This should be done in such a way as to give the impression not that we
regard the points as desperate, but that we have deliberately dropped
them because we can prove our case without them. Suppose that the agent
for a certain person claims the interest on a loan as due under an
inheritance. The question may here arise whether such a claim can be
made by an agent.
we drop it or that the argument is refuted. We then raise the question
whether the person in whose name the action is brought has the right to
employ an agent. Let us yield this point also. cp. III. 6, 8.
Grant these points also and we can still raise the question whether the
sum is due at all? On the other hand, no one will be so insane as to
drop what he considers his strongest point and pass to others of minor
importance. The following case from a scholastic theme is of a similar
character. You may not disinherit your adopted son. And if you
may disinherit him
Such is the
nature of dissimilarity where points of law are concerned. Where,
however, the question is one of fact, there may be several points all
tending to the same result, of which some may be dropped as not
essential to the main issue, as for instance if a man accused of theft
should say to his accuser, quâ adopted son, you may
not disinherit one who is so brave. And if you may disinherit one
who is so brave, you may not disinherit him because he has vir
fortis optet quod uolet,
Let a hero choose what
reward he will
( cp. v. x.
97). A scandalous choice might give ground for disinheriting him
(cp. § 24 below), but the choice in question is not scandalous.
Prove that you had the property,
prove that you lost it, prove that it was stolen, prove that it was
stolen by me.
The first three can be dropped, but not the
last. I used also to employ the following method.
I went back from the ultimate species (which
generally contains the vital point of the case) to the first general
question or descended from the genus to the
ultimate species,
cp. v. x. 5, 6. The
statement man is an animal
is insufficient as a
definition, animal
being the genus.
Man is mortal
introduces a species, but one common to other animals.
Man is rational
introduces the ultima species.
For example, Numa is deliberating whether to accept the crown offered
him by the Romans. First he considers the general question, Ought
I to be a king?
Then, Ought I to be king in a
foreign state? Ought I to be king at Rome? Are the Romans likely to
put up with such a king as myself?
So too in controversial
themes. Suppose a brave man to choose another man's wife as his reward.
The ultimate species is found in the question
whether lie is allowed to choose another man's wife. The general question is whether he should be given
whatever he chooses. Next come questions such as whether he can choose
his reward from the property of private individuals, whether he
But in our search for such questions we follow an order quite different
from that which we employ in actual speaking. cp. III. ix. 6. You have
no right to choose another man's wife.
Consequently undue
haste will spoil our division of the subject. We must not therefore be
content with the thoughts that first offer themselves, but should press
our inquiry further till we reach conclusions such as that he ought not
even to choose a widow: a further advance is made when we reach the
conclusion that be should choose nothing that is private property, or
last of all we may go back to the question next in order to the general
question, and conclude that he should choose nothing inequitable.
Consequently after surveying our opponent's proposition, an easy task, we should consider, if possible, what it is most natural to answer first. And, if we imagine the case as being actually pleaded and ourselves as under the necessity of making a reply, that answer will probably suggest itself. On the other hand,
if this is impossible, we should put aside whatever first occurs to us and reason with ourselves as
follows: What if this were not the case?
We must then
repeat the process a second and a third time and so on, until nothing is
left for consideration. Thus we shall examine even minor points, by our
treatment of which we may perhaps make the judge all the better disposed
to us when we come to the main issue.
The rule that we should descend from the common
to the particular is much the same, since common is usually general. For example, He killed a
tyrant
is common, while A
tyrant was killed by his son, by a woman or by his wife
are
all particular.
I used also to note down separately whatever was admitted both by my
opponent and myself, provided it suited my purpose, and not merely to
press any admissions that he might make, but to multiply them by
partition, as for example in the following controversial theme:—
A general, who had stood against his father as a candidate and
defeated him, was captured: the envoys who went to ransom him met
his father returning from the enemy. He said to the envoys, 'You are
too late.'
What points are admitted
by both parties? We were told that there had been treason and
told it by the general.
We try to find the traitor.
You admit that you went to the enemy, that you did so by stealth,
that you returned unscathed, that you brought back gold and had it
concealed about your person.
For an act of the accused may sometimes be stated in such a way as to
tell heavily against him, and if our statement makes a real impression
on the mind of the judge, it may serve to close his ears to all that is
urged by the defence. For as a general rule it is of advantage to the
accuser to mass his facts together and to the defence to separate them.
I used also, with reference to the whole material of the case, to do
what I have already mentioned