The meaning and origin of the word lictor and the varying opinions of Valgius Rufus and Tullius Tiro on that subject.

VALGIUS RUFUS, in the second of the books which he entitled On Matters Investigated by Letter, says p. 485, Fun. that the lictor was so called from ligando or binding, because when the magistrates of the Roman people had given orders that anyone should be beaten with rods, his legs and arms were always fastened and bound by an attendant, and therefore that the member of the college of attendants who had the duty of binding him was called a lictor. And he quotes as evidence on this subject Marcus Tullius, citing these words from the speech entitled In Defence of Gaius Rabirius: § 13. Lictor, bind his hands. This is what Valgius says.

Now, I for my part agree with him; but Tullius Tiro, the freedman of Marcus Cicero, wrote p. 8, Lion. that the lictor got his name from limus or licium. For, says he, those men who were in attendance upon the magistrates were girt across with a kind of girdle called limus.

But if there is anyone who thinks that what Tiro said is more probable, because the first syllable The vowel is long, not merely the syllable, as Gellius goes on to say. in lictor is long like that of licium, but in the word ligo is short, that has nothing to do with the case. For in lictor from ligando, lector from legendo, vitor from viendo, tutor from tuendo, and structor from struendo, the vowels, which were originally short, are lengthened.

Lines taken from the seventh book of the Annals of Ennius, in which the courteous bearing of an inferior towards a friend of higher rank is described and defined.

QUINTUS ENNIUS in the seventh book of his Annals describes and defines very vividly and skilfully in his sketch of Geminus Servilius, a man of rank, the tact, courtesy, modesty, fidelity, restraint and propriety in speech, knowledge of ancient history and of customs old and new, scrupulousness in keeping and guarding a secret; in short, the various remedies and methods of relief and solace for guarding against the annoyances of life, which the friend of a man who is his superior in rank and fortune ought to have. Those verses in my opinion are no less worthy of frequent, attentive perusal than the rules of the philosophers about duties. Besides this, there is such a venerable flavour of antiquity in these verses, such a sweetness, so unmixed and so removed from all affectation, that in my opinion they ought to be observed, remembered and cherished as old and sacred laws of friendship. Therefore I thought them worthy of quotation, in case there should be anyone who desired to see them at once; Ann. 234 ff., Vahlen.2 So saying, on a friend he called, with whomHe oft times gladly shared both board and speechAnd courteously informed of his affairs,On coming wearied from the sacred HouseOr Forum broad, where he all day had toiled,Directing great affairs with wisdom; one with whomHe freely spoke of matters great and small,Confiding to him thoughts approved or not,If he so wished, and found him trustworthy;With whom he took much pleasure openlyOr privily; a man to whom no thoughtSuggested heedlessness or ill intent,A cultured, loyal and a winsome man,Contented, happy, learned, eloquent,Speaking but little and that fittingly,Obliging, knowing well all ancient lore,All customs old and new, the laws of manAnd of the gods, who with due prudence toldWhat he had heard, or kept it to himself:Him 'mid the strife Servilius thus accosts.

A discourse of the philosopher Taurus on the manner and method of enduring pain, according to the principles of the Stoics.

WHEN the philosopher Taurus was on his way to Delphi, to see the Pythian games and the throng that gathered there from almost all Greece, I was his companion. And when, in the course of the journey, we had come to Lebadia, which is an ancient town in the land of Boeotia, word was brought to Taurus there that a friend of his, an eminent philosopher of the Stoic sect, had been seized with illness and had taken to his bed. Then interrupting our journey, which otherwise would have called for haste, and leaving the carriages, he hastened to visit his friend, and I followed, as I usually did wherever he went. When we came to the house in which the sick man was, we saw that he was suffering anguish from pains in the stomach, such as the Greeks call ko/los, or colic, and at the same time from a high fever. The stifled groans that burst from him, and the heavy sighs that escaped his panting breast, revealed his suffering, and no less his struggle to overcome it.

Later, when Taurus had sent for physicians and discussed with them the means of cure, and had encouraged the patient to keep up his endurance by commending the fortitude which he was showing, we left the house. And as we were returning to the carriages, and our companions, Taurus said: You were witness of no very pleasant sight, it is true, but one which was, nevertheless, a profitable experience, in beholding the encounter and contest of a philosopher with pain. The violent character of the disorder, for its part, produced anguish and torture of body; reason and the spiritual nature, on the other hand, similarly played their part, supporting and restraining within bounds the violence of well-nigh ungovernable pain. He uttered no shrieks, no complaints, not even any unseemly outcries; yet, as you saw, there were obvious signs of a battle between soul and body for the man's possession.

Then one of the disciples of Taurus, a young man not untrained in philosophy, said: If the bitterness of pain is such that it struggles against the will and judgment, forcing a man to groan involuntarily and confess the evil of his violent disorder, why is it said among the Stoics that pain is a thing indifferent and not an evil? Furthermore, why can a Stoic be compelled to do anything, or how can pain compel him, when the Stoics say that pain exerts no compulsion, and that a wise man cannot be forced to anything? iii. 168, Arn.

To this Taurus, with a face that was now somewhat more cheerful, for he seemed pleased at being lured into a discussion, replied as follows: If this friend of ours were now in better health, he would have defended such unavoidable groans against reproach and, I dare say, would have answered your question; but you know that I am no great friend of the Stoics, or rather, of the Stoa; for it is often inconsistent with itself and with us, as is shown in the book which I have written on that subject. But to oblige you, I will say 'unlearnedly and clearly,' as the adage has it, what I imagine that any Stoic now present would have said more intricately and cleverly. For you know, I suppose, that old and familiar proverb: Aristophanes, Frogs, 1445. Less eruditely speak and clearer, please.

And with that preamble he discoursed as follows about the pain and groans of the ailing Stoic: iii. 181, Arn. Nature, said he, "who produced us, implanted in us and incorporated in the very elements from which we sprang a love and affection for ourselves, to such a degree that nothing whatever is dearer or of more importance to us than ourselves. And this, she thought, would be the underlying principle for assuring the perpetuation of the human race, if each one of us, as soon as he saw the light, should have a knowledge and understanding first of all of those things which the philosophers of old have called ta\ prw=ta kata\ fu/sin, or 'the first principles of nature'; that is, that he might delight in all that was agreeable to his body and shrink from everything disagreeable. Later, with increasing years, reason developed from its first elements, and reflection in taking counsel, and the consideration of honour and true expediency, and a wiser and more careful choice of advantages as opposed to disadvantages; and in this way the dignity of virtue and honour became so preeminent and so superior, that any disadvantage from without which prevented our holding and retaining this quality was despised. Nothing was considered truly and wholly good unless it was honourable, and nothing evil unless it is dishonourable. All other things which lay between, and were neither honourable nor dishonourable, were decided to be neither good nor evil. Cf. i. 2. 9. But productions and relationes, which the philosophers call prohgme/na, or 'things desirable,' and a)poprohgme/na, or 'things undesirable,' are distinguished and set apart each by their own qualities. Therefore pleasure also and pain, so far as the end of living well and happily is concerned, are regarded as indifferent and classed neither with good nor with evil. But since the newly-born child is endowed with these first sensations of pain and pleasure before the appearance of judgment and reason, and is attracted to pleasure by nature, but averted and alienated from pain, as if from some bitter enemy—therefore reason, which is given to him later, is hardly able to uproot and destroy those inclinations which were originally and deeply implanted in him. Yet he constantly struggles with them, checks and tramples them under foot when they are excessive, and compels them to obey and submit to him. Hence you saw the philosopher, relying upon the efficacy of his system, wrestling with the insolent violence of disease and pain, yielding nothing, admitting nothing; not, as sufferers commonly do, shrieking, lamenting and calling himself wretched and unhappy, but giving vent only to panting breathing and deep sighs, which are signs and indications, not that he is overcome or subdued by pain, but that he is struggling to overcome and subdue it.

But very likely, said he, because of the mere fact that he struggles and groans, someone may ask, if pain is not an evil, why it is necessary to groan and struggle? It is because all things which are not evil are not also wholly lacking in annoyance, but there are very many things which, though free from any great harm or baneful effect, as not being base, That is, they do not involve any guilt. are none the less opposed to the gentleness and mercy of nature through a certain inexplicable and inevitable law of nature herself. These, then, a wise man can endure and put up with, but he cannot exclude them altogether from his consciousness; for a)nalghsi/a, or 'insensibility,' and a)pa/qeia, or 'lack of feeling,' not only in my judgment, said he, "but also in that of some of the wise men of that same school (such as Panaetius, Fr. 14, Fowler. a serious and learned man) are disapproved and rejected."

"But why is a Stoic philosopher, upon whom they say no compulsion can be exerted, compelled to utter groans against his will? It is true that no compulsion can be exerted upon a wise man when he has the opportunity of using his reason; but when nature compels, then reason also, the gift of nature, is compelled. Inquire also, if you please, why a man involuntarily winks when someone's hand is suddenly directed against his eyes, why when the sky is lit up by a flash of lightning he involuntarily drops his head and closes his eyes, why as the thunder grows louder he gradually becomes terrified, why he is shaken by sneezing, why he sweats in the heat of the sun or grows cold amid severe frosts. For these and many other things are not under the control of the will, the judgment, or the reason, but are decrees of nature and of necessity.

Moreover, that is not fortitude which, like a giant, struggles against nature and goes beyond her bounds, either through insensibility of spirit, or savage pride, or some unhappy and compulsory practice in bearing pain—such as we heard of in a certain savage gladiator of Caesar's school, who used to laugh when his wounds were probed by the doctors—but that is true and noble fortitude which our forefathers called a knowledge of what is endurable and unendurable. From this it is evident that there are some insupportable trials, from the undergoing or endurance of which brave men may shrink.

When Taurus had said this and seemed to intend to say even more, we reached our carriages and entered them.

On the Enigma.

THE kind of composition which the Greeks call enigmas, some of our early writers called scirpi, or rushes. Apparently so called from the involved pattern of plaited rushes. An example is the enigma composed of three iambic trimeters which I recently found— very old, by Jove! and very neat. I have left it unanswered, in order to excite the ingenuity of my readers in seeking for an answer. The three verses are these: I know not if he's minus once or twice,Or both of these, who would not give his place,As I once heard it said, to Jove himself. He who does not wish to puzzle himself too long will find the answer The answer is Terminus. Once minus and twice minus = thrice (ter) minus. In the cella of Jupiter on the Capitolium, or possibly in the pronaos, there was a terminal cippus, representing Terminus, who refused to be removed from his original site. in the second book of Varro's Latin Language, addressed to Marcellus. Fr. 55. G. & S.

Why Gnaeus Dolabella, the proconsul, referred to the court of the Areopagus the case of a woman charged with poisoning and admitting the fact.

WHEN Gnaeus Dolabella was governing the province of Asia with proconsular authority, a woman of Smyrna was brought before him. This woman had killed her husband and her son at the same time by secretly giving them poison. She confessed the crime, and said that she had reason for it, since her husband and son had treacherously done to death another son of hers by a former husband, an excellent and blameless youth; and there was no dispute about the truth of this statement. Dolabella referred the matter to his council. No member of the council ventured to render a decision in so difficult a case, since the confession of the poisoning which had resulted in the death of the husband and son seemed to call for punishment, while at the same time a just penalty had thereby been inflicted upon two wicked men. Dolabella referred the question to the Areopagites A very ancient court at Athens, so called because it held its meetings on the Areopagus, or Hill of Mars. at Athens, as judges of greater authority and experience. The Areopagites, after having heard the case, summoned the woman and her accuser to appear after a hundred years. Thus the woman's crime was not condoned, for the laws did not permit that, nor, though guilty, was she condemned and punished for a pardonable offence. The story is told in the ninth book of Valerius Maximus' work on Memorable Occurrences and Sayings. viii. 1 amb. 2, Kempf; Gellius' reference is wrong.

Noteworthy reconciliations between famous men.

PUBLIUS AFRICANUS the elder and Tiberius Gracchus, father of Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus, men illustrious for their great exploits, the high offices which they held, and the uprightness of their lives, often disagreed about public questions, and for that reason, or some other, were not friends. When this hostility had lasted for a long time, the feast was offered to Jupiter on the appointed day, On the 13th of September, which was also the anniversary of the founding of the Capitoline Temple. See Fowler, .Roman Festivals, pp. 217 f. and on the occasion of that ceremony the senate banqueted in the Capitol. It chanced that the two men were placed side by side at the same table, and immediately, as if the immortal gods, acting as arbiters at the feast of Jupiter, Greatest and Best of Gods, had joined their hands, they became the best of friends. And not only did friendship spring up between them, but at the same time their families were united by a marriage; for Publius Scipio, having a daughter that was unwedded and marriageable at the time, thereupon on the spot betrothed her to Tiberius Gracchus, whom he had chosen and approved at a time when judgment is most strict; that is, while he was his personal enemy.

Aemilius Lepidus, too, and Fulvius Flaccus, men of noble birth, who had held the highest offices, and occupied an exalted place in public life, were opposed to each other in a bitter hatred and enmity of long standing. Later, the people chose them censors at the same time. Then they, as soon as their election was proclaimed by the herald, in the Campus Martius itself, before the assembly was dispersed, both voluntarily and with equal joy, immediately joined hands and embraced each other, and from that day, both during their censorship and afterwards, they lived in continual harmony as loyal and devoted friends.

What is meant by ambiguous words; and that even honos was such a word.

ONE may very often see and notice in the early writings many words which at present in ordinary conversation have one fixed meaning, but which then were so indifferent and general, that they could signify and include two opposite things. Some of these are well known, such as tempestas (weather), valitudo (health), facinus (act), dolus (device), gratia (favour), industria (activity). Tempestas means good or bad weather; valitudo, good or ill health, etc. For it is well-nigh a matter of general knowledge that these are ambiguous and can be used either in a good or in a bad sense.

That periculm (trial), too, and venenum (drug) and contagium (contagion) were not used, as they now are, only in a bad sense, you may learn from many examples of that usage. But the use of honor as an indifferent word, so that people even spoke of bad honour, signifying wrong or injury, is indeed very rare. However, Quintus Metellus Numidicus, in a speech which he delivered On his Triumph, used these words: O. B. F., p. 275, Meyer.2 In this affair, by as much as the whole of you are more important than my single self, by so much he inflicts upon you greater insult and injury than on me; and by as much as honest men are more willing to suffer wrong than to do wrong to another, by so much has he shown worse honour (peiorem honorem) to you than to me; for he wishes me to suffer injustice, Romans, and you to inflict it, so that I may be left with cause for complaint, and you may be open to reproach. He says, he has shown worse honour to you than to me, and the meaning of the expression is the same as when he himself says, just before that, he has inflicted a greater injury and insult on you than on me.

In addition to the citation of this word, I thought I ought to quote the following saying from the speech of Quintus Metellus, in order to point out that it is a precept of Socrates; the saying in question is: It is worse to be unjust than to suffer injustice. Plato, Gorgias, p. 473 A; 489 A; 508 B.

That aeditumus is a Latin word.

AeditimusSo the MSS.; aeditumus is a variant spelling. is a Latin word and an old one at that, formed in the same way as finitimus and legilimus. In place of it many to-day say aedituus by a new and false usage, as if it were derived from guarding the temples. That is, from aedes and tueor. This ought to be enough to say as a warning There is a lacuna in the text. . . . because of certain rude and persistent disputants, who are not to be restrained except by the citation of authorities.

Marcus Varro, in the second book of his Latin Language addressed to Marcellus, thinks Fr. 56, G. & S. that we ought to use aedituus rather than aedituus, because the latter is made up by a late invention, while the former is pure and of ancient origin. Laevius too, in the Protesilaodamia I think, used claustritumum Fr. 16, Bährens. of one who had charge of the fastenings of a door, evidently using the same formation by which he saw that aeditumus, or one who guards the temples, is made. In the most reliable copies of Marcus Tullius' Fourth Oration against Verres I find it written: ii. 4. 96. The custodians (aeditumi) and guards quickly perceive it, but in the ordinary copies aeditui is read. There is an Atellan farce of Pomponius' entitled Aeditumus. In it is this line: v. 2, Ribbeck. 3 As soon as I attend you and keep your temple-door (aeditumor). Titus Lucretius too in his poem vi. 1273. speaks of aedituentes, instead of aeditui. Both aeditumus and aedituus are good Latin words. The former is made like finitumus and originally meant belonging to a temple; it derived its meaning guardian of a temple from aedituus (aedes and tueor).

That those are deceived who sin in the confident hope of being undetected, since there is no permanent concealment of wrongdoing; and on that subject a discourse of the philosopher Peregrinus and a saying of the poet Sophocles.

WHEN I was at Athens, I met a philosopher named Peregrinus, who was later surnamed Proteus, a man of dignity and fortitude, living in a hut outside the city. And visiting him frequently, I heard him say many things that were in truth helpful and noble. Among these I particularly recall the following:

He used to say that a wise man would not commit a sin, even if he knew that neither gods nor men would know it; for he thought that one ought to refrain from sin, not through fear of punishment or disgrace, but from love of justice and honesty and from a sense of duty. If, however, there were any who were neither so endowed by nature nor so well disciplined that they could easily keep themselves from sinning by their own will power, he thought that such men would all be more inclined to sin whenever they thought that their guilt could be concealed and when they had hope of impunity because of such concealment. But, said he, if men know that nothing at all can be hidden for very long, they will sin more reluctantly and more secretly. Therefore he said that one should have on his lips these verses of Sophocles, the wisest of poets: Fr. 280 N2 See to it lest you try aught to conceal;Time sees and hears all, and will all reveal.

Another one of the old poets, whose name has escaped my memory at present, called Truth the daughter of Time.

A witty reply of Marcus Cicero, in which he strives to refute the charge of a direct falsehood.

THIS also is part of a rhetorical training, cunningly and cleverly to admit charges not attended with danger, so that if something base is thrown up to you which cannot be denied, you may turn it off by a jocular reply, making the thing seem deserving of laughter rather than censure. This we read that Cicero did, when by a witty and clever remark he put aside what could not be denied. For when he wished to buy a house on the Palatine, and did not have the ready money, he received a loan of 2,000,000 sesterces About $100,000 or £20,000. privately from Publius Sulla, who was at the time under accusation. He was charged with participation in the conspiracy of Catiline. But before he bought the house, the transaction became known and reached the ears of the people, and he was charged with having received money from an accused man for the purpose of buying a house. Then Cicero, disturbed by the unexpected reproach, said that he had not received the money and also declared that he had no intention of buying a house, adding: Therefore, if I buy the house, let it be considered that I did receive the money. But when later he had bought the house and was twitted in the senate with this falsehood by friends, he laughed heartily, saying as he did so: You are men devoid of common sense, if you do not know that it is the part of a prudent and careful head of a family to get rid of rival purchasers by declaring that he does not intend to buy something that he wishes to purchase.

What is meant by the expression within the Kalends, whether it signifies before the Kalends or on the Kalends, or both; also the meaning of within the Ocean and within Mount Taurus in a speech of Marcus Tullius, and of within the limit in one of his letters.

WHEN I had been named by the consuls a judge extraordinary at Rome, From early times the examination of the evidence in cases at law was turned over by the magistrates to private persons, who acted under instruction from the magistrate. Lawsuits consisted of two parts: a preliminary hearing before the magistrate (in iure) and the proceedings in iudicio before the private judge. Gellius mentions a similar appointment by the praetors in xiv. 2. 1. and ordered to give judgment within the Kalends, I asked Sulpicius Apollinaris, a learned man, whether the phrase within the Kalends included the Kalends themselves; and I told him that I had been duly appointed, that the Kalends had been set as the limit, and that I was to give judgment within that day. Why, said he, do you make this inquiry of me rather than of some one of those who are students of the law and learned in it, whom you are accustomed to take into your counsel when about to act as judge? Then I answered him as follows: If I needed information about some ancient point of law that had been established, one that was contested and ambiguous, or one that was newly ratified, I should naturally have gone to inquire of those whom you mention. But when the meaning, use and nature of Latin words is to be investigated, I should indeed be stupid and mentally blind, if, having the opportunity of consulting you, I had gone to another rather than to you. Hear then, said he, my opinion about the meaning of the word, That is, intra, but be it understood that you will not act according to what I shall say about its nature, but according to what you shall learn to be the interpretation agreed upon by all, or by very many, men; for not only are the true and proper significations of common words changed by long usage, but even the provisions of the laws themselves become a dead letter by tacit consent.

Then he proceeded to discourse, in my hearing and that of several others, in about this fashion: When the time, said he, "is so defined that the judge is to render a decision 'within the Kalends, everyone at once jumps to the conclusion that there is no doubt that the verdict may lawfully be rendered before the Kalends, and I observe that the only question is the one which you raise, namely, whether the decision may lawfully be rendered also on the Kalends. But undoubtedly the word itself is of such origin and such a nature that when the expression 'within the Kalends' is used, no other day ought to be meant than the Kalends alone. For those three words intra, citra, ultra (within, this side, beyond), by which definite boundaries of places are indicated, among the early writers were expressed by monosyllables, in, cis, uls. Then, since these particles had a somewhat obscure utterance because of their brief and slight sound, the same syllable was added to all three words, and what was formerly cis Tiberim (on this side of the Tiber) and uls Tiberim (beyond the Tiber) began to be called citra Tiberim and ultra Tiberim; and in also became intra by the addition of the same syllable. Therefore all these expressions are, so to speak, related, being united by common terminations: intra oppidum, ultra oppidum, citra oppidum, of which intra, as I have said, is equivalent to in; for one who says intra oppidum, intra cubiculum, intra ferias means nothing else than in oppido (in the town), in cubiculo (in the room), in feriis (during the festival)."

'Within the Kalends,' then, is not 'before the Kalends,' but 'on the Kalends'; that is, on the very day on which the Kalends fall. Therefore, according to the meaning of the word itself, one who is ordered to give judgment 'within the Kalends,' unless he do so on the Kalends, acts contrary to the order contained in the phrase; for if he does so earlier, he renders a decision not ' within' but ' before the Kalends.' But somehow or other the utterly absurd interpretation has been generally adopted, that ' within the Kalends' evidently means also ' on this side of the Kalends' or 'before the Kalends'; for these are nearly the same thing. And, besides, it is doubted whether a decision may be rendered on the Kalends also, since it must be rendered neither beyond nor before that date, but 'within the Kalends,' a time which lies between these; that is to say, ' on the Kalends.' But no doubt usage has gained the victory, the mistress not only of all things, but particularly of language.

After this very learned and clear discussion of the subject by Apollinaris, I then spoke as follows: It occurred to me, said I, before coming to you, to inquire and investigate how our ancestors used the particle in question. Accordingly, I found that Tullius in his Third Oration against Verres wrote thus: ii. 3. 207. 'There is no place within the ocean (intra oceanum) either so distant or so hidden, that the licentiousness and injustice of our countrymen has not penetrated it.' He uses 'within the ocean' contrary to your reasoning; for he does not, I think, wish to say 'in the ocean,' but he indicates all the lands which are surrounded by the ocean and to which our countrymen have access; and these are 'this side the ocean,' not 'in the ocean.' For he cannot be supposed to mean some islands or other, which are spoken of as far within the waters of the ocean itself.

Then with a smile Sulpicius Apollinaris replied: Keenly and cleverly, by Heaven! have you confronted me with this Ciceronian passage; but Cicero said ' within the ocean,' not, as you interpret it, ' this side ocean.' What pray can be said to be 'on this side of the ocean,' when the ocean surrounds and encircles all lands on every side? The Greeks of early times regarded the ocean as a great river encircling the earth. For that which is 'on this side' of a thing, is outside of that thing; but how can that be said to be ' within' which is without? But if the ocean were only on one side of the world, then the land in that part might be said to be 'this side the ocean,' or 'before the ocean.' But since the ocean surrounds all lands completely and everywhere, nothing is on this side of it, but, all lands being walled in by the embrace of its waters, everything which is included within its shore is in its midst, just as in truth the sun moves, not on this side of the heavens, but within and in them.

At the time, what Sulpicius Apollinaris said seemed to be learned and acute. But later, in a volume of Letters to Servius Sulpicius by Marcus Tullius, I found within moderation (intra modum) used in the same sense that those give to within the Kalends who mean to say this side of the Kalends. These are the words of Cicero, which I quote: Ad Fam. IV. 4. 4. But yet since I have avoided the displeasure of Caesar, who would perhaps think that I did not regard the present government as constitutional if I kept silence altogether, I shall do this i.e., take part in politics. moderately, or even less than moderately (intra modum), so as to consult both his wishes and my own desires. He first said I shall do this moderately, that is, to a fair and temperate degree; then, as if this expression did not please him and he wished to correct it, he added or even within moderation, thus indicating that he would do it to a less extent than might be considered moderate; that is, not up to the very limit, but somewhat short of, or on this side of the limit.