(Anab. 2.6.16; H. Ed. Foss, de Gorgia Leontino, Halle, 1828, p. 6, &c. ; J. Geel, Histor. Crit. Sophistarum, in the
In his earlier years Gorgias was attracted, though not convinced, by the conclusions to
which the Eleatics had come: but he neither attempted to refute them, nor did he endeavour to
reconcile the reality of the various and varying phaenomena of the world with the supposition
of a simple, eternal, and unchangeable existence, as Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and the atomists
had done. On the contrary, he made use of the conclusions of the Eleatics, for the purpose of
proving that there was nothing which had any existence or reality; and in doing this he paid
so much attention to externals, and kept so evidently appearance alone in view, instead of
truth, that he was justly reckoned among the sophists. His work, On
Nature, or On that which is not, in which he developed his views,
and which is said to have been written in in Plat. Gorg. p. 567, ed. Routh.), seems to have been lost at an early time
(it is doubtful whether Galen, who quotes it, Opera, vol. i. p. 56, ed.
Gesner, actually read it); but we possess sufficient extracts from it, to form a definite idea
of its nature. The work de Xenoph. Gorgia et Melisso, ascribed to
Aristotle or Theophrastus, contains a faithful and accurate account of it, though the text is
unfortunately very corrupt: Sextus Empiricus (ad v. Math. 7.65, &c.)
is more superficial, but clearer. The book of Gorgias was divided into three sections: in the
first he endeavoured to show that nothing had any real existence ; in the second, that if
there was a real existence, it was beyond man's power to ascertain it; and in the third, that
existence could not be communicated, even supposing that it was real and ascertainable. The
first section, of which we have a much more precise and accurate account in the Aristotelian
work than in Sextus Empiricus, shows on the one hand that things neither are nor are not, because otherwise being and
not being would be identical; and on the other hand, that if there were
existence, it could neither have come to be nor not come
to be, and neither be one nor many. The first
of these inferences arises from an ambiguity in the use of the term of existence; the second
from the fact of Gorgias adopting the conclusion of Melissus, which is manifestly wrong, and
according to which existence not having come to be is infinite,
and--applying Zeno's argument against the reality of space--as an infinite has no existence.
Gorgias further makes bad use of another because they are conceived, but exist even when they are not conceived. The
third section urges the fact, that it is not existence which is communicated, but only words,
and that words are intelligible only by their reference to corresponding perceptions ; but
even then intelligible only approximatively, since no two persons ever perfectly agreed in
their perceptions or sentiments, nay, not even one and the same person agreed with himself at
different times. (Comp. Foss, pp. 107-185.)
However little such a mode of arguing might stand the test of a sound dialectical examination, yet it could not but direct attention to the insufficiency of the abstractions of the Eleatics, and call forth more careful investigations concerning the nature and forms of our knowledge and cognition, and thus contribute towards the removal of the later scepticism, the germs of which were contained in the views entertained by Gorgias himself. He himself seems soon to have renounced this sophistical schematism, and to have turned his attention entirely to rhetorical and practical pursuits. Plato at least notices only one of those argumentations, and does not even speak of that one in the animated description which he gives of the peculiarities of Gorgias in the dialogue bearing his name, but in the
Gorgias, as described by Plato, avoids general definitions, even of virtue and morality, and
confines himself to enumerating and characterising the particular modes in which they appear,
according to the differences of age, sex, &c., and that not without a due appreciation of
real facts, as is clear from an expression of Aristotle, in which he recognises this merit.
(Plat. Meno, p. 71, &c.; comp. Meno, p. 95, Gorg. p. 452, Phileb. p. 58), and he preferred the name of a rhetorician to that of a
sophist (Plat. Gory. p. 520 a, 449, 452); but on the supposition that
oratory comprehended and was the master of all our other powers and faculties. (Ib p. 456,
454.) The ancients themselves were uncertain whether they should call him an orator or a
sophist. (Cic. de Invent, 1.5; Lucian, Macrob.
23.)
In his explanations of the phaenomena of nature, though without attaching any importance to
physics, Gorgias seems to have followed in the footsteps of Empedocles, whose disciple he is
called, though in all probability not correctly. (Meno, p. 76, Gorg. p. 453 ; comp. Dionys. de Isocrat. 1.)
The eloquence of Gorgias, and probably that of his Sicilian contemporary Tisias also, was
chiefly calculated to tickle the ear by antitheses, by combinations of words of similar
sound, by the Symmetry of its parts and similar artifices (Orat. 49, 52; Dionys. passim),
and to dazzle by metaphors, hypallagae, allegories, repetitions, apostrophes, and the like
(Suidas; Dionys. passim); by novel images, poetical circumlocutions, and
high-sounding expressions, and sometimes also by a strain of irony. (Symp. 2; de Lys. 3.) He lastly tried to charm his hearers by a
symmetrical arrangement of his periods. (Demetr. de Elocut. 15.) But as
these artifices, in the application of which he is said to have often shown real grandeur,
earnestness, and elegance (de Admir. vi Demosth. 4), were made use
of too profusely, and, for the purpose of giving undue prominence to poor thoughts, his
orations did not excite the feelings of his hearers (de Sublim.
3.12; Hermog. de Ideis, 1.6, 2.9; Dionys. passim),
and at all events could produce only a momentary impression. This was the case with his
oration addressed to the assembled Greeks at Olympia, exhorting them to union against their
common enemy (loci communes probably as rhetorical exercises, to show how subjects might
be looked at from opposite points of view. (
Respecting the genuineness of the two declamations which have come down to us under the name of Gorgias, viz.
The works of Gorgias did not even contain the elements of a scientific theory of oratory,
any more than his oral instructions; he confined himself to teaching his pupils a variety of
rhetorical artifices, and made them learn by heart certain formulas relative to them (