surnamed EUPATOR, and also DIONYSUS, but
more commonly known by the name of THE
GREAT (a title which is not, however, bestowed on him by any ancient
historian), was the son and successor of the preceding. We have no precise statement of the
year of his birth, and great discrepancies occur in those concerning his age and the duration
of his reign. Strabo, who was likely to be well informed in regard to the history of his
native country, affirms that he was eleven years old at the period of his accession (x. p.
477), and this statement agrees with the account of Appian, that he was sixty-eight or
sixty-nine years old at the time of his death, of which he had reigned fifty-seven. Memnon, on
the other hand (100.30, ed. Orell.), makes him thirteen at the time when he ascended the
throne, and Dio Cassius (35.9) calls him above seventy years old in
We have very imperfect information concerning the earlier years of his reign, as indeed
during the whole period which preceded his wars with the Romans; and much of what has been
transmitted to us wears a very suspicious, if not fabulous, aspect. According to Justin,
unfortunately our chief authority for the events of this period, both the year of his birth
and that of his accession were marked by the appearance of comets of portentous magnitude. The
same author tells us that immediately on ascending the throne he found himself assailed by the
designs of his guardians (perhaps some of those who had conspired against his father's life),
but that he succeeded in eluding all their machinations, partly by displaying a courage and
address in warlike exercises beyond his years, partly by the use of antidotes against poison,
to which he began thus early to accustom himself. In order to evade the designs formed against
his life, he also devoted much of his time to hunting, and took refuge in the remotest and
most unfrequented regions, under pretence of pursuing the pleasures of the chase. (l.c.;
The first steps of his career, like those of most Eastern despots, were marked by blood. He
is said to have established himself in the possession of the sovereign power by the death of
his mother, to whom a share in the royal authority had been left by Mithridates Euergetes; and
this was followed by the assassination of his brother. (Memnon, 100.30; Appian, Kl. Shift. p. 388-390.)
While he was thus extending his own sovereignty, he did not neglect to strengthen himself by
forming alliances with his more powerful neighbours, especially with Tigranes, king of
Armenia, to whom he gave his daughter Cleopatra in marriage, as well as with the warlike
nations of the Parthians and Iberians. He thus found himself in possession of such great power
and extensive resources, that he began to deem himself equal to a contest with Rome itself.
Many causes of dissension had already arisen between them, and the Romans had given abundant
proofs of the jealousy with which they regarded the rising greatness of Mithridates, but that
monarch had hitherto avoided an open rupture with the republic. Shortly after his accession
they had taken advantage of his minority to wrest from him the province of Phrygia, which had
been bestowed by Aquillius upon his father. (Epit. lxxiv.)
It is not very easy to understand or account for the conduct of Mithridates at this period,
as related to us in the very imperfect accounts which we possess. It seems probable that he
was emboldened to make these direct attacks upon the allies of Rome by the knowledge that the
arms of the republic were sufficiently occupied at home by the Social War, which was now
devastating Italy. But, although that war did in fact prevent the Romans from rendering any
efficient support to the monarchs whose cause they had espoused, Mithridates offered no
opposition to their proceedings, but yielded once more, as it would seem, to the very name of
Rome, and allowed the consular legates and L. Cassius, at the head of a few cohorts only, to
reinstate both Nicomedes and Ariobarzanes. He even went so far as to put to death Socrates,
whom he had himself incited to lay claim to the throne of Bithynia, and who now, when expelled
by the Romans, naturally sought refuge at his court. (Appian, Exc. Phot. p. 540.) It is
difficult to judge whether he was really meditating a war with Rome, but did not yet consider
his preparations sufficiently advanced to commence the contest, or was desirous by a show of
moderation to throw upon the Romans the odium of forcing on the war. If the latter were his
object, his measures were certainly not ill chosen; for it is clear even from the accounts
transmitted to us, that whatever may have been the secret designs of Mithridates, the
immediate occasion of the war arose from acts of aggression and injustice on the part of the
Romans and their allies.
No sooner was Nicomedes replaced on the throne of Bithynia than he was urged by the Roman
legates to invade the territories of Mithridates, into which he made a predatory incursion as
far as Amastris. Mithridates offered no resistance, but sent Pelopidas to the Romans to demand
satisfaction, and it was not until his ambassador was sent away with an evasive answer that he
prepared for immediate hostilities, Epit. lxxvi. lxxvii.
lxxviii.;
These events took place in the summer and autumn of Epit. lxxviii.; Dio Cass. Fr. 115; p. Leg. Manil. 3, pro Flacc. 24, 25;
But while he thus created an apparently insuperable barrier to all hopes of reconciliation
with Rome, Mithridates did not neglect to prepare for the approaching contest; and though he
remained inactive himself at Pergamus, he was busily employed in raising troops and collecting
ships, so that in the spring of ARCHELAUS], Mithridates was continually sending fresh
reinforcements both by land and sea to his support; besides which he entrusted the command of
a second army to his son Arcathias, with orders to advance through Thrace and Macedonia, to
co-operate in the war against Sulla. The intended diversion was prevented by the death of
Arcathias; but the following year (FIMBRIA], now advanced through Bithynia to assail
Mithridates, Epit. lxxxii. lxxxiii.) It was not long afterwards that he received the
tidings of the complete destruction of his armies in Greece, near Orchomenus; and the news of
this disaster, coupled with the progress of Fimbria in Asia, now made Mithridates desirous to
treat for peace, which he justly hoped to obtain on more favourable terms than he could
otherwise have expected, in consequence of the divided state of his enemies. He accordingly
commissioned Archelaus, who was still in Euboea, to open negotiations with Sulla, which led to
the conclusion of a preliminary treaty: but on the conditions of this being reported to the
king, he positively refused to consent to the surrender of his fleet. Sulla hereupon prepared
to renew hostilities, and in the spring of the following year (Lucull. 4; Memnon, 35 ;
Dio Cass. Frag. 174-176; Liv. Epit. lxxxiii. ;
The attention of Mithridates was now attracted towards his own more remote provinces of
Colchis and the Bosporus, where symptoms of disaffection had begun to manifest themselves: the
Colchians, however, submitted immediately on the king appointing his son Mithridates to be
their governor, with the title of king, and even received their new ruler with such
demonstrations of favour as to excite the jealousy of Mithridates, who, in consequence,
recalled his son, and placed him in confinement. He now assembled a large force both military
and naval, for the reduction of the revolted provinces; and so great were his preparations for
this purpose, that they aroused the suspicions of the Romans, who pretended that they must be
in fact designed against them. Murena, who had been left in command by Sulla, was eager for
some opportunity of earning the honour of a triumph, and he now (
He was now at leisure to complete the reduction of the Bosporus, which he successfully
accomplished, and established Machares, one of his sons, as king of that country. But he
suffered heavy losses in an expedition which he subsequently undertook against the Achaeans, a
warlike tribe who dwelt at the foot of Mount Caucasus. (Appian, ib. 67.) Meanwhile, he could
not for a moment doubt that, notwithstanding the interposition of Sulla, the peace between him
and Rome was in fact a mere suspension of hostilities; and that that haughty republic would
never suffer the massacre of her citizens in Asia to remain ultimately unpunished. (See Cic.
pro L. Manil. 3.) Hence all his efforts were directed towards the
formation of an army capable of contending not only in numbers, but in discipline, with those
of Rome; and with this view he armed his barbarian troops after the Roman fashion, and
endeavoured to train them up in that discipline of which he had so strongly felt the effect in
the preceding contest. (ad Cic. Verr. 1.34, p.
183, ed. Orell.) It is remarkable that no formal treaty seems ever to have been concluded
between Mithridates and the Roman senate; and the king had in vain endeavoured to obtain the
ratification of the terms agreed on between him and Sulla. (Appian, 6; Liv. Epit. xciii.; Appian, Hist. iv. p. 239, ed. Gerlach ;
It was evident that the contest in which both parties were now about to engage would be a
struggle for life or death, which could be terminated only by the complete overthrow of
Mithridates, or by his establishment as undisputed monarch of Asia. The forces with which he
was now prepared to take the field were such as might inspire him with no unreasonable
confidence of victory. He had assembled an army of 120,000 foot soldiers, earned and
disciplined in the Roman manner, and sixteen thousand horse, besides an hundred scythed
chariots : but, in addition to this regular army, lie was supported by a vast number of
auxiliaries from the barbarian tribes of the Chalybes, Achaeans, Armenians, and even the
Scythians and Sarmatians. His fleet also was so far superior to any that the Romans could
oppose to him, as to give him the almost undisputed command of the sea. These preparations,
however, appear to have delayed him so long that the season was far advanced before he was
able to take the field, and both the Roman consuls, Lucullus and Cotta, had arrived in Asia.
Neither of them, however, was able to oppose his first irruption; he traversed almost the
whole of Bithynia without encountering any resistance; and when at length Cotta ventured to
give him battle Under the walls of Chalcedon, he was totally defeated both by sea and land,
and compelled to take refuge within the city. Here Mithridates at first prepared to besiege
him, but soon changed his intention. and moved with his whole army to Cyzicus, to which
important city he proceeded to lay siege, both by sea and land. His military engines and works
were managed by a Greek named N iconides, who displayed the utmost skill and science in this
department; while the attacks of the besieging forces were unremitting. But the Roman general
Lucullus, who had advanced from Phrygia to the relief of Cotta, and followed Mithridates to
Cyzicus, had been allowed, by the negligence of the king, or the treachery, as it was said, of
the Roman L. Magius, who enjoyed a high place in his confidence, to occupy an advantageous
position near the camp of Mithridates, where he almost entirely cut him off from receiving
supplies by land, while the storms of the winter prevented him from depending on those by sea.
Hence it was not long before famine began to make itself felt in the camp of Mithridates, and
all his assaults upon the city having been foiled by the courage and resolution of the
besieged, he was at length compelled (early in the year 73) to abandon the enterprise and
raise the siege. But a large detachment of his army, which he at first sent off into Bithynia,
was intercepted and cut to pieces by Lucullus; and when at length he broke up his camp, his
main body, as it moved along the coast towards the westward, was repeatedly attacked by the
Roman general, and suffered very heavy loss at the passage of the Aesepus and Granicus. The
king himself proceeded by sea to Parium, where he collected the shattered remnants of his
forces, and leaving a part of his fleet under Varius to maintain possession of the Hellespont
and the Aegaean, withdrew himself with the rest, after a fruitless attempt upon Perinthus, to
Nicomedia. Here he was soon threatened by the advance of three Roman armies under Cotta and
the two lieutenants of Lucullus, Triarius and Voconius Barba. These generals had made
themselves masters in succession of Prusias and Nicaea, and were preparing to besiege
Mithridates himself at Nicomedia, when the king received intelligence of the defeat of his
fleet under Varius at Tenedos, and becoming in consequence apprehensive for the safety of his
communications by sea, hastened to set sail for Pontus. On his voyage he encountered a violent
storm, by which he lost many of his ships, and was himself compelled to make his escape in the
light galley of a pirate captain. He obtained, however, an important advantage by the surprise
of the free city of Heracleia, which had hitherto remained neutral, but was now compelled to
receive a Pontic garrison. Afrer this he returned to Sinope. (Appian, Epit. xciii. xcv.;
The great army with which Mithridates had commenced the war was now annihilated; and he was
not only compelled to retire into his own dominions, but was without the means of opposing the
advance of Lucullus into the heart of Pontus itself. But he now again set to work with
indefatigable activity to raise a fresh army; and while he left the whole of the sea coast of
Pontus open to the invaders, he established himself in the interior at Cabeira, where he soon
gathered a numerous force around his standard, while he sent to his son Machares and his
son-in-law Tigranes, to request succours and auxiliaries. Lucullus. having in vain tried to
allure him to the relief of Amisus. the siege of which he continued throughout the winter, on
the approach of spring (LUCULLUS, Vol. II. p. 834, note.)
Tigranes was at this moment the most powerful monarch of Asia [TIGRANES]; but though he had previously promised assistance
to Mithridates, he appears to have been unwilling to engage openly in war with Rome; and on
this account, while he received the fugitive monarch in a friendly manner, and assigned him
all that was requisite for maintaining his royal dignity, he refused to admit him to his
presence, and showed no disposition to attempt his restoration. But the arrogance of the
Romans brought about a change in his policy; and Tigranes, offended at the haughty conduct of
Appius Claudius, whom Lucullus had sent to demand the surrender of Mithridates, not only
refused this request, but determined at once to prepare for war with the Romans. Community of
interests now led to a complete reconciliation between the two monarchs; and Mithridates, who
had spent a year and eight months in the dominions of his son-in-law without being admitted to
a personal interview, was now made to participate in all the councils of Tigranes, and
appointed to levy an army to unite in the war. But it was in vain that in the ensuing campaign
(
During the ensuing winter both monarchs were busily engaged in raising a fresh army, into
which Mithridates endeavoured to introduce some discipline, as well as to arm a large body of
them after the Roman fashion. They at the same time endeavoured to procure the important
assistance of the Parthian king, to whom Mithridates addressed a letter, urging him to consult
his true interest by espousing their cause before it was too late, and not to wait until the
Romans attacked him in his turn. Whether the epistle to this effect preserved among the
fragments of Sallust really bears any resemblance to that composed by the king of Pontus we
have unfortunately no means of determining. (Fr. 178, 35.1-3; Liv. Epit. xcviii.; Sall. Hist. iv. p. 238, ed. Gerlach.)
But the Parthian king still wavered, and in the following summer (pro Leg.
Manil. 9.)
The advance of Lucullus himself from Mesopotamia prevented Mithridates from following up his
advantage, and he withdrew into Lesser Armenia, where he took up a strong position near
Talaura, to await the approach of Tigranes. He doubtless expected that the Roman general would
quickly resume the offensive; but the farther proceedings of Lucullus were paralysed by the
mutinous and disaffected spirit of his own soldiers; and on the arrival of Tigranes the two
monarchs found themselves able to overrun almost the whole of Pontus and Cappadocia without
opposition. Before the close of the year 67 Mithridates saw himself once more in possession of
the greater part of his hereditary dominions. (pro Leg. Mlanil.
3.)
But early in the following year (66) the conduct of the war was entrusted by the Romans to
the general whose fame was at this moment eclipsing all others--the illustrious Pompey, and
one of the first measures of the new commander was to secure the friendship and alliance of
the Parthian king Phraates III., a step by which he not only deprived Mithridates of all hopes
of the co-operation of that monarch, but precluded him from the support of Tigranes also, by
compelling the Armenian king to look to the defence of his own dominions against the Parthian.
Thus thrown back upon his own resources, Mithridates made overtures for peace; but Pompey
would listen to no terms except those of unqualified submission and the surrender of all Roman
deserters, and these conditions the king of Pontus rejected with scorn. He still found himself
at the head of an army of 30,000 foot and 2000 horse, with which, however, he did Epit. ci. ;
He had now nothing to fear from the pursuit of Pompey, who appears to have at once abandoned
all thoughts of following the fugitive monarch into the wild and inaccessible regions beyond
the Phasis, and turned his arms first against Tigranes, and afterwards against Syria. It was
probably this sense of security that emboldened him in the year 64 to send ambassadors to
Pompey to sue for peace, offering to submit on terms similar to those which had been lately
granted to Tigranes, namely, that he should be allowed to retain possession of his hereditary
dominions, as a tributary to Rome. Pompey, however, insisted that the king should come in
person to make his submission, and this Mithridates resolutely refused. The negotiations were
in consequence broken off; and while Pompey regulated the affairs of Pontus, which he reduced
to the condition of a Roman province, Mithridates on his part commenced the most extensive
preparations for a renewal of the contest. Far from contenting himself with the possession of
the remote province of the Bosporus, in which, from its inaccessible position, he might defy
the arms of Rome, he now conceived the daring project of marching round the north and west
coasts of the Euxine, through the wild tribes of the Sarmatians and Getae, which had been in
part already visited by his generals Neoptolemus and Diophantus, and having gathered around
his standard all these barbarian nations, of whose hostility towards Rome there could be no
question, to throw himself with these accumulated masses upon the frontiers of the Roman
state, and perhaps penetrate even into Italy itself. With these views, he was busily engaged
in assembling such a fleet and army as would be sufficient for an enterprise of this
magnitude. But his proceedings were much delayed at first by a violent earthquake, which
overthrew whole towns and villages, and subsequently by a long and painful illness, which
incapacitated him for any personal exertion. At length, however, his preparations were
completed, and he found himself at the head of an army of 36,000 men and a considerable fleet.
But during his illness, while he lived in complete seclusion, visible to none but a few chosen
eunuchs, disaffection had made rapid progress among his followers. The fill extent of his
schemes was probably communicated to few ; but enough had transpired to alarm the multitude,
and neither the soldiers nor their leaders were disposed to follow their aged monarch on an
enterprise which they might well regard as little less than desperate. In this state of things
an act of private revenge led to the revolt of the important town of Phanagoria, where the
sons of Mithridates, who held the citadel, were compelled to surrender to the insurgents, and
the flame of insurrection quickly spread to several other cities of the Tauric Chersonese.
Still the spirit of the old king was unbroken: he endeavoured to renew his alliances with the
neighbouring Scythian chieftains, and sent some of his daughters to them as brides, under the
escort of some confidential eunuchs, who, however, followed the general example, and betrayed
their charge into the hands of the Romans. A more formidable conspiracy was now organised by
Pharnaces, the favourite son of Mithridates, and whom he had declared heir to his crown. The
designs of the young man were discovered, and his accomplices put to death, but Mithridates
was persuaded to spare his son's life, and Pharnaces immediately availed himself of his
impunity to break out into open insurrection. He was quickly joined both by the whole army and
the citizens of Panticapaeum, who unanimously proclaimed him king ; and Mithridates, who had
taken refuge in a strong tower, after many fruitless messages and embassies to his son, saw
that no choice remained to him but death or captivity. Hereupon he took poison, which he
constantly carried with him; but his constitution had been so long inured to antidotes, that
it did not produce the desired effect, and he was compelled to call in the assistance of one
of his Gaulish mercenaries to despatch him with his sword. (Appian, Epit. cii.; de Vir. Illust. 76, 77;
The death of Mithridates took place in the year 63 B. C. (De Leg. Ayrar. 2.19), and we may thus readily credit the statement of
Plutarch, that his death was regarded by the army as equal to a great victory. Acad. pr. 2.1), and in another passage says that he was a more formidable
opponent than any other monarch whom the Roman arms had vet encountered (pro
Muren. 15; see also Veil. Pat. 2.18). Nor can we doubt the truth of these enlogiums,
when we contemplate the circumstances in which he was placed, and the instruments with which
he had to work. The numerous defeats of Mithridates are a proof not so much of his own
deficiency as a general, as of the inferiority of his troops to those which were opposed to
him. This was the radical defect, which he was unable to cure. After the unsuccessful issue of
his war with Sulla, all his efforts were directed, as we have already seen, to the training up
a disciplined army, capable of contending with the Roman legions ; and even after the failure
of this first experiment he still seems to have formed armies, comparatively small in numbers,
but well organised, instead of the unwieldy and undisciplined multitudes of Tigranes. But he
latterly became convinced of the impossibility of coping with the Romans in the field, and on
all occasions sought to avoid a pitched battle, and draw his enemies into positions where he
might cut them off from their supplies, or take advantage of the rugged and difficult nature
of the country in which he had involved them. If he was frequently foiled in these projects,
we must remember that he was opposed to generals such as Lucullus and Pompey. But whatever
opinion may be entertained of the skill and ability of Mithridates as a general in conducting
his campaigns, there can be no question as to the undaunted spirit and energy with which he
rose superior to all his defeats, and was ever ready to recommence the unequal contest.
What little we know of his character in other respects is far from favourable; and
notwithstanding his Greek education and habits, presents all the characteristics of a genuine
Eastern despot. His unreasonable suspicions of those around him, which lost him the province
of Galatia and the services of Archelaus; the reliance placed on eunuchs for all confidential
purposes; the barbarous execution of several of his numerous sons for various and often
trivial causes; and the truly Oriental jealousy which led him to order the death of his wives
and sisters, when he found himself compelled to fly from his kingdom--not to speak of the
severe punishment inflicted on the people of Chios for a trifling and apparently involuntary
offence (Astron. 5.510.)
Of his numerous wives or concubines, the names of a few only have been preserved to us:
among the most conspicuous of which are: Laodice, put to death early in his reign; Berenice
and Monima, both of whom were put to death at Pharnacia [MONIMA],
STRATONICE and Hypsicratea, the last of whom is said to have
accompanied him on all his campaigns, and shared with him every danger and privation. (
The portrait of Mithridates which appears on his coins is remarkable for the fire and energy
of his countenance, which accords well with all we know of his character; while the beautiful
execution of the coins themselves, both in gold and silver, bears testimony to his patronage
of the arts. They usually bear a date, which refers to an era commencing with the year
MITHRIDATES, a son of the preceding, who was appointed by his
father to take the command of the army which he opposed to the Roman general, Fimbria, in