Further there are cases where a senator sets forth to the senate the reasons which determine him to commit suicide, Based on a law of Massilia, where the state provided poison for the would-be suicide, provided he could justify himself before the senate. in which there is one legal question, namely, whether a man who desires to kill himself in order to escape the clutches of the law ought to be prevented from so doing, while the remaining questions are all concerned with quality. There are also fictitious cases concerned with wills, in which the only question raised is one of quality, as, for instance, in the controversial theme quoted above, VII. i. 38. where the philosopher, physician and orator all claim the fourth share which their father had left to the most worthy of his sons. The same is true of cases where suitors of equal rank claim the hand of an orphan and the question confronting her relatives is which is the most suitable.

I do not, however, intend to discuss every possible theme, since fresh ones can always be invented, nor yet to deal with all the questions to which they give rise, since these vary with circumstances. But I cannot help expressing my astonishment that Flavus, i.e. Verginius mentioned in § 24. for whose authority I have the highest respect, restricted the range of quality to such an extent in the text-book which he composed for the special guidance of the schools.

Quantity also, as I have already stated, § 16. falls as a rule, though not always, under the head of quality, whether it is concerned with measure or number. Measure, however, sometimes consists in the valuation of a deed with a view to determining the amount of guilt or the amount of benefit involved, while, on the other hand, it sometimes turns on a point of law, when the dispute is under what law a man is to be punished or rewarded.

For example is a ravisher to pay 10,000 sesterces cp. IV. ii. 69. because that is the penalty appointed by law, or is he liable to capital punishment as a murderer because his victim hanged himself? In such cases those who plead as if there were a question between two laws, are wrong: for there is no dispute about the fine of 10,000, since it is not claimed by the prosecution.

The point on which judgment has to be delivered is whether the accused is guilty of causing his victim's death. The same type of case will also bring conjecture into play, when, for example, the question in dispute is whether the accused shall be punished with banishment for life or for five years. For the question then is whether he caused his death willingly or not.

Again, there are questions concerned with numerical quantity which turn on a point of law, such as the questions whether thirty rewards are due to Thrasybulus, i.e. for his overthrow of the thirty tyrants; cp. II. vi. 26. or whether, when two thieves have stolen a sum of money, they are each to be required to refund fourfold or twofold. But in these cases, too, valuation of the act is necessary, and yet the point of law also turns on quality.

V. He who neither denies nor defends his act nor asserts that it was of a different nature from that alleged, must take his stand on some point of law that tells in his favour, a form of defence which generally turns on the legality of the action brought against him.

This question is not, however, as some have held, always raised before the commencement of the trial, like the elaborate deliberations of the praetor when there is a doubt as to whether the prosecutor has any legal standing, but frequently comes up during the course of the actual trial. Such discussions fall into two classes, according as the point in dispute arises from an argument advanced by the prosecution or from some prescription cp. III. vi. 72. (or demurrer) put forward by the defence. There have indeed been some writers who have held that there is a special prescriptive basis; but prescription is covered by precisely the same questions that cover all other laws.

When the dispute turns on prescription, there is no need to enquire into the facts of the case itself. For example, a son puts forward a demurrer against his father on the ground that his father has forfeited his civil rights. The only point which has to be decided is whether the demurrer can stand. Still, wherever possible, we should attempt to create a favourable impression in the judge as to the facts of the case as well, since, if this be done, he will be all the more disposed to give an indulgent hearing to our point of law: for example, in actions taking the form of a wager and arising out of interdicts, sponsio (= wager) was a form of suit in which the litigant promised to pay a sum of money if he lost his case. The interdict was an order issued by the praetor commanding or prohibiting certain action. It occurred chiefly in disputes about property. even though the question is concerned solely with actual possession, the question as to tile right to possession not being raised, it will be desirable to prove not merely that the property was actually in our possession, but that it was ours to possess.

On tile other hand, the question more frequently turns on intention. Take the law i.e. an imaginary law of the schools of rhetoric. Let a hero choose what reward he will. I deny that he is entitled to receive whatever he chooses. I cannot put forward any formal demurrer, but none the less I use the intention as against the letter of the law just as I should use a demurrer. In both cases the basis is the same.

Moreover every law either gives or takes away punishes or commands, forbids or permits, and involves a dispute either on its own account or on account of another law, while the question which it involves will turn either on the letter or the intention. The letter is either clear or obscure or ambiguous.

And what I say with reference to laws will apply equally to wills, agreements, contracts and every form of document; nay, it will apply even to verbal agreements. And since I have classified such cases under four questions or bases, I will deal with each in turn.