(Φίλιππος), king of MACEDONIA, son of Demetrius II., was one of the ablest and most eminent
of the Macedonian monarchs. It appears that he was born in the year B. C.
237, and he was thus only eight years old at the death of his father Demetrius. The
sovereign power was consequently assumed by his uncle Antigonus Doson, who, though he
certainly ruled as king rather than merely as guardian of his nephew, was faithful to the
interests of Philip, whom he regarded as his natural successor, and to whom he transferred the
sovereignty at his death, in B. C. 220, to the exclusion of his own
children. (Plb. 2.45, 70, 4.2; Paus. 8.8.9; Just.
28.4; Porphyr. ap. Euseb. Arm. p. 158.) He was careful however to appoint friends of
his own to all the more important offices of the state; one of whom, Apelles, bore the title
of guardian of the young king (Plb. 4.87), though the latter seems
to have in fact assumed the administration of affairs into his own hands from the very
beginning of his reign. The prudent and vigorous administration of Antigonus had greatly
strengthened the Macedonian empire; but the youth of Philip, who was only seventeen years old
at the time of his accession (Plb. 4.5; Justin makes him only
fourteen), was regarded with contempt by his enemies, and the Aetolians seized the opportunity
to commit acts of aggression and hostility in the Peloponnese. Aratus and the Achaeans
immediately applied to the young king for assistance ; but Philip, though not unmindful of his
allies, was at first unwilling to engage in open war with the Aetolians on account of what he
regarded as mere plundering expeditions. Soon, however, the defeat of the Achaeans at Caphyae,
and the daring outrage of the Aetolians in seizing and burning Cynaetha, aroused him to the
necessity of immediate action, and he proceeded in person to Corinth at the head of a
considerable force. He arrived too late to act against the Aetolians, who had already quitted
the Peloponnese, but by advancing to Tegea he succeeded in overawing the Lacedaemonians, who
were secretly disposed to favour the Aetohans, and for a time prevented them from quitting the
cause of their allies. He next presided at a general assembly of the Achaeans and other allied
states at Corinth, at which war was declared against the Aetolians by the common consent of
all present, including besides Philip himself and the Achaeans, the Boeotians, Phocians,
Epeirots, Acarnanians, and Messenians. Few of these, however, were either disposed or ready to
take an active part in immediate hostilities, while the Lacedaemonians and Eleans openly
espoused the cause of the Aetolians. It was evident there-fore that the chief burden of the
war would devolve upon Philip and the Achaeans, and the young king returned to Macedonia to
prepare for the contest. (Plb. 4.5, 9,
16, 19, 22-29, 31_36; Plut. Arat. 47). His first care was to fortify
his own frontiers against the neighboring barbarians, and he was able to
conclude a treaty with Scerdilaidas, king of Illyria, who undertook to assail the Aetolians by
sea. Early in the ensuing spring (B. C. 219) Philip entered Epeirus
with an army of 15,000 foot and 800 horse, and was quickly joined by the whole forces of the
Epeirots and Acarnanians; but his successes were limited to the reduction of some forts and
towns on the frontiers of Aetolia and Acarnania, and to the ravage of the adjoining country,
when he was recalled to Macedonia by the news of an invasion of the Dardanians. The
barbarians, indeed, retired on hearing of his return, but Philip spent the remainder of the
summer and autumn in Thessaly. and it was not until the winter had already set in, and his
Achaean allies had begun to despair of his arrival, that he suddenly presented himself at
Corinth at the head of a small but select army. This unexpected manoeuvre was completely
successful; he surprised and totally defeated a force of Aetolian and Eleian troops under
Euripidas, and following up his advantage, took the strong fortress of Psophis by a sudden
assault, laid waste without opposition the rich plains of Elis, and then advancing into
Triphylia, made himself master of the whole of that region, though abounding in strongholds,
within six days. After this brilliant campaign. he took up his quarters at Argos for the
remainder of the winter. (Polyh. 4.37, 57, 61-82.)
The ensuing spring (B. C. 218) he first turned his attention to
the reduction of the important island of Cephallenia, but failed in an attack on the city of
Palae in consequence of the treachery and misconduct of one of his own officers, Leontius, who
purposely prevented the troops under his command from carrying the breach by assault. Hereupon
Philip abandoned the enterprise; but landing suddenly at the head of the Ambracian gulf, he
penetrated unexpectedly into the heart of Aetolia, where he surprised the capital city of
Thermus, in which all the wealth and treasures of the Aetolian leaders were deposited. The
whole of these fell into the hands of the king, and were either carried off or destroyed,
together with a vast quantity of arms and armour; but not content with this, Philip set fire
to the sacred buildings, and destroyed all the statues and other works of art with which they
were adorned. The Aetolians in vain attacked his army on his retreat, and he succeeded in
carrying off the spoils in safety to his fleet. (Plb. 5.2-9, 13, 14.) Having
by this sudden blow struck terror into the Aetolians themselves, he next turned his arms
against their Peloponnesian allies, and returning in all haste to Corinth, assembled the
Achaean forces, and invaded Laconia before the Spartans had heard of his having quitted
Aetolia. Descending the valley of the Eurotas he passed close to Sparta itself, laid waste the
whole country as far as Taenarus and Malea and on his return totally defeated the forces with
which Lycurgus had occupied the heights near Sparta, in order to, intercept his retreat. (Id. 5.17-24.) An attempt was now made byy the Chians and Rhodians to effect
a peace by their mediation; but though Philip consented to a truce for the purpose of carrying
on the negotiations, these proved abortive, and the war was still continued. The operations of
the next year (B. C. 217) were less brilliant, but fortune still
favoured the arms of Philip and his allies; the king, who had returned to Macedonia, took the
important fortress of Bylazora, in Paeonia, which was well calculated to check the inroads of
the Dardanians, and afterwards invaded Thessaly, where he reduced the Phthiotic Thebes. The
Achaeans, on their side, had raised large forces, and carried on the war with much success in
the Peloponnese. Meanwhile, events of far greater importance had been passing in Italy, and
the news of the battle of Thrasymene, which reached Philip while he was celebrating the Nemean
games at Argos, determined him to listen to the overtures for peace which had been renewed by
the neutral powers, the Chians, Rhodians, and Ptolemy, king of Egypt. A treaty was soon
brought about, by which it was agreed that both parties should retain what they then
possessed; and thus ended, after a duration of three years, the contest commonly known as the
Social War. (Plb. 5.24, 29, 30, 97_105.)
During the course of these events it is certain that the character of Philip appears in the
most favourable light. Throughout the military operations he displayed uncommon abilities. His
daring and rapid movements disconcerted all the plans of his enemies; and the boldness of his
conceptions was accompanied with a vigour and skill in the execution of them, which might have
done credit to the oldest and most practised general. But his military talents were
accompanied with merits of a still higher order. His policy inclined always to the side of
clemency and moderation, and he had established a well-earned popularity throughout Greece, by
repeated proofs of generosity and good faith. So high, indeed, was his character in these
respects, that all the cities of Crete are said to have voluntarily united in placing
themselvesunderhis protection and patronage (Plb. 7.12; Plut. Arat. 48). Unfortunately these favourable dispositions were
not destined to last long; and the change that subsequently came over his character appears to
have commenced almost immediately after the close of the Social War. It is scarcely probable,
as suggested by Plutarch, that his naturally evil disposition had been hitherto restrained by
fear, and that he now first began to show himself in his true colours ; Polybius more
plausibly ascribes the change in his character to the influence of evil counsellors ; though
these very probably did no more than accelerate the natural effects too often produced by the
intoxication of success and the possession of arbitrary power at an early age. It is certain
at least that the evil counsellors were not wanting. Apelies and the other officers to whom
the chief posts in the administration had been confided by Antigonus Doson, had hoped to hold
the uncontrolled direction of affairs, under the reign of the young king, and could ill brook
to see their power supplanted by the growing influence of Aratus, who at this period chiefly
swayed the counsels of Philip. Having filed in repeated attempts to undermine the power of the
Achaean leader, by calumnies and intrigues, they went so far as to engage in the most
treasonable schemes for frustrating all the designs of Philip himself, and thwarting the
success of his military enterprizes. Their machinations were at length discovered, and Apelles
himself together with Leontius and Megaleas, the partners of his guilt, were severally Put to
death. (Plb. 4.76, 82-87, 5.2, 4, 14_16, 25-28; Plnt, Arat. 48.)
But the removal of these adversaries was far from giving to Aratus the increased power and
influence which might have been anticipated. A more dangerous rival had already
made his appearance in Demetrius of Pharos, who, after his expulsion from his own dominions by
the Romans [DEMETRIUS, p. 966a.], had taken refuge at the court of
Philip, and soon acquired unbounded influence over the mind of the young king. It was the
Pharian exile who first gave a new turn to the foreign policy of Philip, by directing his
attention to the state of affairs beyond the Ionian sea; and pershaded him to conclude peace
with the Aetolians, in order to watch the contest which was going on in Italy. (Plb. 4.66, 5.12, 101, 105; Just. 29.2, 3). The ambition of the young king was flattered by the prospect thus
held out to him, but he did not deem the time yet come openly to take part in the contest, and
in the meanwhile his attention was turned to the side of Illyria. Scerdilaidas, king of that
country, had abandoned the alliance of the Macedonian monarch, by whom he deemed himself
aggrieved; and had taken advantage of Philip's absence in Greece to occupy some towns and
fortresses on the frontiers of the two countries. The recovery of these occupied Philip during
the remainder of the summer of 217, and the winter was spent principally in the preparation
and equipment of a fleet with which he designed to attack thecoastsof Illyria. But scarcely
had be entered the Adriatic in the following summer (B. C. 216),
when the rumour that a Roman fleet was coming to the assistance of Scerdilaidas inspired him
with such alarm that he made a hasty retreat to Cephallenia, and afterwards withdrew to
Macedonia, the younger Aratus. At length the king was without attempting anything farther
(Plb. 5.108_110). But the news of the
great disaster sustainted by the Roman arms at Cannae soon after decided Philip openly to
espouse the cause of Carthage, and he despatched Xenophanes to Italy to conclude a treaty of
alliance with Hannibal. Unfortunately the ambassador, after having successfully accomplished
his mission, on his return fell into the hands of the Romans, who thus became aware of the
projects of Philip, and immediately stationed a fleet at Brundusium, to prevent him from
crossing into Italy; while the king himself, on the contrary? regained for a long time in
ignorance of the result of his negotiations, and it was not till late in the following year
(B. C. 215) that he sent a second embassy, and a treaty of alliance
was detinitively concluded between him and the Carthaginian general. (Liv. 23.33, 34, 38, 39 ; Plb. 3.2, 7.9;
Appian, App. Mac. 1; Justin, 29.4.)
Whether Philip really meditated at this time the invasion of Italy, or was merely desirous
of establishing his power over all the countries east of the Adriatic, it is certain that his
proceedings were marked by an unaccountable degree of hesitation and delay. He suffered the
remainder of the season of 215 to pass away without any active measures, and though in the
following year (B. C. 214), he at length appeared in the Adriatic
with a fleet, with which he took the town of Oricus, and laid siege to the important city of
Apollonia, his arms were soon paralysed by the arrival of a small Roman force under M.
Laevnus, and he was not only compelled to raise the siege of Apollonia, but destroyed his own
ships to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy, and effected his retreat to
Macedonia by land. (Liv. 24.40.) The folrelieve it. (Liv. 26.25, 26, 28; Plb. 9.41, lowing year (213), he was more successful,
having made himself master of the strong fortress of Lissus, the capture of which was followed
by the submisance sion of great part of Illyria (Plb. 8.15): but
this decisive blow was not followed up; and the apparent inaction of the king during the two
fol lowing years is the more remarkable, because the occupation of Tarentum by Hannibal would
have seemed likely, at this juncture, to facilitate his communications with Italy.
Meanwhile, the proceedings of Philip in Greece were but too well calculated to alienate all
the favourable dispositions previously entertained to wards him. In B. C.
215, he had interposed in the affairs of Messenia, in a manner that led to a fearful
massacre of the oligarchical party in that state: the reproaches of Aratus on this occasion
were bitter and vehement, and from henceforth all friendship was at an end between them.
Philip was, however, still so far swayed by his influence as to refrain at that time from the
design of seizing by treachery on the fortress of Ithome: but after his return from his
unsuccessful expedition to Illyria (B. C. 214) he returned to this
project, and sent Demetrius of Pharos to carry it into execution. The latter was killed in the
attempt; but his death produced no change in the counsels of Philip, who now invaded Messenia
himself, and laid waste the open country with fire and sword. Meanwhile, the breach between
him and Aratus had become daily more complete, and was still further widened by the discovery
that the king was carrying on a criminal intercourse with the wife of the younger Aratus. At
length the king was induced to listen to the insidious proposal of Taurion, and to rid himself
of his former friend and counsellor by means of a slow and secret poison, B. C. 213. (Plb. 7.10_14, 8.10, 14; Plut.
Arat. 49-52.)
The war between Philip and the Romans had been carried on, for some time, with unaccountable
slackness on both sides, when it all at once assumed a new character in consequence of the
alliance entered into by the latter with the Aetolians. In the treaty concluded by the Roman
praetor, M.Valerius Laevinus, with that people (before the end of B. C.
211), provision was also made for comprising in the alliance Scerdilaidas, king of
Illyria, and Attalus, king of Pergamus, and the king of Macedonia thus found himself
threatened on all sides by a powerful confederacy. (Liv. 26.24;
Just. 29.4.) This news at length roused him from his apathy.
Though it was then midwinter, he hastened to provide for the safety of his frontiers, both on
the side of Illyria and that of Thrace, and then marched southwards, with an army, to the
succour of the Acarnanians, who were attacked by the Aetolians, but the latter withdrew on
learning the approach of Philip, and the king returned to Macedonia. hostilities were renewed
in the spring (B. C. 210), and the Romans opened the campaign by the
capture of Anticvra; but after this, instead of supporting their allies with vigour, they
withdrew the greater part of their forces, and P. Sulpicius Galba, who had succeeded Laevinus
in the command, found himself unable to effect anything more than the conquest of Aegina,
while Philip succeeded in reducing the strong fortress of Echinus in Thessaly, notwithstand
ing all the efforts of the Romans and Aetolians to relieve it. (Liv.
26.25, 26, 28; Plb. 9.41, 42.)
The next summer (B. C. 209) * Concerning the
chronology of these events, and the error committed by Livy, who assigns this campaign to the
year 208, see Schorn (Gesch. Griechenl. p. 186, not.), and Thirlwall
(Hist. of Greece, vol. viii. p. 268, not.). Clinton (F.
H. vol. iii. p. 48) has.followed Livy without comment., the arms of Philip were
directed to the support of his allies, the Achaeans, who were unable to make head against the
Lacedaemonians, Messenians, and Eleans. Marching through Thessaly, he defeated the Aetolian
general Pyrrhias, though supported by some Roman troops furnished him by Galba, in two
successive actions, forced the pass of Thermopylae, and made his way successfully to the
Peloponnese, where he celebrated the Heraean games at Argos. The Rhodians and Chians, as well
as the Athenians and Ptolemy, king of Egypt, now again interposed their good offices, to bring
about a peace between the contending parties, and negotiations were opened at Aegium, but
these proved abortive in consequence of the arrogant demands of the Aetolians, in whom the
arrival of Attalus at this juncture had excited fresh hopes. Philip now invaded Elis in
conjunction with the Achaean praetor Cycliadas, but was worsted in an engagement under the
walls of the city, in which, however, the king greatly distinguished himself by his personal
bravery; and the inroads of the Dardanians, and other Barbarian tribes now compelled him to
return to Macedonia. (Liv. 27.29_33;
Just. 29.4.)
At the opening of the campaign of 208, Philip found himself assailed on all sides by the
formidable confederacy now organized against him. Sulpicius with the Roman fleet, in
conjunction with the king Attalus, commenced their attacks by sea, while the Illyrian princes,
Scerdilaidas and Pleuratus, and the Thracian tribe of the Maedi threatened his northern
frontiers, and his allies, the Achaeans, Acarnanians, and Boeotians, were clamorous for
support and assistance against the Aetolians and Lacedaemonians. The energy and activity
displayed by the king under these trying circumstances, is justly praised by Polybius: while
he sent such support as his means enabled him to his various allies, he himself took up his
post at Demetrias in Thessaly, to watch the proceedings of Sulpicius and Attalus; and though
he was unable to prevent the fall of Oreus, which was betrayed into their hands [PLATOR], he not only saved Chalcis from a similar fate, but
narrowly missed surprising Attalus himself in the neighbourhood of Opus. The king of Pergamus
was soon after recalled to the defence of his own dominions against Prusias, king of Bithynia,
and Sulpicius, unable to keep the sea single-handed, withdrew to Aegina. Philip was thus left
at liberty to act against the Aetolians, and to support his own allies in the Peloponnese,
where Machanidas, the Lacedaemonian tyrant, retired on his approach. The king was content with
this success; and after taking part in the general assembly of the Achaeans at Aegium, and
ravaging the coasts of Aetolia, returned once more into his own dominions. (Plb. 10.41, 42; Liv.
28.5-8; Just. 29.4.)
The events of the succeeding years of the war are very imperfectly known to us, but it is
evident that matters took a turn decidedly favourable to Philip and his allies. Attalus
continued in Asia, and the Romans, whose attention was directed wholly towards affairs in
Spain and Africa, lent no support to their Grecian allies. Meanwhile, the Achaeans, under
Philopoemen, were victorious in the Peloponnese over Machanidas, and the Aetolians, finding
themselves abandoned by their allies, and unable to cope single-handed with the power of
Philip, who had a second time carried his ravages into the heart of their country, and
plundered their capital city of Thermus, at length consented to peace upon the conditions
dictated by the conqueror. What these were we know not, but the treaty had hardly been
concluded, when a Roman fleet and army, under P. Sempronius Tuditanus, arrived at Dyrrhachium.
Philip hastened to oppose him, and offered him battle, but the Roman general shut himself up
within the walls of Apollonia; and meanwhile the Epeirots, by their intervention, succeeded in
bringing about a peace between the two parties. A preliminary treaty was concluded between
Philip and Sempronius at Phoenice in Epeirus, B. C. 205, and was
readily ratified by the Roman people, who were desirous to give their undivided attention to
the war in Africa. (Liv. 29.12; Plb.
11.4, 7; Appian. Mac. Exc. 2.)
It is probable that both parties looked upon the peace thus concluded as little more than a
suspension of hostilities. Such was clearly the view with which the Romans had accepted it,
and Philip was evidently well aware of their sentiments in this respect. Hence he not only
proceeded to carry out his views for his own aggrandizement and the humiliation of his rivals
in Greece, without any regard to the Roman alliances in that country, but he even went so far
as to send a strong body of auxiliaries to the Carthaginians in Africa, who fought at Zama
under the standard of Hannibal. (Liv. 30.26, 33, 42, 31.1.) Meanwhile, his
proceedings in Greece were stained by acts of the darkest perfidy and the most wanton
aggression. The death of Ptolemy Philopator, king of Egypt (B. C.
205), and the infancy of his successor, at this time opened a new field to the
ambition of Philip, who concluded a league with Antiochus against the Egyptian monarch,
according to which the Cyclades, as well as the cities and islands in Ionia subject to
Ptolemy, were to fall to the share of the Macedonian king. (Plb.
3.2, 15.20; Appian. Mac. Exc. 3; Just. 30.2.)
In order to carry out this scheme, it was necessary for Philip to establish his naval power
firmly in the Aegaean, and to humble that of Attalus and the Rhodians, and the latter object
he endeavoured to effect by the most nefarious means, for which he found ready instruments in
Dicaearchus, an Aetolian pirate, and Heracleides, an exile from Tarentum, who seems at this
period to have held the same place in the king's confidence previously enjoyed by Demetrius of
Pharos. While Dicaearchus, with a squadron of twenty ships, cruised in the Aegaean, and made
himself master of the principal islands of the Cyclades, Heracleides contrived to ingratiate
himself with the Rhodians, and then took an opportunity to set fire to their arsenal, and burn
great part of their fleet. (Plb. 13.4, 5, 15.20, 18.37; Diod. xxviii.
Exc. Vales. pp. 572, 573; Polyaen. 5.17.2.) Meanwhile, Philip
himself had reduced under his dominion the cities of Lysimachia and Chalcedon, notwithstanding
they were in a state of alliance with the Aetolians, and he next proceeded to
lay siege to Cius, in Bithynia. The Rhodians (who had not yet come to an open rupture with
Philip, though his share in the perfidy of Heracleides could be no secret) in vain interposed
their good offices in favour of Cius: their representations were treated with derision; and
the king having made himself master of the place, gave it up to plunder, sold all the
inhabitants as slaves, and then consigned the empty city to his ally, Prusias, king of
Bithynia. On his return to Macedonia, he inflicted a similar fate on Thasos, though it had
surrendered on capitulation. (Plb. 15.21_24 ; Liv. 32.33.) But these repeated injuries at length
roused the Rhodians to open hostilities: they concluded a league with Attalus (B. C. 201), and equipped a powerful fleet. Philip had taken Samos, and
was besieging Chios, when the combined fleets of the allies presented themselves, and a
general battle ensued, in which, after a severe and long-protracted struggle, the allies were
victorious, although the Rhodian admiral, Theophiliscus, was killed, and Attalus himself
narrowly escaped falling into the hands of the enemy. The advantage, however, was by no means
decisive, and in a second action off Lade, Philip obtained the victory. This success appears
to have left him almost free scope to carry on his operations on the coasts of Asia; he took
Chios, ravaged without opposition the dominions of Attalus, up to the very walls of Pergamus,
and afterwards reduced the whole of the district of Peraea held by the Rhodians on the main
land, including the cities of Iasus and Bargylia. But meanwhile the Rhodians and Attalus had
strengthened their fleet so much that they were greatly superior at sea, and Philip was, in
consequence, compelled to take up his winter-quarters in Caria. It was not till the ensuing
spring (B. C. 200), that he was able to elude, by a stratagem, the
vigilance of his enemies, and effect his return to Europe, where the state of affairs
imperiously demanded his presence. Attalus and the Rhodians having failed in their attempt to
overtake him, repaired to Aegina, where they readily induced the Athenians, already on hostile
terms with Philip, to join their alliance, and openly declare war against the Macedonian king.
(Plb. 16.11, 12, 24-26; Polyaen. 4.17.2;
Liv. 31.14, 15.)
But a more formidable enemy was now at hand. The Romans were no sooner free from their
longprotracted contest with Carthage than they began to lend a favourable ear to the
complaints that poured in on all sides from the Athenians, the Rhodians, Attalus, and Ptolemy,
against the Macedonian monarch; and notwithstanding some reluctance on the part of the people,
war was declared against Philip, and the conduct of it assigned to the consul P. Sulpicius
Galba, B. C. 200. But it was late in the season before he was able
to set out for his province; and after sending a small force, under C. Claudius Centho, to the
assistance of the Athenians, he took up his quarters for the winter at Apollonia. Meanwhile
Attalus and the Rhodians neglected to prosecute the war, perhaps waiting for the arrival of
the Roman forces. Philip, on his part, was not slow in availing himself of the respite thus
granted him. While he sent Nicanor to invade Attica, he himself turned his arms towards
Thrace, where he reduced in succession the important towns of Aenus and Maroneia, and then
advancing to the Chersonese, laid siege to Abydus. The desperate resistance of the inhabitants
prolonged the defence of this place for so long a time that it would have been easy for their
allies to have relieved them, but Attalus and the Rhodians neglected to send them assistance,
the remonstrances of the Roman ambassador, M. Aemilius Lepidus, were treated with derision by
Philip, and the city ultimately fell into his hands, though not till almost the whole of the
inhabitants had perished either by the sword of the enemy or by their own hands. (Liv. 31.2_5, 6,
14, 16_18; Plb. 16.27_34.)
Immediately after the fall of Abydos, Philip learnt the arrival of Sulpicius in Epeirus, but
finding that the consul had already taken up his winterquarters, he took no farther measures
to oppose him. Claudius, who had been sent to the support of the Athenians, was more
enterprizing, and not content with guarding the coasts of Attica, he, by a bold stroke,
surprised and plundered Chalcis. Philip, on this news, hastened to oppose him, but finding
that Claudius had already quitted Chalcis, which he was not strong enough to hold, the king
pushed on with great rapidity, in the hopes of surprising Athens itself, an object which, in
fact, he narrowly missed. Foiled in this scheme, he avenged himself by laying waste the
environs of the city, sparing in his fury neither the sepulchres of men, nor the sacred groves
and temples of the gods. After this he repaired to Corinth, and took part in an assembly of
the Achaeans, but failed in inducing that people to take part more openly in the war with the
Romans; and having a second time ravaged the territory of Attica, returned once more into
Macedonia. (Liv. 31.18, 22-26.)
The consul, Sulpicius, was now, at length, ready to take the field, B. C.
199. He had already gained some slight successes through his lieutenant, L. Apustius,
and had been joined by the Illyrian prince Pleuratus, Amynander, king of Athamania, and the
Dardanian, Bato. The Aetolians, on the contrary, though strongly solicited both by Philip and
the Romans, as yet declined to take part in the war. Sulpicius advanced through Dassaretia.
where Philip met him with his main army, and several unimportant actions ensued, in one of
which, near Octolophus, the Romans gained the victory; and this advantage, though of little
consequence in itself, had the effect of deciding the Aetolians to espouse the Roman cause,
and they joined with Amynander in an inroad into Thessaly. At the same time the Dardanians
invaded Macedonia from the north, and Philip found it necessary to make head against these new
enemies. He accordingly quitted his strong position near the camp of Sulpicius, and having
eluded the vigilance of the Roman general, effected his retreat unmolested into Macedonia,
from whence he sent Athenagoras against the Dardanians, while he himself hastened to attack
the Aetolians, who were still in Thessaly, intent only upon plunder. Philip fell upon them by
surprise, put many of them to the sword, and totally defeated their army, which would have
been utterly destroyed, had it not been for their ally, Amynander. The Roman general
meanwhile, after pushing on into Eordaea and Orestis, where he took the city of Celetrus, had
fallen back again into Epeirus, without effecting anything of importance: the Dardanians had
been repulsed and defeated by Athenagoras, and thus, on the whole, the result of
the campaign had been certainly not unfavorable to Philip. (Liv.
31.27-43.)
It was apparently late in the season before the new consul, P. Villius Tappulus, arrived in
Epeirus to succeed Sulpicius, and a mutiny that broke out in his own army prevented him from
undertaking any hostile operations. Philip meanwhile had followed up his victory over the
Aetolians by laying siege to Thaumaci, in Thessaly, but the courageous defence of the garrison
protracted this siege until so late a period of the year, that Philip was compelled to abandon
the enterprise, and return to Macedonia for the winter. (Id. 32.3, 4.) After spending this
period of repose in the most active preparations for renewing the contest, he took the field
again with the first approach of spring, B. C. 198, and established
his camp in a strong position near the pass of Antigoneia, where it completely commanded the
direct route into Macedonia, Viilius advanced to a position near that of the king, but was
wholly unable to force the pass; and while he was still deliberating what to do, his successor
Flamininus arrived and took the command of the army. (Id. ib. 5, 6, 9.)
The events of the war from this period till its termination have been already fully given
under FLAMININUS.
By the peace finally granted to Philip (B. C. 196), the king was
compelled to abandon all his conquests, both in Europe and Asia, withdraw his garrisons from
all Greek cities, surrender his whole fleet to the Romans, and limit his standing army to 5000
men, besides paying a sum of 1000 talents. Among the hostages given for the fulfilmeant of
these hard conditions, was his son Demetrius. (Plb. 18.27; Liv. 33.30.) Whatever resentment and enmity he might still entertain
against his conquerors, Philip was now effectually humbled, and it is certain that his conduct
towards Rome at this time is characterised by every appearance of good faith and of a sincere
desire to cultivate the friendship of the all-powerful republic. At the suggestion of the
Roman deputy, Cn. Cornelius, he sent an embassy to Rome, to request that the treaty of peace
might be converted into one of alliance (Plb. 18.31); and in the
following year (195), he sent a strong body of auxiliaries to the assistance of Flamininus
against Nabis. (Liv. 34.26.) At a subsequent period he resisted
all the efforts of the Aetolian envoy, Nicander, to induce him once more to take up arms in
concert with Antiochus, as well as the tempting offers of that monarch himself, who spared no
promises in order to gain him over to his alliance. (Id. 35.12, 39.28.) At the commencement of
B. C. 191, he sent ambassadors to Rome, with offers of support and
assistance against Antiochus, who was then already in Greece. The Syriann king had the
imprudence at this time to give personal offence to Philip, who immediately engaged in
measures of more active hostility, lent all the assistance in his power to the Roman praetor,
Baebius, and co-operated with the Romans in the siege of Limnaea, while he took the
opportunity to expel Amynander from Athamania, and make himself master of that province. (Id.
36.4, 8, 13, 14.) Though he took no part in the decisive battle at Thermopylae, he joined the
consul Aciiius Galabrio shortly after, and it was arranged between them that Philip should
besiege Lamia at the same time that Glabrio carried on the siege of Heracleia, but the latter
city having fallen first, the king was ordered to desist from the siege of Lamia, which
thereupon surrendered to the Romans. Philip was indignant at being thus balked of his prize,
but he nevertheless obtained permission from the consul, while the latter was occupied in the
siege of Naupactus, to turn his arms against some of the cities which had taken part with the
Aetolians ; and not only made himself master of Demetrias, and other places in Thessaly, but
overran the whole of Perrhaebia, Aperantia, and Dolopia. (Id. 36.25, 33, 34, 39.23.) The
Romans, at this period, evinced their satisfaction with the conduct of Philip by restoring to
him his son Demetrius and the other hostages, and remitting all the arrears of tribute, which
remained yet unpaid (Pol. 20.13, 21.9; Liv. 36.35): the king, in
return, rendered them still more important services, by providing every thing necessary for
the march of their army through Macedonia and Thrace, when advancing to the attack of
Antiochus in Asia; and securing its passage, without obstruction, as far as the Hellespont.
(Liv. 37.7; Appian. Mac. Exc. 7.3.) But the
seeds of fresh disputes were already sown, and Polybius has justly remarked that the real
causes of the second war of the Romans with Macedonia arose before the death of Philip, though
it did not break out till a later period. So long as the Romans were engaged in the contest
with Antiochus, and stood in need of the support of the Macedonian king, he had been allowed
to retain possession of the conquests he had made during that war; and though Athamania had
been again wrested from him by Amynander and the Aetolians, he still held many towns in
Perrhaebia and Thessaly, which he had captured from the Aetolians, with the express permission
of Acilius Glabrio. But after the fall of Antiochus, deputies from those states appeared at
Rome (B. C. 185), to demand the restitution of the cities in
question, and at the same time Eumenes warned the senate of the increasing power of Philip,
who was diligently employed in strengthening hisinternal resources, while he was secretly
enlarging his frontiers on the side of Thrace, and had made himself master of the important
cities of Aenus and Maroneia. This was enough to arouse the jealousy of the senate. After the
usual form of sending deputies to inquire into the matters on the spot, it was decreed that
Philip should surrender all his conquests in Perrhaebia and Thessaly, withdraw his garrisons
from the cities of Thrace, and confine himself within the ancient limits of Macedonia. (Liv. 39.23_29, 33; Polvb. 23.4, 6, 11, 13. 14.)
The indignation of the king was vehemently excited by these commands, but he was not yet
prepared to resist the power of Rome, and accordingly complied, but, before he withdrew his
troops from Maroneia, made a barbarous massacre of many of the unhappy citizens. At the same
time he sent his younger son, Demetrius, to Rome, to answer the complaints which were now
pouring in from all sides against him : and the young prince was received with so much favour
by the senate. that they arreed to pardon all the past grounds of offence against Philip, out
of consideration for his son, B. C. 183. (Plb. 23.13, 14, 24.1_3 :
Liv. 39.34, 35, 46, 47.) Unhappily the partiality thus displayed by the
Romans towards Demetrius had the effect of arousing the jealousy both of Philip
himself and of his eldest son, Perseus ; and from henceforth the disputes between the two
brothers embittered the declining years of the king [DEMETRIUS, p.
966]. Many other causes combined to the same effect; and the intrigues which the Romans were
perpetually carrying on among his subjects and followers naturally aggravated the suspicious
and jealous turn which his temper had by this time assumed. He was conscious of having
alienated the affections of his own subjects by many acts of injustice and cruelty, and he now
sought to diminish the number of the disaffected by the barbarous expedient of putting to
death the children of all those whom he had previously sacrificed to his vengeance or
suspicions (Liv. 39.53, 40.3-5). But while he was thus rendering himself the object of universal
hatred at home, he was unremitting in his preparations for the renewal of the war with Rome.
By way of disguising the real object of his levies and armaments, which was, however, no
secret for the Romans, he undertook an expedition against the barbarian tribes of Paeonia and
Maedica, and advanced as far as the highest ridge of Mount Haemus. It was during this
expedition that Perseus succeeded in effecting the object for which he had been so long
intriguing, and having by means of forged letters convinced the king of the guilt of
Demetrius, induced him to consent to the execution of the unhappy prince. But Philip was
unable to stifle the feelings of grief and remorse occasioned by this deed, and these passions
broke forth with renewed violence when he afterwards discovered the deceit that had been
practised upon him, and learnt that his son had been unjustly sacrificed to the jealousy of
his elder brother. He believed himself to be haunted by the avenging spirit of Demetrius, and
was meditating the punishment of Perseus for his perfidy, by excluding him from the throne in
favour of his cousin Antigonus, the son of Echecrates, when he himself fell sick at
Amphipolis, more from the effects of grief and remorse than any bodily ailment, and died
shortly after, imprecating curses in his last moments upon the head of Perseus. His death took
place before the end of B. C. 179, in the 59th year of his age,
after a reign of nearly 42 years (Liv. 40.6, 16, 21_24, 54_56; Plb.
24.7, 8; Euseb Arm. p. 158; Dexippus
ap. Syncell. p. 508; Clinton, F. H. vol. ii. p. 243).
The character of Philip may be summed up in the remark of the impartial Polybius (10.26) that there are few monarchs of whom more good or more evil could
justly be said. His naturally good qualities were gradually eclipsed and overgrown by evil
tendencies, and he is a striking, though by no means a solitary, example of a youth full of
hopeful promise degenerating by degrees into a gloomy and suspicious tyrant. Of his military
and political abilities the history of his reign affords sufficient proof, notwithstanding
occasional intervals of apparent apathy and inaction for which it is difficult to account. He
was also a fluent and ready speaker, and possessed a power of repartee which he loved to
indulge in a manner not always consistent with kingly dignity (Plb.
17.4; Liv. 32.34, 36.14). In
addition to the darker stains of perfidy and cruelty, his private character was disgraced by
the most unbridled licentiousness, as well as by habitual excesses in drinking. (Plb. 10.26, 26.5; Liv.
27.30.)
Besides his two sons already mentioned, he left a third son, named Philip (but whether
legitimate or not we are not informed), who could have been born but a few years before the
death of his father. [PHILIPPUS, No. 25.] (In addition to the
ancient authorities cited in the course of the above narrative, the reign and character of
Philip will be found fully discussed and examined by Schorn, Gesch.
Griechenlands, Bonn, 1833; Flathe, Gesch. Macedoniens, vol. ii.;
Thirlwall's Greece, vol. viii. chap. 63-66; and Brandstätter, Gesch. des Aetolischen Bundes, Berlin, 1844.)