Of this kind is the saying of Cicero See IV. iv. 8. : As our bodies can make no use of their members without a mind to direct them, so the state can make no use of its component parts, which may be compared to the sinews, blood and limbs, unless it is directed by law. And just as he draws this simile in the pro Cluentio from the analogy of the human body, so in the pro Cornelio pro Clunt. liii. 146. he draws a simile from horses, and in the pro Archia pro Arch. viii. 19. from stones.

As I have already said, the following type of simile comes more readily to hand: As oarsmen are useless without a steersman, so soldiers are useless without a general. Still it is always possible to be misled by appearances in the use of simile, and we must therefore use our judgment in their employment. For though a new ship is more useful than one which is old, this simile will not apply to friendship: and again, though we praise one who is liberal with her money, we do not praise one who is liberal with her embraces. In these cases there is similitude in the epithets old and liberal, but their force is different, when applied to ships and friendship, money and embraces.

Consequently, it is allimportant in this connexion to consider whether the simile is really applicable. So in answering those Socratic questions which I mentioned above, § 3. the greatest care must be taken to avoid giving an incautious answer, such as those given by the wife of Xenophon to Aspasia in the dialogue of Aeschines the Socratic: the passage is translated by Cicero de Inv. I. xxxi. 51. as follows:

Tell me, pray, wife of Xenophon, if your neighbour has finer gold ornaments than you, would you prefer hers or yours? Hers, she replied. Well, then, if her dress and the rest of her ornaments are more valuable than yours, which would you prefer, hers or yours? Hers, she replied. Come, then, said she, if her husband is better than yours, would you prefer yours or hers? At this the wife of Xenophon not unnaturally blushed; for she had answered ill in replying that she would prefer her neighbour's gold ornaments to her own, since it would be wrong to do so. If on the other hand she had replied that she would prefer her ornaments to be of the same quality as those of her neighbour, she might have answered without putting herself to the blush that she would prefer her husband to be like him who was his superior in virtue.

I am aware that some writers have shown pedantic zeal in making a minute classification of similes, and have pointed out that there is lesser similitude (such as that of a monkey to a man or a statue when first blocked out to its original), a greater similitude (for which compare the proverb As like as egg to egg ), a similitude in things dissimilar (an elephant, for instance, and an ant both belong to the genus animal ),and dissimilitude in things similar (puppies and kids, for example, are unlike the parents, Verg. Ecl i. 23. for they differ from them in point of age).

So too they distinguish between contraries: some are opposites, as night to day, some hurtful, as cold water to a fever, some contradictory, as truth to falsehood, and some negative, as things which are not hard when contrasted with things which are hard. But I cannot see that such distinctions have any real bearing on the subject under discussion.

It is more important for our purpose to note that arguments may be drawn from similar, opposite, and dissimilar points of law. As an example of the first, take the following passage from the Topica of Cicero, iii. 15. where he argues that a man to whom the usufruct of a house has been left will not restore it in the interests of the heir if it collapses; just as lie would not replace a slave if he should die. The following will provide an example of an argument drawn from opposite points of law: The absence of a formal contract is no bar to the legality of a marriage, provided the parties cohabit by mutual consent, since the signing of a formal document will count for nothing in the absence of such mutual consent. An instance of an argument drawn from dissimilar points of law occurs in the pro Caecina of Cicero xii. 34. :

If anyone had driven me from my house by armed violence, I should have ground for action against him. Have I then no ground, if he has prevented me from entering my house? Dissimilar points may be illustrated by the following example cp. Cic. Top. iii. 13 and 16. : Because a man has bequeathed all his silver to a given person and this bequest is regarded as including silver coin as well as plate, it does not follow that he intended all outstanding debts to be paid to the legatee.

Some draw a distinction between analogy and similarly, but personally I regard the former as included under the latter. For the statement that the relation of 1 to 10 is the same as that of 10 to certainly involves similarity,

just as does the statement that a bad citizen may be compared to an actual enemy. But arguments of this kind are carried still further: If connexion with a male slave is disgraceful to the mistress of the house, so is the connexion of the master with a female slave. If pleasure is an end sought by dumb animals, so also must it be with men.

But these arguments may readily be met by arguments from dissimilars: It is not the same thing for the master of the house to have intercourse with a female slave as for the mistress to have intercourse with a male slave; nor does it follow that because dumb animals pursue pleasure, reasoning beings should do likewise. Or they may even be met by arguments from opposites; as for instance, Because pleasure is an end sought by dumb animals, it should not be sought by reasoning beings.

Authority also may be drawn from external sources to support a case. Those who follow the Greeks, who call such arguments κρίσεις, style them judgments or adjudications, thereby referring not to matters on which judicial sentence has been pronounced (for such decisions form examples or precedents), but to whatever may be regarded as expressing the opinion of nations, peoples, philosophers, distinguished citizens, or illustrious poets. Nay,

even common sayings and popular beliefs may be found to be useful. For they form a sort of testimony, which is rendered all the more impressive by the fact that it was not given to suit special cases, but was the utterance or action of minds swayed neither by prejudice or influence, simply because it seemed the most honourable or honest thing to say or do.

For instance, if I am speaking of the misfortunes of this mortal life, surely it will help me to adduce the opinion of those nations who hold that we should weep over the new-born child and rejoice over the dead. Or if I am urging the judge to shew pity, surely my argument may be assisted by the fact that Athens, the wisest of all states, regarded pity not merely as an emotion, but even as a god. Again,

do we not regard the precepts of the Seven Wise Men as so many rules of life? If an adulteress is on her trial for poisoning, is she not already to be regarded as condemned by the judgment of Marcus Cato, who asserted that every adulteress was as good as a poisoner? As for reflexions drawn from the poets, not only speeches, but even the works of the philosophers, are full of them; for although the philosophers think everything inferior to their own precepts and writings, they have not thought it beneath their dignity to quote numbers of lines from the poets to lend authority to their statements.

Again, a remarkable example of the weight carried by authority is provided by the fact that when the Megarians disputed the possession of Salamis with the Athenians, the latter prevailed by citing a line from Homer, II. ii. 558. Twelve ships great Ajax brought from Salamis, And ranged them where the Athenian army stood. which is not however found in all editions, to the effect that Ajax united his ships with those of the Athenians.

Generally received sayings also become common property owing to the very fact that they are anonymous, as, for instance, Friends are a treasure, or Conscience is as good as a thousand witnesses, or, to quote Cicero, Cato maj. iii 7. In the words of the old proverb, birds of a feather flock together. Sayings such as these would not have acquired immortality had they not carried conviction of their truth to all mankind.

Some include under this head the supernatural authority that is derived from oracles, as for instance the response asserting that Socrates was the wisest of mankind: indeed, they rank it above all other authorities. Such authority is rare, but may prove useful. It is employed by Cicero in his speech on the Replies of the Soothsayers de har. resp. passim. The soothsayers consulted as to the significance of certain prodigies had replied that they were due to the profanation of sacred rites. Clodius interpreted this as referring to the rebuilding of Cicero's house. Cicero argued against this in a speech to the senate (56 B.C.). and in the oration in which he denounced Catiline to the people, in Cat. III. ix. 21. when he points to the statue of Jupiter crowning a column, and again in the pro Ligario, vi. 19. where lie admits the cause of Caesar to be the better because the gods have decided in his favour. When such arguments are inherent in the case itself they are called supernatural evidence; when they are adduced from without they are styled supernatural arguments.

Sometimes, again, it may be possible to produce some saying or action of the judge, of our adversary or his advocate in order to prove our point. There have therefore been some writers who have regarded examples and the use of authorities of which I am speaking as belonging to inartificial proofs, on the ground that the orator does not discover them, but receives them readymade. But the point is of great importance.

For witnesses and investigation and the like all make some pronouncement on the actual matter under trial, whereas arguments drawn from without are in themselves useless, unless the pleader has the wit to apply them in such a manner as to support the points which he is trying to make.