II. Works

The preceding statement finds its confirmation in the list of the writings of the Eresian given us, though with his usual haste, by Diogenes Laertius, but probably borrowed from authorities like Hermippus and Andronicus (Schol. at the end of the of Theophrastus), and the statements respecting them contained in other writers, which Menage has already, at least in part, collected in his notes. Thus Theophrastus, like Aristotle, had composed a first and second Analytic (D. L. 5.42, ib. Menag.), and, at least in the case of the former, had connected his treatise with that of his great predecessor, in the manner indicated above (see below, section III.). He had also written books on Topics (D. L. 5.42, 45, 50), and on the confutation of fallacies (ib. 42, 45); the former again, at all events, with a careful regard to the Topica of Aristotle. The work of Theophrastus (περὶ καταφάσεως καὶ ἀποφάσεως, D. L. 5.44) seems to have corresponded to that of Aristotle (περὶ ἑρμηνείας). To the books of Aristotle on the (Physica Auscultatio), on Heaven, and on Meteorological Phenomena, Theophrastus had had regard in corresponding works. (D. L. 5.42, 50. 47.) Further, he had written on the Warm and the Cold (D. L. 5.44, ib. Menag.), on Water. Fire (D. L. 5.45), the Sea (ib.), on Coagulation and Melting (περι πήξεως καὶ τήξεως,) on various phenomena of organic and spiritual life (D. L. 5.45, ib. Menag., 43, 46, 49, 43, 44) ; on the Soul and Sensuous Perception (ib. 4(6), not without regard to the corresponding works of Aristotle, as may at least in part be demonstrated. In like manner we find mention of monographies of Theophrastus on the older Greek physiologians Anaximenes, Anaxagoras, Empedocles, Archelaus (D. L. 5.42, 43), Diogenes of Apollonia, Democritus (ib. 43), which were not unfrequently made use of by Simplicius; and also on Xenocrates (ib. 47), against the Academics (49), and a sketch of the political doctrine of Plato (ib. 43), which shows that the Eresian followed his master likewise in the critico-historical department of inquiry. That he also included general history within the circle of his scientific investigation, we see from the quotations in Plutarch's lives of Lycurgus, Solon, Aristides, Pericles, Nicias, Alcibiades, Lysander, Agesilaus, and Demosthenes, which were probably borrowed from the work on Lives (περὶ βίων γ́, D. L. 5.42). But his principal endeavours were directed to the supplementation and continuation of the labours of Aristotle in the domain of natural history. This is testified not only by a number of treatises on individual subjects of zoology, of which, besides the titles, but few fragments remain, but also by his books on Stones and Metals, and his works on the History, and on the Parts of Plants, which have come down to us entire. In politics, also, he seems to have trodden in the footsteps of Aristotle. Besides his books on the State, we find quoted various treatises on Education (ib. 42, 50), on Royalty (ib. 47, 45), on the Best State, on Political Morals, and particularly his works on the Laws, one of which, containing a recapitulation of the laws of various barbaric as well as Grecian states (Νόμων κατὰ στοιχεῖον κδ́, D. L. 5.44, ib. Menag.), was intended to form a pendant to Aristotle's delineation of Politics, and must have stood in close relation to it. (Cic. de Fin. 5.4.)

Of the books of Theophrastus on oratory and poetry, almost all that we know is, that in them also Aristotle was not passed by without reference. (Cic. de Invent. 1.35.)

Theophrastus, without doubt, departed farther from his master in his ethical writings (ib. 42, 43, 44, 45, 47, 49, 50), as also in his metaphysical investigations respecting motion, the soul, and the Deity. (ib. 47, 48.)

Besides the writings belonging to the above-mentioned branches of science, Theophrastus was the author of others, partly of a miscellaneous kind, as, for instance, several collections of problems, out of which some things at least have passed into the Problems which have come down to us under the name of Aristotle (D. L. 5.45, 47,48; comp. Plin. Nat. 28.6; Arist. Probl. 33.12), and commentaries (D. L. 5.48, 49; comp. 43), partly dialogucs (Basil. Magn. Epist. 167), to which probably belonged the Ἐρωτικός (D. L. 5.43; Ath. 12.511, 13.562), Megacles (D. L. 47), Callisthenes (῍ἢ περὶ πένθους, D. L. 5.44; Cic. Tusc. 3.10; Alex. Aphrod. de Anima ii. extr.), and Μεαρικός (D. L. 5.44), and letters (D. L. 5.46, 50), partly books on mathematical sciences and their history (ib. 42, 46, 48, 50).

Besides the two great works on botany (περὶ φυτῶν ἱστορία, in ten books, written about Ol. 118; see Schneider, Theoph. Opp. iv. p. 586; and αἴτια φυσικά, in six books), we only possess some more or less ample fragments of works by Theophrastus, or extracts from them, among which the ethical characters, that is, delineations of character, and the treatise on sensuous perception and its objects (περὶ αἰσθήσεως [καὶ αισθητῶν]) are the most considerable, the first important as a contribution to the ethical history of that time, the latter for a knowledge of the doctrines of the more ancient Greek philosophers respecting the subject indicated. With the latter class of works we may connect the fragments (περὶ ὀσμῶν), (περὶ κόπων), (περὶ ἰλίγγων), (περὶ ἱδρώτων), (περὶ λειποψυχίας), (περὶ παραλύσεως) and (περὶ μέλιτος). To physics, in the narrower sense of the word, belong the still extant sections on fire (περὶ πυρός), on the winds (περὶ ἀνέυων), on the signs of waters, winds, and storms (περὶ σημείων ὑδάτων καὶ πνευμάτων καὶ χειμώνων καὶ εὐδιῶν, probably out of the fourth book of the Meteorology of Theophrastus : περὶ μεταρσίων : see Plut. Quaest. Gr. vii.; comp. Schneider, iv. p. 719, &c.) To the zoology belong six other sections. Also the treatise on stories (περὶ λίθων, written Ol. 116. 2, see Schneider, l.c. iv. p. 585), and on metaphysics τῶν μετὰ τὰ φυσικά), are only fragments, and there is no reason for assigning the latter to some other author because it is not noticed in Hermippus and Andronicus, especially as Nicolaus (Damascenus) had already mentioned it (see the scholia at the end of the book). But throughout the text of these fragments and extracts is so corrupt that the well-known story of the fate of the books of Aristotle and Theophrastus [ARISTOTELES] might very well admit of application to them. The same is the case with the books on colours, on indivisible lines, and on Xenophanes, Gorgias, and Melissus, which may with greater right be assigned to Theophrastus than to his master, among whose works we now find them. (Respecting the first of these books -- περὶ χρωμάτων -- see Schneider, l.c. iv p. 864; respecting the second, D. L. 5.42, ib. Menag.)

III. Theophrastus and the Aristotelic Doctrines

How far Theophrastus attached himself to the Aristotelic doctrines, how he defined them more closely, or conceived them in a different form, and what additional structures of doctrine he formed upon them, can be determined but very partially owing to the scantiness of the statements which we have, and what belongs to this subject can be merely indicated in this place. In the first place, Theophrastus seems to have carried out still further the grammatical foundation of logic and rhetoric, since in his book on the elements of speech (ἐν τψ͂ͅ περὶ τοῦ λόγου στοιχείῳ, l. ἐν τῷ περὶ τῶν τοῦ λόγου στοιχείων), respecting which again others had written, he distinguished the main parts of speech from the subordinate parts, and again, direct (κυρία λέξις) from metaphorical expressions, and treated of the affections (πάθη) of speech (Simpl. in Categ. 8, Basil.), and further distinguished a twofold reference of speech (σχίσις) -- to things (πράγματα), and to the hearers, and referred poetry and rhetoric to the latter (Ammon. de Interpr. 53 ; Schol. in Arist. p. 108. 27). In what he taught respecting judgment (ἐν τῷ περὶ καταφάσεως [καὶ ἀποφάσεως] -- de affirmationc et negatione) he had treated at length on its oneness (Alex. in Anal. Pr. f. 128, 124; Schol. in Arist. p. 184. 24.183, b. 2 ; Both. de Interpr. pp. 291, 327), on the different kinds of negation (Ammon. in Arist. de Interpr. 128, b. 129, 134; Schol. in Arist. p. 121. 18), and on the difference between unconditioned and conditioned necessity (Alex. l.c. f. 12. 6; Schol. in Arist. p. 149. 44). In his doctrine of syllogisms he brought forward the proof for the conversion of universal affirmative judgments, differed from Aristotle here and there in the laying down and arranging the modi of the syllogisms (Alex. l.100.14, 72, 73, 82, 22, b, 35; Boeth. de Syll. categ. 2.594. 5, f. 603, 615), partly in the proof of them (Alex. l.100.39, b), partly in the doctrine of mixture, i. e. of the influence of the modality of the premises upon the modality of the conclusion (Alex. l.100.39, b. &100.40, 42, 56, b. 82, 64, b. 51; Joh. Ph. xxxii, b. &c.). Then in two separate works he had treated of the reduction of arguments to the syllogistic form (ἀνηγμένων λόγων εἰς τὰ σχήματα) and on the resolution of them (περὶ ἀναλύσεως συλλογισμῶν. Alex. 115); further, of hypothetical conclusions (Alex. in Arist. Anal. Pr. 109, b. &100.131, b.; Joh. Phil. lx. &c. lxxv.; Boeth. de Syll. hypoth. p. 606). For the doctrine of proof, Galenus quotes the second Analytic of Theophrastus, in conjunction with that of Aristotle, as the best treatises on that doctrine (de Hippocr. et Plat. Dogm. 2.2. p. 213, Lips. 253, Basil.) In different monographies he seems to have endeavoured to expand it into a general theory of science. To this too may have belonged the proposition quoted from his that the principia of opposites (τῶν ἐναντίων) are themselves opposed, and cannot be deduced from one and the same higher genus. (Simpl. in Categ. f. 5 ; Schol. p. 89. 15; comp. Alex. in Metaph. p. 342. 30, Bonitz.) For the rest, some inconsiderable deviations from the Aristotelic definitions are quoted from the of Theophrastus. (Alex. in Top. 5, 68, 72, 25, 31.) With this treatise, that upon ambiguous words or ideas περὶ τοῦ ποσαχῶς, π. τ. πολλαχῶς. Alex. ib. 83, 189), which, without doubt, corresponded to the book E of Aristotle's Metaphysics, seems to have been closely connected.

Theophrastus introduced his with the proof that all natural existence, being corporeal, that is composite, presupposes principia (Simpl. in Phys. f. 1, 6, in Schneider 5.7), and before everything else, motion, as the basis of the changes common to all (ib. 5, 6; Schncid. ib. 6). Denying the subsistence of space, he seems to have been disposed, in opposition to the Aristotelic definition, to regard it as the mere arrangement and position (τάξις and θέσις) of bodies (Simpl. l.100.149, b. 141 ; Schneid. p. 213f. 9, 8). Time he designated as an accident of motion, without, as it seems, conceiving it, with Aristotle, as the numerical determination of motion. (Simpl. f. 87, b; Joh. 213. 4.) He departed more widely from his master in his doctrine of motion, since on the one hand he extended it over all categories, and did not limit it to those laid down by Aristotle (Simpl. in Categ. Schneid. p. 212; comp. Simpl. in Phys. 94, 201, 202, 1. Schneid. 214. 10); and on the other hand, while he conceived it, with Aristotle, as an activity, not carrying its own end in itself (ἀτελής), of that which only exists potentially (Simpl. l.c. and f. 94, 1. Schneid. 11), and therefore could not allow that the activity expended itself in motion, be also recognised no activity without motion (Simpl. in Categ. Schneid. 212. 2), and so was obliged to refer all activities of the soul to motion, the desires and affections to corporeal motion, judgment (κρίσεις) and contemplation to spiritual motion. (Simpl. in Phys. 225 ; Schneid. 215. 13.) The conceivableness of a spirit entirely independent of organic activity, must therefore have appeared to him very doubtful; yet he appears to have contented himself with developing his doubts and difficulties on the point, without positively rejecting it (Themist. in Arist. de An. 89, b. 91, b; Schneid. 215. 15). Other Peripatetics, as Dicaearchus, Arlstoxenus, and especially Straton, more unreservedly and unconditionally gave a sensualistic turn to the Aristotelic doctrine. Theophrastus seems, generally speaking, where the investigation overstepped the limits of experience, to have shown more acuteness in the development of difficulties than in the solution of them, as is especially apparent in the fragment of his metaphysics. In a penetrating and unbiassed conception of phenomena, in acuteness of reflection and combination respecting them and within their limits, in compass and certainty of experimental knowledge, he may have stood near Aristotle, if he did not come quite up to him : the incessant endeavour of his great master to refer phenomena to their ultimate grounds, his profundity in unfolding the internal connections between the latter, and between them and phenomena, were not possessed by Theophrastus. Hence even in antiquity it was a subject of complaint that Theophrastus had not expressed himself with precision and consistency respecting the Deity, and had understood thereby at one time Heaven, at another an (enlivening) breath (πνεῦμα, Clem. Alex. Protrept. p. 44. b; Cic. de Nat. Deor. 1.13) ; that he had not been able to comprehend a happiness resting merely upon virtue (Cic. Ac. 1.10, Tusc. 5.9), or, consequently, to hold fast by the unconditional value of morality, and, although blameless in his life, had subordinated moral requirements to the advantage at least of a friend. (A. Gell. N. A. 1.3.23), and had admitted in prosperity the existence of an influence injurious to them. (In particular, fault was found with his expression in the Callisthenes, vitam regit fortuna non sapientia, Cic. Tusc. 3.10; comp. Alex. Aphrod. de Anima, ii. extr.) That in the definition of pleasure, likewise, he did not coincide with Aristotle, seems to be indicated by the titles of two of his writings, one of which treated of pleasure generally, the other of pleasure, as Aristotle had defined it (D. L. 5.44, περὶ ἡδονῆς ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης); and although, like his teacher, he preferred contemplative (theoretic), to active (practical) life (Cic. Att. 2.16), he was at the same time disposed to set the latter free from the fetters of family life, &c. in a manner of which the former would not have approved (Hieron. ad v. Jovinian. i, 189, Bened.) Respecting Theophrastus's treatment of botany in his two chief works, see J. G. Schneider, " de Auctoritate, Integritate, Argumento, Ordine, Methodo et Pretio Librorum, de Historia et Causis Plantarum" (Theophr. Opp. v. p. 227-264.) Comp. R. Sprengel, Geschichte der Botanik, vol. i. p. 52, &c.