For the judge is always in a hurry to reach the most important point. If he has a patient disposition he will merely make a silent appeal to the advocate, whom he will treat as bound by his promise. On the other hand, if he is busy, or holds exalted position, or is intolerant by nature, he will insist in no very courteous manner on his coming to the point.

For these reasons there are some who disapprove of the partition adopted by Cicero in the pro Cluentio, iv. 9. Oppianicus had been indicted by Cluentius for an attempt upon his life and condemned. The previous judgments referred to were condemnations of his accomplices, which made Oppianicus' condemnation inevitable. Oppianicus was condemned, and it was alleged that this was due to bribery by Cluentius. Cluentius was now on his trial for the alleged murder of various persons. where he premises that he is going to show, first, that no man was ever arraigned for greater crimes or on stronger evidence than Oppianicus, secondly, that previous judgments had been passed by those very judges by whom he was condemned, and finally, that Cluentius made no attempt to bribe the jury, but that his opponent did. They argue that if the third point can be proved, there is no need to have urged the two preceding.

On the other hand you will find no one so unreasonable or so foolish as to deny that the partition in the pro Murena v. 11. is admirable. I understand, gentlemen, that the accusation falls into three parts, the first aspersing my client's character, the second dealing with his candidature for the magistracy, and the third with charges of bribery. These words make the case as clear as possible, and no one division renders any other superfluous.

There are also a number who are in doubt as to a form of defence which I may exemplify as follows: If I murdered him, I did right; but I did not murder him. See III. vi 10. What, they ask, is the value of the first part, if the second can be proved, since they are mutually inconsistent, and if anyone employs both arguments, we should believe neither? This contention is partially justified; we should employ the second alone only if the fact can be proved without a doubt.

But if we have any doubts as to being able to prove the stronger argument, we shall do well to rely on both. Different arguments move different people. He who thinks that the act was committed may regard it as a just act, while he who is deaf to the plea that the act was just may perhaps believe that it was never committed: one who is confident of his powers as a marksman may be content with one shaft, whereas he who has no such confidence will do well to launch several and give fortune a chance to come to his assistance.

Cicero in the pro Milone reveals the utmost skill in showing first that Clodius laid an ambush for Milo and then in adding as a supernumerary argument that, even if he had not done so, he was nevertheless so bad a citizen that his slaying could only have done credit to the patriotism of the slayer and redounded to his glory.

I would not however entirely condemn the order mentioned above, § 13. since there are certain arguments which, though hard in themselves, may serve to soften those which come after. The proverb, If you want to get your due, you must ask for something more, The proverb would seem originally to refer to bargaining in the market: the salesman, knowing he will be beaten down, sets his original price too high. But it would equally apply to claims for damages in the courts.

is not wholly unreasonable. Still no one should interpret it to mean that you must stop short of nothing. For the Greeks are right when they lay it down as a rule that we should not attempt the impossible. But whenever the double-barrelled defence of which I am speaking is employed, we must aim at making the first argument support the credibility of the second. For he who might without danger to himself have confessed to the commission of the act, can have no motive for lying when he denies the commission.

Above all it is important, whenever we suspect that the judge desires a proof other than that on which we are engaged, to promise that we will satisfy him on the point fully and without delay, more especially if the question is one of our client's honour.