he will be all the readier to listen to our defence of our client's character. Thus the two points will render mutual assistance to each other; the judge will be more attentive to our legal proofs owing to his hope that we shall proceed to a vindication of character and better disposed to accept that vindication because we have proved our point of law.

But although partition is neither always necessary nor useful, it will, if judiciously employed, greatly add to the lucidity and grace of our speech. For it not only makes our arguments clearer by isolating the points from the crowd in which they would otherwise be lost and placing them before the eyes of the judge, but relieves his attention by assigning a definite limit to certain parts of our speech, just as our fatigue upon a journey is relieved by reading the distances on the milestones which we pass.

For it is a pleasure to be able to measure how much of our task has been accomplished, and the knowledge of what remains to do stimulates us to fresh effort over the labour that still awaits us. For nothing need seem long, when it is definitely known how far it is to the end.

Quintus Hortensius deserves the high praise which has been awarded him for the care which he took over his partitions, although Cicero more than once indulges in kindly mockery of his habit of counting his headings on his fingers. For there is a limit to gesture, and we must be specially careful to avoid excessive minuteness and any suggestion of articulated structure in our partition. If our divisions are too small,

they cease to be limbs and become fragments, and consequently detract not a little from the authority of our speech. Moreover, those who are ambitious of this sort of reputation, in order that they may appear to enhance the nicety and tile exhaustive nature of their division, introduce what is superfluous and subdivide things which naturally form a single whole. The result of their labours is, however, not so much to increase the number of their divisions as to diminish their importance, and after all is done and they have split up their argument into a thousand tiny compartments, they fall into that very obscurity which the partition was designed to eliminate.

The proposition, whether single or multiple, must, on every occasion when it can be employed with profit, be clear and lucid; for what could be more discreditable than that a portion of the speech, whose sole purpose is to prevent obscurity elsewhere, should itself be obscure? Secondly it must be brief and must not be burdened with a single superfluous word; for we are not explaining what we are saying, but what we are going to say.

We must also ensure that it is free alike from omissions and from redundance. Redundance as a rule occurs through our dividing into species when it would be sufficient to divide into genera, or through the addition of species after stating the genus. The following will serve as an example: I will speak of virtue, justice and abstinence. But justice and abstinence are species of tile genus virtue.

Our first partition will be between admitted and disputed facts. Admitted facts will then be divided into those acknowledged by our opponent and those acknowledged by ourselves. Disputed facts will be divided into those which we and those which our opponents allege. But the worst fault of all is to treat your points in an order different from that which was assigned them in your proposition.

Book V

There have been certain writers of no small authority cp. Ar. Rhet. i. 4 Also Quint. IV. v. 6. who have held that the sole duty of the orator was to instruct: in their view appeals to the emotions were to be excluded for two reasons, first on the ground that all disturbance of the mind was a fault, and secondly that it was wrong to distract the judge from the truth by exciting his pity, bringing influence to bear, and the like. Further, to seek to charm the audience, when the aim of the orator was merely to win success, was in their opinion not only superfluous for a pleader, but hardly worthy of a self-respecting man.

The majority however, while admitting that such arts undoubtedly formed part of oratory, held that its special and peculiar task is to make good the case which it maintains and refute that of its opponent.

Whichever of these views is correct (for at this point I do not propose to express my own opinion), they will regard this book as serving a very necessary purpose, since it will deal entirely with the points on which they lay such stress, although all that I have already said on the subject of judicial causes is subservient to the same end.

For the purpose of the exordium and the slatement of facts is merely to prepare the judge for these points, while it would be a work of supererogation to know the bases See III. vi. of cases or to consider the other points dealt with above, III. xi. unless we intend to proceed to the consideration of the proof Finally,

of the five parts I. ix. 1; IV. iii. 15. into which we divided judicial cases, any single one other than the proof may on occasion be dispensed with. But there can be no suit in which the proof is not absolutely necessary. With regard to the rules to be observed in this connexion, we shall, I think, be wisest to follow our previous method of classification and show first what is common to all cases and then proceed to point out those which are peculiar to the several kinds of cases.

1. To begin with it may be noted that the division laid down by Aristotle Rhet. i. ii. 2. has met with almost universal approval. It is to the effect that there are some proofs adopted by the orator which lie outside the art of speaking, and others which he himself deduces or, if I may use the term, begets out of his case. The former therefore have been styled ἄτεχνοι or inartificial proofs, the latter ἔντεχνοι or artificial.

To the first class belong decisions of previous courts, rumours, evidence extracted by torture, documents, oaths, and witnesses, for it is with these that the majority of forensic arguments are concerned. But though in themselves they involve no art, all the powers of eloquence are as a rule required to disparage or refute them. Consequently in my opinion those who would eliminate the whole of this class of proof from their rules of oratory, deserve the strongest condemnation.

It is not, however, my intention to embrace all that can be said for or against these views. I do not for instance propose to lay down rules for commonplaces, a task requiring infinite detail, but merely to sketch out the general lines and method to be followed by the orator. The method once indicated, it is for the individual orator not merely to employ his powers on its application, but on the invention of similar methods as the circumstances of the case may demand. For it is impossible to deal with every kind of case, even if we confine ourselves to those which have actually occurred in the past without considering those which may occur in the future.

As regards decisions in previous courts, these fall under three heads. First, we have matters on which judgment has been given at some time or other in cases of a similar nature: these are, however, more correctly termed precedents, as for instance where a father's will has been annulled or confirmed in opposition to his sons. Secondly, there are judgments concerned with the case itself; it is from these that the name praeiudicium is derived: as examples I may cite those passed against Oppianicus pro Cluent. xvii. sqq. or by the senate against Milo. pro Mil. v. Thirdly, there are judgments passed on the actual case, as for example in cases where the accused has been deported, Banished persons who have been accused afresh after their restoration. or where renewed application is made for the recognition of an individual as a free man, When a slave claimed his liberty by assertio through a representative known as assertor, his case was not disposed of once and for all by a first failure, but the claim might be presented anew. or in portions of cases tried in the centumviral court which come before two different panels of judges. The meaning is not clear. The Latin suggests that portions of a case might be tried by two panels sitting separately, while the case as a whole was tried by the two panels sitting conjointly. The hasta (spear) was the symbol of the centumviral court. cp. XI. i. 78.

Such previous decisions are as a rule confirmed in two ways: by the authority of those who gave the decision and by the likeness between the two cases. As for their reversal, this can rarely be obtained by denouncing the judges, unless they have been guilty of obvious error. For each of those who are trying the case wishes the decision given by another to stand, since he too has to give judgment and is reluctant to create a precedent that may recoil upon himself.

Consequently, as regards the first two classes, we must, if possible, take refuge in some dissimilarity between the two cases, and two cases are scarcely ever alike in all their details. If, however, such a course is impossible and the case is the same as that on which the previous decision was given, we must complain of the negligence shown in the conduct of the previous case or of the weakness of the parties condemned, or of undue influence employed to corrupt the witnesses, or again of popular prejudice or ignorance which reacted unfavourably against our client; or else we must consider what has occurred since to alter the aspect of the case.

If none of these courses can be adopted, it will still be possible to point out that the peculiar circumstances of many trials have led to unjust decisions; hence condemnations such as that of Rutilius Publius Rutilius Rufus condemned for extortion while governor of Asia, owing to a conspiracy of the publicans against him. He went into voluntary exile at Mitylene and was highly honoured by the people of Asia. 91 B.C. and acquittals such as those of Clodius and Catiline. We must also ask the judges to consider the facts of the case on their merits rather than make their verdict the inevitable consequence of a verdict given by others.