There is another form of conclusion which is not actually identical with the major premise, but has the same force Death is nothing to us, for that which is dissolved into its elements is devoid of' feeling, and that which is devoid of feeling is nothing to us. There is a third form in which the major premise and the conclusion are different. All animate things are better than inanimate, but there is nothing better than the universe, wherefore the universe is animate. It may be thought that in this case there is no real major premise, since it would be possible to state the reasoning in the following form: The universe is animate, for all things animate are better than inanimate, etcetera.

This major premise is either an admitted fact as in the last example or requires to be proved as in the following: He who wishes to live a happy life, must be a philosopher : for this is not an acknowledged truth, and the premises must be established before we can arrive at the conclusion. Sometimes again the minor premise is an admitted fact, as for instance, But all men wish to live a happy life, while sometimes it requires to be proved, as for example the statement quoted above, That which is dissolved into its elements is devoid of feeling, since it is doubtful whether the soul is immortal after its release from the body or only continues to exist for a time. Some call this a minor premise, some a reason.

There is no difference between the epicheireme and the syllogism, except that the latter has a number of forms and infers truth from truth, whereas the epicheireme is frequently concerned with statements that are no more than credible. For if it were always possible to prove controversial points from admitted premises, the orator would have little to do in this connexion.

For what skill does it require to say, The property is mine, for I am the only son of the deceased, or I am the sole heir, since possession of the testator's estate is given by the law of property in accordance with the terms of his will: the property therefore belongs to me ?

But when the reason given is itself disputable, we must establish the certainty of the premises by which we are proposing to prove what is uncertain. For example, if our opponent says You are not his son or You are illegitimate or You are not his only son ; or, again, You are not his heir or The will is invalid or You are not entitled to inherit or You have co-heirs, we must prove the validity of the reason on which we base our claim that the property should be adjudicated to us.

But when a reason of unusual length intervenes, it is necessary to state the final conclusion, otherwise the major premise and the reason would suffice. Laws are silent in the midst of arms, and do not require us to await their sanction when the circumstances are such that he who would await their sanction is certain to be the victim of an unjust penalty before ever the just penalty can be claimed. pro Mil. iv. 10. Hence it has been asserted that the form of enthymeme which is based on denial of consequents resembles a reason. But sometimes, again, it is sufficient to state a single proposition as in the example just quoted, The laws are silent in the midst of arms.

We may also begin with the reason and then proceed to the conclusion as in another passage from the same speech ib. iii. 9. : But if the Twelve Tables permitted the killing of a thief by night under any circumstances, and by day if he used a weapon to defend himself, who is there who will contend that the slayer must be punished under whatever circumstances a man has been killed? 'The process is still further varied by Cicero, and the reason placed third, as in the phrase, When he sees that the sword is sometimes placed in our hands by the laws themselves.

On the other hand, he places the various parts in the regular order in the following instance: How can it be unjust to kill a robber who lies in wait for his victim? ib. iv. 10. Next comes the reason: What is the object of our escorts and our swords? Last comes the conclusion resulting from the major premise and the reason: Which we certainly should not be permitted to have, if we were absolutely forbidden to use them.

This form of proof may be countered in three ways, that is to say it may be attacked in all its parts. For either the major premise or the minor or the conclusion or occasionally all three are refuted. The major premise is refuted in the following case: I was justified in killing him, as he lay in wait for me. For the very first question in the defence of Milo is whether it is right that he who confesses that he has killed a man should look upon the light of day.

The minor premise is refuted by all the methods which we mentioned in dealing with refutation. In the preceding chapter. As to the reason it must be pointed out that it is sometimes true when the proposition to which it is attached is not true, but may on the other hand sometimes be false although the proposition is true. For example, Virtue is a good thing is true, but if the reason, Because it brings us wealth, be added, we shall have an instance of a true major premise and a false reason.

With regard to the conclusion, we may either deny its truth when it infers something which does not logically result from the premises, or we may treat it as irrelevant. The truth is denied in the following case: We are justified in killing one who lies in wait for us; for since, like an enemy, he threatens us with violence, we ought to repulse his attack as though he were an enemy: therefore Milo was justified in killing Clodius as an enemy. The conclusion is not valid, since we have not yet proved that Clodius lay in wait for him But the conclusion that we are therefore justified in killing one who lies in wait for us is perfectly true, though irrelevant to the case, for it is not yet clear that Clodius lay in wait for Milo.

But while the major premise and the reason may both be true and the conclusion false, yet if both are false, the conclusion can never be true.

Some call the enthymeme a rhetorical syllogism, while others regard it as a part of the syllogism, because whereas the latter always has its premises and conclusion and effects its proof by the employment of all its parts, the ethymeme is content to let its proof be understood without explicit statement.

The following is an example of a syllogism: Virtue is the only thing that is good, for that alone is good which no one can put to a bad use: but no one can make a bad use of virtue; virtue therefore is good. The enthymeme draws its conclusion from denial of consequents. Virtue is a good thing because no one can put it to a bad use. On the other hand take the following syllogism. Money is not a good thing; for that is not good which can be put to a bad use: money may be put to a bad use; therefore money is not a good thing. The enthymeme draws its conclusion from incompatibles. Can money be a good thing when it is possible to put it to a bad use?

The following argument is couched in syllogistic form: If money in the form of silver coin is silver, the man who bequeathed all his silver to a legatee, includes all money in the form of coined silver: but he bequeathed all his silver: therefore he included in the bequest all money in the form of coined silver. But for the orator it will be sufficient to say, Since he bequeathed all his silver, he included in his bequest all his silver money.

I think I have now dealt with all the precepts of those who treat oratory as a mystery. But these rules still leave scope for free exercise of the judgment. For although I consider that there are occasions when the orator may lawfully employ the syllogism, I am far from desiring him to make his whole speech consist of or even be crowded with a mass of epicheiremes and enthymemes. For a speech of that character would resemble dialogues and dialectical controversies rather than pleadings of the kind with which we are concerned, and there is an enormous difference between the two.

For in the former we are confronted with learned men seeking for truth among men of learning; consequently they subject everything to a minute and scrupulous inquiry with a view to arriving at clear and convincing truths, and they claim for themselves the tasks of invention and judgment, calling the former τοπική or the art of selecting the appropriate material for treatment, and the latter κριτική or the art of criticism.

We on the other hand have to compose our speeches for others to judge, and have frequently to speak before an audience of men who, if not thoroughly ill-educated, are certainly ignorant of such arts as dialectic: and unless we attract them by the charm of our discourse or drag them by its force, and occasionally throw them off their balance by an appeal to their emotions, we shall be unable to vindicate the claims of truth and justice.

Eloquence aims at being rich, beautiful and commanding, and will attain to none of these qualities if it be broken up into conclusive inferences which are generally expressed in the same monotonous form: on the contrary its meanness will excite contempt, its severity dislike, its elaboration satiety, and its sameness boredom.

Eloquence therefore must not restrict itself to narrow tracks, but range at large over the open fields. Its streams must not be conveyed through narrow pipes like the water of fountains, but flow as mighty rivers flow, filling whole valleys; and if it cannot find a channel it must make one for itself. For what can be more distressing than to be fettered by petty rules, like children who trace the letters of the alphabet which others have first written for them, or, as the Greeks say, insist on keeping the coat their mother gave them. The proverb which is also found in Plutarch ( de Alex. Fort. i. 330 B) seems to refer to a child's passionate fondness for some particular garment. Are we to have nothing but premises and conclusions from consequents and incompatibles? Must not the orator breathe life into the argument and develop it?