We must also consider the resources possessed by the parties concerned, more especially when dealing with questions of fact; for it is more credible that a smaller number of persons were killed by a larger, a weaker party by a stronger, sleepers by men that were wide awake, the unsuspecting by the well-prepared, while the converse arguments may be used to prove the opposite.

Such considerations arise both in deliberative and forensic oratory: in the latter they occur in relation to two questions, namely, whether some given person had the will, and whether lie had the power to do the deed; for hope will often create the will to act. Hence the well-known inference in Cicero: pro Mil. x. 29. Clodius lay in wait for Milo, not Milo for Clodius, for Clodius had a retinue of sturdy slaves, while Milo was with a party of women; Clodius was mounted, Milo in a carriage, Clodius lightly clad, Milo hampered by a cloak.

With resources we may couple instruments, which form part of resources and means. But sometimes instruments will provide us with indications as well, as for instance if we find a javelin sticking in a dead body.

To these we may add manner, the Greek τρόπος, in regard to which we ask how a thing was done. Manner is concerned sometimes with quality and the letter of the law See § 40. Also III. vi. 55 and 66. (we may for instance argue that it was unlawful to kill an adulterer by poison), sometimes with questions of fact, as for example if I argue that an act was committed with a good intent and therefore openly, or with a bad intent and therefore treacherously, by night, in a lonely place.

In all cases, however, in which we enquire into the nature and meaning of an act, and which can be considered by themselves apart from all considerations of persons and all else that gives rise to the actual cause, there are clearly three points to which we must give attention, namely Whether it is, What it is and Of what kind it is. But as there are certain places See above § 20. of argument which are common to all three questions, this triple division is impracticable and we must therefore consider these questions rather in connexion with those places in which they most naturally arise.

Arguments, then, may be drawn from definition, sometimes called finitio and sometimes finis. Definition is of two kinds. We may ask whether a particular quality is a virtue or make a definition precede and ask what is the nature of a virtue. Such a definition is either stated in general terms, such as Rhetoric is the science of speaking well, or in detail, such as Rhetoric is the science of correct conception, arrangement and utterance, coupled with a retentive memory and a dignified delivery. Further,

we may define a word by giving its content as in the preceding instances, or by etymology: we may for instance explain assiduus Paulus (exc. Fest.) gives the following explanation of this absurd derivation, for which Cicero tells that Aelius Stilo was responsible: Some think that assiduus was originally the epithet applied to one who served in the army at his own expense, contributing an as ( i.e. instead of receiving it)! by deriving it from as and do, locuples locheples ( wealthy ) is derived from locus = the posses sors of many places. by deriving it from copia locorum, pecuniosus pecuniosus ( moneyed ) is derived from pecus = rich in herds. from copiapecorum. Genus, species, difference and property seem more especially to afford scope for definition, for we derive arguments from all of these.

Genus is of little use when we desire to prove a species, but of great value for its elimination. A tree is not necessarily a plane tree, but that which is not a tree is certainly not a plane tree; again, a virtue is not necessarily the virtue of justice, but that which is not a virtue is certainly not justice. We must proceed from the genus to the ultimate species; cp. § 5. for example, to say that man is an animal will not suffice; for animal merely gives us the genus: nor yet will the addition of the words subject to death be adequate; for although this epithet gives us a species, it is common to other animals as well. If, however, we define man as a rational animal, we need nothing further to make our meaning clear.

On the other hand species will give us clear proof of genus, but is of little service for its elimination. For example, justice is always a virtue, but that which is not justice may still be a virtue, such as fortitude, constancy or self-control. Genus therefore cannot be eliminated by species unless all the species included in the genus be eliminated, as for instance in the following sentence: That which is neither rational nor mortal nor an animal is not a man.

To these they add property and difference. Properties serve to establish definitions, differences to overthrow them. A property is that which happens to one particular object and that alone; speech and laughter for instance are properties of man. Or it may be something specially belonging to an object, but not to it alone; heating for instance is a property of fire. The same thing may also have a number of properties: light and heat are both properties of fire. Consequently, the omission of any property in a definition will impair it, but the introduction of a property, whatever it may be, will not necessarily establish a definition.

We have, however, often to consider what is a property of some given object; for example, if it should be asserted, on the ground of etymology, that the peculiar property of a tyrannicide is to kill tyrants, we should deny it: for an executioner is not ipso facto a tyrannicide, if he executes a tyrant who has been delivered to him for the purpose, nor again is he a tyrannicide who kills a tyrant unwittingly or against his will.

What is not a property will be a difference: it is, for instance, one thing to be a slave, and another to be in a state of servitude; hence the distinction raised in connexion with persons assigned to their creditors for debt: A slave, if he is manumitted becomes a freedman, but this is not the case with one who is assigned. There are also other points of difference which are dealt with elsewhere. VII. iii. 26. Also III vi. 25.

Again, the term difference is applied in cases when the genus is divided into species and one species is subdivided. Animal, for instance, is a genus, mortal a species, while terrestrial or biped is a difference: for they are not actually properties, but serve to show the difference between such animals and quadrupeds or creatures of the sea. This distinction, however, comes under the province not so much of argument as of exact definition. Cicero Cic. Top. iii. 13. separates genus and species,

which latter he calls form, from definition and includes them under relation. For example, if a person to whom another man has left all his silver should claim all his silver money as well, he would base his claim upon genus; on the other hand if when a legacy has been left to a married woman holding the position of materfamilias, it should be maintained that the legacy is not due to a woman who never came into the power of her husband, the argument is based on species, since there are two kinds of marriage. There was the formal marriage per coemptionem, bringing the woman under the power ( in manum )of her husband and giving her the title of materfamilias, and the informal marriage based on cohabitation without involving the wife's coming in manum mariti. Cicero Cic. Top.

further shows that definition is assisted by division, which he distinguishes from partition, making the latter the dissection of a whole into its parts and the former the division of a genus into its forms or species. The number of parts he regards as being uncertain, as for instance the elements of which a state consists; the forms or species are, however, certain, as for instance the number of forms of government, which we are told are three, democracy, oligarchy, and monarchy. It is true that he does not use these illustrations,

since, as he was writing to Trebatius, A famous lawyer, cp. III. xi. 18. v. 17. he preferred to draw his examples from law. I have chosen my illustrations as being more obvious. Properties have relation to questions of fact as well; for instance, it is the property of a good man to act rightly, of an angry man to be violent in speech or action, and consequently we believe that such acts are committed by persons of the appropriate character, or not committed by persons of inappropriate character. For just as certain persons possess certain qualities, so certain others do not possess certain qualities, and the argument is of precisely the same nature, though from opposite premises.

In a similar way division is valuable both for proof and refutation. For proof, it is sometimes enough to establish one thing. To be a citizen, a man must either have been born or made such. For refutation, both points must be disproved: he was neither born nor made a citizen.

This may be done in many ways, and constitutes a form of argument by elimination, whereby we show sometimes that the whole is false, sometimes that only that which remains alter the process of elimination is true. An example of the first of these two cases would be: You say that you lent him money. Either you possessed it yourself, received it from another, found it or stole it. If you did not possess it, receive it from another, find or steal it, you did not lend it to him.

The residue after elimination is shown to be true as follows: This slave whom you claim was either born in your house or bought or given you or left you by will or captured from the enemy or belongs to another. By the elimination of the previous suppositions he is shown to belong to another. This form of argument is risky and must be employed with care; for if, in setting forth the alternatives, we chance to omit one, our whole case will fail, and our audience will be moved to laughter. It is safer to do what Cicero pro Caec. xiii. 37.

does in the pro Caecina, when he asks, If this is not the point at issue, what is? For thus all other points are eliminated at one swoop. Or again two contrary propositions may be advanced, either of which if established would suffice to prove the case. Take the following example from Cicero: pro Cluent. xxiii. 64. There can be no one so hostile to Cluentius as not to grant me one thing: if it be a fact that the verdict then given was the result of bribery, the bribes must have proceeded either from Habitus or Oppianicus: if I show that they did not proceed from Habitus I prove that they proceeded from Oppianicus: if I demonstrate that they were given by Oppianicus, I clear Habitus.