 E ff., also 496 E, 498 D, 608 D.) For let me tell you, Socrates, he said, that when a man begins to realize that he is going to die, he is filled with apprehensions and concern about matters that before did not occur to him. The tales that are told of the world below and how the men who have done wrong here must pay the penalty there,[*](Cf. 498 C and Pindar Ol. ii. 64. But 500 D, there is the realm of Platonic ideas.) though he may have laughed them down[*](Cf. Gorgias 523 A, 527 A.) hitherto, then begin to torture his soul with the doubt that there may be some truth in them. And apart from that the man himself[*](The conclusion logically expected, is more credulous, shifts to the alternative preferred by Plato. ὥσπερ marks the figurative sense of nearer. καθορᾷ is not takes a more careful view of it (Goodwin) but wins a glimpse, catches sight of those obscure things, as a sailor descries land. So often in Plato. Cf. Epin. 985 C. Sir Thomas Browne, Christ. Morals, iii. 22 And having been long tossed in the Ocean of the world, he will by that time feel the draught of another. Waller on the Divine Poems—The Soul's Dark Cottage, batter'd and decay'd,Lets in new light through chinks that time has made . . . Leaving the old, both worlds at once they viewThat stand upon the threshold of the new. Rabelais, iii. 21 Aussi les anges, les heroes, les bons demons (selon la doctrine des Platonicques) voyans les humains prochains de mort comme deport très sceur et salutaire—les saluent les consolent, parlent avec eux et ja commencement leur communicquer art de divination.) either from the weakness of old age or possibly as being now nearer to the things beyond has a somewhat clearer view of them. Be that as it may, he is filled with doubt, surmises, and alarms and begins to reckon up and consider whether he has ever wronged anyone.

Now he to whom the ledger of his life shows an account of many evil deeds starts up[*](Polyb. v. 52. 13, and for the thought Iamblichus, Protrepticus 127 A, Job iv. 13-14. Tennyson, Vastness ix.—Pain, that has crawl’d from the corpse of Pleasure, a worm which writhes all day, and at nightStirs up again in the heart of the sleeper, and stings him back to the curse of the light.) even from his dreams like children again and again in affright and his days are haunted by anticipations of worse to come. But on him who is conscious of no wrong that he has done a sweet hope[*](The better hope of the initiated, often mentioned in connection with the mysteries, blends with the better hope of the righteous (Isocrates i. 39, iv. 20, viii. 34, Schmidt, Ethik der Griechen, ii. 73), and in the conclusion of the Pindar passage almost becomes the hope against which Greek moralists warn us. Cf. Pindar Nem. xi. in fine, Sophocles Antigone 615, Thuc. 2.62, Thuc. 3.45.) ever attends and a goodly to be nurse of his old age, as Pindar[*](Pindar, Fragment 214, L.C.L. Edition.) too says. For a beautiful saying it is, Socrates, of the poet that when a man lives out his days in justice and piety

  1. sweet companion with him, to cheer his heart and nurse his old age, accompanies
  2. Hope, who chiefly rules the changeful mind of mortals.
Pindar Frag. 214, Loeb That is a fine saying and an admirable. It is for this, then, that I affirm that the possession of wealth is of most value not it may be to every man but to the good man. Not to cheat any man even unintentionally or play him false, not remaining in debt to a god[*](Cf. the famous, We owe a cock to Aesculapius, Phaedo 118 A. Cf. further, Browne, Christian Morals, i. 26 Well content if they be but rich enough to be honest, and to give every man his due.) for some sacrifice or to a man for money, so to depart in fear to that other world—to this result the possession of property contributes not a little. It has also many other uses. But, setting one thing against another, I would lay it down, Socrates, that for a man of sense this is the chief service of wealth.An admirable sentiment, Cephalus, said I. But speaking of this very thing, justice, are we to affirm thus without qualification[*](It is Platonic Doctrine that no act is per se good or bad. Plat. Sym. 181a. This opens the door to casuistry, Xen. Mem. 4.2.12, Cic. De offic. 3.25. For the argument cf. Xen. Mem. 4.2.18, Cic. De offic. 3.25. For the proverb, a knife to a child or a madman cf. Athen. 5.52, Iambl. Protrep. 18k, Jebb’s Bentley, p. 69, where Jebb misses Bentley’s allusion to it.) that it is truth-telling and paying back what one has received from anyone, or may these very actions sometimes be just and sometimes unjust? I mean, for example, as everyone I presume would admit, if one took over weapons from a friend who was in his right mind and then the lender should go mad and demand them back, that we ought not to return them in that case and that he who did so return them would not be acting justly—nor yet would he who chose to speak nothing but the truth to one who was in that state. You are right, he replied. Then this is not the definition of justice: to tell the truth and return what one has received. Nay, but it is, Socrates, said Polemarchus breaking in, if indeed we are to put any faith in Simonides. Very well, said Cephalus, indeed I make over the whole argument[*](The argument, or one side of it, is often treated as a thesis which may be thus transferred. Cf. Philebus 12 A, Charmides 162 E, Protagoras 331 A.) to you. For it is time for me to attend the sacrifices. Well, said I, is not Polemarchus the heir of everything that is yours? Certainly, said he with a laugh, and at the same time went out to the sacred rites.[*](Cicero Ad Att. iv. 16 Credo Platonem vix putasse satis consonum fore, si hominem id aetatis in tam longo sermone diutius retinuisset, Bagehot, Hartley Coleridge, It (metaphysical debate) attracts the scorn of middle-aged men, who depart πρὸς τὰ ἱερά, etc.) Tell me, then, you the inheritor of the argument, what it is that you affirm that Simonides says and rightly says about justice. That it is just, he replied, to render to each his due.[*](The defintion is not found in the fragments of Simonides. Cf. 433 E, and the Roman Jurists’ Iustitia est constans et perpetua voluntas suum cuique tribuens. For the various meanings of the Greek word cf. my Articles Righteousness and Theognis in Hastings, Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics.) In saying this I think he speaks well.

I must admit, said I, that it is not easy to disbelieve Simonides. For he is a wise and inspired man.[*](The Platonic Socrates ironically treats the poets as inspired but not wise because they cannot explain their fine sayings. Apology 22 A-B, Ion 542 A. He always assumes that the utterances of the wise men must be true. Theaetetus 152 B, Phaedrus 260 A, Laws 888 E, Euthydemus 280 A. But they are often obscure, and he reserves for himself the right of interpretation (335 E). Since the poets contradict one another and cannot be cross-examined they are not to be taken seriously as authorities. Protagoras 347 E, Meno 71 D, Lysis 214-215, Hippias Minor 365 D.) But just what he may mean by this you, Polemarchus, doubtless know, but I do not. Obviously he does not mean what we were just speaking of, this return of a deposit[*](Owing to the rarity of banks reddere depositum was throughout antiquity the typical instance of just conduct. Cf. 442 E, Mayor on Juvenal Satire 13. 15, Herodotus. vi. 86, Democr. fr. 265 Diels, Philo, De spec. leg. 4. 67. Salt was a symbol of justice because it preserves ἃ παραλαμβάνει: Diogenes Laertius viii. 35. Earth is iustissima tellus because she returns the seed with interest. Socrates’ distinction between the fact of returning a deposit, and returning it rightly is expressed in Stoic terminology: ut si iuste depositum reddere in recte factis sit, in officiis ponatur depositum reddere, Cicero De fin. iii. 18.) to anyone whatsoever even if he asks it back when not in his right mind. And yet what the man deposited is due to him in a sense, is it not? Yes. But rendered to him it ought not to be by any manner of means when he demands it not being his right mind. True, said he. It is then something other than this that Simonides must, as it seems, mean by the saying that it is just to render back what is due. Something else in very deed, he replied, for he believes that friends owe it to friends to do them some good and no evil. I see, said I; you mean that[*](Adam insists that the meaning of μανθάνω ὅτι here and everywhere is it is because.) he does not render what is due or owing who returns a deposit of gold if this return and the acceptance prove harmful and the returner and the recipient are friends. Isn’t that what you say Simonides means? Quite so. But how about this—should one not render to enemies what is their due? By all means, he said, what is due[*](In the Greek the particles indicate slight irritation in the speaker.) and owing to them, and there is due and owing from an enemy to an enemy what also is proper for him, some evil. It was a riddling[*](Cf. Lysis 214 D, Charmides 162 A, Theaetetus 152 C, 194 C, Alc. II. 147 B. The poet, like the soothsayer, is inspired, but only the thinker can interpret his meaning. Cf. 331 E, Tim. 72 A. Allegory and the allegorical interpretation are always conscious and often ironical in Plato.) definition of justice, then, that Simonides gave after the manner of poets; for while his meaning, it seems, was that justice is rendering to each what befits him, the name that he gave to this was the due. What else do you suppose? said he. In heaven’s name! said I, suppose[*](Socrates often presents an argument in this polite form. Cf. 337 A-B, 341 E, Gorgias 451 B, Hippias Major 287 B ff., Thompson on Meno 72 B.) someone had questioned him thus: Tell me, Simonides, the art that renders what that is due and befitting to what is called the art of medicine.[*](Socrates tests ambitious general definitions by the analogy of the arts and their more specific functions. Cf. Gorgias 451 A, Protagoras 311 B, 318 B. The idiomatic double question must be retained in the translation. The English reader, if puzzled, may compare Calverly’s Pickwick examination: Who thinks that in which pocket of what garment and where he has left what entreating him to return to whom and how many what and all how big?) What do you take it would have been his answer? Obviously, he said, the art that renders to bodies drugs, foods, and drinks. And the art that renders to what things what that is due and befitting is called the culinary art? Seasoning to meats. Good. In the same way tell me the art that renders what to whom would be denominated justice. If we are to follow the previous examples,[*](Similarly Protagoras 312 A.) Socrates, it is that which renders benefits and harms to friends and enemies. To do good to friends and evil to enemies,[*](Simonides’ defintion is reduced to the formula of traditional Greek morality which Plato was the first to transcend not only in the Republic infra, 335 D-336 A, but in the Crito 49 B-C. It is often expressed by Xenophon (Memorabilia ii. 3. 14, ii. 6. 35) and Isocrates (i. 26). But the polemic is not especially aimed at them. Cf. Schmidt, Ethik, ii. 313, 319, 363, Pindar, Pyth. ii. 85, Aeschylus Choeph. 123, Jebb, introduction to Sopocles Ajax, p. xxxix, Thumser, Staats-Altertumer, p. 549, n. 6, Thompson on Meno 71 E.) then, is justice in his meaning? I think so. Who then is the most able when they are ill to benefit friends and harm enemies in respect to disease and health? The physician. And who navigators in respect of the perils of the sea? The pilot. Well then, the just man, in what action and for what work is he the most competent to benefit friends and harm enemies? In making war and as an ally, I should say. Very well. But now if they are not sick, friend Polemarchus, the physician is useless to them. True. And so to those who are not at sea the pilot. Yes. Shall we also say this that for those who are not at war the just man is useless?

By no means.There is a use then even in peace for justice?Yes, it is useful.But so is agriculture, isn’t it?Yes.Namely, for the getting of a harvest?Yes.But likewise the cobbler’s art?Yes.Namely, I presume you would say, for the getting of shoes.Certainly.Then tell me, for the service and getting of what would you say that justice is useful in time of peace?In engagements and dealings, Socrates.And by dealings do you mean associations, partnerships, or something else?Associations, of course.Is it the just man, then, who is a good and useful associate and partner in the placing of draughts or the draught-player?The player.And in the placing of bricks and stones is the just man a more useful and better associate than the builder?By no means.Then what is the association[*](Justice (the political art) must be something as definite as the special arts, yet of universal scope. This twofold requirement no definition of a virtue in the minor dialogues is ever able to satisfy. It is met only by the theory worked out in the Republic. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 14.) in which the just man is a better partner than the harpist as an harpist is better than the just man for striking the chords?For money-dealings,[*](Justice is more nearly defined as having to do with money or legal obligations—the common-sense view to which Aristotle inclines.) I think.Except, I presume, Polemarchus, for the use of money when there is occasion to buy in common or sell a horse. Then, I take it, the man who knows horses, isn’t it so?Apparently.And again, if it is a vessel, the shipwright or the pilot.It would seem so.What then is the use of money in common for which a just man is the better partner?When it is to be deposited and kept safe, Socrates.You mean when it is to be put to no use but is to lie idle[*](Interest is ignored. Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 1120 a 9, splits hairs on this.)?Quite so.Then it is when money is useless that justice is useful in relation to it?It looks that way.And similarly when a scythe is to be kept safe, then justice is useful both in public and private. But when it is to be used, the vinedresser’s art is useful?Apparently.And so you will have to say that when a shield and a lyre are to be kept and put to no use, justice is useful, but when they are to be made use of, the military art and music.Necessarily.And so in all other cases, in the use of each thing, justice is useless but in its uselessness useful?It looks that way.Then, my friend, justice cannot be a thing of much worth[*](A virtue is presumably a good. A defintion that makes justice useless is ipso facto refuted. This line of argument is a standardized procedure in the minor dialogues. Cf. my Unity of Plato’s Thought, n. 78. The argument continues: The arts are faculties of opposites. The fallacy is intentional, as in Hippias Minor 365, where it is argued that the voluntary lie is better than the involuntary. This impressed Aristotle, who met it with his distinction between habit and faculty (ἕξις and δύναμις). Cf Topics, vi. 12. 6, Eth. Nic. v. 1. 4, vi. 5. 7, Met. 1046 b, Unity of Plato’s Thought, n. 38.) if it is useful only for things out of use and useless. But let us consider this point. Is not the man who is most skilful to strike or inflict a blow in a fight, whether as a boxer or elsewhere, also the most wary to guard against[*](The shift from the active to the middle here helps Plato to his transition from guarding to guarding against.) a blow?Assuredly.Is it not also true that he who best knows how to guard against disease is also most cunning to communicate it and escape detection?I think so.

But again the very same man is a good guardian of an army who is good at stealing a march[*](The play on the Greek word recalls Shakespeare’s If you do take a thief . . . let him show himself what he is and steal out of your company, Much Ado, III. iii.) upon the enemy in respect of their designs and proceedings generally.Certainly.Of whatsoever, then, anyone is a skilful guardian, of that he is also a skilful thief?It seems so.If then the just man is an expert in guarding money he is an expert in stealing it.The argument certainly points that way.[*](The qualified assent here marks the speaker’s perception that something is wrong. But often it expresses modesty or is a mere mannerism. Cf. 399 D, 401 D, 409 C, 410 A, 553 E, etc.)A kind of thief then the just man it seems has turned out to be, and it is likely that you acquired this idea from Homer.[*](Plato playfully follows the fashion of tracing all modern wisdom to Homer. Cf. Theaetetus 152 E.) For he regards with complacency Autolycus,[*](A snapper-up of unconsidered trifles (Winter’s Tale, IV. iii. 26), whom Homer celebrates (Hom. Od. 19.395). The naivete of Homer’s amoral standpoint (Cf. Odyssey xiii. 290 ff.) tickles Plato’s sense of humor, and he amuses himself by showing that the popular rule help friends and harm enemies is on the same ethical plane. So in the Euthyphro, popular piety is gravely reduced to a kind of καπηλεία or retail trade in prayer and blessings. Cf. also Dio Chrys. Or. xi. 315 R., and modern laments over the Decay of Lying.) the maternal uncle of Odysseus, and says

he was gifted beyond all men in thievery and perjury.
Hom. Od. 19.395 So justice, according to you and Homer and Simonides, seems to be a kind of stealing, with the qualification that it is for the benefit of friends and the harm of enemies. Isn’t that what you meant?No, by Zeus, he replied. I no longer know what I did mean.[*](For humorous bewilderment of Socrates’ interlocutors cf. Xenophon Memorabilia iv. 2. 19, Lysis 216 C, Alc. I. 127 D, Meno 80, Euthyphro 11 B, Symposium 201 B, Theaetetus 149 A, 169 C.) Yet this I still believe, that justice benefits friends and harms enemies. May I ask whether by friends you mean those who seem[*](The antithesis of seeming and being is a common category of early Greek and Platonic thought. Cf. 361 A-B, 365 C, Aeschylus Agamemnon 788, and the fragments of Parmenides. This discussion of the true φίλος recalls the manner of the Lysis; cf. Aristotle Topics i. 8. 5.) to a man to be worthy or those who really are so, even if they do not seem, and similarly of enemies? It is likely, he said, that men will love those whom they suppose to be good and dislike those whom they deem bad. Do not men make mistakes in this matter so that many seem good to them who are not and the reverse? They do. For those, then, who thus err the good are their enemies and the bad their friends? Certainly. But all the same is then just for them to benefit the bad and injure the good? It would seem so. But again the good are just and incapable of injustice. True. On your reasoning then it is just to wrong those who do no injustice. Nay, nay, Socrates, he said, the reasoning can’t be right.[*](Or, that is an immoral conclusion.) Then, said I, it is just to harm the unjust and benefit the just. That seems a better conclusion than the other. It will work out, then, for many, Polemarchus, who have misjudged men that it is just to harm their friends, for they have got bad ones, and to benefit their enemies, for they are good. And so we shall find ourselves saying the very opposite of what we affirmed Simonides to mean. Most certainly, he said, it does work out so. But let us change our ground; for it looks as if we were wrong in the notion we took up about the friend and the enemy. What notion, Polemarchus? That the man who seems to us good is the friend. And to what shall we change it now? said I.

That the man who both seems and is good is the friend, but that he who seems but is not really so seems but is not really the friend. And there will be the same assumption about the enemy.Then on this view it appears the friend will be the good man and the bad the enemy.Yes.So you would have us qualify our former notion of the just man by an addition. We then said it was just to do good to a friend and evil to an enemy, but now we are to add that it is just to benefit the friend if he is good and harm the enemy if he is bad?By all means, he said, that, I think, would be the right way to put it. Is it then, said I, the part of a good man to harm anybody whatsoever?[*](After the word-fence the ethical idea is reached which Plato was the first to affirm.) Certainly it is, he replied; a man ought to harm those who are both bad and his enemies. When horses[*](For Socratic comparison of animals and men Cf. Apology 30 C, Euthyphro 13 B-C, and on 451 C.) are harmed does it make them better or worse? Worse. In respect of the excellence or virtue of dogs or that of horses? Of horses. And do not also dogs when harmed become worse in respect of canine and not of equine virtue? Necessarily. And men, my dear fellow, must we not say that when they are harmed it is in respect of the distinctive excellence or virtue of man that they become worse? Assuredly. And is not justice the specific virtue of man?[*](The desired conclusion and all the idealistic paradoxes of Socrates, and later of Stoicism, follow at once from the assumption that justice, being the specific virtue of man, is human excellence generally, so that nothing is of import except justice, and no real wrong (or harm) can be done to a man except by making him less just (or wise, or good). Cf Apology 41 D, Crito 44 D. The ambiguity of ἀρετή is similarly used 353 and 609 B-D.) That too must be granted. Then it must also be admitted, my friend, that men who are harmed become more unjust. It seems so. Do musicians then make men unmusical by the art of music? Impossible. Well, do horsemen by horsemanship unfit men for dealing with horses? No. By justice then do the just make men unjust, or in sum do the good by virtue make men bad? Nay, it is impossible. It is not, I take it, the function[*](The special work (Xenophon Memorabilia iv. 2. 12, iv. 6. 14) is generalized as the idea of specific function, which after Plato and Aristotle retains a prominent place in the moralizing of the Stoics and in all philosophizing. See 351 D, 352 E, Aristotle Eth. Nic. i. 7. 10, Idea of Good p. 210, Diogenes Laertius vii. 103, Porphyr.De abstin. ii. 41, Courtney, Studies in Philosophy p. 125, Spencer, Data of Ethics 12.) of heat to chill but of its opposite. Yes. Nor of dryness to moisten but of its opposite. Assuredly. Nor yet of the good to harm but of its opposite. So it appears. But the just man is good? Certainly. It is not then the function of the just man, Polemarchus, to harm either friend or anyone else, but of his opposite. I think you are altogether right, Socrates. If, then, anyone affirms that it is just to render to each his due and he means by this, that injury and harm is what is due to his enemies from the just man[*](Xenophon approves the doctrine (Memorabilia ii. 6. 35, ii. 3. 14) and attributes it to Simonides (Hiero 2. 2). But Plato is not thinking specially of him. See on 332 p.) and benefits to his friends, he was no truly wise man who said it. For what he meant was not true. For it has been made clear to us that in no case is it just to harm anyone. I concede it, he said. We will take up arms against him, then, said I, you and I together, if anyone affirms that either Simonides or Bias[*](For the legend and the varying lists of the Seven Wise Men see Zeller i. 158, n. 2. No sage or saint could have taught unedifying doctrine. His meaning must have been right. Cf. 331 E, 332 B, Protagoras 345 D, Simplic. on Aristotle Physics 107. 30.) or Pittacus or any other of the wise and blessed said such a thing. I, for my part, he said, am ready to join in the battle with you.

Do you know, said I, to whom I think the saying belongs—this statement that it is just to benefit friends and harm enemies? To whom? he said. I think it was the saying of Periander or Perdiccas or Xerxes or Ismenias[*](Cf. Thompson, Meno xl.) the Theban or some other rich man who had great power in his own conceit.[*](It is a Socratic paradox that doing as one likes is not power or freedom unless one likes the good. Cf. Gorgias 467 A, 577 D.) That is most true, he replied. Very well, said I, since it has been made clear that this too is not justice and the just, what else is there that we might say justice to be?[*](Cf. Introduction pp. ix-x.) Now Thrasymachus,[*](Cf. Introduction.) even while we were conversing, had been trying several times to break in and lay hold of the discussion but he was restrained by those who sat by him who wished to hear the argument out. But when we came to a pause after I had said this, he couldn’t any longer hold his peace. But gathering himself up like a wild beast he hurled himself upon us as if he would tear us to pieces. And Polemarchus and I were frightened and fluttered apart, and he bawled out into our midst, What balderdash is this that you have been talking, and why do you Simple Simons truckle and give way to one another? But if you really wish, Socrates, to know what the just is, don’t merely ask questions or plume yourself upon controverting any answer that anyone gives—since your acumen has perceived that it is easier to ask questions than to answer them,[*](Cf. Gorgias 483 A, Aristotle Soph. El. 183 b 7. Socrates asked questions but did not answer, for he admitted that he did not know. For similar complaints cf. Xenophon Memorabilia i. 2. 36, iv. 4. 9, Theaetetus 150 C, Clitophon passim.) but do you yourself answer and tell what you say the just is. And don’t you be telling me[*](Thrasymachus objects to definition by substitution of synonyms (Cf. Clitophon 409 C). He demands an analysis of the underlying facts (338 D-E), such as is given in the later books.) that it is that which ought to be, or the beneficial or the profitable or the gainful or the advantageous, but express clearly and precisely whatever you say. For I won’t take from you any such drivel as that! And I, when I heard him, was dismayed, and looking upon him was filled with fear, and I believe that if I had not looked at him before he did at me I should have lost my voice.[*](For the fancy that to be seen first by the wolf makes dumb see Virgil Eclogues 9. 53, Theocr. 14. 22, Pliny, N.H. viii. 34, Milton, Epitaphium Damonis 27 nisi me lupus ante videbit.) But as it is, at the very moment when he began to be exasperated by the course of the argument I glanced at him first, so that I became capable of answering him and said with a light tremor: Thrasymachus, don’t be harsh[*](For similar irony Cf. Gorgias 461 C-D, 489 D.) with us. If I and my friend have made mistakes in the consideration of the question, rest assured that it is unwillingly that we err. For you surely must not suppose that while[*](For this type of a fortiori or ex contrario argument cf. 589 E, 600 C-D, Crito 46 D, Laws 647 C, 931 C, Protagoras 325 B-C, Phaedo 68 A, Thompson on Meno 91 E.) if our quest were for gold[*](Cf. Heracleitus fr. 22 Diels, and Ruskin, King’s Treasuries The physical type of wisdom, gold, Psalms xix. 10.) we would never willingly truckle to one another and make concessions in the search and so spoil our chances of finding it, yet that when we are searching for justice, a thing more precious than much fine gold, we should then be so foolish as to give way to one another and not rather do our serious best to have it discovered.

You surely must not suppose that, my friend. But you see it is our lack of ability that is at fault. It is pity then that we should far more reasonably receive from clever fellows like you than severity.And he on hearing this gave a great guffaw and laughed sardonically and said, Ye gods! here we have the well-known irony[*](Cf. Symposium 216 E, and Gomperz, Greek Thinkers iii. p. 277.) of Socrates, and I knew it and predicted that when it came to replying you would refuse and dissemble and do anything rather than answer any question that anyone asked you.That’s because you are wise, Thrasymachus, and so you knew very well that if you asked a man how many are twelve, and in putting the question warned him: don’t you be telling me, fellow, that twelve is twice six or three times four or six times two or four times three, for I won’t accept any such drivel as that from you as an answer—it was obvious I fancy to you that no one could give an answer to a question framed in that fashion. Suppose he had said to you, Thrasymachus, what do you mean? Am I not to give any of the prohibited answers, not even, do you mean to say, if the thing really is one of these, but must I say something different from the truth, or what do you mean? What would have been your answer to him?Humph! said he, how very like the two cases are! There is nothing to prevent, said I; yet even granted that they are not alike, yet if it appears to the person asked the question that they are alike, do you suppose that he will any the less answer what appears to him, whether we forbid him or whether we don’t? Is that, then, said he, what you are going to do? Are you going to give one of the forbidden answers? I shouldn’t be surprised, I said, if on reflection that would be my view. What then, he said, if I show you another answer about justice differing from all these, a better one—what penalty do you think you deserve? Why, what else, said I, than that which it befits anyone who is ignorant to suffer? It befits him, I presume, to learn from the one who does know. That then is what I propose that I should suffer. I like your simplicity,[*](In American, nerve. Socrates’ statement that παθεῖν due him is μαθεῖν (gratis) affects Thrasymachus as the dicasts were affected by the proposal in the Apology that his punishment should be—to dine at the City Hall. The pun on the legal formula could be remotely rendered: In addition to the recovery of your wits, you must pay a fine. Plato constantly harps on the taking of pay by the Sophists, but Thrasymachus is trying to jest, too.) said he; but in addition to learningyou must pay a fine of money. Well, I will when I have got it, I said. It is there, said Glaucon: if money is all that stands in the way, Thrasymachus, go on with your speech. We will all contribute for Socrates. Oh yes, of course, said he, so that Socrates may contrive, as he always does, to evade answering himself but may cross-examine the other man and refute his replies.

Why, how, I said, my dear fellow, could anybody answer if in the first place he did not know and did not even profess to know, and secondly even if he had some notion of the matter, he had been told by a man of weight that he mustn’t give any of his suppositions as an answer? Nay, it is more reasonable that you should be the speaker. For you do affirm that you know and are able to tell. Don’t be obstinate, but do me the favor to reply and don’t be chary[*](Grudging. Cf. Laches 200 B.) of your wisdom, and instruct Glaucon here and the rest of us. When I had spoken thus Glaucon and the others urged him not to be obstinate. It was quite plain that Thrasymachus was eager to speak in order that he might do himself credit, since he believed that he had a most excellent answer to our question. But he demurred and pretended to make a point of my being the respondent. Finally he gave way and then said, Here you have the wisdom of Socrates, to refuse himself to teach, but go about and learn from others and not even pay thanks[*](Cf. Cratylus 391 B.) therefor. That I learn from others, I said, you said truly, Thrasymachus. But in saying that I do not pay thanks you are mistaken. I pay as much as I am able. And I am able only to bestow praise. For money I lack.[*](Socrates’ poverty (Apology 38 A-B) was denied by some later writers who disliked to have him classed with the Cynics.) But that I praise right willingly those who appear to speak well you will well know forthwith as soon as you have given your answer. For I think that you will speak well. Hearken and hear then, said he. I affirm that the just is nothing else than[*](For this dogmatic formulation of a definition Cf. Theaetetus 151 E.) the advantage of the stronger.[*](To idealists law is the perfection of reason, or νοῦ διανομή, Laws 714 A; her seat is in the bosom of God (Hooker). To the political positivist there is no justice outside of positive law, and law is the command of a political superior to a political inferior. Whatsoever any state decrees and establishes is just for the state while it is in force, Theaetetus 177 D. The formula justice is the advantage of the superior means, as explained in Laws 714, that the ruling class legislates in its own interest, that is, to keep itself in power. This interpretation is here drawn out of Thrasymachus by Socrates’ affected misapprehensions (cf. further Pascal, Pensees iv. 4, la commodite du souverain. Leibniz approves Thrasymachus’s definition: justum potentiori utile . . . nam Deus ceteris potentior!).) Well, why don’t you applaud? Nay, you’ll do anything but that. Provided only I first understand your meaning, said I; for I don’t yet apprehend it. The advantage of the stronger is what you affirm the just to be. But what in the world do you mean by this? I presume you don’t intend to affirm this, that if Polydamas the pancratiast is stronger than we are and the flesh of beeves[*](The unwholesomeness of this diet for the ordinary man proves nothing for Plato’s alleged vegetarianism. The Athenians ate but little meat.) is advantageous for him, for his body, this viand is also for us who are weaker than he both advantageous and just. You’re a buffoon,[*](The Greek is stronger—a beastly cad. A common term of abuse in the orators. Cf. Aristophanes Frogs 465, Theophrast.Char. xvii. (Jebb).) Socrates, and take my statement[*](Cf. 392 C, 394 B, 424 C, Meno 78 C, Euthydemus 295 C, Gorgias 451 A δικαίως ὑπολαμβάνεις, you take my meaning fairly. For complaints of unfair argument cf. 340 D, Charmides 166 C, Meno 80 A, Theaetetus 167 E, Gorgias 461 B-C, 482 E.) in the most detrimental sense. Not at all, my dear fellow said I; I only want you to make your meaning plainer.[*](This is the point. Thrasymachus is represented as challenging assent before explaining his meaning, and Socrates forces him to be more explicit by jocosely putting a perverse interpretation on his words. Similarly in Gorgias 451 E, 453 B, 489 D, 490 C, Laws 714 C. To the misunderstanding of such dramatic passages is due the impression of hasty readers that Plato is a sophist.) Don’t you know then, said he, that some cities are governed by tyrants, in others democracy rules, in others aristocracy?[*](These three forms of government are mentioned by Pindar, Pyth. ii. 86, Aeschines In Ctes. 6. See 445 D, Whibley, Greek Oligarchies, and Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 62.) Assuredly. And is not this the thing that is strong and has the mastery[*](κρατεῖ with emphasis to suggest κρείττων. Cf. Menexenus 238 D, Xenophon Memorabilia 1. 2. 43. Platonic dialectic proceeds by minute steps and linked synonyms. Cf. 333 A, 339 A, 342 C, 346 A, 353 E, 354 A-B, 369 C, 370 A-B, 379 B, 380-381, 394 B, 400 C, 402 D, 412 D, 433-434, 486, 585 C, Meno 77 B, Lysis 215 B, where L. and S. miss the point.) in each—the ruling party? Certainly. And each form of government enacts the laws with a view to its own advantage, a democracy democratic laws and tyranny autocratic and the others likewise, and by so legislating they proclaim that the just for their subjects is that which is for their—the rulers’—advantage and the man who deviates[*](On this view justice is simply τὸ νόμιμον (Xenophon Memorabilia iv. 4. 12; Cf. Gorgias 504 D). This is the doctrine of the Old Oligarch, [Xenophon] Rep. Ath. 2. Against this conception of class domination as political justice, Plato (Laws 713 ff.) and Aristotle Politics iii. 7) protest. Cf. Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, chap. ii.: We only conceive of the State as something equivalent to the class in occupation of the executive government etc.) from this law they chastise as a law-breaker and a wrongdoer.

This, then, my good sir, is what I understand as the identical principle of justice that obtains in all states —the advantage of the established government. This I presume you will admit holds power and is strong, so that, if one reasons rightly, it works out that the just is the same thing everywhere,[*](Thrasymachus makes it plain that he, unlike Meno (71 E), Euthyphro (5 ff.), Laches (191 E), Hippias (Hippias Major 286 ff.), and even Theaetetus (146 C-D) at first, understands the nature of a definition.) the advantage of the stronger.Now, said I, I have learned your meaning, but whether it is true or not I have to try to learn. The advantageous, then, is also your reply, Thrasymachus, to the question, what is the just—though you forbade me to give that answer. But you add thereto that of the stronger. A trifling addition[*](Cf. Laches 182 C.) perhaps you think it, he said. It is not yet clear[*](For the teasing or challenging repetition cf. 394 B, 470 B-C, 487 E, 493 A, 500 B, 505 D, 514 B, 517 C, 523 A, 527 C, Lysis 203 B, Sophocles O.T. 327.) whether it is a big one either; but that we must inquire whether what you say is true, is clear.[*](For the teasing or challenging repetition cf. 394 B, 470 B-C, 487 E, 493 A, 500 B, 505 D, 514 B, 517 C, 523 A, 527 C, Lysis 203 B, Sophocles O.T. 327.) For since I too admit that the just is something that is of advantage[*](For Plato’s so-called utilitarianism or eudaemonism see 457 B, Unity of Plato’s Thought, pp. 21-22, Gomperz, ii. p. 262. He would have nearly accepted Bentham’s statement that while the proper end of government is the greatest happiness of the greatest number, the actual end of every government is the greatest happiness of the governors. Cf. Leslie Stephen, English Utilitarianism, i. p. 282, ii. p. 89.)—but you are for making an addition and affirm it to be the advantage of the stronger, while I don’t profess to know,[*](This profession of ignorance may have been a trait of the real Socrates, but in Plato it is a dramatic device for the evolution of the argument.) we must pursue the inquiry. Inquire away, he said. I will do so, said I. Tell me, then; you affirm also, do you not, that obedience to rulers is just? I do. May I ask whether the rulers in the various states are infallible[*](The argument turns on the opposition between the real (i.e. ideal) and the mistakenly supposed interest of the rulers. See on 334 C.) or capable sometimes of error? Surely, he said, they are liable to err. Then in their attempts at legislation they enact some laws rightly and some not rightly, do they not? So I suppose. And by rightly we are to understand for their advantage, and by wrongly to their disadvantage? Do you mean that or not? That. But whatever they enact[*](Cf. 338 E and Theaetetus 177 D.) must be performed by their subjects and is justice? Of course. Then on your theory it is just not only to do what is the advantage of the stronger but also the opposite, what is not to his advantage. What’s that you’re saying?[*](Τί λέγεις σύ; is rude. See Blaydes on Aristophanes Clouds 1174. The supspicion that he is being refuted makes Thrasymachus rude again. But Cf. Euthydemus 290 E.) he replied. What you yourself are saying,[*](Cf. Berkeley, Divine Visual Language, 13: The conclusions are yours as much as mine, for you were led to them by your own concessions. See on 334 D, Alc. I. 112-113. On a misunderstanding of this passage and 344 E, Herbert Spencer (Data of Ethics, 19) bases the statement that Plato (and Aristotle), like Hobbes, made state enactments the source of right and wrong.) I think. Let us consider it more closely. Have we not agreed that the rulers in giving orders to the ruled sometimes mistake their own advantage, and that whatever the rulers enjoin is just for the subjects to perform? Was not that admitted? I think it was, he replied. Then you will have to think,[*](Socrates is himself a little rude.) I said, that to do what is disadvantageous to the rulers and the stronger has been admitted by you to be just in the case when the rulers unwittingly enjoin what is bad for themselves, while you affirm that it is just for the others to do what they enjoined. In that way does not this conclusion inevitably follow, my most sapient[*](Cf. Gorgias 495 D.) Thrasymachus, that it is just to do the very opposite[*](Cf. Laches 215 E, Phaedo 62 E.) of what you say? For it is in that case surely the disadvantage of the stronger or superior that the inferior are commanded to perform.

Yes, by Zeus, Socrates, said Polemarchus, nothing could be more conclusive. Of course, said Cleitophon, breaking in, if you are his witness.[*](It is familiar Socratic doctrine that the only witness needed in argument is the admission of your opponent. Cf. Gorgias 472 A-B.) What need is there of a witness? Polemarchus said. Thrasymachus himself admits that the rulers sometimes enjoin what is evil for themselves and yet says that it is just for the subjects to do this. That, Polemarchus, is because Thrasymachus laid it down that it is just to obey the orders[*](τὰ κελευόμενα ποιεῖν is a term of praise for obedience to lawful authority, and of disdain for a people or state that takes orders from another. Cleitophon does not apprehend the argument and, thinking only of the last clause, reaffirms the definition in the form it is just to do what rulers bid. Polemarchus retorts: And (I was right), for he (also) . . .) of the rulers. Yes, Cleitophon, but he also took the position that the advantage of the stronger is just. And after these two assumptions he again admitted that the stronger sometimes bid the inferior and their subjects do what is to the disadvantage of the rulers. And from these admissions the just would no more be the advantage of the stronger than the contrary. O well, said Cleitophon, by the advantage of the superior he meant what the superior supposed to be for his advantage. This was what the inferior had to do, and that this is the just was his position. That isn’t what he said, replied Polemarchus. Never mind, Polemarchus, said I, but if that is Thrasymachus’s present meaning, let us take it from him[*](Socrates always allows his interlocutors to amend their statements. Cf. Gorgias 491 B, 499 B, Protagoras 349 C, Xenophon Memorabilia iv. 2. 18.) in that sense. So tell me, Thrasymachus, was this what you intended to say, that the just is the advantage of the superior as it appears to the superior whether it really is or not? Are we to say this was your meaning? Not in the least, he said.[*](Thrasymachus rejects the aid of an interpretation which Socrates would apply not only to the politician’s miscalculation but to his total misapprehension of his true ideal interests. He resorts to the subtlety that the ruler qua ruler is infallible, which Socrates meets by the fair retort that the ruler qua ruler, the artist qua artist has no sinister or selfish interest but cares only for the work. If we are to substitute an abstraction or an ideal for the concrete man we must do so consistently. Cf. modern debates about the economic man.) Do you suppose that I call one who is in error a superior when he errs? I certainly did suppose that you meant that, I replied, when you agreed that rulers are not infallible but sometimes make mistakes. That is because you argue like a pettifogger, Socrates. Why, to take the nearest example, do you call one who is mistaken about the sick a physician in respect of his mistake or one who goes wrong in a calculation a calculator when he goes wrong and in respect of this error? Yet that is what we say literally—we say that the physician[*](For the idea cf. Rousseau’s Émile, i.: On me dira . . . que les fautes sont du médecin, mais que la médicine en elle-même est infaillible. A al bonne heure; mais qu’elle vienne donc sans le médecin. Lucian, De Parasito 54, parodies this reasoning.) erred and the calculator and the schoolmaster. But the truth, I take it, is, that each of these in so far as he is that which we entitle him never errs; so that, speaking precisely, since you are such a stickler for precision,[*](For the invidious associations of ἀκριβολογία (1) in money dealings, (2) in argument, cf. Aristotle Met. 995 a 11, Cratylus 415 A, Lysias vii. 12, Antiphon B 3, Demosthenes. xxiii. 148, Timon in Diogenes Laertius ii. 19.) no craftsman errs. For it is when his knowledge abandons him that he who goes wrong goes wrong—when he is not a craftsman. So that no craftsman, wise man, or ruler makes a mistake then when he is a ruler, though everybody would use the expression that the physician made a mistake and the ruler erred.

It is in this loose way of speaking, then, that you must take the answer I gave you a little while ago. But the most precise statement is that other, that the ruler in so far forth as ruler does not err, and not erring he enacts what is best for himself, and this the subject must do, so that, even as I meant from the start, I say the just is to do what is for the advantage of the stronger.So then, Thrasymachus, said I, my manner of argument seems to you pettifogging? It does, he said. You think, do you, that it was with malice aforethought and trying to get the better of you unfairly that I asked that question? I don’t think it, I know it, he said, and you won’t make anything by it, for you won’t get the better of me by stealth and , failing stealth, you are not of the force[*](Cf. 365 D.) to beat me in debate. Bless your soul, said I, I wouldn’t even attempt such a thing. But that nothing of the sort may spring up between us again, define in which sense you take the ruler and stronger. Do you mean the so-called ruler[*](i.e., the one who in vulgar parlance is so; cf. τῷ ῥήματι, Plat. Rep. 340d.) or that ruler in the precise sense of whom you were just now telling us, and for whose advantage as being the superior it will be just for the inferior to act? I mean the ruler in the very most precise sense of the word, he said. Now bring on against this your cavils and your shyster’s tricks if you are able. I ask no quarter. But you’ll find yourself unable. Why, do you suppose, I said, that I am so mad to try to try to beard a lion[*](A rare but obvious proverb. Cf. Schol. ad loc. and Aristides, Orat. Plat. ii. p. 143.) and try the pettifogger on Thrasymachus? You did try it just now, he said, paltry fellow though you be.[*](καὶ ταῦτα = idque, normally precedes (cf. 404 C, 419 E, etc.). But Thrasymachus is angry and the whole phrase is short. Commentators on Aristophanes Wasps 1184, Frogs 704, and Acharn. 168 allow this position. See my note in A.J.P. vol. xvi. p. 234. Others: though you failed in that too.) Something too much[*](Cf. 541 B, Euthyphro 11 E, Charmides 153 D.) of this sort of thing, said I. But tell me, your physician in the precise sense of whom you were just now speaking, is he a moneymaker, an earner of fees, or a healer of the sick? And remember to speak of the physician who is really such. A healer of the sick, he replied. And what of the lot—the pilot rightly so called—is he a ruler of sailors or a sailor? A ruler of sailors. We don’t, I fancy, have to take into account the fact that he actually sails in the ship, nor is he to be denominated a sailor. For it is not in respect of his sailing that he is called a pilot but in respect of his art and his ruling of the sailors. True, he said. Then for each of them[*](Plato, like Herodotus and most idiomatic and elliptical writers, is content if his antecedent can be fairly inferred from the context. Cf. 330 C τοῦτο, 373 C, 396 B, 598 C τεχνῶν, Protagoras 327 C.) is there not a something that is for his advantage? Quite so. And is it not also true, said I, that the art naturally exists for this, to discover and provide for each his advantage? Yes, for this. Is there, then, for each of the arts any other advantage than to be perfect as possible[*](Pater, Plato and Platonism, p. 242, fancifully cites this for art for art’s sake. See Zeller, p. 605. Thrasymachus does not understand what is meant by saying that the art (= the artist qua artist) has no interest save the perfection of its (his) own function. Socrates explains that the body by its very nature needs art to remedy its defects (Herodotus i. 32, Lysis 217 B). But the nature of art is fulfilled in its service, and it has no other ends to be accomplished by another art and so on ad infinitum. It is idle to cavil and emend the text, because of the shift from the statement (341 D) that art has no interest save its perfection, to the statement that it needs nothing except to be itself (342 A-B). The art and the artist qua artist are ideals whose being by hypothesis is their perfection.)? What do you mean by that question? Just as if, I said, you should ask me whether it is enough for the body to be the body or whether it stands in need of something else, I would reply, By all means it stands in need. That is the reason why the art of medicine has now been invented, because the body is defective and such defect is unsatisfactory. To provide for this, then, what is advantageous, that is the end for which the art was devised. Do you think that would be a correct answer, or not?

Correct, he said. But how about this? Is the medical art itself defective or faulty, or has any other art any need of some virtue, quality, or excellence—as the eyes of vision, the ears of hearing, and for this reason is there need of some art over them that will consider and provide what is advantageous for these very ends—does there exist in the art itself some defect and does each art require another art to consider its advantage and is there need of still another for the considering art and so on ad infinitum, or will the art look out for its own advantage? Or is it a fact that it needs neither itself nor another art to consider its advantage and provide against its deficiency? For there is no defect or error at all that dwells in any art. Nor does it befit an art to seek the advantage of anything else than that of its object. But the art itself is free from all harm and admixture of evil, and is right so long as each art is precisely and entirely that which it is. And consider the matter in that precise way of speaking. Is it so or not? It appears to be so, he said. Then medicine, said I, does not consider the advantage of medicine but of the body? Yes. Nor horsemanship of horsemanship but of horses, nor does any other art look out for itself—for it has no need—but for that of which it is the art. So it seems, he replied. But surely,[*](The next step is the identification of (true) politics with the disinterested arts which also rule and are the stronger. Cf. Xenophon Memorabilia iii. 9. 11. γε emphasizes the argumentative implication of ἄρχουσι to which Thrasymachus assents reluctantly; and Socrates develops and repeats the thought for half a page. Art is virtually science, as contrasted with empiric rule of thumb, and Thrasymachus’s infallible rulers are of course scientific. Ruler is added lest we forget the analogy between political rule and that of the arts. Cf. Newman, Introduction Aristotle Politics 244, Laws 875 C.) Thrasymachus, the arts do hold rule and are stronger than that of which they are the arts. He conceded this but it went very hard. Then no art considers or enjoins[*](It is not content with theoretic knowledge, but like other arts gives orders to achieve results. Cf. Politicus 260 A, C.) the advantage of the stronger but every art that of the weaker which is ruled by it. This too he was finally brought to admit though he tried to contest it. But when he had agreed—Can we deny, then, said I, that neither does any physician in so far as he is a physician seek or enjoin the advantage of the physician but that of the patient? For we have agreed that the physician, precisely speaking, is a ruler and governor of bodies and not a moneymaker. Did we agree on that? He assented. And so the precise pilot is a ruler of sailors, not a sailor? That was admitted. Then that sort of a pilot and ruler will not consider and enjoin the advantage of the pilot but that of the sailor whose ruler he is. He assented reluctantly. Then, said I, Thrasymachus, neither does anyone in any office of rule in so far as he is a ruler consider and enjoin his own advantage but that of the one whom he rules and for whom he exercises his craft, and he keeps his eyes fixed on that and on what is advantageous and suitable to that in all that he says and does.

When we had come to this point in the discussion and it was apparent to everybody that his formula of justice had suffered a reversal of form, Thrasymachus, instead of replying,[*](Thrasymachus first vents his irritation by calling Socrates a snivelling innocent, and then, like Protagoras (Protagoras 334), when pressed by Socrates’ dialectic makes a speech. He abandons the abstract (ideal) ruler, whom he assumed to be infallible and Socrates proved to be disinterested, for the actual ruler or shepherd of the people, who tends the flock only that he might shear it. All political experience and the career of successful tyrants, whom all men count happy, he thinks confirms this view, which is that of Callicles in the Gorgias. Justice is another’s good which only the naive and innocent pursue. It is better to inflict than to suffer wrong. The main problem of the Republic is clearly indicated, but we are not yet ready to debate it seriously.) said, Tell me, Socrates, have you got a nurse? What do you mean? said I. Why didn’t you answer me instead of asking such a question? Because, he said, she lets her little snotty run about drivelling[*](κορυζῶντα L. and S., also s. v. κόυζα. Lucian, Lexiphanes 18, treats the expression as an affectation, but elsewhere employs it. The philosophers used this and similar terms (1) of stupidity, (2) as a type of the minor ills of the flesh. Horace, Satire i. 4. 8, ii. 2. 76, Epictet. i. 6. 30 ἀλλ’ αἱ μύξαι μου ῥέουσι.) and doesn’t wipe your face clean, though you need it badly, if she can’t get you to know[*](Literally, if you don’t know for her. For the ethical dative cf. Shakespeare Taming of the Shrew, I. ii. 8 Knock me here soundly. Not to know the shepherd from the sheep seems to be proverbial. Shepherd of the people, like survival of the fittest, may be used to prove anything in ethics and politics. Cf. Newman, Introduction Aristotle Politics p. 431, Xenophon Memorabilia iii. 2. 1, Suetonius Vit. Tib. 32, and my note in Class. Phil . vol. i. p. 298.) the difference between the shepherd and the sheep. And what, pray, makes you think that? said I. Because you think that the shepherds and the neat-herds are considering the good of the sheep and the cattle and fatten and tend them with anything else in view than the good of their masters and themselves; and by the same token you seem to suppose that the rulers in our cities, I mean the real rulers,[*](Thrasymachus’s real rulers are the bosses and tyrants. Socrates’ true rulers are the true kings of the Stoics and Ruskin, the true shepherds of Ruskin and Milton.) differ at all in their thoughts of the governed from a man’s attitude towards his sheep[*](Cf. Aristophanes Clouds 1203 πρόβατ’ ἄλλως, Herrick, Kings ought to shear, not skin their sheep.) or that they think of anything else night and day than the sources of their own profit. And you are so far out[*](This (quite possible) sense rather than the ironical, so far advanced, better accords with ἀγνοεῖς and with the direct brutality of Thrasymachus.) concerning the just and justice and the unjust and injustice that you don’t know that justice and the just are literally[*](τῷ ὄντι like ὡς ἀληθῶς, ἀτεχνῶς, etc., marks the application (often ironical or emphatic) of an image or familiar proverbial or technical expression or etymology. Cf. 443 D, 442 A, 419 A, 432 A, Laches 187 B, Philebus 64 E. Similarly ἐτήτυμον of a proverb, Archil. fr. 35 (87). The origin of the usage appears in Aristophanes Birds 507 τοῦτ’ ἄρ’ ἐκεῖν ἦν τοὔπος ἀληθῶς, etc. Cf. Anth. Pal. v. 6. 3. With εὐηθικῶν, however, ὡς ἀληθῶς does not verify the etymology but ironically emphasizes the contradiction between the etymology and the conventional meaning, simple, which Thrasymachus thinks truly fits those to whom Socrates would apply the full etymological meaning of good character. Cf. 348 C, 400 E, Laws 679 C, Thucydides iii. 83. Cf. in English the connexion of silly with selig, and in Italian, Leopardi’s bitter comment on dabbenaggine (Pensieri xxvi.).) the other fellow’s good[*](Justice not being primarily a self-regarding virtue, like prudence, is of course another’s good. Cf. Aristotle Eth. Nic. 1130 a 3; 1134 b 5. Thrasymachus ironically accepts the formula, adding the cynical or pessimistic comment, but one’s own harm, for which see 392 B, Euripides Heracleid. 1-5, and Isocrates’ protest (viii. 32). Bion (Diogenes Laertius iv. 7. 48) wittily defined beauty as the other fellow’s good; which recalls Woodrow Wilson’s favourite limerick, and the definition of business as l’argent des autres.)—the advantage of the stronger and the ruler, but a detriment that is all his own of the subject who obeys and serves; while injustice is the contrary and rules those who are simple in every sense of the word and just, and they being thus ruled do what is for his advantage who is the stronger and make him happy in serving him, but themselves by no manner of means. And you must look at the matter, my simple-minded Socrates, in this way: that the just man always comes out at a disadvantage in his relation with the unjust. To begin with, in their business dealings in any joint undertaking of the two you will never find that the just man has the advantage over the unjust at the dissolution of the partnership but that he always has the worst of it. Then again, in their relations with the state, if there are direct taxes or contributions to be paid, the just man contributes more from an equal estate and the other less, and when there is a distribution the one gains much and the other nothing. And so when each holds office, apart from any other loss the just man must count on his own affairs[*](For the idea that the just ruler neglects his own business and gains no compensating graft cf. the story of Deioces in Herodotus i. 97, Democ. fr. 253 Diels, Laches 180 B, Isocrates xii. 145, Aristotle Pol. v. 8. 15-20. For office as a means of helping friends and harming enemies cf. Meno 71 E, Lysias ix. 14, and the anecdote of Themistocles (Plutarch, Praecept. reipub. ger. 13) cited by Goodwin (Political Justice) in the form: God forbid that I should sit upon a bench of justice where my friends found no more favour than my enemies. Democr. (fr. 266 Diels) adds that the just ruler on laying down his office is exposed to the revenge of wrongdoers with whom he has dealt severely.) falling into disorder through neglect, while because of his justice makes no profit from the state, and thereto he will displease his friends and his acquaintances by his unwillingness to serve them unjustly. But to the unjust man all the opposite advantages accrue.

I mean, of course, the one I was just speaking of, the man who has the ability to overreach on a large scale. Consider this type of man, then, if you wish to judge how much more profitable it is to him personally to be unjust than to be just. And the easiest way of all to understand this matter will be to turn to the most consummate form of injustice which makes the man who has done the wrong most happy and those who are wronged and who would not themselves willingly do wrong most miserable. And this is tyranny, which both by stealth and by force takes away what belongs to others, both sacred and profane, both private and public, not little by little but at one swoop.[*](The order of the words dramatically expressses Thrasymachus’s excitement and the sweeping success of the tyrant.) For each several part of such wrongdoing the malefactor who fails to escape detection is fined and incurs the extreme of contumely; for temple-robbers, kidnappers, burglars, swindlers, and thieves the appellations of those who commit these partial forms of injustice. But when in addition to the property of the citizens men kidnap and enslave the citizens themselves, instead of these opprobrious names they are pronounced happy and blessed[*](The European estimate of Louis Napoleon before 1870 is a good illustration. Cf. Theopompus on Philip, Polybius viii. 11. Euripides’ Bellerophon (fr. 288) uses the happiness of the tyrant as an argument against the moral government of the world.) not only by their fellow-citizens but by all who hear the story of the man who has committed complete and entire injustice.[*](Aristotle Eth. Nic. 1130 b 15 uses the expression in a different sense.) For it is not the fear of doing[*](The main issue of the Republic. Cf. 360 D, 358 E and Gorgias 469 B.) but of suffering wrong that calls forth the reproaches of those who revile injustice. Thus, Socrates, injustice on a sufficiently large scale is a stronger, freer, and a more masterful thing than justice, and, as I said in the beginning, it is the advantage of the stronger that is the just, while the unjust is what profits man’s self and is for his advantage.After this Thrasymachus was minded to depart when like a bathman[*](Cf. Theophrastus, Char. xv. 19 (Jebb), Tucker, Life in Ancient Athens, p. 134. For the metaphor cf. 536 B, Lysis 204 D, Aristophanes Wasps 483. Sudden, lit. all at once.) he had poured his speech in a sudden flood over our ears. But the company would not suffer him and were insistent that he should remain and render an account of what he had said. And I was particularly urgent and said, I am surprised at you, Thrasymachus; after hurling[*](Cf. Euripides Alcestis 680 οὐ βαλὼν οὕτως ἄπει.) such a doctrine at us, can it be that you propose to depart without staying to teach us properly or learn yourself whether this thing is so or not? Do you think it is a small matter[*](Socrates reminds us that a serious moral issue is involved in all this word-play. So 352 D, Gorgias 492 C, 500 C, Laches 185 A. Cf. 377 B, 578 C, 608 B.) that you are attempting to determine and not the entire conduct of life that for each of us would make living most worth while? Well, do I deny it?[*](Plainly a protesting question, Why, do I think otherwise? Cf. 339 D.) said Thrasymachus. You seem to, said I, or else[*](For the impossibility of J. and C.’s or rather see my note in A.J.P. vol. xiii. p. 234.) to care nothing for us and so feel no concern whether we are going to live worse or better lives in our ignorance of what you affirm that you know.

Nay, my good fellow, do your best to make the matter clear to us also: it will be no bad investment[*](κείσεται of an investment perhaps. Cf. Plautus, Rudens 939 bonis quod bene fit, haud perit.) for you—any benefit that you bestow on such company as this. For I tell you for my part that I am not convinced, neither do I think that injustice is more profitable[*](Isocrates viii. 31 and elsewhere seems to be copying Plato’s idea that injustice can never be profitable in the higher sense of the word. Cf. also the proof in the Hipparchus that all true κέρδος is ἀγαθόν.) than justice, not even if one gives it free scope and does not hinder it of its will.[*](Plato neglects for the present the refinement that the unjust man does not do what he really wishes, since all desire the good. Cf. 438 A, 577 D, and Gorgias 467 B.) But, suppose, sir, a man to be unjust and to be able to act unjustly either because he is not detected or can maintain it by violence,[*](Cf. 365 D.) all the same he does not convince me that it is more profitable than justice. Now it may be that there is someone else among us who feels in this way and that I am not the only one. Persuade us, then, my dear fellow, convince us satisfactorily that we are ill advised in preferring justice to injustice.And how am I to persuade you?[*](Thrasymachus has stated his doctrine. Like Dr. Johnson he cannot supply brains to understand it. Cf. Gorgias 489 C, 499 B, Meno 75 D.) he said. If you are not convinced by what I just now was saying, what more can I do for you? Shall I take the argument and ram[*](The language is idiomatic, and the metaphor of a nurse feeding a baby, Aristophanes Eccl. 716, is rude. Cf. Shakespeare, He crams these words into my ears against the stomach of my sense.) it into your head? Heaven forbid! I said, don’t do that. But in the first place when you have said a thing stand by it,[*](Cf. Socrates’ complaint of Callicles’ shifts, Gorgias 499 B-C, but Cf. 334 E, 340 B-C.) or if you shift your ground change openly and don’t try to deceive us. But, as it is, you see, Thrasymachus—let us return to the previous examples—you see that while you began by taking the physician in the true sense of the word, you did not think fit afterwards to be consistent and maintain with precision the notion of the true shepherd, but you apparently think that he herds his sheep in his quality of shepherd not with regard to what is best for the sheep but as if he were a banqueter about to be feasted with regard to the good cheer or again with a view to the sale of them as if he were a money-maker and not a shepherd. But the art of the shepherd[*](The art = the ideal abstract artist. See on 342 A-C. Aristotle Eth. Nic. 1098 a 8 ff. says that the function of a harper and that of a good harper are generically the same. Cf. Crito 48 A.) surely is concerned with nothing else than how to provide what is best for that over which is set, since its own affairs, its own best estate, are entirely sufficiently provided for so long as it in nowise fails of being the shepherd’s art. And in like manner I supposed that we just now were constrained to acknowledge that every form of rule[*](Aristotle’s despotic rule over slaves would seem to be an exception (Newman, Introduction Aristotle Politics p. 245.). But that too should be for the good of the slave; infra 590 D.) in so far as it is rule considers what is best for nothing else than that which is governed and cared for by it, alike in political and private rule. Why, do you think that the rulers and holders of office in our cities—the true rulers[*](See on 343 B, Aristotle Eth. Nic. 1102 a 8. The new point that good rulers are reluctant to take office is discussed to 347 E, and recalled later, 520 D. See Newman, l.c. pp. 244-245, Dio Cass. xxxvi. 27. 1.)—willingly hold office and rule? I don’t think, he said, I know right well they do.

But what of other forms of rule, Thrasymachus? Do you not perceive that no one chooses of his own will to hold the office of rule, but they demand pay, which implies that not to them will benefit accrue from their holding office but to those whom they rule? For tell me this: we ordinarily say, do we not, that each of the arts is different from others because its power or function is different? And, my dear fellow, in order that we may reach some result, don’t answer counter to your real belief.[*](Cf. Gorgias 495 A. But elsewhere Socrates admits that the argument may be discussed regardless of the belief of the respondent (349 A). Cf. Thompson on Meno 83 D, Campbell on Soph. 246 D.) Well, yes, he said, that is what renders it different. And does not each art also yield us benefit[*](As each art has a specific function, so it renders a specific service and aims at a specific good. This idea and the examples of the physician and the pilot are commonplaces in Plato and Aristotle.) that is peculiar to itself and not general,[*](Hence, as argued below, from this abstract point of view wage-earning, which is common to many arts, cannot be the specific service of any of them, but must pertain to the special art μισθωτική. This refinement is justified by Thrasymachus’ original abstraction of the infallible craftsman as such. It also has this much moral truth, that the good workman, as Ruskin says, rarely thinks first of his pay, and that the knack of getting well paid does not always go with the ability to do the work well. See Aristotle on χρηματιστική, Politics i. 3 (1253 b 14).) as for example medicine health, the pilot’s art safety at sea, and the other arts similarly? Assuredly. And does not the wage-earner’s art yield wage? For that is its function. Would you identify medicine and the pilot’s art? Or if you please to discriminate precisely as you proposed, none the more if a pilot regains his health because a sea voyage is good for him, no whit the more, I say, for this reason do you call his art medicine, do you? Of course not, he said. Neither, I take it, do you call wage-earning medicine if a man earning wages is in health. Surely not. But what of this? Do you call medicine wage-earning, if a man when giving treatment earns wages? No, he said. And did we not agree that the benefit derived from each art is peculiar to it? So be it, he said. Any common or general benefit that all craftsmen receive, then, they obviously derive from their common use of some further identical thing. It seems so, he said. And we say that the benefit of earning wages accrues to the craftsmen from their further exercise of the wage-earning art. He assented reluctantly. Then the benefit, the receiving of wages does not accrue to each from his own art. But if we are to consider it precisely medicine produces health but the fee-earning art the pay, and architecture a house but the fee-earning art accompanying it the fee, and so with all the others, each performs its own task and benefits that over which it is set, but unless pay is added to it is there any benefit which the craftsman receives from the craft? Apparently not, he said. Does he then bestow no benefit either when he works for nothing? I’ll say he does. Then, Thrasymachus, is not this immediately apparent, that no art or office provides what is beneficial for itself—but as we said long ago it provides and enjoins what is beneficial to its subject, considering the advantage of that, the weaker, and not the advantage the stronger?