present or future. These latter, however, although accidents of persons, should be referred to that class of arguments which we draw from causes, as also should certain dispositions of mind, for example when we inquire whether one man is the friend or enemy of another.

Names also are treated as accidents of persons; this is perfectly true, but names are rarely food for argument, unless indeed they have been given for some special reasons, such as the titles of Wise, Great, Pious, or unless the name has suggested some special thought to the bearer. Lentulus Publius Cornelius Lentulus Sura, Catilinarian conspirator. cp. Sail Cat. c. 46. for instance had the idea of conspiracy suggested to him by the fact that according to the Sibylline books and the Responses of the soothsayers the tyranny was promised to three members of the Cornelian family, and he considered himself to be the third in succession to Sulla and Cinna, since he too bore the name Cornelius.

On tile other hand the conceit employed by Euripides Phoeniss. 636. ἀληθῶς δ᾽ ὄνομα Πολυνείκη πατὴρ ἔθετό σοι θείᾳ προνοίᾳ νεικέων ἐπώνυμον, with truth did our father call thee Polynices with divine foreknowledge naming thee after 'strife.' where he makes Eteocles taunt his brother Polynices on the ground that his name is evidence of character, is feeble in the extreme. Still a name will often provide the subject for a jest, See vi. iii. 53. witness the frequent jests of Cicero on the name of Verres. Such, then, and the like are the accidents of persons. It is impossible to deal with them all either here or in other portions of this work, and I must content myself with pointing out the lines on which further enquiry should proceed.

I now pass to things: of these actions are the most nearly connected with persons and must therefore be treated first. In regard to every action the question arises either Why or Where or When or How or By what means the action is performed.

Consequently arguments are drawn from the causes of past or future actions. The matter of these causes, by some called ὕλη, by others δύναμις, falls into two genera, which are each divided into four species. For the motive for any action is as a rule concerned with the acquisition, increase, preservation and use of things that are good or with the avoidance, diminution, endurance of things that are evil or with escape there from. All these considerations carry great weight in deliberative oratory as well.

But right actions have right motives, while evil actions are the result of false opinions, which originate in the things which men believe to be good or evil. Hence spring errors and evil passions such as anger, hatred, envy, desire, hope, ambition, audacity, fear and others of a similar kind. To these accidental circumstances may often be added, such as drunkenness or ignorance, which serve sometimes to excuse and sometimes to prove a charge, as for instance when a man is said to have killed one person while lying in wait for another. Further,

motives are often discussed not merely to convict the accused of the offence with which he is charged, but also to defend him when he contends that his action was right, that is to say proceeded from an honourable motive, a theme of which I have spoken more fully in the third book. III. xi. 4–9.

Questions of definition are also at times intimately connected with motives. Is a man a tyrannicide if he kills a tyrant by whom he has been detected in the act of adultery? Or is lie guilty of sacrilege who tore down arms dedicated in a temple to enable him to drive the enemy from the city?

Arguments are also drawn from place. With a view to proving our facts we consider such questions as whether a place is hilly or level, near the coast or inland, planted or uncultivated, crowded or deserted, near or far, suitable for carrying out a given design or the reverse. This is a topic which is treated most carefully by Cicero in his pro Milone. pro Mil. xx.

These points and the like generally refer to questions of fact, but occasionally to questions of law as well. For we may ask whether a place is public or private, sacred or profane, our own or another's, just as where persons are concerned we ask whether a man is a magistrate, a father, a foreigner.

Hence arise such questions as the following. You have stolen private money, but since you stole it from a temple, it is not theft but sacrilege. You have killed adulterers, an act permitted by law, but since the act was done in a brothel, it is murder. "You have committed an assault, but since the object of your assault was a magistrate, the crime is lèse-majesté.

Similarly it may be urged in defence, The act was lawful, because I was a father, a magistrate. But such points afford matter for argument when there is a controversy as to the facts, and matter for enquiry when the dispute turns on a point of law. Place also frequently affects the quality of an action, for the same action is not always lawful or seemly under all circumstances, while it makes considerable difference in what state the enquiry is taking place, for they differ both in custom and law.

Further arguments drawn from place may serve to secure approval or the reverse. Ajax for instance in Ovid Met. xiii. 5. Ajax had saved the ships from being burned by the Trojans. The dispute as to whether the arms of Achilles should be awarded to him or to Ulysses is being tried there. Ajax's argument is, Can you refuse me my due reward on the very spot where I saved you from disaster? says:— What! do we plead our cause before the ships?And is Ulysses there preferred to me? Again one of the many charges brought against Milo was that he killed Clodius on the monument of his ancestors. pro Ail. vii. 17. i.e. on the Appian Way constructed by one of Clodius' ancestors.

Such arguments may also carry weight in deliberative oratory, as may those drawn from time, which I shall now proceed to discuss. Time may, as I have said elsewhere, III. vi. 25. be understood in two different senses, general and special. The first sense is seen in words and phrases such as now, formerly, in the reign of Alexander, in the days of the siege of Troy, and whenever we speak of past, present or future. The second sense occurs when we speak either of definite periods of time such as in summer, in winter, by night, by day, or of fortuitous periods such as in time of pestilence, in time of war, during a banquet.

Certain Latin writers have thought it a sufficient distinction to call the general sense time, and the special times. In both senses time is of importance in advisory speeches and demonstrative oratory, but not so frequently as in forensic.

For questions of law turn on time, while it also determines the quality of actions and is of great importance in questions of fact; for instance, occasionally it provides irrefragable proofs, which may be illustrated by a case which I have already cited, v. v. 2. when one of the signatories to a document has died before the day on which it was signed, or when a person is accused of the commission of some crime, although he was only an infant at the time or not yet born.

Further, all kinds of arguments may easily be drawn either from facts previous to a certain act, or contemporary or subsequent. As regards antecedent facts the following example will illustrate my meaning; You threatened to kill him, you went out by night, you started before him. Motives of actions may also belong to past time.

Some writers have shown themselves over-subtle in their classification of the second class of circumstances, making a sound was heard an example of circumstances combined with an act and a shout was raised an instance of circumstances attached to an act. As regards subsequent circumstances I may cite accusations such as You hid yourself, you fled, livid spots and swellings appeared on the corpse. The counsel for the defence will employ the same divisions of time to discredit the charge which is brought against him.

In these considerations are included everything in connexion with words and deeds, but in two distinct ways. For some things are done because something else is like to follow, and others because something else has previously been done, as for instance, when the husband of a beautiful woman is accused of having acted as a procurer on the ground that he bought her after she was found guilty of adultery, or when a debauched character is accused of parricide on the ground that he said to his father You have rebuked me for the last time. Both cases are clearly themes from the schools of rhetoric. For in the former case the accused is not a procurer because he bought the woman, but bought her because he was a procurer, while in the latter the accused is not a parricide because he used these words, but used them because lie intended to kill his father.

With regard to accidental circumstances, which also provide matter for arguments, these clearly belong to subsequent time, but are distinguished by a certain special quality, as for instance if I should say, Scipio was a better general than Hannibal, for he conquered Hannibal ; He was a good pilot, for he was never shipwrecked ; He was a good farmer, for he gathered in huge harvests ; or referring to bad qualities, He was a prodigal, for he squandered his patrimony ; His life was disgraceful, for he was hated by all.