I now turn to arguments, the name under which we comprise the enthymeme (which we translate by commentun or commentatio,
there being no alternative, though we should be wiser to use the Greek
name) has three meanings: firstly it means anything conceived in the
mind (this is not however the sense of which I am now speaking);
secondly it signifies a proposition with a reason, and thirdly a
conclusion of an argument drawn either from denial of consequents or
from incompatibles epicheireme, while it will be found that the
majority hold the view that an epicheireme is a
conclusion from incompatibles: contrarium or argument from contraries. Some
again call it a rhetorical
syllogism, others an incomplete syllogism, because its parts are not so
clearly defined or of the same number as those of the regular syllogism,
since such aggressio,
that is an attempt. It would however, in my opinion, be truer to say
that it is not our handling of the subject, but the thing itself which
we attempt which should be called an
Others regard it not as an attempted or imperfect proof, but a complete
proof, falling under the most special p. § 56 and VII. i. 23. i.e. the
major and minor premisses and the conclusion. See v. xiv. 6 sqq.
reason,
but Cicero de Inv. . xxxi. 34. reasoning, although he too seems to derive this
name from the syllogism rather than anything else; for he calls the syllogistic basis
ratiocinative basis and quotes philosophers to
support him. And since there is a certain kinship between a syllogism
and an epicheireme, it may be thought that he was
justified in his use of the latter term.
An linear demonstrations
epicheireme solely in the kind of conclusion
arrived at and that an apodeixis is simply an
incomplete epicheireme for the same reason that
we said an enthymeme differed from a syllogism. For an epicheireme is also part of a syllogism. Some think that an
apodeixis is portion of an epicheireme,
But all authorities, however much they may differ on other points,
define both in the same way, in so far as they call both a method of
proving what is not certain by means of what is certain. Indeed this is
the nature of all arguments, for what is certain cannot be proved by
what is uncertain. To all these forms of argument the Greeks give the
name of fides
a warrant
of credibility,
is best translated by probatio
proof.
But argument has several other meanings.
For the plots of plays composed for acting in the theatre are called
arguments, while Pedianus, when explaining the themes of the speeches of
Cicero, says The argument is as follows. Cicero
Fearing that I might transfer something from that source to my Cato,
although the argument is quite different. It is thus clear
that all subjects for writing are so called.
Nor is this to be wondered at, since the term is also in common use
among artists; hence the Vergilian phrase A mighty
argument.
Aen. vii. 791, with Reference to the design
on the shield of Turnus. rich in argument.
But the sense with which we are now concerned is that which provides
proof Celsus indeed treats the terms, proof, indication, credibility,
attempt, simply as different names for the same things, in which, to my
thinking, he betrays a certain confusion of thought.
For proof and credibility are not merely the result of logical
processes, but may equally be secured by inartificial arguments. Now I
have already
Otherwise there will be nothing by which we can prove anything; there must be something which either is or is believed to be true, by means of which doubtful things may be rendered credible. We may regard as certainties, first, those things which we perceive by the senses, things for instance that we hear or see, such as signs or indications; secondly, those things about which there is general agreement, such as the existence of the gods or the duty of loving one's parents;
thirdly, those things which are established by law or have passed into current usage, if not throughout the whole world, at any rate in the nation or state where the case is being pleaded—there are for instance many rights which rest not on law, but on custom; finally, there are the things which are admitted by either party, and whatever has already been proved or is not disputed by our adversary.
Thus for instance it may be argued that since the world is governed by providence, the state should similarly be governed by some controlling power: it follows that the state must be so governed, once it is clear that the world is governed by providence.
Further, the man who is to handle arguments correctly must know the
nature and meaning of everything and their usual effects. For it is thus
that we arrive at probable arguments or
With regard to credibility there are three degrees. First, the highest,
based on what usually happens, as for instance the assumption that
children are loved by