The student who desires to give a wider consideration to figures of thought and speech will, therefore, have a guide to follow, and 1 would not venture to assert that he could have a better. But I would ask him to read these passages of Cicero with reference to my own views on this subject. For I intend to speak only of those figures of thought which depart from the direct method of statement, and I note that a similar procedure has been adopted by a number of learned scholars.

On the other hand, all those embellishments which differ in character from these are none the less virtues whose importance is such that without them all oratory will be little less than unintelligible. For how can the judge be adequately instructed unless lucidity characterise our performance of the following tasks: explanation, proposition, promise of proofs, definition, distinction, exposition of our own opinion, logical conclusion, defence by anticipation, introduction of comparisons or precedents, disposition and distribution, interruption, repression of those who interrupt us, antithesis, exculpation and personal attack?

Again, what would eloquence do if deprived of the artifices of amplification and its opposite? of which the first requires the gift of signifying more than we say, that is emphasis, together with exaggeration and overstatement of the truth, while the latter requires the power to diminish and palliate. What scope is there for the stronger emotions if the orator is not allowed to give free rein to his speech, to flame out in anger, to reproach, to wish or execrate? Or for the milder emotions without the assistance of commendation, conciliation and humour?

What pleasure can an orator hope to produce, or what impression even of the most moderate learning, unless he knows how to fix one point in the minds of the audience by repetition, and another by dwelling on it, how to digress from and return to his theme, to divert the blame from himself and transfer it to another, or to decide what points to omit and what to ignore as negligible? It is qualities such as these that give life and vigour to oratory; without them it lies torpid like a body lacking the breath to stir its limbs.

But more than the mere possession of these qualities is required; they must be deployed, each in their proper place and with such variety that every sound may bewitch the hearer with all the charm of music. But these qualities are as a rule open and direct, manifesting themselves without disguise. They do, however, as I have said, admit of figures, as the instances to which I shall proceed will show.

What is more common than to ask or enquire? For both terms are used indifferently, although the one seems to imply a desire for knowledge, and the other a desire to prove something. But whichever term we use, the thing which they represent admits a variety of figures. We will begin with those which serve to increase the force and cogency of proof to which I assign the first place.

A simple question may be illustrated by the line: quanquam, Spalding: quam cum, A: cum, B. But who are ye and from what shores are come? On the other hand, a question involves a figure, whenever it is employed not to get information, but to emphasise our point, as in the following examples: pro. Lig. iii. 9 and in Cat. i. 1. What was that sword of yours doing, Tubero, that was drawn on the field of Pharsalus? and How long, Catiline, will you abuse our patience? and Do you not see that your plots are all laid bare? with the whole passage that follows.

How much greater is the fire of his words as they stand than if he had said, You have abused our patience a long time, and Your plots are all laid bare. We may also ask what cannot be denied, as Was Gaius Fidiculanius Falcula, I ask you, brought to justice? pro Cluent. xxxvii. 103. Or we may put a question to which it is difficult to reply, as in the common forms, How is it possible? How can that be?

Or we may ask a question with a view to throw odium on the person to whom it is addressed, as in the words placed by Seneca in the mouth of Medea: Med. 451. What lands dost bid me seek? Or our aim may be to excite pity, as is the case with the question asked by Sinon in Virgil: Aen. ii. 69. Alas, what lands, lie cried,What seas can now receive me? Or to embarrass our opponent and to deprive him of the power to feign ignorance of our meaning, as Asinius does in the following sentence: Do you hear? The will which we impugn is the work of a madman, not of one who lacked natural affection. In fact questions admit of infinite variety.

They may serve our indignation, as in the line: Are any leftThat still adore Juno's divinity?Aen. i. 48. Or they may still express wonder, as in: To what dost thou not drive the hearts of men,Accursed greed of gold?Aen. iii. 56. Again, at times they may express a sharp command,

as in: Will they not rush to arms and follow forthFrom all the city?Aen. iv. 592. Or we may ask ourselves, as in the phrase of Terence, What, then, shall I do? Eun. I. i. 1.

A figure is also involved in a reply, when one question is asked and another is answered, because it suits the respondent's purpose better to do so, or because it aggravates the charge brought against the accused. For example, a witness for the prosecution was asked whether he had been cudgelled by the plaintiff, and replied, And what is more, I had done him no harm. Or the purpose may be to elude a charge, a very common form of reply. The advocate says, I ask if you killed the man? The accused replies, He was a robber. The advocate asks, Have you occupied the farm? The accused replies, It was my own.

Again, the answer may be of such a kind as to make defence precede confession. For example, in the Eclogues Ecl. iii. 17 and 21. of Virgil, when one shepherd asks: Did I not see you, villain, snare a goatOf Damon's? the other replies: I vanquished him in song, and should he notPay me the prize, my due?

Akin to this kind of answer is the dissimulatory reply, which is employed solely with the purpose of raising a laugh, and has therefore been treated in its appropriate place. VI. iii. 68. If it were meant seriously, it would be tantamount to a confession. Further, there is the practice of putting the question and answering it oneself, which may have quite a pleasing effect. Take as an example the following passage from the pro Ligario, iii. 7. where Cicero says, Before whom do I say this? Before one who, although he was aware of these facts, yet restored me to my country even before he had seen me.

A different form of fictitious question is to be found in the pro Caelio. Some one will say, 'Is this your moral discipline? Is this the training you would give young men?' with the whole passage that follows. Then comes his reply, Gentlemen, if there were any man with such vigour of mind, with such innate virtue and self-control, etc. xvii. 39 sqq. The passage concludes, I should consider such an one the possessor of qualities which I can only call worthy of a god. A different method is to ask a question and not to wait for a reply, but to subjoin the reply at once yourself. For example, Had you no house? Yes, you had one. Had you money and to spare? No, you were in actual want. Orat. lxvii. 223. This is a figure which some call suggestion.

Again, a question may involve comparison, as, for instance, Which of the two then could more easily assign a reason for his opinion? pro Cluent. xxxviii. 106. There are other forms of question as well, some concise, some developed at greater length, some dealing with one thing only, others with several. Anticipation, or, as the Greeks call it, πρόληψις, whereby we forestall objections, is of extraordinary value in pleading; it is frequently employed in all parts of a speech, but is especially useful in the exordium.

However, it forms a genus in itself, and has several different species. One of these is the defence by anticipation, such as Cicero employs against Quintus Caecilius, Div. in Caec. i. 1. where he points out that though previously he himself has always appeared for the defence, he is now undertaking a prosecution. Another is a form of confession, such as he introduces in his defence of Rabirius Postumus, Chs. i. and ix. where he admits that he himself regards his client as worthy of censure for lending money to the king. Another takes the form of prediction, as in the phrase, For I will say without any intention of aggravating the charge. Again, there is a form of self-correction, such as, I beg you to pardon me, if I have been carried too far. And, most frequent of all, there is preparation, whereby we state fully why we are going to do something or have done it.

Anticipation may also be employed to establish the meaning or propriety of words, as in the following case, Although that was not a punishment, but merely a prevention of crime, From a lost work of Cicero. while the same effect may be produced by qualification, as in the following sentence, Citizens, I say, if I may call them by that name. pro Mur. xxxvii. 80.

Again, hesitation may lend an impression of truth to our statements, when, for example, we pretend to be at a loss, where to begin or end, or to decide what especially requires to be said or not to be said at all. All speeches are full of such instances, but for the present one will be enough. As for myself, I know not where to turn. Shall I deny that there was a scandalous rumour that the jury had been bribed, etc.? pro Cluent. i. 4.

This device may also be employed to cover the past; for we may equally pretend that we had felt hesitation on the subject. This figure is akin to that known as communication, when we actually take our opponents into consultation, as Domitius Afer does in his defence of Cloatilla. She is so agitated that she does not know what is permitted to a woman or what becomes a wife. It may be that chance has brought you into contact with the unhappy woman in her helpless plight. What counsel do you give her, you her brother, and you, her father's friends?