Or we may give our opponent the choice between two alternatives of which one must necessarily be true, and as a result, whichever he chooses, lie will damage his case. Cicero does this in the pro Oppio: Oppius was accused of embezzling public money and plotting against the life of M. Aurelius Cotta, governor of Bithynia, where Oppius was serving as quaestor. Cicero's defence of him is lost. Was the weapon snatched from his hands when he had attacked Cotta, or when he was trying to commit suicide? and in the pro Vareno: See iv. ii. 26. You have a choice between two alternatives: either you must show that the choice of this route by Varenus was due to chance or that it was the result of this man's persuasion and inducement. He then shows that either admission tells against his opponent. Sometimes again,

two propositions are stated of such a character that the admission of either involves the same conclusion, as in the sentence, We must philosophise, even though we ought not, or as in the common dilemma, What is the use of a figure, See vii. iv. 28, ix. i. 14, ix. ii. 65. if its meaning is clear? And what is its use, if it is unintelligible? or, He who is capable of enduring pain will lie if tortured, and so will he who cannot endure pain.

As there are three divisions of time, so the order of events falls into three stages. For everything has a beginning, growth and consummation, as for instance a quarrel, blows, murder. Thus arise arguments which lend each other mutual support; for the conclusion is inferred from the beginnings, as in the following case: I cannot expect a purple-striped toga, when I see that the beginning of the web is black ; or the beginning may be inferred from the conclusion: for instance the fact that Sulla resigned the dictatorship is an argument that Sulla did not take up arms with the intention of establishing a tyranny.

Similarly from the growth of a situation we may infer either its beginning or its end, not only in questions of fact but as regards points of equity, such as whether the conclusion is referable to the beginning, that is, Should the man that began the quarrel be regarded as guilty of the bloodshed with which it ended? Arguments are also drawn from similarities:

If self-control is a virtue, abstinence is also a virtue.If a guardian should be required to be faithful to his trust, so should an agent. To this class belongs the type of argument called ἐπαγωγή by the Greeks, induction by Cicero. de Inv. i. 31. Or arguments may be drawn from unlikes: It does not follow that if joy is a good thing, pleasure also is a good thing : It does not follow that what applies to the case of a woman applies also to the case of a ward. Or from contraries: Frugality is a good thing, since luxury is an evil thing : If war is the cause of ill, peace will prove a remedy : If he who does harm unwittingly deserves pardon, he who does good unwittingly does not deserve a reward.

Or from contradictions: He who is wise is not a fool. Or from consequences necessary or probable It is possible that Quintilian regards adiuncta as = consequentia. The distinction made above is that made by Cicero, Top. xii. : If justice is a good thing, we must give right judgment : If breach of faith is a bad thing, we must not deceive. And such arguments may also be reversed. Similar to these are the following arguments, which must therefore be classed under this same head, since it is to this that they naturally belong: A man has not lost what he never had : A man does not wittingly injure him whom he loves : If one man has appointed another as his heir, he regarded, still regards and will continue to regard him with affection. However, such arguments, being incontrovertible, are of the nature of absolute indications. See ch. ix.

These, however, I call consequent or ἀκόλουθα goodness, for instance, is consequent on wisdom: while in regard to things which merely have taken place afterwards or will take place I use the term insequent or παρεπόμενα, though I do not regard the question of terminology as important. Give them any name you please, as long as the meaning is clear and it is shown that the one depends on time, the other on the nature of things.

I have therefore no hesitation in calling the following forms of argument also consequential, although they argue from the past to the future: some however divide them into two classes, those concerned with action, as in the pro Oppio, How could he detain against their will those whom he was unable to take to the province against their will? and those concerned with time, as in the Verrines, Verr. I. xlii. 109. The praetor on entering office on Jan. I issued an edict announcing the principles on which his rulings would be given. This edict was an interpretation of the law of Rome, and held good only during the praetor's year of office. If the first of January puts an end to the authority of the praetor's edict, why should the commencement of its authority not likewise date from the first of January?

Both these instances are of such a nature that the argument is reversible. For it is a necessary consequence that those who could not be taken to the province against their will could not be retained against their will.

So too I feel clear that we should rank as consequential arguments those derived from facts which lend each other mutual support and are by some regarded as forming a separate kind of argument, which they Ar. Rhet. II. xxiii. 3. call ἐκ τῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα, arguments from things mutually related, while Cicero de Inv. I. xxx. 46. styles them arguments drawn from things to which the same line of reasoning applies; take the following example ib. 47. : If it is honourable for the Rhodians to let out their harbour dues, it is honourable likewise for Hermocreon to take the contract, or What it is honourable to learn, it is also honourable to teach. Such also is the fine sentence of Domitius Afer,

which has the same effect, though it is not identical in form: I accused, you condemned. Arguments which prove the same thing from opposites are also mutually consequential; for instance, we may argue that he who says that the world was created thereby implies that it is suffering decay, since this is the property of all created things.

There is another very similar form of argument, which consists in the inference of facts from their efficient causes or the reverse, a process known as argument from causes. The conclusion is sometimes necessary, sometimes generally without being necessarily true. For instance, a body casts a shadow in the light, and the shadow wherever it falls indicates the presence of a body.

There are other conclusions which, as I have said, are not necessary, whether as regards both cause and effect or only one of the two. For instance, the sun colours the skin, but not everyone that is coloured receives that colour from the sun; a journey makes the traveller dusty, but every journey does not produce dust, nor is everyone that is dusty just come from a journey.

As examples of necessary conclusions on the other hand I may cite the following: If wisdom makes a man good, a good man must needs be wise ; and again, It is the part of a good man to act honourably, of a bad man to act dishonourably, or Those who act honourably are considered good, those who act dishonourably are considered bad men. In these cases the conclusion is correct. On the other hand, though exercise generally makes the body robust, not everyone who is robust is given to exercise, nor is everyone that is addicted to exercise robust. Nor again, because courage prevents our fearing death, is every man who has no fear of death to be regarded as a brave man; nor is the sun useless to man because it sometimes gives him a headache.

Arguments such as the following belong in the main to the hortative department of oratory:— Virtue brings renown, therefore it should be pursued; but the pursuit of pleasure brings ill-repute, therefore it should be shunned. But the warning that we should not necessarily search for the originating cause is just: an example of such error is provided by the speech of Medea The opening of Ennius' translation of the Medea of Euripides. beginning

Ah! would that never there in Pelion's grove, as though her misery or guilt were due to the fact that there The beams of fir had fallen to the ground ; or I might cite the words addressed by Philoctetes to Paris, From the Philoctetes of Accius, Ribbeck fr. 178. Hadst thou been other than thou art, then IHad ne'er been plunged in woe. By tracing back causes on lines such as these we may arrive anywhere.

But for the fact that Cicero Top. iii. 12. has done so, I should regard it as absurd to add to these what is styled the conjugate argument, such as Those who perform a just act, act justly, a self-evident fact requiring no proof; or again, Every man has a common right to send his cattle to graze in a common pasture.

Some call these arguments derived from causes or efficients by the Greek name ἐκβάσεις that is, results; for in such cases the only point considered is how one thing results from another. Those arguments which prove the lesser from the greater or the greater from the less or equals from equals are styled apposite or comparative.

A conjecture as to a fact is confirmed by argument from something greater in the following sentence: If a man commit sacrilege, he will also commit theft ; from something less, in a sentence such as He who lies easily and openly will commit perjury ; from something equal in a sentence such as He who has taken a bribe to give a false verdict will take a bribe to give false witness.

Points of law may be proved in a similar manner; from something greater, as in the sentence If it is lawful to kill an adulterer, it is lawful to scourge him ; from something less, If it is lawful to kill a man attempting theft by night, how much more lawful is it to kill one who attempts robbery with violence ; from something equal, The penalty which is just in the case of parricide is also just in the case of matricide. In all these cases we follow the syllogistic method. See III. vi. 15, 43, 88.