The Editio Princeps of the collected rhetorical works of Cicero was printed at Venice by Alexandrinus and Asulanus, fol. 1485, containing the De Oratore, the Orator, the Topica, the Partitiones Oratoriae, and the De Optimo Genere Oratorum, and was reprinted at Venice in 1488 and 1495, both in fol.The first complete edition, including, in addition to the above, the Brutus, the , and the , was published at Venice by Aldus in 1514, 4to., edited in part by Naugerius.Of modern editions the most notable are the following: that by Schütz, which contains the whole, Lips. 1804, 3 vols. 8vo.; the "Opera Rhetorica Minora," by Wetzel, Lignitz, 1807, containing all with the exceptions of the De Oratore, the Brutus, and the Orator; and the Orator, Brutus, Topica, De Optimo Genere Oratorum, with the notes of Beier and Orelli, Zurich, 1830, 8vo.

This appears to have been the earliest of the efforts of Cicero in prose composition. It was intended to exhibit in a compendious systematic form all that was most valuable and worthy of note in the works of the Greek rhetoricians. Aristotle had already performed this task in so far as his own predecessors were concerned; and hence his writings, together with those of his disciples and of the followers of Isocrates, would supply all the necessary materials for selection and combination. According to the original plan, this treatise was to have embraced the whole subject; but there is no reason to fix upon the exact number of four books as the extent contemplated, and it certainly never was completed. The author, after finishing the two which have descended to us, seems to have thrown them aside, and speaks of them at a later period perhaps too slightingly ( 1.2) as a crude and imperfect performance. After a short preface regarding the origin, rise, progress, use and abuse of eloquence, we find an enumeration and classification of the different branches of the subject. The whole art must be considered under five distinct heads:--1. Its general character and the position which it occupies among the sciences (genus.) 2. The duty which it is called upon to perform (officium.) 3. The end which it seeks to attain (finis.) 4. The subject matter of a speech (materia.) 5. The constituent elements of which a speech is made up (partes rhetoricae.) After remarking cursorily, with regard to the genus, that the art of rhetoric is a branch of civil knowledge (civilis scientiae), that its officium is, to use all the methods most suitable for persuasion by oratory, and its finis to achieve this persuasion, Cicero confines himself for the present to the materiaeZZZ and partes. Now the material subject-matter, or form of a speech, may belong to one of three classes, according to the nature of the audience. (Comp. 3.) 1. The genus demonstrativum (γένος ἐπιδανικόν), addressed to mere listeners who study the oratory as an exhibition of art. 2. The genus deliberativum (γένος συμβουλευτικόν) addressed to those who judge of the future as in legislative and political assemblies. 3. The genus judiciale (γένος δικανικόν), addressed to those who judge of the past as in courts of law. Again, the partes rhetoricae or constituent elements of a speech are five. 1. The invention of arguments (inventio). 2. The arrangement of these arguments (dispositio). 3. The diction in which these arguments are expressed (eloquutio). 4. The clear and distinct perception in the mind of the things and words which compose the arguments and the power of producing them at the fitting season (memoria). 5. The delivery, comprehending the modulation of the voice, and the action of the body (pronuntiatio). These points being premised, it is proposed to treat of inventio generally and independently, and then to apply the principles established to each of the three classes under which the materia may be ranged, according to the following method:

Every case which gives rise to debate or difference of opinion (controversia) involves a question, and this question is termed the constitution (constitutio) of the case. The constitution may be fourfold. 1. When the question is one of fact (controversia facti), it is a constitutio conjecturalis. 2. When both parties are agreed as to the fact, but differ as to the name by which the fact ought to be distinguished (controversia nominis), it is a constitutio definitiva. 3. When the question relates to the quality of the fact (generis controversia), it is a constitutio generalis. 4. When the question concerns the fitness or propriety of the fact (quum aut quem, aut quicum, aut quomodo, aut apud quos, aut quo jure, aut quo tempore agere oporteat quaeretur), it is a constitutio translativa. Again, the constitutio generalis admits of being divided into--a. The constitutio juridicialis, in which right and wrong, reward and punishment, are viewed in the abstract; and b. The constitutio negotialis, where they are considered in reference to existing laws and usages; and finally, the constitutio juridicialis is subdivided into a. The constitutio absoluta, in which the question of right or wrong is viewed with reference to the fact itself; and B. The constitutio assumptiva, in which the question of right and wrong is viewed not with reference to the fact itself, but to the external circumstances under which the fact took place. The constitutio assumptiva is itself fourfold --(1) concessio. when the accused confesses the deed with which he is charged, and does not justify it but seeks forgiveness, which may be done in two ways, (a) by purgatio, when the deed is admitted but moral guilt is denied in consequence of its having been done unwittingly (imprudentia), or by accident (casu), or unavoidably (necessitate), (B) by deprecatio when the misdeed is admitted to have been done, and to have been done wilfully, but notwithstanding forgiveness is sought--a very rare contingency; (2) remotio criminis, when the accused defends himself by casting the blame on anotner; (3) relatio criminis, when the deed is justified by previous provocation; (4) comparatio, when the deed is justified by pleading a praiseworthy motive.

The constitution of the case being determined, we must next examine whether the case be simple (simplex) or compound (conjuncta), that is, whether it involves a single question or several, and whether the reasonings do or do not depend upon some written document (in ratione, an in scripto sit controversia). We must then consider the exact point upon which the dispute turns (quaestio), the plea in justification (ratio), the debate which will arise from the reply to the plea of justification (judicatio), and the additional arguments by which the defendant seeks to confirm his plea of justification after it had been attacked by his opponent (firmamentum), which will convert the judicatio into a disceptatio (comp. 30), and so lead more directly to a decision.

These matters being duty weighed, the orator must proceed to arrange the different divisions of his speech (partes orationis), which are six in number.

1. The Exordium or introduction, which is divided into a. the Principium or opening, and b. the Insinuatio, of which the great object is to awaken the attention and secure the goodwill of the audience. 2. The Narratio or statement of the case. 3. The Partitio or explanation of the manner in which the speaker intends to handle the case, indicating at the same time those points on which both parties are agreed, and those on which they differ. 4. The Confirmatio or array of arguments by which the speaker supports his case. 5. The Reprehensio or confutation of the argmuents employed by the antagonist. 6. The Conclusio or peroration, consisting of a. the Enumeratio or brief impressive summary of the whole; b. the Indignatio, which seeks to enlist the passions of the audience, and, c. the Conquestio or appeal to their sympathies.

Each of these six divisions is discussed separately, and numerous rules and precepts are laid down for the guidance of the orator.

In the second book the fifth and sixth of the above divisions, the Confirmatio and Reprehensio are considered at large with direct reference to cases belonging to the Genus Judiciale, and to each of the four constitutions and their subdivisions, after which the two remaining classes, the Genus Deliberativum and the Genus Demonstrativum, are very briefly noticed, and the dissertation upon Rhetorical invention closes somewhat abruptly.

We have no means of deciding with certainty the exact time at which these books were composed and published. The expressions employed in the De Oratore (1.2), quoniam quae pueris aut adolescentulis nobis ex commentariolis nostris inchoata ac rudia exciderunt, vix hac aetate digna et hoc usu quem ex causis, quas diximus, tot tantisque consecuti sumus (comp. 1.6), point unquestionably to the early youth of Cicero, but without enabling us to fix upon any particular year. They formed, very probably, a portion of the fruits of that study continued incessantly during the period of tranquillity which prevailed in the city while Sulla was engaged in prosecuting the Mithridatic war (B. C. 87-84), and bear the appearance of notes taken down from the lectures of some instructor, arranged, simplified, and expanded by reference to the original sources. The work is repeatedly quoted by Quintilian, sometimes under the title sometimes as Libri Artis Rhetoricae, generally as (comp. Serv. ad Virg. Aen. 8.321, 9.481), and we might infer from a passage in Quintilian (2.14.5), that De Rhetorice was the appellation selected by the author; at all events, the addition rests upon no ancient authority.

This has been correctly described as a catechism of Rhetoric, according to the method of the middle Academy, by way of question and answer, drawn up by Cicero for the instruction of his son Marcus, in which the whole art is comprised under three heads. 1. The Vis Oratoris, in which the subject is treated with reference to the speaker;2. the Oratio, which treats of the speech;3. the Quaestio, which treats of the case.

The precepts with regard to the speaker are ranged under five heads. 1. Inventio2. Collocatio3. Eloquutio4. Actio5. Memoria

The precepts with regard to the speech are also under five heads. 1. Exordium2. Narratio3. Confirmtio4. Reprehensio5. Peroratio

The case may be a. Infinita, in which neither persons nor times are defined, and then it is called propositum or consultatio, or it may be b. Finita, in which the persons are defined, and then it is called causa; this in reality is included in the former.

The precepts with regard to the quaestio infinita or consulatio are ranged under 1. Cognitio, by which the existence, the nature, and the quality of the case are determined; 2. Actio, which discusses the means and manner in which any object may be obtained.

The precepts with regard to the quaestio finita or causa are ranged under three heads, according as the case belongs to 1. the Genus Demonstrativum; 2. the Genus Deliberativum; 3. the Genus Judiciale.

The different constitutiones are next passed under review, and the conversation concludes with an exhortation to the study of philosophy.

These partitiones, a term which corresponds to the Greek διαιρέσεις, may be considered as the most purely scientific of all the rhetorical works of Cicero, and form a useful companion to the treatise but from their strictly technical character the tract appears dry and uninteresting, and from the paucity of illustrations is not unfrequently somewhat obscure. From the circumstance that Cicero makes no mention of this work in his other writings, some critics have called in question its authenticity, but there seems to be no evidence either internal or external to justify such a suspicion, and it is repeatedly quoted by Quintilian without any expression of doubt. Another debate has arisen as to the period when it was composed. We are told at the commencement that it was drawn up during a period when the author was completely at leisure in consequence of having been at length enabled to quit Rome, and this expression has been generally believed to indicate the close of the year B. C. 46 or the beginning of B. C. 45, shortly before the death of Tullia and the departure of Marcus for Athens, when, as we know from his correspondence, he was devoting himself with the greatest diligence to literary pursuits. (Ad Fam. 7.28, 9.26.) Hand has, however, endeavoured to prove (Ersch and Grüber's Encyclopädie, art. Cicero), that we may with greater probability fix upon the year B. C. 49, when Cicero after his return from Cilicia suddenly withdrew from Rome about the middle of January (ad Att. 7.10), and having spent a considerable time at Formiae, and visited various parts of Campania, proceeded to Arpinum at the end of March, invested his son with the manly gown, and afterwards made him the companion of his flight. But this critic seems to have forgotten that Cicero never entered the city from the spring of B. C. 51 until late in the autumn of B. C. 47, and therefore could certainly never have employed the phrase "quoniam aliquando Roma exeundi potestas data est," and still less could he ever have talked of enjoying "summum otium" at an epoch perhaps the most painful and agitating in his whole life.

Cicero having been urged by his brother Quintus to compose a systematic work on the art of oratory, the dialogues which bear the above title were drawn up in compliance with this request. They were completed towards the end of B. C. 55 (ad Att. 4.13), about two years after the return of their author from banishment, and had occupied much of his time during a period in which he had in a great measure withdrawn from public life, and had sought consolation for his political degradation by an earnest devotion to literary pursuits. All his thoughts and exertions were thus directed in one channel, and consequently, as might be expected, the production before us is one of his most brilliant efforts, and will be found to be so accurately finished in its most minute parts, that it may be regarded as a master-piece of skill in all that relates to the graces of style and composition. The object in view, as explained by himself, was to furnish a treatise which should comprehend all that was valuable in the theories of Aristotle, Isocrates, and other ancient rhetoricians, and at the same time present their precepts in an agreeable and attractive form, diselmbarrassed of the formal stiffness and dry technicalities of the schools. (Ad Fam. 1.9, ad Att. 4.16.)

The conversations, which form the medium through which instruction is conveyed, are supposed to have taken place in B. C. 91, immediately before the breaking out of the Social war, at the moment when the city was violently agitated by the proposal of the tribune M. Livius Drusus, to grant to the senators the right of acting in common with the equites as judices on criminal trials. The measure was vehemently opposed by the consul Philippus, who was in consequence regarded as a traitor to his order, and supported by all the influence and talent of L. Licinius Crassus, the most celebrated orator of that epoch, who had filled the preceding year the office of censor. This venerable statesman is represented as having retired to his villa at Tusculum during the celebration of the Roman games, in order that he might collect his thoughts and brace up his energies for the grand struggle which was soon to decide the contest. He was accompanied to his retirement by two youths of high promise, C. Ameilius Cotta (consul B. C. 75) and P. Sulpicius Rufus, and there joined by his father-in-law and former colleague in the consulship (B. C. 95), Q. Mucius Scaevola, renowned for his profound knowledge of civil law, and by his friend and political ally, M. Antonius (consul B. C. 99), whose fame as a public speaker was little if at all inferior to that of Crassus himself. The three consular sages having spent the first day in reflections upon politics and the aspect of public affairs, unbend themselves on the second by the introduction of literary topics. The whole party being stretched at ease under the shadow of a spreading plane, the elders, at the earnest solicitation of Cotta and Sulpicius, commence a discourse upon oratory, which is renewed the following morning and brought to a close in the afternoon. At the end of the first dialogue, Scaevola, in order that strict dramatic propriety may be observed (see ad Att. 4.16), retires, and his place, in the two remaining colloquies, is supplied by Q. Lutatius Catulus, and his half-brother, C. Julius Caesar Strabo, both distinguished as public speakers, the former celebrated for the extreme purity of his diction, the latter for the pungency of his wit.

An animated debate first arises on the qualifications essential for pre-eminence in oratory. Crassus, who throughout must be regarded as expressing the sentiments of Cicero, after enlarging upon the importance, the dignity, and the universal utility of eloquence, proceeds to describe the deep learning, the varied accomplishments, and the theoretical skill which must enter into the combination which shall form a perfect orator, while Antonius, although he allows that universal knowledge, if attainable, would mightily increase the power of those who possessed it, is contented to pitch the standard much lower, and seeks to prove that the orator is more likely to be embarrassed .than benefited by aiming at what is beyond his reach, and that, by attempting to master the whole circle of the liberal arts, he will but waste the time that might be more profitably employed, since the natural gifts of quick talents, a good voice, and a pleasing delivery, when improved by practice, self-training, and experience, are in themselves amply sufficient to produce the result sought. This preliminary controversy, in which, however, both parties agree in reality, as to what is desirable, although they differ as to what is practicable, being terminated, Antonius and Crassus enter jointly upon the Τεχνολογία (ad Att. 4.16) of the subject, and expound the principles and rules upon which success in the rhetorical art depends and by the observance of which it may be achieved. The former discusses at large in the second book, the invention and arrangement of arguments, and winds up with a dissertation on memory, the continuous flow of his discourse being broken and relieved by an essay, placed in the mouth of Caesar, upon the nature and use of humour, a digression, both amusing in itself, and interesting generally, as evincing the miserable bad taste of the Romans in this department. In the third book, Crassus devotes himself to an exposition of the ornaments of rhetoric, comprising all the graces of diction, to which are added a few remarks upon delivery, that is, upon the voice, pronunciation, and action of the speaker.

The MSS. of the known up to the early part of the 15th century, were all imperfect. There were blanks extending in Bk. i. from 28.128 to 34.157, and from 43.193 to Bk. 2.59.19, although in the Erfurt MS. only as far as Bk. 2.3.13; in Bk. ii. from 12.50 to 14.60; and in Bk. iii. from 5.17 to 28.110. These gaps were first supplied by Gasparinus of Barziza, from a MS. found at Lodi, and hence called Codex Laudensis, 1419, which in addition to the the the and the contained the three books entire. This MS., which is now lost, was repeatedly copied, and its contents soon became known all over Italy; but it is uncertain whether the whole was transcribed, or merely those passages which were required to fill up existing deficiencies.

This work is in the form of a dialogue, the speakers being Cicero himself, Atticus, and M. Brutus; the scene a grass plot, in front of a colonnade, attached to the house of Cicero at Rome, with a statue of Plato close at hand. It contains a complete critical history of Roman eloquence, from the earliest epochs, commencing with L. Junius Brutus, Appius Claudius, M. Curius, and sundry sages of the olden time, whose fame rested upon obscure tradition alone, passing on to those with regard to whose talents more certain information could be obtained, such as Cornelius Cethegus and Cato, the censor, advancing gradually till it reached such men as Catulus, Licinius Crassus, and M. Antonius, whose glory was bright in the recollection of many yet alive, and ending with those whom Cicero himself had heard with admiration as a youth, and rivalled as a man, the greatest of whom was Hortensius, and with him the list closes, living orators being excluded. Prefixed, are some short, but graphic sketches, of the most renowned Grecian models; the whole discourse being interspersed with clever observations on the speculative principles of the art, and many important historical details connected with the public life and services of the individuals enumerated. Great taste and discrimination are displayed in pointing out the characteristic merits, and exposing the defects, of the various styles of composition reviewed in turn, and the work is most valuable as a contribution to the history of literature. But, from the desire to render it absolutely complete, and, at the same time, to confine it within moderate limits, the author is compelled to hurry from one individual to another, without dwelling upon any for a sufficient period to leave a distinct impression on the mind of the reader; and, while we complain of the space occupied by a mere catalogue of uninteresting names, by which we are wearied, we regret that our curiosity should have been excited, without being gratified, in regard to many of the shining lights which shed such a lustre over the last century of the commonwealth.

The Brutus was composed next in order, although at a long interval, after the at a period when Caesar was already master of the state, it was written before the the itself coming immediately before the a combination of circumstances which fixes it down to the year B. C. 46. (Brut. 1, 2, 5, 6, Orat. 7, 2.1.)

The Brutus was unknown until the discovery of the Codex Laudensis described above. Hence all the MSS. being confessedly derived from this source do not admit of being divided into families, although the text might probably be improved if the transcripts existing in various European libraries were more carefully examined and compared.

Cicero having been frequently requested by M. Brutus to explain his views with regard to what constituted a faultless orator, this term being understood to denote a public speaker in the senate or in the forum, but to exclude the eloquence displayed by philosophers in their discourses, and by poets and historians in their writings, endeavours in the present essay to perform the task imposed on him. We must not, therefore, expect to find here a series of precepts, the result of observation and induction, capable of being readily applied in practice, or a description of anything actually existing in nature, but rather a fancy picture, in which the artist represents an object of ideal beauty, such as would spring from the union of all the prominent characteristic excellences of the most gifted individuals, fused together and concentrated into one harmonious whole.

He first points out that perfection must consist in absolute propriety of expression, and that this could be obtained only by occasional judicious transitions from one style to another, by assuming, according to the nature of the subject, at one time a plain, familiar, unpretending tone; by rising at another into lofty, impassioned, and highly ornamented declamation; and by observing in general a graceful medium between the two extremes; by ascending, as the Greeks expressed it, from the ἰσχνόν to the ἀδρόν, and falling back from the ἀδρόν to the μέσον,--instead of adhering steadfastly, after the fashion of most great orators, to one particular form. He next passes on to combat an error very prevalent among his countrymen, who, admitting that Athenian eloquence was the purest model for imitation, imagined that its essence consisted in avoiding with scrupulous care all copious, flowing, decorated periods, and in expressing every idea in highly polished, terse, epigrammatic sentences--a system which, however interesting as an effort of intellect, must necessarily produce results which will fall dull and cold upon the ear of an ordinary listener, and, if carried out to its full extent, degenerate into offensive mannerism. After dwelling upon these dangers and insisting upon the folly of neglecting the practice of Aeschines and Demosthenes and setting up such a standard as Thucydides, Cicero proceeds to shew that the orator must direct his chief attention to three points, which in fact comprehend the soul of the art, the what, the where, and the how ; the matter of his speech, the arrangement of that matter, the expression and enunciation of that matter each of which is in turn examined and discussed. The perfect orator being defined to be one who clearly demonstrates to his hearers the truth of the position he maintains, delights them by the beauty and fitness of his language, and wins them over to his cause (" is, qui in foro, causisque civilibus, ita dicet, ut probet, ut delectet, ut flectat"), we are led to consider the means by which these ends are reached. The groundwork and foundation of the whole is true wisdom, but true wisdom can be gained only by the union of all the highest natural endowments with a knowledge of philosophy and all the chief departments of literature and science; and thus Cicero brings us round to the conclusion, which is in fact the pervading idea of this and the two preceding works, that he who would be a perfect orator must be a perfect man. What follows (from 100.40 to the end) is devoted to a dissertation on the harmonious arrangement of words and the importance of rhythmical cadence in prose composition--a curious topic, which attracted much attention in ancient times, as may be seen from the elaborately minute dulness of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, but possesses comparatively little interest for the modern reader.

The Orator was composed about the beginning of B. C. 45, having been undertaken immediately after the completion of the Cato. Cicero declares, that he was willing to stake his reputation for knowledge and taste in his own art upon the merits of this work: " Mihi quidem sic persuadeo, me quidquid habuerim judicii de dicendo in illum librum contulisse ;" and every one must be charmed by the faultless purity of the diction, the dexterity manifested in the choice of appropriate phraseology, and the sonorous flow with which the periods roll gracefully onwards. There is now and then perhaps a little difficulty in tracing the connexion of the different divisions; and while some of the most weighty themes are touched upon very slightly, disproportionate space is assigned to the remarks upon the music of prose; but this probably arose from the subject having been entirely passed over in the two preceding treatises. For it must be borne in mind that the the and the were intended to constitute a connected and continuous series, forming a complete system of the rhetorical art. In the first are expounded the principles and rules of oratory. and the qualifications natural and acquired requisite for success; in the second the importance of these qualifications, and the use and application of the principles and rules are illustrated by a critical examination of the leading merits and defects of the greatest public speakers; while in the third is delineated that ideal perfection to which the possession of all the requisite qualifications and a strict adherence to all the principles and rules would lead.

We have already noticed in the remarks on the Orator the opinion advocated by several of the most distinguished speakers of this epoch, such as Brutus and Calvus, that the essence of the true Attic style consisted in employing the smallest possible number of words, and concentrating the meaning of the speaker into subtle, terse, pointed sentences, which, however, from being totally devoid of all ornament and amplitude of expression, were for the most part stiff, lean, and dry, the very reverse of Cicero's style. In order to refute practically this prevalent delusion, Cicero resolved to render into Latin the two most perfect specimens of Grecian eloquence, the orations of Acschines and Demosthenes in the case of Ctesiphon. The translation itself has been lost; but a short preface, in which the origin and object of the undertaking is explained, is still extant, and bears the title given above,

C. Trebatius, the celebrated jurisconsult, having found himself unable to comprehend the Topics of Aristotle, which treat of the Invention of Arguments, and having failed in procuring any explanation from a celebrated rhetorician, whose aid he sought, had frequently applied to Cicero for information and assistance. Cicero's incessant occupations prevented him for a long time from attending to these solicitations; but when he was sailing towards Greece, the summer after Caesar's death, he was reminded of Trebatius by the sight of Velia, a city with which the lawyer was closely connected, and accordingly, while on board of the ship. drew up from recollection the work before us, and Jisspatched it to his friend from Rhegium on the 27th of July, B. C. 44.

We are here presented with an abstract of the original, expressed in plain, familiar terms, illustrated by examples derived chiefly from Roman law instead of from Greek philosophy, accompanied by a promise to expound orally, at a future period, any points which might still appear confused or obscure. We cannot, of course, expect to find in such a book any originality of matter; but when we consider the circumstances under which it was composed, and the nature of the subject itself, we cannot fail to admire the clear head and the wonderful memory which could produce at once a full and accurate representation of a hard, complicated, and technical disquisition on the theory of rhetoric.

All that we know regarding this work is comprised in a single sentence of Quintilian (2.1.11): " Communes loci, sive qui sunt in vitia directi, quales legimus a Cicerone composites; seu quibus quaestiones generaliter tractantur, quales sunt editi a Quinto quoque Hortensio." Orelli supposes, that the are here spoken of ; but this opinion is scarcely borne out by the expression in the preface to which he refers.

A general view of the whole art of Rhetoric, including a number of precepts and rules for the guidance of the student. Passages from this treatise are quoted by St. Jerome (ad v. Rufin. lib. i. p. 204, ed. Basil.), by Priscian, by Rufinus (de Comp. et Metr. Orat. pp. 315, 321 of the ed. Pith.), and by other ancient grammarians, who speak of it as the work of Cicero, and as such it was generally received by the most distinguished scholars of the fifteenth century, Leonardus Arretinus, Angelus Politianus, and Laurentius Valla. At a very early period, however, its authenticity was called in question by Raphael Rhegius and Angelus Decembrius, and the controversy has been renewed at intervals down to the present day. Almost all the best editors agree in pronouncing it spurious, but the utmost diversity of opinion has existed with regard to the real author. Regius propounded no less than three hypotheses, assigning it at one time to Q. Corniticius, who was quaestor B. C. 81, and an unsuccessful candidate for the consulship in B. C. 64; at another, to Virginius, a rhetorician contemporary with Nero; and lastly, to Timolaus, son of queen Zenobia, who had an elder brother Herennianus. Paulus and Aldus Manutius, Sigonius, Muretus, Barthius, and many of less note, all adopted the first supposition of Regius. G. J. Vossius began by deeiding in fiavour of the younger Q. Cornificius, the colleague of Cicero in the augurate (ad Fam. 12.17-30), but afterwards changed his mind and fixed upon Tullius Tiro; Julius Caesar Scaliger upon M. Gallio ; Nascimbaenius upon Laureas Tullius; while more recently Schütz has laboured hard to bring home the paternity to M. Antonius Gnipho, and Van Heusde to Aelius Stilo. The arguments which seem to prove that the piece in question is not the production of Cicero are briefly as follows: 1. It could not have been composed before the for Cicero there (1.2) speaks of his juvenile efforts in this department as rough and never brought to a conclusion,--a description which corresponds perfectly with the two books whereas the is entire and complete in all its parts; moreover, the author of the complains at the outset that he was so oppressed with family affairs and business, that he could scarcely find any leisure for his favourite pursuits--a statement totally inapplicable to the early career of Cicero. 2. It could not have deen written after the for not only does Cicero never make any allusion to such a performance among the numerous labours of his later years, but it would have been quite unworthy of his mature age, cultivated taste, and extensive experience : it is in reality in every way inferior to the that boyish essay which he treats so contemptuously. We shall not lay any stress here upon the names of Terentia and young Tullius which occur in bk. 1.100.12, since these words are manifest interpolations. 3. Quintilian repeatedly quotes from the and other acknowledged rhetorical pieces of Cicero, but never notices the 4. Marius Victorinus in his commentary on the makes no allusion to the existence of the it is little probable that he would have carefully discussed the imperfect manual, and altogether passed over that which was complete. 5. Servius refers three times (ad Virg. Aen. 8.321, 9.481, 614) to the " Rhetorica" and Cassiodorus ( pp. 339, 341, ed. Pith.) to the "Ars Rhetorica" of Cicero; but these citations are all from the and not one from the

The most embarrassing circumstance connected with these two works is the extraordinary resemblance which exists between them--a resemblance so strong that it is impossible to doubt that there is some bond of union. For although there are numerous and striking discrepancies, not only is the general arrangement the same, but in very many divisions the same precepts are conveyed in nearly if not exactly the same phraseology, and illustrated by the same examples. Any one who will compare 1.2, 2.20, 22, 23, 25, 27, with 1.7, 42, 45, 48, 49, 51, will at once be convinced that these coincidences cannot be accidental; but the single instance to be found 2.23, and 1.50 would alone be sufficient, for in both we find the same four lines extracted for the same purpose from the Trinummus, and Plautus censured for a fault of which he is not guilty, the force of his expression having been misunderstood by his critics. We cannot suppose that the author of the copied from the since the former embraces a much wider compass than the latter; still less can we believe that Cicero would be guilty of a shameless plagiarism, which must have been open to such easy detection. Both parties cannot have derived their matter from a common Greek original, for not only is it incredible that two persons translating independently of each other should have rendered so many phrases in words almost identical, but the illustrations from Roman writers common to both at once destroy such an explanation. Only two solutions of the enigma suggest themselves. Either we have in the and the the notes taken down by two pupils from the lectures of the same Latin rhetorician, which were drawn out at full length by the one, and thrown aside in an unfinished state by the other after some alterations and corrections had been introduced; or we have in the the original lectures, published subsequently by the professor himself. This last idea is certainly at variance with the tone assumed in the preliminary remarks, but may receive some support from the claim put forth (1.9) to originality in certain divisions of insinuationes, which are adopted without observation in the Whatever conclusion we may adopt upon this head, it is clear that we possess no evidence to determine the real author. The case made out in favour of Cornificius (we cannot tell which Cornificius) is at first sight plausible. Quintilian (3.1.21, comp. 9.3.89) frequently mentions a certain Cornificius as a writer upon rhetoric, and in one place especially (9.3.98) enumerates his classification of figures, which corresponds exactly with the (4.15, &c.); and a second point of agreement has been detected in a citation by Julius Rufinianus. (De Fig. Sent. p. 29.) But, on the other hand, many things are ascribed by Quintilian to Cornificius which nowhere occur in the and, still more fatal, we perceive, upon examining the words referred to above (9.3.93), that the remarks of Cornificius on figures must have been taken from a separate and distinct tract confined to that subject. We can accord to Schütz the merit of having demonstrated that M. Antonius Gnipho may be the compiler, and that there is no testimony, external or internal, to render this position untenable; but we cannot go further. There are several historical allusions dispersed up and down reaching from the consulship of L. Cassius Longinus, B. C. 107, to the death of Sulpicius in B. C. 88; and if Burmann and others are correct in believing that the second consulship of Sulla is distinctly indicated (4.54, 68), the fact will be established, that these books were not published before B. C. 80.

The materials for arriving at a correct judgment with regard to the merits of this controversy, will be found in the preface of the younger Burmann, to his edition of the and printed at Leyden in 1761, 8vo., and republished with additional notes by Lindemann, Leipzig, 1828, 8vo.; in the prooemium of Schütz to his edition of the rhetorical works of Cicero, Leipzig, 1804, 3 vols. 8vo., enlarged and corrected in his edition of the whole works of Cicero, Leipzig, 1814; and in the disquisition of J. van Heusde, De Aelio Stilone, Utrecht, 1839; to which we may add, as one of the earliest authorities, Utrum Ars Rhetorica ad Herennium Ciceroni falso inscribatur, appended to the Problemata in Quintil. Instit. Orat. by Raphael Regius, published at Venice in 1492.

This work on the best form of government and the duty of the citizen, was one of the earliest of Cicero's philosophical treatises, drawn up at a period when, from his intimacy with Pompey, Caesar and Crassus being both at a distance, he fancied, or at least wished to persuade others, that he was actually grasping the helm of the Roman commonwealth (de Div. 2.1). Deeply impressed with the arduous nature of his task, he changed again and again not only various minute details but the whole general plan, and when at length completed, it was received with the greatest favour by his contemporaries, and is referred to by himself repeatedly with evident satisfaction and pride. It was commenced in the spring of B. C. 54 (ad Att. 4.14, comp. 16), and occupied much of his attention during the summer months of that year, while he was residing at his villas in the vicinity of Cumae and of Pompeii. (Ad Q. Fr. 2.14.) It was in the first instance divided into two books (ad Q. Fr. 3.5), then expanded into nine (ad Q. Fr. l.c.), and finally reduced to six (de Leg. 1.6, 2.10, de Div. 2.1). The form selected was that of Dialogue, in imitation of Plato, whom he kept constantly in view. The epoch at which the several conferences, extending over a space of three days, were supposed to have been held, was the Latinae feriae, in the consulship of C. Sempronius Tuditanus and M.' Aquillius, B. C. 129; the dramatis personae consisted of the younger Africanus, in whose suburban gardens the scene is laid, and to whom the principal part is assigned; his bosom friend C. Laelius the Wise; L. Furius Philus, consul B. C. 136, celebrated in the annals of the Numantine war, and bearing the reputation of an eloquent and cultivated speaker ( 28); M.' Manilius, consul B. C. 149, under whom Scipio served as military tribune at the outbreak of the third Punic war, probably the same person as Manilius the famous jurisconsult; Sp. Mummius, the brother of him who sacked Corinth, a man of moderate acquirements, addicted to the discipline of the Porch; Q. Aelius Tubero, son of Aemilia, sister of Africanus, a prominent opponent of the Gracchi, well skilled in law and logic, but no orator; P. Rutilius Rufus, consul B. C. 105, the most worthy citizen, according to Velleius, not merely of his own day, but of all time, who having been condemned in a criminal trial (B. C. 92), although innocent, by a conspiracy among the equites, retired to Smyrna, where he passed the remainder of his life in honourable exile; Q. Mucius Scaevola, the augur, consul B. C. 117, the first preceptor of Cicero in jurisprudence; and lastly, C. Fannius, the historian, who was absent, however, on the second day of the conference, as we learn from the remarks of his father-in-law Laelius, and of Scaevola, in the (4, 7). In order to give an air of probability to the action of the piece, Rutilius is supposed to have been visited at Smyrna by Cicero during his Asiatic tour, and on that occasion to have spent some days in recounting the particulars of this memorable conversation, in which he had taken a part, to his young friend who afterwards dedicated the De Republica to the person who was his travelling companion on this occasion. It is hard to discover who this may have been, but historical considerations go far to prove that either Q. Cicero or Atticus was the individual in question. (De Rep. 1.8, 22; Mai, Praef. § iv.) The precise date at which the De Republica was given to the world is unknown; it could scarcely have been before the end of B. C. 54, for the work was still in an unfinished state at the end of September in that year (ad Att. 4.16), and during the month of October scarcely a day passed in which the author was not called upon to plead for some client (ad Q. Fr. 3.3); on the other hand, it appears from an expression in the correspondence of Caelius with Cicero, while the latter was in Cilicia (ad Fam. 8.1), that the " politici libri" were in general circulation in the early part of B. C. 51, while the language used is such as would scarcely have been employed except with reference to a new publication.

The greater number of the above particulars are gleaned from incidental notices dispersed over the writings of Cicero. The dialogues themselves, although known to have been in existence during the tenth century, and perhaps considerably later, had ever since the revival of literature eluded the most earnest search, and were believed to have been irrecoverably lost with the exception of the episode of the Somnium Scipionis, extracted entire from the sixth book by Macrobius, and sundry fragments quoted by grammarians and ecclesiastics, especially by Lactantius and St. Augustin. But in the year 1822, Angelo Mai detected among the Palimpsests in the Vatican a portion of the long sought-for treasure, which had been partially obliterated to make way for a commentary of St. Augustin on the Psalms. A full history of this volume, which seems to have been brought from the monastery of Bobio during the pontificate of Paulus V., about the beginning of the 7th century, is contained in the first edition, printed at Rome in 1822, and will be found in most subsequent editions. Although what has been thus unexpectedly restored to light is in itself most valuable, yet, considered as a whole, the work presents a sadly deformed and mutilated aspect. These imperfections arise from various causes. In the first place, the commentary of Augustin reaches from the 119th to the 140th psalm, but the remainder, down to the 150th psalm, written, as may be fairly inferred, over sheets of the same MS., has disappeared, and gaps occur in what is left to the extent of 64 pages, leaving exactly 302 pages entire in double columns, each consisting of fifteen lines. In the second place, it must be remembered that to prepare an ancient MS. for the reception of a new writing, it must have been taken to pieces in order to wash or scrape every page separately, and that, no attention being paid to the arrangement of these disjecta membra, they would, when rebound, be shuffled together in utter disorder, and whole leaves would be frequently rejected altogether, either from being decayed or from some failure in the cleaning process. Accordingly, in the palimpsest in question the different parts of the original were in the utmost confusion, and great care was required not only in deciphering the faint characters, but in restoring the proper sequence of the sheets. Altogether, after a minute calculation, we may estimate that by the palimpsest we have regained about one-fourth of the whole, and if the fragments collected from other sources be added, they will increase the proportion to one-third. The MS. is written in very large well-formed capitals, and from the splendour of its appearance those best skilled in palaeography have pronounced it to be the oldest MS. of a classic in existence, some being disposed to carry it back as far as the second or third century, the superinduced MS. being probably earlier than the tenth century. In the first book, the first 33 pages are wanting, and there are fourteen smaller blanks scattered up and down, amounting to 38 pages more. A few words are wanting at the beginning of the second book, which runs on with occasional blanks, amounting in all to 50 pages, until we approach the close, which is very defective. The third book is a mere collection of disjointed scraps; of the fourth the MS. contains but a few lines, the same is the case with the fifth, and the sixth is totally wanting.

The object of the work was to determine the best form of government, to define the duties of all the members of the body politic, and to investigate those principles of justice and morality which must form the basis of every system under which a nation can expect to enjoy permanent prosperity and happiness. We cannot doubt that Cicero was stimulated to this undertaking by perceiving the destruction which threatened the liberties of his country; and, in the vain hope of awakening those around him to some sense of their danger, he resolved to place before their eyes a lively representation of that constitution by which their forefathers had become masters of the world.

The materials of which this production was formed appear, for we can speak with little certainty of the last four books, to have been distributed in the following manner:--

The greater part of the prologue to the first book is lost, but we gather that it asserted the superiority of an active over a purely contemplative career. After a digression on the uncertainty and worthlessness of physical pursuits, the real business of the piece is opened, the meaning of the word republic is defined, and the three chief forms of government, the monarchical, the aristocratical, and the democratical, are analyzed and compared, Scipio awarding the preference to the first, although, since all in their simple shape are open to corruption and degeneracy, and contain within themselves the seeds of dissolution, the ideal of a perfect constitution would be a compound of all these three elements mixed in due proportions--a combination to which the Roman constitution at one time closely approximated.

The subject being pursued in the second book leads to a history of the origin and progress of the Roman state; and, passing from the particular to the general, the remainder of the book is occupied by an examination of the great moral obligations which serve as the foundation of all political union.

The third book, as we glean from Lactantius and St. Augustin, contained a protracted discussion on the famous paradox of Carneades, that justice was a visionary delusion.

The fourth book entered upon the duties of citizens in public and private life, and enlarged upon general education and moral training.

In the prologue to the fifth nook, of which we know less than of any of the preceding, Cicero indulged in lamentations on the general depravity of morals which were becoming rapidly more corrupt. The main topic in what followed was the administration of laws, including a review of the practice of the Roman courts, beginning with the paternal jurisdiction of the kings, who were the sole judges in the infancy of the city.

We can hardly hazard a conjecture on the contents of the sixth book, with the exception of the well-known Somnium Scipionis, in which Scipio relates that he saw in a dream, when, in early youth, he visited Masinissa, in Africa, the form of the first Africanus, which dimly revealed to him his future destiny, and urged him to press steadily forward in the path of virtue and of true renown, by announcing the reward prepared in a future state for those who have served their country in this life with good faith.

The authorities chiefly consulted by Cicero, in composing the De Republica, are concisely enumerated in the first chapter of the second book "Sex de Republica libros scripsimus-- Magnus locus philosophiaeque proprius, a Platone, Aristotele, Theophrasto totaque Peripateticorum familia tractus uberrime." To these we must add Polybius, from whom many of the most important opinions are directly derived (e. g. comp. Plb. 6.3, 6, 7).

Three dialogues, in a somewhat mutilated condition, on the nature, the origin, and the perfection of laws. These have given rise to a series of controversies respecting the real author of the work, the time at which it was written, its extent when entire, its proper title, the date of publication, the existence of a prologue, or preface, the sources from which the author derived his materials, and the design which he proposed to accomplish. On each of these points it is necessary to say a few words.

1. The opinion that Cicero was not the author, rests solely upon the fact that, contrary to his usual practice in such matters, he nowhere makes mention of these books; no notice of them is taken in the catalogue of his philosophical writings, inserted in the (2.1), nor in any part of his correspondence with Atticus, which generally contains some account of the literary labours in which he was from time to time engaged, nor in any of those passages where a reference might very naturally have been expected (e. g. 4.1, 5.19), while the expressions which have been adduced as containing indirect allusions, will be found upon examination to be so indistinct, or to have been so unfairly interpreted, that they throw no light whatever on the question. (e. g. 1.42, ad All. 14.17.) On the other hand, " M. Tullius . . . in libro de legibus primo," and "Cicero in quinto de legibus," are the words with which Lactantius (De Opif. Dei, i.) and Macrobius (6.4) introduce quotations, and all the best scholars agree in pronouncing that not only is there no internal evidence against the authenticity of the treatise, but that the diction, style, and matter, are in every respect worthy of Cicero, presenting no trace of a late or interior hand, of interpolation, or of forgery. Even if we do not feel quite certain that the sentence in Quintilian (12.3), " M. Tullius non modo inter agendum numquam est destitutus scientia juris, sed etiam componere aliquat de eo coeperat," was intended to indicate the work before us, yet the word coeperat may be allowed at least to suggest a solution of the difficulty. Taking into account the actual state of these dialogues as they have descended to us, remarking the circumstance, which becomes palpable upon close examination, that some portions are complete, full, and highly polished, while others are imperfect, meagre, and rough, we are led to the conclusion, that the plan was traced out and partially executed; that, while the undertaking was advancing, some serious interruption occurred, possibly the journey to Cilicia ; that being thus thrown aside for a time, the natural disinclination always felt by Cicero to resume a train of thought once broken off Compp. de Leg. 1.3) combined with a conviction that the disorders of his country were now beyond the aid of philosophic remedies, prevented him from ever following out his original project, and giving the last touches to the unfinished sketch. This supposition will account in a satisfactory manner for the silence observed regarding it in the the and elsewhere; and if it was in progress, as we shall see is very probable, towards the close of B. C. 52, we can be at no loss to explain why it makes no figure in the epistles to Atticus, for no letters between the friends are extant for that year, in consequence, perhaps, of both being together at Rome. Chapman, in his Chronological Dissertation, avoids the objection altogether by supposing, that the was not written until after the but from what is said below, it will appear that this hypothesis is probably erroneous, and, according to the view we have given, it is certainly unnecessary.

2. Since we find in the work allusions to the elevation of Cicero to the augurate (2.12, 3.19), an event which did not take place until the vacancy caused by the death of Crassus (B. C. 53) was known at Rome, and also to the death of Clodius (2.17, B. C. 52), and since Cato and Pompey are both named as alive (3.18, 1.3, 3.9), it is manifest that the action of the drama belongs to some epoch between the beginning of the year, B. C. 52, and the battle of Pharsalia, B. C. 48; but on the other hand this evidence will only enable us to deeide that the drama was composed after the 18th of January, B. C. 52, the day when Clodius perished, without defining any second limit before which it must have been composed. When, however, we remark the evident bitterness of spirit displayed towards Clodius and his friends, together with the suppressed, but not concealed, dissatisfaction, with the conduct of Pompey (2.16, 41, 3.9, 21), we are led to suppose that these paragraphs were penned under the influence of feelings recently excited, such as might have been roused by the proceedings which distinguished the trial of Milo. We are inclined, therefore, to think that the date of the action of the drama, and the date of composition, are nearly identical, and that both may be assigned to the middle or end of B. C. 52.

3. With regard to the number of books at one time in existence, we are certain that there were more than three, for Macrobius (l.c.) quotes the but how many there may have been is purely a matter of conjecture. Fabricius, Hülsemann, and Wagner, decide that there were just five; Goerenz argues very ingeniously that there must have been six; Davis fixes that there were eight.

4. The title rests on the authority of nearly all the MSS. One alone exhibits which doubtless arose from a desire to include the supposed contents of the later books. (See de Leg. 3.5 fin.; Gel. 1.22.)

5. If we are correct in our position, that Cicero never finished his work, it follows that it was not published during his life, and, therefore, remained unknown to his contemporaries.

6. As to the existence of a prologue, we should naturally have imagined that this was a question of fact, affording no scope for reasoning. Nevertheless the point also has been keenly debated. Turnebus, in one commentary, considers that the first few chapters constitute a regular introduction, but he afterwards changed his mind, and, startled by the abruptness with which the conversation opens, maintained that the exordium had been lost. Goerenz and Moser, the most judicious editors, adopt the first conclusion of Turnebus.

7. In all that relates to external form and decoration Plato is evidently the model, and the imitation throughout is most close and accurate. But the resemblance extends no farther than the surface: the definitions, the propositions, the arguments, and the whole substance, except what is immediately connected with Roman law, can be traced to the labours of the Stoics, especially to the φυσίκαι θέσεις, the περὶ καλοῦ, the περὶ δικαίοσυνης, and above all the περὶ νόμου of Chrysippus; for the few fragments which have been preserved of these tracts are still sufficient to shew that not only did Cicero draw his materials from their stores, but in some instances did little more than translate their words. Even in the passages on magistrates the ideas of Plato, Aristotle, and Theophrastus are presented with the modifications introduced by Dion (Diogenes ?) and Panaetius. (De Leg. 3.6.)

8. The general plan of the work is distinctly traced in one of the opening chapters (1.5, 17). It was intended to comprehend an exposition of the nature of justice and its connexion with the nature of man, an examination of the laws by which states ought to be governed, and a review of the different systems of legislation which had been adopted by different nations.

Accordingly, in the first book we have an investigation into the sources of justice and virtue. It is laid down (1), That the Gods are the ultimate source of justice; (2) That men, being bound together by a community of faculties, feelings, and desires, are led to cultivate social union--and hence justice, without which social union could not exist. Thus human nature is a second source of justice. But since human nature is intimately connected with God by reason and virtue, it follows that God and the moral nature of man are the joint sources of justice, law being the practical exposition of its principles. Much more stress is, however, laid upon the second of these two sources than upon the first, which is quickly dismissed and kept out of sight.

In the second book the author explains his views of a Model Code, illustrated by constant references to the ancient institutions of Rome. Attention is first called to the laws which relate to religion and sacred observances, which are considered under the different heads of divine worship in general, including the solemnities to be observed in the performance of ordinances, and the classification of the Gods according to the degrees of homage to which they are severally entitled; the celebration of festivals ; the duties of the various orders of priests ; the exhibition of public games; the maintenance of ancient rites; the punishment of perjury and impurity; the consecration of holy places and things; and the respect to be paid to the spirits of the departed.

The third book treated of Magistrates, commencing with a short exposition of the nature and importance of their functions as interpreters and enforcers of the laws. This is followed by a dissertation on the expediency of having one magistrate in a state to whom all the rest shall be subordinate, which leads to certain reflections on the authority of the consuls, as controlled bythe tribunes. Here, however, there is a great blank, the part which is lost having contained, it would appear, an inquiry into the functions of all the chief officers of the Roman republic. What remains consists of three discussions, one on the power exercised by tribunes of the plebeians, a second on the propriety of supplying the vacancies in the senate from the number of those who had held certain appointments, and, thirdly, on the advantages and drawbacks of voting by ballot.

The scene of these dialogues is laid in the villa of Cicero, in the neighbourhood of his native Arpinum, near the point where the Fibrenus joins the Liris.

A. Gellius quotes a sentence from a work of Cicero which he says bore the above title. The subject of civil law was also discussed in one of the last books but the words of Gellius can apply only to an independent treatise. See Orelli's Cicero vol. iv. pt. ii. p. 478. (Gel. 1.22; Quint. Inst. 12.3.10; Macrob. 6.4; Cic. de Leg. 3.20.)

Cicero, in a letter to Atticus, (12.40,) written in June, B. C. 45, tells his friend, that he had made several attempts to compose an address to Caesar, in imitation of those of Aristotle and Theopompus to Alexander, but had hitherto failed (Συμβουλευτικόν saepe conor : nihil reperio). A few days later, however, it appears to have been finished (ad Att. 13.26), and was soon after sent to Atticus (ad Att. 12.49), but never forwarded to the dictator; for, having been previously submitted to his friends for their approbation, they made so many objections, and suggested so many alterations, that Cicero threw it aside in disgust. (Ad Att. 12.51, 52, 13.1, 27, 28, 31.)

A treatise on moral obligations, viewed not so much with reference to a metaphysical investigation of the basis on which they rest, as to the practical business of the world and the intercourse of social and political life. It was composed and published late in the year B. C. 44, certainly after the end of August (iii. sub fin.), and is addressed to young Marcus, at that time residing at Athens under the care of Cratippus the Peripatetic. This being a work professedly intended for the purposes of instruction, Cicero does not dwell upon the conflicting doctrines of rival sects, but endeavours rather to inculcate directly those views which he regarded as the most correct; and, rejecting the form of dialogue, enunciates the different precepts with the authority of a teacher addressing his pupil. The discipline of the Stoics is principally followed. In the first two books, the περὶ καθηκοντός of Panaetius served as a guide, and not a little was borrowed from Diogenes of Babylon, Antipater of Tarsus, Hecato, Posidonius, Antipater of Tyre, and others enumerated in the commentary of Beier and the tract of Lynden on Panaetius. Notwithstanding the express declaration of Cicero to the contrary, we cannot, from internal evidence, avoid the conclusion, that the Greek authorities have in not a few passages been translated verbatim, and translated not very happily, for the unyielding character of the Latin language rendered it impossible to express accurately those nice gradations of thought and delicate distinctions which can be conveyed with so much clearness and precision by the copious vocabulary and graceful flexibility of the sister tongue. (See the essay of Garve named at the end of the article.) The third book, which is occupied with questions in casuistry, although it lays claim to greater originality than those which precede it, was certainly formed upon the model of the περὶ καθηκοντός of the Stoic Hecato. But while the skeleton of the whole work is unquestionably of foreign origin, the examples and illustrations are taken almost exclusively from Roman history and Roman literature, and are for the most part selected with great judgment and clothed in the most felicitous diction.

In the first book, after a few preliminary remarks, we find a threefold division of the subject. When called upon to perform any action we must inquire, 1. Whether it is honestum, that is, good in itself, absolutely and abstractedly good; 2. Whether it is utile, that is, good when considered with reference to external objects; 3. What course we must pursue when the honestum and the utile are at variance. Moreover, the honestum and the utile each admit of degrees which also fall to be examined in order that we may make choice of the highest. The general plan being thus sketched, it is followed out by a discussion of the four constituent elements into which the honestum may be resolved: a. Sapientia, the power of discerning truth; b. Justilia et Beneficentia, which consist in studying the welfare of those around us, in rendering to every one his own, and in preserving contracts inviolate; c. Fortitudo, greatness and strength of mind; d. Temperantia, the faculty of doing and saying everything in a becoming manner, in the proper place, and to the proper extent. Each of these is explained at length, and the book closes with a debate on the degrees of the honestum, that is, the method of deciding, when each of two lines of conduct is honestum, which is to be preferred as superior (honesinus) to the other.

The second book is devoted to the utile, and considers how we may best conciliate the favour of our fellow-men, apply it to our own advancement, and thus arrive at wealth and public distinction, enlarging peculiarly on the most pure and judicious mode of displaying liberality, whether by pecuniary gifts or by aid of any other description. This is succeeded by a short notice of two utilitates passed over by Panaetius-the care of the health and the care of the purse, after which a few words are added on the comparison of things expedient with each other.

In the third book it is demonstrated that there never can be any real collision between the honestum and the utile ; but that when an action is viewed through a proper medium the honestum will invariably be found to be inseparable from the utile and the utile from the honestum, a proposition which had been briefly enunciated at the beginning of book second, but is here fully developed and largely illustrated. A number of difficult cases are then stated, which serve as exercises in the application of the rules laid down, among which a prominent place is assigned to the story of Regulus.

This work, if it ever existed, which is far from being certain, must have been intended as a sort of supplement to the just as Aristotle added a tract, περὶ ἀρετῶν., to his Ethics. (Hieron. in Zachar. Prophet. Comment. 1.2; Charisius, ii. p. 186.)

This little tract, drawn up at the end of B. C. 45 or the commencement of B. C. 44, for the purpose of pointing out how the burden of old age may be most easily supported, is addressed to Atticus, who was now in his sixty-eighth year, while Cicero himself was in his sixty-second or sixty-third. It is first mentioned in a letter written from Puteoli on the 11th of May, B. C. 44 (ad Att. 14.21, comp. 17.11), and is there spoken of as already in the hands of his friend. In the short introductory dialogue, Scipio Aemilianus and Laelius are supposed to have paid a visit during the consulship of T. Quinctius Flamininus and M.' Acilius Balbus (B. C. 150; see c. 5 and 10) to Cato the censor, at that time 84 years old. Beholding with admiration the activity of body and cheerfulness of mind which he displayed, they request him to point out by what means the weight of increasing years may be most easily borne. Cato willingly complies, and commences a dissertation in which he seeks to demonstrate how unreasonable are the complaints usually urged regarding the miseries which attend the close of a protracted life. The four principal objections are stated and refuted in regular succession. It is held that old age is wretched, 1. Because it incapacitates men for active business; 2. Because it renders the body feeble; 3. Because it deprives them of the enjoyment of almost all pleasures ; 4. Because it heralds the near approach of death. The first three are met by producing examples of many illustrious personages in whom old age was not attended by any of these evils, by arguing that such privations are not real but imaginary misfortunes, and that if the relish for some pleasures is lost, other delights of a more desirable and substantial character are substituted. The fourth objection is encountered still more boldly, by an eloquent declaration that the chief happiness of old age in the eyes of the philosopher arises from the conviction, that it indicates the near approach of death, that is, the near approach of the period when the soul shall be released from its debasing connexion with the body, and enter unfettered upon the paths of immortality.

This piece has always been deservedly esteemed as one of the most graceful moral essays bequeathed to us by antiquity. The purity of the language, the liveliness of the illustrations, the dignity of the sentiments, and the tact with which the character of the strong-minded but self-satisfied and garrulous old man is maintained, have excited universal applause. But however pleasing the picture here presented to us, every one must perceive that it is a fancy sketch, not the faithful copy of a scene from nature. In fact the whole treatise is a tissue of special pleading on a question which is discussed in the same tone of extravagance on the opposite side by Juvenal in his tenth satire. The logic also is bad, for in several instances general propositions are attacked by a few specious particular cases which are mere exceptions to the rule. No one can doubt the truth of the assertions, that old age does incapacitate us for active business, that it does render the body feeble, and that it does blunt the keenness of our senses; but while it is a perfectly fair style of argument to maintain that these are imaginary and not real ills, it is utterly absurd to deny their existence, because history affords a few instances of favoured individuals who have been exempted from their influence.

Cicero appears to have been indebted for the idea, if not for the plan, of this work to Aristo of Chios, a Stoic philosopher (100.1); much has been translated almost literally from the Republic of Plato (see cc. 2, 3, 14), and more freely from the and of Xenophon. The passage with regard to the immortality of the soul is derived from the Timaeus, the Phaedon, the Phaedrus, and the Menon (see Kühner, p. 116), and some editors have traced the observations upon the diseases of young men (100.19) to Hippocrates. It must be remarked, that although Cato was a rigid follower of the Porch, the doctrines here propounded have little of the austerity of that sect, but savour more of the gentle and easy discipline of the Peripatetics. (Kühner, 1. c.)

The five earliest editions of the were all printed at Cologne, the first three by Ulric Zell, the fourth by Winter de Homborch, the fifth by Arnold Therhoernen, not one of which bears a date, but some of them are certainly older than the edition of the collected philosophical works printed at Rome, in 2 vols. fol., by Sweynheym and Pannartz, which contains the [See above, p. 719b.] The best modern editions are those of Gernhard, which include the Paradoxa also, Leipzig, 8vo., 1819, and of Otto, Leipzig, 1830.

This dialogue was written after the preceding, to which it may be considered as forming a companion. Just as the dissertation upon old age was placed in the mouth of Cato because he had been distinguished for energy of mind and body preserved entire to the very close of a long life, so the steadfast attachment which existed between Scipio and Laelius pointed out the latter as a person peculiarly fitted to enlarge upon the advantages of friendship and the mode in which it might best be cultivated. To no one could Cicero dedicate such a treatise with more propriety than to Atticus, the only individual among his contemporaries to whom he gave his whole heart.

The imaginary conversation is supposed to have taken place between Laelius and his two sons-in-law, C. Fannius and Q. Mucius Scaevola, a few days after the death of Africanus (B. C. 129), and to have been repeated, in after times, by Scaevola to Cicero. Laelius begins by a panegyric on his friend. Then, at the request of the young men, he explains his own sentiments with regard to the origin, nature, limits, and value of friendship; traces its connexion with the higher moral virtues, and lays down the rules which ought to be observed in order to render it permanent and mutually advantageous. The most pleasing feature in this essay is the simple sincerity with which it is impressed. The author casts aside the affectation of learning, and the reader feels convinced throughout that he is speaking from his heart. In giving full expression to the most amiable feelings, his experience, knowledge of human nature, and sound sense, enabled him to avoid all fantastic exaggeration, and, without sacrificing his dignified tone, or pitching his standard too low, he brings down the subject to the level of ordinary comprehension, and sets before us a model which all may imitate.

The exordium is taken from the Theaetetus, and in the 8th chapter we detect a correspondence with a passage in the Lysis of Plato; the Ethics of Aristotle, and the Memorabilia of Socrates by Xenophon afforded some suggestions; a strong resemblance can be traced in the fragments of Theophrastus περὶ φιλίας, and some hints are supposed to have been taken from Chrysippus περὶ φιλίας and περὶ τοῦ δικάζειν (Kühner, p. 118.)

Cicero completed a work under the above title, in two books dedicated to Atticus, on the 4th of July, B. C. 44. A few words only having been preserved, we have no means of determining the manner or tone in which the subject was handled. Petrarch was in possession of a MS. of the De Gloria, which afterwards passed into the hands of Bernardo Giustiniani, a Venetian, and then disappeared. Paulus Manutius and Jovius circulated a story that it had been destroyed by Petrus Alcyonius, who had stolen numerous passages and inserted them in his own treatise De Exilio; but this calumny has been refuted by Tiraboschi in his history of Italian literature. (See Orelli's Cicero, vol. iv. pt. ii. p. 487: Cic. de Of. 2.9, ad Att. 15.27, 16.2.)

This treatise was written B. 100.45, soon after the death of his beloved daughter, Tullia, when seeking distraction and relief in literary pursuits. We learn from Pliny (praef. H.N.), that the work of Crantor the Academician was closely followed. A few inconsiderable fragments have been preserved chiefly by Lactantius, and will be found in Orelli's Cicero, vol. iv. pt. ii. p. 489. The tract published at Venice in 1583 under the title is a notorious forgery, executed, as is generally believed, by Sigonius or Vianellus. (Cic. Att. 12.20, 23, 3.28, 31; Augustin, de Civ. Dei, 19.4; Hieron. Epitaph. Nepot.)

The history of this work before it finally quitted the hands of its author is exceedingly curious and somewhat obscure, but must be clearly understood before we can explain the relative position of those portions of it which have been transmitted to modern times. By comparing carefully a series of letters written to Atticus in the course of B. C. 45 (ad Att. 13.32, 12-14, 16, 18, 19, 21-23, 25, 35, 44), we find that Cicero had drawn up a treatise upon the Academic Philosophy in the form of a dialogue between Catulus, Lucullus, and Hortensius, and that it was comprised in two books, the first bearing the name of Catulus, the second that of Lucullus. A copy was sent to Atticus, and soon after it had reached him, two new introductions were composed, the one in praise of Catulus, the other in praise of Lucullus. Scarcely had this been done, when Cicero, from a conviction that Catulus, Lucullus, and Hortensius, although men of highly cultivated minds, and well acquainted with general literature, were known to have been little conversant with the subtle arguments of abstruse philosophy, determined to withdraw them altogether, and accordingly substituted Cato and Brutus in their place. (Ad. Att. 13.16.) Immediately after this change had been introduced, he received a communication from Atticus representing that Varro was much offended by being passed over in the discussion of topics in which he was deeply versed. Thereupon, Cicero, catching eagerly at the idea thus suggested, resolved to recast the whole piece, and quickly produced, under the old title, a new and highly improved edition, divided into four books instead of two, dedicating the whole to Varro, to whom was assigned the task of defending the tenets of Antiochus of Ascalon, while the author himself undertook to support the views of Philo, Atticus also taking a share in the conversation. But although these alterations were effected with great rapidity, the copy originally sent to Atticus had in the meantime been repeatedly transcribed: hence both editions passed into circulation, and a part of each has been preserved. One section, containing 12 chapters, is a short fragment of the first book of the second or Varronian edition; the other, containing 49 chapters, is the entire second book of the first edition, to which is prefixed the new introduction noticed above (ad Att. 13.32), together with the proper title of Thus it appears that the first book of the first edition has been altogether lost, and the whole of the second edition, with the exception of the fragment of the first book already mentioned and a few scraps quoted by Lactantius, Augustin, and the grammarians. Upon examining the dates of the letters referred to, it will be seen that the first edition had been despatched to Atticus about the middle of June, for the new introductions were written by the 27th (ad Att. 13.32); that the second edition, which is spoken of with great complacency—Libri quidem ita exierunt (nisi forte me communis φιλαυτία decipit), ut in tali genere ne apud Graecos quidem simile quidquam—was fully completed towards the close of July (ad Att. 13.15), a few days before the last touches had been given to the (13.19); and that it was actually in the possession of Varro before the ides of August. (13.35, 44.) Goerenz has taken great pains to prove that these books were published under the title of , and that the appellation , or Academicae Disputationes, by which they are frequently distinguished, are without authority and altogether inappropriate.

The object proposed was, to give an accurate narrative of the rise and progress of the Academic Philosophy, to point out the various modifications introduced by successive professors, and to demonstrate the superiority of the principles of the New Academy, as taught by Philo over those of the Old Academy, as advocated by Antiochus of Ascalon. It is manifestly impossible, under existing circumstances, to determine with certainty the amount of difference between the two editions. That there was a considerable difference is certain, for, although Cicero was in the first instance induced to depart from his plan merely because he considered the topics discussed out of keeping with the character of the individuals who were represented as discussing them, still the division of the two books into four necessarily implies some important change in the arrangement if not in the substance of the subject-matter. We are, moreover, expressly informed, that many things were omitted, and that the four books of the second edition, although more concise than the two of the first, were at the same time better and more brilliant (splendidiora, breviora, meliora). It is probable that the first book of the first edition, after giving a sketch of the leading principles of the different branches of the Academy as they grew out of each other in succession, was occupied with a detailed investigation of the speculations of Carneades, just as those of Philo, which were adopted to a certain extent by Cicero himself, form the leading theme of the second. What remains of the first book of the second edition enables us to discover that it was devoted to the history of Academic opinions from the time of Socrates and Plato, who were regarded as the fathers of the sect, down to Antiochus, from whom Cicero himself had in his youth received instruction while residing at Athens. The second book may have been set apart for an inquiry into the theories of Arcesilas, who, although the real founder of the New Academy, appears to have been alluded to in the former edition only in an incidental and cursory manner; while the third and fourth books would embrace the full and clear development and illustration of his pregnant though obscure doctrines, as explained in the eloquent disquisitions of Carneades and Philo. Such is the opinion of Goerenz, and although it does not admit of strict proof, yet it is highly plausible in itself, and is fully corroborated by the hints and indications which appear in those portions of the dialogue now extant.

The scene of the Catulus was the villa of that statesman at Cumae, while the is supposed to have been held at the mansion of Hortensius near Bauli. The dialogues of the second edition commence at the Cumanum of Varro; but, as we learn from a fragment of the third book quoted by Nonius Marcellus, the parties repaired during the course of the conference to the shores of the Lucrine lake.

A series of dialogues dedicated to M. Brutus, in which the opinions of the Grecian schools, especially of the Epicureans, the Stoics, and the Peripatetics, on the Supreme Good, that is, the finis, object, or end, towards which all our thoughts, desires, and actions are or ought to be directed,-- the kernel, as it were, of practical wisdom,--are expounded, compared, and discussed. The style is throughout perspicuous and highly polished, the doctrines of the different sects are stated with accurate impartiality according to the representations contained in accredited authorities; but, from the abstruse nature of many of the points investigated, and the subtilty of the arguments by which the different positions are defended, this treatise must be regarded as the most difficult, while it is the most perfect and finished, of all the philosophical performances of Cicero.

These conversations are not supposed to have been all held at the same period, nor in the same place, nor between the same parties. They agree in this, that, after the fashion of Aristotle (ad Att. 13.19), the author throughout assumes the most prominent place, and that the rest of the actors, at least those to whom important parts are assigned, were dead at the time of publication--a precaution taken to avoid giving umbrage to living men by exciting jealousy in reference to the characters which they are respectively represented as supporting (ἀζηλοτύπητον, id fore putram, ad Att. l.c.), but the time, the scene, and the performers are twice changed. In the third and fourth books they are different from those in the first and second, and in the fifth from those in any of the preceding.

The first book opens with an apology for the study of philosophy; after which Cicero relates, for the information of Brutus, a debate which took place at his Cumanum, in the presence of C. Valerius Triarius, between Cicero himself and L. Manlius Torquatus, who is represented as being praetor elect and just about to enter upon his office--a circumstance which fixes this imaginary colloquy to the close of the year B. C. 50, a date agreeing perfectly with the allusion (2.18) to the excessive power then wielded by Pompey. Cicero, being challenged by Torquatus to state his objections to the discipline of Epicurus, briefly impugns in general terms his system of physics, his imperfect logic, and, above all, the dogma that the Supreme Good is Pleasure, and the Supreme Evil, Pain. This elicits from Torquatus a lengthened explanation of the sentiments really entertained by Epicurus and the worthiest of his followers respecting ἡδονή, sentiments which he contends had been misunderstood and misrepresented, but whose truth he undertakes to demonstrate in a series of propositions ; in opposition to which Cicero, in the second book, sets in array the reasonings by which the Stoics assailed the whole system. In the third book we find ourselves in the library of young Lucullus in his Tusculan villa, to which Cicero had repaired for the purpose of consulting a work of Aristotle, and there meets Cato, immersed in study and surrounded by the books of the Stoics. In this way a controversy arises, in which Cicero maintains, that there was no real discordance between the ethics of the Porch and those previously promulgated by the Old Academy and the Peripatetics ; that the differences were merely verbal, and that Zeno had no excuse for breaking off from Plato and Aristotle, and establishing a new school, which presented the same truths in a worse form. These assertions are vigorously combated by Cato, who argues, that the principles of his sect were essentially distinct, and descants with great energy on the superior purity and majesty of their ideas concerning the Supreme Good; in reply to which Cicero, in the fourth book, employs the weapons with which the New Academy attacked the Stoics. The second discourse is supposed to have been held in B. C. 52, for we find a reference (4.1) to the famous provision for limiting the length of speeches at the bar contained in a law passed by Pompey against bribery in his second consulship, an enactment here spoken of as having recently come into force. This was the year also in which L. Lucullus the elder died and left his son under the guardianship of Cato.

In the fifth book we are carried hack to B. C. 79 and transported from Italy to Athens, where Cicero was at that time prosecuting his studies. [See above, p. 709b.] The dramatis personae are Cicero himself, his brother Quintus, his cousin Lucius, Pomponius Atticus, and M. Pupius Piso. These friends having met in the Academia, the genius of the place calls up the recollection of the mighty spirits who had once trod that holy ground, and Piso, at the request of his companion, enters into a full exposition of the precepts inculcated by Aristotle and his successors on the Summum Bonum, the whole being wound up by a statement on the part of Cicero of the objections of the Stoics, and a reply from Piso. The reason which induced Cicero to carry this last dialogue back to his youthful days was the difficulty he experienced in finding a fitting advocate for the Peripatetic doctrines, which had made but little progress among his countrymen. M. Brutus and Terentius Varro were both alive, and therefore excluded by his plan; L. Lucullus, although dead, was not of sufficient weight to be introduced with propriety on such an occasion ; Piso alone remained, but in consequence of the quarrel between Cicero and himself arising out of his support of Clodius, it was necessary to choose an epoch when their friendship was as yet unshaken. (See Goerenz, introd. xix.) It will be observed that throughout, the author abstains entirely from pronouncing any judgment of his own. The opinions of the Epicureans are first distinctly explained, then follows the refutation by the Stoics ; the opinions of the Stoics are next explained, then follows the refutation by the New Academy; in the third place, the opinions of the Peripatetics are explained, then follows the refutation by the Stoics. In setting forth the opinions of Epicurus, in addition to the writings of that sage enumerated by Diogenes Laertius, much use seems to have been made of his epistle to Menoeceus and his περὶ κυριῶν δοξῶν, and not unfrequently the very words of the original Greek have been literally translated ; while the lectures of Phaedrus and Zeno [see above, p. 709] would supply accurate information as to the changes and additions introduced by the successive disciples of the Garden after the death of their master. The Stoical refutation of Epicurus, in book second, was probably derived from Chrysippus περὶ τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς and from the writings and oral communications of Posidonius [see above, p. 709,b.]; the Stoical doctrines in book third were taken from Zeno, from Diogenes, and from Chrysippus περὶ τελῶν; the refutation of the Stoics in book fourth probably proceeds from Carneades. The Peripatetical doctrines in book fifth are from Aristotle and Theophrastus, as explained and enlarged by Antiochus of Ascalon; while the Stoical objections are in all probability due to Diodotus [see above p. 709a.], who, we are told elsewhere, was strongly opposed to Antiochus. ( 2.36.)

In determining the precise date at which the work before us was completed and published, we cannot agree with Goerenz, that the expression "duo magna συντάγματα absolvi" (ad Att. 12.45, 11th June, B. C. 45) can with certainty be made to comprehend both the and the No distinct notice of the former occurs until the 27th of June, when, in a letter to Atticus, (13.32,) we find "Torquatus Romae est. Misi ut tibi daretur," where Torquatus denotes the first book. On the 24th of July (ad Att. 13.12), the treatise is spoken of as finished. " Nunc illam περὶ τελῶν σύνταξιν, sane mihi probatam, Bruto, ut tibi placuit, despondimus." Again, on the 30th of the same month, " Ita confeci quinque libros περὶ τελῶν, ut Epicurea L. Torquato, Stoica M. Catoni, περιπατητικά M. Pisoni darem. Ἀζηλοτύπητον id fore putaram, quod oranes illi decesserant" (ad Att. 13.19); and we learn from an epistle, despatched only two days afterwards (ad Att. 13.21, comp. 22), that it had been for some time in the hands of Atticus, through whom Balbus had obtained a copy of the fifth book, while the widow Caerellia, in her philosophic zeal, had contrived by some means to get possession of the whole. Cicero complains of this for two reasons ; first, because it was but fitting that since the work was dedicated to Brutus it should be presented to him before it became trite and stale, and in the second place, because he had made some changes in the last book; which he was desirous to insert before finally dismissing it from his hands. It is not unlikely that the formal presentation to Brutus took place about the middle of August, when he paid a visit to Cicero at his Tusculanum (ad ltt. 13.44), and that two editions of the fifth book, differing in some respects from each other, may have gone abroad, which will account for some singular variations and interpolations which have long exercised the ingenuity of editors. (See Goerenz. praef. p. xiv.)

This work, addressed to M. Brutus, is a series of discussions on various important points of practical philosophy supposed to have been held in the Tusculanum of Cicero, who, on a certain occasion, soon after the departure of Brutus for the government of Gaul (B. C. 46), requested one of the numerous circle of friends and visitors by whom he was surrounded, to propose some subject for debate which he then proceeded to examine as he sat or walked about. These exercises were continued for five days, a new topic being started and exhausted at each successive conference. There is an utter want of dramatic effect in this collection of dialogues, for the antagonist is throughout anonymous, and is not invested with any life or individuality, but is a sort of a man of straw who brings forward a succession of propositions which are bowled down by Cicero as fast as they are set up. This personage is usually designated in MSS. by the letter A, and editors have amused themselves by quarrelling about the import of the symbol which they have variously interpreted to mean Atticus, Adolescens, Auditor, and so forth. There is little room for doubt as to the period when this work was actually composed, since it abounds in allusions to historical events and to former treatises which enable us, when taken in connexion with other circumstances, to determine the question within very narrow limits. Thus, in the eleventh chapter of the fifth book, we have a reference to the which was not published until the month of August, B. C. 45, while the dissertations before us were familiarly known before the middle of May in the following year (ad Att. 15.24), and must consequently have been given to the world early in B. C. 44, since the task appears to have been undertaken just at the time when the were completed (ad Att. 13.32). Schütz (Proleg.) has satisfactorily proved that is the true title, and not as a few MSS. have it.

The first book treats of the wisdom of despising death which, it is maintained, cannot be considered as an evil either to the living or to the dead, whether the soul be mortal or immortal. This leads to an investigation of the real nature of death, and a review of the opinions entertained by different philosophers with regard to the soul. The arguments for its immortality are derived chiefly from the writings of the Stoics and of Plato, especially from the Phaedon.

The second book is on the endurance of pain, in which it is demonstrated, after Zeno, Aristo, and Pyrrho, that pain is not an evil, in opposition to Aristippus and Epicurus, who held it to be the greatest evil, to Hieronymus of Rhodes, who placed the chief good in the absence of pain, and to the numerous band of philosophers, belonging to different schools, who agreed that pain was an evil, although not the greatest of evils. Here everything is taken from the Stoics.

In the third book it is proved that a wise man is insensible to sorrow; and the doctrines of the Peripatetics, of Epicurus, of the Cyrenaics, and of Crantor, being examined in turn, and weighed against the tenets of Zeno, are found wanting. The authorities chiefly consulted appear to have been Chrysippus, Cleanthes, Cleitomachus, Antiochus of Ascalon, Carneades, and Epicurus περὶ τέλους.

The thesis supported in the fourth book, which forms a continuation to the preceding, is, that the wise man is absolutely free from all mental disquietude (animi perturbatione). We have first a curious classification of perturbations in which the terms sorrow, joy, fear, pity, and a host of others, are carefully analysed and defined according to the discipline of the Porch; and, after a few remarks upon the main proposition, we find a long essay on the best means of tranquillising the heart, and fortifying it against the attacks of all those passions and desires which must be regarded as diseases of the mind. Here again the Stoics, and especially Zeno and Chrysippus, are chiefly followed, although several hints can be traced to Aristotle, Plato, and even to the Pythagoreans.

The fifth book contains a reply in theaffirmative to the question, whether virtue is in itself sufficient to insure happiness, thus carrying out to its full extent the grand moral dogma of the Stoics in opposition to the more qualified views of the Peripatetics and Academics. The materials for this section were supplied by Plato, Aristotle, Theophrastus, Xenocrates, Speusippus, Polemo, Carneades, and the Stoics. (5.12, 13, 18, 27.)

Although each of these five books is complete within itself and independent of the rest, yet we feel inclined to adopt the hypothesis of Olivet, that they were drawn up and digested according to a regular and well-imagined plan, and ought to be taken in connexion with each other as forming one harmonious whole. In fact, all the reasonings converge to one point. They all act in unison to defend one position--that man possesses within himself the means of securing his own happiness. To make this evident it was necessary to expose the folly of those alarms, and the weakness of those assailants by which tranquillity is scared away from the human bosom. Hence, the fear of death, and the fear of pain, are shewn to be the result of ignorance and error, while joy, sorrow, love, hatred, with the whole array of desires and passions which excite such tumults, are treated as mere visionary unsubstantial forms which the sage can dissipate by a vigorous exertion of his will.

The Tusculan Disputations are certainly inferior in recondite learning, in subtle reasoning, and in elaborately finished composition, to the the and the yet no one among the philosophical essays of Cicero is more deservedly popular, or forms a better introduction to such studies, on account of the easy, familiar, and perspicuous language in which the ideas are expressed, and the liveliness imparted to each of the discourses by the numerous entertaining and apt illustrations, many of which being poetical quotations from the earlier bards, are in themselves highly interesting to the grammarian and the historian of literature. Certainly no work has ever been more enthusiastically, perhaps extravagantly, admired. Erasmus, after ascribing to it every conceivable excellence both in matter and manner, declares his conviction, that the author was directly inspired from heaven, while another worthy deems that his faith must have been of the same quality with that of Abraham.

Six favourite Paradoxes of the Stoics explained in familiar language, defended by popular arguments, and illustrated occasionally by examples derived from contemporary history, by which means they are made the vehicles for covert attacks upon Crassus, Hortensius, and Lucullus, and for vehement declamation against Clodius. This must not be viewed as a serious work, or one which the author viewed in any other light than that of a mere jeu d'esprit (Ego vero, illa ipsa, quae vix in gymnasiis et in otio Stoici probant, ludens conjeci in communes locos, praef.), for the propositions are mere philosophical quibbles, and the arguments by which they are supported are palpably unsatisfactory and illogical, resolving themselves into a juggle with words, or into induction resting upon one or two particular cases. The theorems enunciated for demonstration are, 1. That which is morally fair (τὸ καλόν) is alone good (ἀγαθὸν).2. Virtue alone is requisite to secure happiness.3. Good and evil deeds admit of no degrees, i. e. all crimes are equally heinous, all virtuous actions equally meritorious.4. Every fool is a madman.5. The wise man alone is free, and therefore every man not wise is a slave.6. The wise man alone is rich.

The preface, which is addressed to M. Brutus, must have been written early in B. C. 46, for Cato is spoken of in such terms that we cannot doubt that he was still alive, or at all events that intelligence of his fate had not yet reached Italy, and there is also a distinct allusion to the as already published. But although the offering now presented is called a " parvum opusculum," the result of studies prosecuted during the shorter nights which followed the long watchings in which the had been prepared, it is equally certain that the fourth paradox bears decisive evidence of having been composed before the death of Clodius (B. C. 52), and the sixth before the death of Crassus (B. C. 53). Hence we must conclude that Cicero, soon after his arrival at Rome from Brundusium, amused himself by adding to a series of rhetorical trifles commenced some years before, and then despatched the entire collection to his friend.

A dialogue in praise of philosophy, drawn up for the purpose of recommending such pursuits to the Romans. Hortensius was represented as depreciating the study and asserting the superior claims of eloquence; his arguments were combated by Q. Lutatius Catulus, L. Licinius Lucullus, Balbus the Stoic, Cicero himself, and perhaps other personages. The work was composed and published B. C. 45, immediately before the Academica, but the imaginary conversation must have been supposed to have been held at some period earlier than B. C. 60, the year in which Catulus died. A considerable number of unimportant fragments have been preserved by St. Augustin, whose admiration is expressed in language profanely hyperbolical, and by the grammarians. These have been carefully collected and arranged by Nobbe, and are given in Orelli's Cicero, vol. iv. pt. ii. pp. 479-486. (Cic. 2.1, 2.2.)

We possess a fragment of a translation of Plato's Timaeus, executed after the completion of the Academica, as we learn from the prooemium. It extends from p. 22, ed. Bekker, with occasional blanks as far as p. 54, and affords a curious specimen of the careless and inaccurate style in which Cicero was wont to represent the meaning of his Greek originals.

A translation of the Protagoras of Plato into Latin. At what period this was executed we cannot determine, but it is generally believed to have been an exercise undertaken in early youth.

Three dialogues dedicated to M. Brutus, in which the speculations of the Epicureans and the Stoics on the existence, attributes, and providence of a Divine Being are fully stated and discussed at length, the debate being illustrated and diversified by frequent references to the opinions entertained upon these topics by the most celebrated philosophers. The number of sects and of individuals enumerated is so great, and the field of philosophic research thrown open is so wide, that we can scarcely believe that Cicero could have had recourse to original sources for the whole mass of information which he lavishes so profusely on his subject, but must conclude that he made use of some useful manual or summary, such as were doubtless compiled by the preceptors of those days for the use of their pupils, containing a view of the tenets of different schools presented in a condensed form. Be that as it may, in no production do we more admire the vigorous understanding and varied learning of the author, in none does he display a greater command over appropriate language, in none are liveliness and grace more happily blended with lucid arrangement and brilliant eloquence. Although the materials may have been collected by degrees, they were certainly moulded into shape with extraordinary rapidity, for we know that this work was published immediately after the Tusculan Disputations, and immediately before the (de Div. 2.1), and that the whole three appeared in the early part of B. C. 44. The imaginary conversation is supposed to have been held in the presence of Cicero, somewhere about the year B. C. 76, at the house of C. Aurelius Cotta, the pontifex maximus (consul B. C. 75), who well sustains the part of a New Academician, attacking and overthrowing the doctrines of others without advancing any dogma of his own, while the discipline of the Porch, mixed up however with much that belongs rather to Plato and Aristotle, is developed with great earnestness and power by Q. Lucilius Balbus, the pupil of Panaetius, and the doctrines of the Garden are playfully supported by Velleius (trib. pleb. B. C. 90), who occupies himself more in ridiculing the speculations of different schools than in any laboured defence of those espoused by himself. Accordingly, in the first book he opens with an attack upon Plato and the Stoics; he then adverts briefly to the theories of no less than 27 of the most famous philosophers, commencing with Thales of Miletus and ending with Diogenes of Babylon, characterizing them, in many cases not unjustly, as little superior to the dreams of madmen, the fables of poets, or the superstitions of the vulgar. Passing on from this motley crew to Epicurus, he pronounces him worthy of all praise, first, because he alone placed the argument for the existence of gods upon its proper and only firm basis,--the belief implanted by nature in the hearts of all mankind; secondly, because he assigned to them their real attributes, happiness, immortality, apathy; representing them as dwelling within themselves, susceptible of neither pleasure nor pain from without, bestowing no benefits and inflicting no evils on men, but fit objects of honour and worship on account of their essential excellence, a series of propositions which are carefully elucidated by an inquiry into the form, the mode of existence, and the mental constitution of divine beings. Cotta now comes forward, takes up each point in succession, and overturns the whole fabric piecemeal. He first proves that the reasons assigned by Epicurus for the existence of gods are utterly inadequate; secondly, that, granting their existence, nothing can be less dignified than the form and attributes ascribed to them ; and thirdly, granting these forms and qualities, nothing more absurd than that men should render homage or feel gratitude to those from whom they have not received and do not hope to receive any benefits.

The second book contains an investigation of the question by Balbus, according to the principles of the Stoics, who divided the subject into four heads. 1. The existence of gods. 2. Their nature. 3. Their government of the world. 4. Their watchful care of human affairs (providence), which is in reality included under the third head. The existence of gods is advocated chiefly a. From the universal belief of mankind; b. From the wellauthenticated accounts of their appearances upon earth; c. From prophesies, presentiments, omens, and auguries; d. From the evident proofs of design, and of the adaptation of means to a beneficent end, everywhere visible in the arrangements of the material world; e. From the nature of man himself and his mental constitution; f. From certain physical considerations which tend clearly and unequivocally to the establishment of a system of pantheism, the introduction of which is somewhat curious in this place, since, if admitted, it would at once destroy all the preceding arguments; g. From the gradual upward progression in the works of creation, from plants to animals and from the lower animals to man, which leads us to infer that the series ascends from mall to beings absolutely perfect. In treating of the nature of the gods, the pantheistic principle is again broadly asserted, --God is the Universe and the Universe is God,-- whence is derived the conclusion that the Deity must be spherical in form, because the sphere is the most perfect of figures. But while the Universe is God as a whole, it contains within its parts many gods, among the number of whom are the heavenly bodies. Then follows a curious digression on the origin of the Greek and Roman Pantheon, and on the causes which led men to commit the folly of picturing to themselves gods differing in shape, in age, and in apparel; of assigning to them the relationships of domestic life, and of ascribing to them the desires and passions by which mortals are agitated. Lastly, the government and providence of the gods is deduced from three considerations: (α) From their existence, which being granted, it necessarily follows, that they must rule the world. (β) From the admitted truth, that all things are subject to the laws of Nature; but Nature, when properly defined and understood, is another name for God. (γ) From the beauty, harmony, wisdom, and benevolence, manifested in the works of creation. This last section is handled with great skill and effect; the absurdity of the doctrine which taught that the world was produced by a fortuitous concourse of atoms is forcibly exposed, while the arguments derived from astronomy, from the structure of plants, of fishes, of terrestial animals, and of the human frame, form a most interesting essay on natural theology. The whole is wound up by demonstrating that all things serviceable to man were made for his use, and that the Deity watches over the safety and welfare, not only of the whole human race collectively, but of every individual member of the family.

In the third book Cotta resumes the discourse for the purpose not of absolutely demolishing what has been advanced by Balbus, but of setting forth, after the fashion of the Sceptics, that the reasonings employed by the last speaker were unsatisfactory and not calculated to produce conviction. In following his course over the different divisions in order, we find two remarkable blanks in the text. By the first we lose the criticism upon the evidence for the visible appearances of the gods on earth; the second leaves us in ignorance of the doubts cast upon the belief of a general ruling Providence. We have no means of discovering how these deficiencies arose; but it has been conjectured, that the chapters were omitted by some early Christian transcriber, who conceived that they might be quoted for a special purpose by the enemies of revealed religion.

The authorities followed in these books, in so far as they can be ascertained, appear to have been, for the Epicurean doctrines, the numerous works of Epicurus himself, whose very words are sometimes quoted, and the lectures of his distinguished follower Zeno, which Cicero had attended while residing at Athens; in the development of the Stoic principles much was derived from Cleanthes, from Chrysippus, from Antipater of Tarsus, and from Posidonius περὶ θεῶν, while in the dexterous and subtle logic of Cotta we may unquestionably trace the master-spirit of Carneades as represented in the writings of his disciple Cleitomachus. (Kühner, p. 98.)

This is intended as a continuation of the preceding work, out of which the inquiry naturally springs. We are here presented with an exposition of the conflicting opinions of the Porch and the Academy upon the reality of the science of divination, and the degree of confidence which ought to be reposed in its professors. In the first book the doctrines of the Stoics are defended by Q. Cicero, who begins by dividing divination into two branches. 1. The divination of Nature. 2. The divination of Art. To the first belong dreams, inward presages, and presentiments, and the ecstatic phrenzy, during which the mind inspired by a god discerns the secrets of the future, and pours forth its conceptions in prophetic words; in the second are comprehended the indications yielded by the entrails of the slaughtered victim, by the flight, the cries, and the feeding of birds, by thunder and lightning, by lots, by astrology, and by all those strange sights and sounds which were regarded as the shadows cast before by coming events. A cloud of examples is brought to establish the certainty of each of the various methods, cases of failure being explained away by supposing an error in the interpretation of the sign, while the truth of the general principles is confirmed by an appeal to the concurring belief of philosophers, poets, and mankind at large. Silence Quintus maintains, that we are justified in concluding that the future is revealed to us both from within and from without, and that the information proceeds from the Gods, from Fate, or from Nature; having, however, previously insisted that he was not bound to explain how each circumstance came to pass, it being sufficient for his purpose if he could prove that it actually did come to pass.

In the second book Cicero himself brings forward the arguments of Carneades, who held that. divination was altogether a delusion, and that the knowledge which it pretends to convey, if real, would be a curse rather than a blessing to men. He then proceeds to confute each of the propositions enunciated by his antagonist, and winds up by urging the necessity of upholding and extending the influence of true religion, and of waging a vigorous war in every quarter against superstition under every form.

Although many modern writers may be and probably are quite correct in their assertion, that the whole religious system of the Romans was a mere engine of government, that it was a deliberate cheat, in which men of education were the deceivers and the ignorant populace the dupes, yet we have no right in the present instance, and the same remark extends to all the philosophical writings, to pronounce that the reasonings employed by Cicero are to be taken as the expression of his own views. Here and elsewhere he always carefully guards himself against such an imputation ; his avowed object in every matter of controversy was merely to assist the judgment of the reader by stating fairly the strong points upon both sides of the question, scrupulously leaving the inference to be drawn by each individual, according to the impression produced. In the piece before us whatever may have been the private convictions of the author, it would have been little seemly in a member of that august college whose duty to the state consisted in presiding over and regulating augury to declare openly, that the whole of the discipline which he was required to enforce was a tissue of fraud and imposture; and Cicero above all others was the last man to be guilty of such a breach of public decency.

The scene of the conversation is the Lyceum in the Tusculanum of Cicero. The tract was composed after the death of Caesar, for that event is spoken of in the course of the debate.

Cicero appears to have consulted Chrysippus, who wrote several works upon this subject, especially a book entitled , to have availed himself of the labours of Posidonius and Diogenes of Babylon περὶ μαντικῆς, and to have derived some assistance from Cratippus, Antipater, Plato, and Aristotle. In the second book he avowedly followed Carneades, and there is a reference (2.47) to Panaetius also. (See Kühner, p. 100.)

A dialogue to complete the series upon speculative theology, of which the and the form the first two parts. ( 2.1.) It is a confused and mutilated fragment on the subject of all others the most perplexing to unaided reason, the doctrine of predestination and its compatibility with free-will. The beginning and the end are wanting, and one if not more chasms break the continuity of what remains. We find it generally stated that the work consisted of two books, and that the whole or the greater portion of what has been preserved belongs to the second; but there is no evidence whatever to prove in what manner it was originally divided, nor do we know whether it was ever finished, although, judging from the careless style of the composition, we are led to infer that the author left his task incomplete. It would appear to have contained, or to have been intended to contain, a review of the opinions held by the chief philosophic sects upon Fate, or Destiny, the most prominent place being assigned to the Stoics--who maintained that Fate, or Destiny, was the great ruling power of the Universe, the λόγος or anima mundi, in other words, the Divine Essence from which all impulses were derived--and to the Academics, who conceived that the movements of the mind were voluntary, and independent of, or at least not necessarily subject to, external controul. The scene of conversation is the Puteolanum of Cicero, where he spent the months of April and May after the death of Caesar, the speakers being Cicero himself, and Hirtius, at that time consulelect.

Charisius quotes three words from a work of Cicero under the former title, Servius refers apparently to the same under the latter designation. We know nothing more upon the subject. (Charisius, i. p. 98, comp. p. 112; Serv. ad Virg. Aen. 5.737.)

Translations from Homer. (See de Fin. 5.18.) The lines which are found 2.30, 3.26, 9, de Fin. 5.18; Augustin, de Civ. Dei, 5.8, amounting in all to 44 hexameters, may be held as specimens.

Capitolinus (Gordian. 3) mentions a poem under this name ascribed to Cicero, of which nearly two lines are quoted by Nonius. (s. v. Praevius.)

(See Capitolin. l.c.)

(See Capitolin. l.c.)

Four hexameter lines in praise of Terence from this poem, the general subject of which is unknown, are quoted by Suetonius. (Vit. Terent. 5.)

Written before the year B. C. 82. (De Leg. 1.1; Vell. 2.26.) A spirited fragment of thirteen hexameter lines, describing a prodigy witnessed by Marius and interpreted by him as an omen of success, is'quoted in (1.47), a single line in the (1.1), and another by Isidorus. (Orig. 19.1.)

Cicero wrote a history of his own consulship, first in Greek prose, which he finished before the month of June, B. C. 60 (ad Att. 2.1), and soon afterwards a Latin poem on the same subject, divided, it would seem, into three parts. A fragment consisting of seventyeight hexameters, is quoted from the second book in the (1.11-13), three lines from the third in a letter to Atticus (2.3), and one verse by Nonius. (s. v. Eventus.)

We are informed by Cicero in a letter belonging to B. C. 54 (ad Fam. 1.9), that he had written three books in verse upon his own times, including, as we gather from his words, an account of his exile, his sufferings, and his recall--the whole being probably a continuation of the piece last mentioned. Four disjointed lines only remain (Quint. Inst. 11.1.24, 9.4.41), one of which is, " Cedant arma togae concedat laurea linguae," and the other, the unlucky jingle so well known to us from Juvenal (10.122), " O fortunatam natam me console Romam."

An elegy upon some unknown theme. One line and a word are found in the commentary of Servius on Virgil. (Ecl. 1.58.)

Our acquaintance with this is derived solely from Quintilian (8.6.73), who quotes a punning couplet as the words of Cicero " in quodam joculari libello."

Plutarch tells us that Cicero, while yet a boy, wrote a little poem in tetrameters with the above title. The subject is unknown. (Plut. Cic. 2.)

Mentioned by Pliny. (Ep. 7.4.)