Hellenica

These latter, who were drawn up only eight deep, thinking that the outer end of the phalanx was too weak, undertook to swing it around upon itself.[*]( The ἀναστροφή involved two movements, (1) a facing about, followed by a march to the rear, and (2) a turning of the line until it stood behind the adjacent troops, thus doubling the depth of the phalanx. In this case the enemy’s attack prevented the accomplishment of the second movement.) But as soon as they began the backward movement, the enemy fell upon them, in the belief that they were in flight, and they did not go on and swing forward; furthermore, those who were next to them also began to flee.

As for Mnasippus, while he was unable to aid the troops which were hard pressed, because the enemy was attacking him in front, he was left with an ever smaller number of men. Finally, all of the enemy massed themselves together and charged upon Mnasippus and his troops, which were by this time very few. And the citizens, seeing what was going on, came out to join in the attack.

Then after they had killed Mnasippus, all straightway joined in the pursuit. And they probably would have captured the very camp, along with its stockade, had not the pursuers turned back upon seeing the crowd of camp-followers, of attendants, and of slaves, imagining that there was some fighting ability in them.

At this time, accordingly, the Corcyraeans set up a trophy and gave back the bodies of the dead under a truce. And after this the people in the city were stouter of heart, while those outside were in the utmost despondency. For there was not only a report that Iphicrates was already practically at hand, but the Corcyraeans were in fact also manning ships.

Then Hypermenes, who chanced to be vice-admiral under[*](373 B.C.) Mnasippus, manned fully the entire fleet which he had there, and after sailing round to the stockade and filling all his transports with the slaves and the captured property, sent them off; he himself, however, with his marines and such of the soldiers as had been left alive, kept guard over the stockade;

but finally they, too, embarked upon the triremes in great confusion and went sailing off, leaving behind them a great deal of corn, much wine, and many slaves and sick soldiers; for they were exceedingly afraid that they would be caught on the island by the Athenians. And so they reached Leucas in safety.

As for Iphicrates, when he began his voyage around Peloponnesus he went on with all needful preparations for a naval battle as he sailed; for at the outset he had left his large sails behind him at Athens, since he expected to fight, and now, further, he made but slight use of his smaller sails, even if the wind was favourable; by making his voyage, then, with the oar, he kept his men in better condition of body and caused the ships to go faster.

Furthermore, whenever the expedition was going to take the noonday or the evening meal at any particular spot, he would often draw back the head of the column from the shore opposite the place in question; then he would turn the line around again, cause the triremes to head toward the land, and start them off at a signal to race to the shore. It was counted a great prize of victory to be the first to get water or anything else they needed, and the first to get their meal. On the other hand, those who reached the shore last incurred a great penalty in that they came off worse in all these points, and in[*](373 B.C.) the fact that they had to put to sea again at the same time as the rest when the signal was given; for the result was that those who came in first did everything at their leisure, while those who came in last had to hurry.

Again, in setting watches, if he chanced to be taking the midday meal in a hostile country, he posted some on the land, as is proper, but besides he hoisted the masts on the ships and had men keep watch from their tops. These men, therefore, could see much farther, from their higher point of view, than those on the level. Further, wherever he dined or slept, he would not have a fire inside the camp during the night, but kept a light burning in front of his forces, so that no one could approach unobserved. Frequently, however, if it was good weather, he would put to sea again immediately after dining; and if there was a favourable breeze, they sailed and rested at the same time, while if it was necessary to row, he rested the sailors by turns.

Again, when he sailed by day, he would lead the fleet, by signals, at one time in column and at another in line of battle; so that, while still pursuing their voyage, they had at the same time practised and become skilled in all the manoeuvres of battle before they reached the sea which, as they supposed, was held by the enemy. And although for the most part they took both their noonday and their evening meals in the enemy’s country, nevertheless, by doing only the necessary things, he always got to sea before the enemy’s forces arrived to repel him and speedily got under way again.

At the time of Mnasippus’ death Iphicrates chanced to be near the Sphagiae.[*]( Islands situated off Pylos in Laconia.) Then, after reaching Elis and sailing past the mouth of the[*](373 B.C.) Alpheus, he anchored beneath the promontory called Ichthys. From there he put to sea on the following day for Cephallenia, having his fleet in such order and making the voyage in such a way that, if it should be necessary to fight, he should be ready in all essential respects to do so. For he had not heard the news of Mnasippus’ death from any eyewitness, but suspected that it was told to deceive him, and hence was on his guard; when he arrived at Cephallenia, however, he there got definite information, and so rested his forces.

Now I am aware that all these matters of practice and training are customary whenever men expect to engage in a battle by sea, but that which I commend in Iphicrates is this, that when it was incumbent upon him to arrive speedily at the place where he supposed he should fight with the enemy, he discovered a way to keep his men from being either, by reason of the voyage they had made, unskilled in the tactics of fighting at sea, or, by reason of their having been trained in such tactics, any the more tardy in arriving at their destination.

After subduing the cities in Cephallenia he sailed to Corcyra. There, upon hearing that ten triremes were sailing thither from Dionysius to aid the Lacedaemonians, he first went in person and looked over the ground to find a point from which any who approached the island could be seen and the men stationed there to send signals to the city would be visible; he then stationed his watchers at that point.

He also agreed with them as to how they were to signal when the enemy were approaching and when they were at anchor. Then he gave his orders to twenty of the captains, whose duty it should be to[*](373 B.C.) follow him when the herald gave the word; and in case anyone failed to follow, he warned him that he would not have occasion to find fault with his punishment. Now when the signal came that the triremes were approaching, and when the word was given by the herald, the ardour of all was a sight worth seeing; for there was no one among those who were to sail who did not run to get aboard his ship.

When Iphicrates had reached the place where the enemy’s triremes were, he found the crews of all save one already disembarked on the shore, but Melanippus, the Rhodian, had not only advised the others not to remain there, but had manned his own ship and was sailing out to sea. Now although he met the ships of Iphicrates, he nevertheless escaped, but all the ships from Syracuse were captured, along with their crews.

Thereupon Iphicrates cut off the beaks and towed the triremes into the harbour of Corcyra; as for the crews, he concluded an agreement that each man should pay a fixed ransom, with the exception of Crinippus the commander, whom he kept under guard, intending either to exact a very large ransom or to sell him. Crinippus, however, was so mortified that he died by a self-inflicted death, and Iphicrates let the rest go, accepting Corcyraeans as sureties for the ransoms.

Now he maintained his sailors for the most part by having them work for the Corcyraeans on their lands; the peltasts, however, and the hoplites from his ships he took with him and crossed over to Acarnania. There he gave aid to the cities which were friendly, in case any of them needed aid, and made war upon the Thyrians, who were very valiant men and were in possession of a very strong fortress.

Furthermore,[*](372 B.C.) he took over the fleet which was at Corcyra, and with almost ninety[*]( The fleet of the Corcyraeans (cp. 24 above) having been added to Iphicrates’ original seventy (14) ships. The text, however, appears to be faulty.) ships first sailed to Cephallenia and collected money, in some cases with the consent of the people, in other cases against their will. Then he made preparations to inflict damage upon the territory of the Lacedaemonians, and to bring over to his side such of the other hostile states in that region as were willing and to make war upon such as would not yield.

Now for my part I not only commend this campaign in particular among all the campaigns of Iphicrates, but I commend, further, his directing the Athenians to choose as his colleagues Callistratus, the popular orator, who was not very favourably inclined toward him, and Chabrias, who was regarded as a very good general. For if he thought them to be able men and hence wished to take them as advisers, he seems to me to have done a wise thing, while on the other hand if he believed them to be his adversaries and wished in so bold a way to prove that he was neither remiss nor neglectful in any point, this seems to me to be the act of a man possessed of great confidence in himself. He, then, was occupied with these things.