At times, on the other hand, the blame may be shifted to some thing: for instance, a person who has failed to comply with some testamentary injunction may plead that the laws forbade such compliance. The Greek term for such shifting is μετάστασις. If these methods of defence are out of the question, we must take refuge in making excuses. We may plead ignorance. For example, if a man has branded a runaway slave and the latter is subsequently adjudged to be a free man, he may deny that he was cognisant of the truth. Or we may plead necessity; for instance, if a soldier overstays his leave, he may plead that his return was delayed by floods or ill health.

Again, the blame is often cast upon fortune, while sometimes we assert that, although we undoubtedly did wrong, we did so with the best intentions. Instances of these two latter forms of excuse are, however, so numerous and obvious that there is no need for me to cite them here. If all the above-mentioned resources prove unavailable, we must see whether it may not be possible to extenuate the offence. It is here that what some call the quantitative basis cp. III. vi. 23, 51, 53. comes into play.

But when quantity is considered in reference to punishment or reward, it is determined by the quality of the act, and therefore in my opinion comes under the qualitative basis, as also does quantity which is used with reference to number by the Greeks, who distinguish between ποσότης and πηλικότης ποσότης = quantity with reference to number; πηλικότης = quantity with reference to magnitude. : we, however, have only one name for the two.

In the last resort we may plead for mercy, a though most writers deny that this is ever admissible in the courts. Pro Lig. X. 30. Indeed Cicero himself seems to support this view in his defence of Quintus Ligarius where he says, I have pleaded many causes, Caesar, some of them even in association with yourself, so long as your political ambitions prevented you from abandoning the bar, but never have I pleaded in words such as these, ' Forgive him, gentlemen, he erred, he made a slip, he did not think that it mattered, he will never do it again,' and so on.

On the other hand, in addressing the senate, the people, the emperor or any other authority who is in a position to show clemency, such pleas for mercy have a legitimate place. In such cases there are three points based on the circumstances of the accused which are most effective. The first is drawn from his previous life, if he has been blameless in his conduct and deserved well of the state, or if there is good hope that his conduct will be blameless for the future and likely to be of some use to his fellow men; the second is operative if it appears that he has been sufficiently punished already on the ground that he has suffered other misfortunes, or that his present peril is extreme, or that he has repented of his sin; while thirdly we may base his appeal on his external circumstances, his birth, his rank, his connexions, his friendships.

It is, however, on the judge that we shall pin our highest hopes, if the circumstances be such that acquittal will result in giving him a reputation for clemency rather than for regrettable weakness. But even in the ordinary courts appeals for mercy are frequently employed to a large extent, although they will not colour the whole of our pleading. For the following form of division is common:— Even if he had committed the offence, he would have deserved forgiveness, a plea which has often turned the balance in doubtful cases, while practically all perorations contain such appeals.

Sometimes indeed the whole case may rest on such considerations. For example, if a father has made an express declaration that he has disinherited his son because lie was in love with a woman of the town, will not the whole question turn on the point whether it was the father's duty to pardon such an offence and whether it is the duty of the centumviral court to overlook it? Nay, even in penal prosecutions governed by strict forms of law we raise two separate questions: first whether the penalty has been incurred, and secondly whether, if so, it ought to be inflicted. Still the view of the authorities to whom I have referred that an accused person cannot be saved from the clutches of the law by this method of defence is perfectly correct.

With regard to rewards, there are two questions which confront us: namely, whether the claimant is deserving of any reward, and, if so, whether he deserves so great a reward. If there are two claimants, we have to decide which is the more worthy of the two; if there are a number, who is the most worthy. The treatment of these questions turns on the kind of merit possessed by the claimants. And we must consider not merely the act (whether it has merely to be stated or has to be compared with the acts of others), but the person of the claimant as well. For it makes a great difference whether a tyrannicide be young or old, man or woman, a stranger or a connexion.

The place may also be discussed in a number of ways: was the city in which the tyrant was killed one inured to tyranny or one which had always been free? was he killed in the citadel or in his own house? The means, too, and the time call for consideration: was he killed by poison or the sword? was he killed in time of peace or war, when he was intending to lay aside his power or to venture on some fresh crime?

Further, in considering the question of merit, the danger and difficulty of the act will carry great weight, while with regard to liberality it will similarly be of importance to consider the character of the person from whom it proceeds. For liberality is more pleasing in a poor man than in a rich, in one who confers than in one who returns a benefit, in a father than in a childless man. Again, we must consider the immediate object of the gift, the occasion and the intention, that is to say, whether it was given in the hope of subsequent profit; and so on with a number of similar considerations. The question of quality therefore makes the highest demands on the resources of oratory, since it affords the utmost scope for a display of talent on either side, while there is no topic in which the emotional appeal is so effective.

For conjecture has often to introduce proofs from without and uses arguments drawn from the actual subject matter, whereas the real task of eloquence is to demonstrate quality: there lies its kingdom, there its power, and there its unique victory. Verginius includes under quality cases concerned with disinheritance, lunacy, cruelty to a wife, and claims of female orphans to marry relatives. The questions thus involved are, it is true, frequently questions of quality, while some writers style them questions of moral obligation.

But the laws governing these cases sometimes admit of other bases. For example, conjecture is involved in quite a number of such cases, as when the accused urges either that he did not commit the act or, if he did, acted with the best intentions. I could quote many examples of this kind. Again, it is definition which tells us what precisely is meant by lunacy or cruelty to a wife. The general sense of 25 and 26 is clear. These cases do not always come under the status qualitatis: they not infrequently come under the status coniecturalis and finitivus. They cannot however, strictly be said to come under the states legalis, since although the leges of such scholastic themes do involve certain questions of law, these are not such as to constitute the status legally. Still in the last resort such cases may be argued on legal grounds. The text adopted for the last sentence of 25 is that which involves the least change, but it is highly obscure and the corruption may well lie deeper still. For the whole question of bases, which is highly technical, see III, vi. For as a rule the laws cited in such themes involve certain legal questions, though not to such an extent as to determine the basis of the case.

But this notwithstanding, if the actual fact cannot be defended, we may in the last resort base our defence on legal grounds, in which case we shall consider how many and what cases there are in which a father may not disinherit his son, what charges fail to justify an action for cruelty, and under what circumstances a son is not allowed to accuse his father of lunacy.