It is also important on such occasions to know whether the judge prefers equity or a strict interpretation of the law, since the necessity for such digression will vary accordingly.

Such passages may also serve as a kind of peroration after the main question. The Greeks call this παρέκβασις, the Romans egressus or egressio (digression). They may however, as I have said, be of various kinds and may deal with different themes in any portion of the speech. For instance we may extol persons or places, describe regions, record historical or even legendary occurrences.

As examples I may cite the praise of Sicily and the rape of Proserpine Verr. I vii. 27. in the Verrines, or the famous recital of the virtues of Gneius Pompeius in the pro Cornelio, See note on IV. iv. 8. where the great orator as though the course of his eloquence had been broken by the mere mention of the general's name, interrupts the topic on which he had already embarked and digresses forthwith to sing his praises.

παρέκβασις may, I think, be defined as the handling of some theme, which must however have some bearing on the case, in a passage that involves digression from the logical order of our speech. I do not see therefore why it should be assigned a special position immediately following on the statement of facts any more than I understand why they think that the name is applicable only to a digression where some statement has to be made, when there are so many different ways in which a speech may leave the direct route.

For whatever we say that falls outside the five divisions of the speech already laid down is a digression, whether it express indignation, pity, hatred, rebuke, excuse, conciliation or be designed to rebut invective. Other similar occasions for digression on points not involved by the question at issue arise when we amplify or abridge a topic, make any kind of emotional appeal or introduce any of those topics which add such charm and elegance to oratory, topics that is to say such as luxury, avarice, religion, duty: but these would hardly seem to be digressions as they are so closely attached to arguments on similar subjects that they form part of the texture of the speech.

There are however a number of topics which are inserted in the midst of matter which has no connexion with them, when for example we strive to excite, admonish, appease, entreat or praise the judge. Such passages are innumerable. Some will have been carefully prepared beforehand, while others will be produced to suit the occasion or the necessity of the moment, if anything extraordinary should occur in the course of our pleading, such as an interruption, the intervention of some individual or a disturbance.

For example, this made it necessary for Cicero to digress even in the exordium when he was defending Milo, as is clear from the short speech The speech actually delivered, not the long speech which has come down to us, but was never delivered. which he made on that occasion. But the orator who makes some preface to the main question or proposes to follow up his proofs with a passage designed to commend them to the jury, may digress at some length. On the other hand, if he breaks as say in the middle of his speech, he should not be long in returning to the point from which he departed.

IV. After the statement of facts some place the proposition III. ix. 5; xi. 27. which they regard as forming a division of a forensic speech. I have already expressed my opinion of this view. III. ix. 2. But it seems to me that the beginning of every proof is a proposition, such as often occurs in the demonstration of the main question and sometimes even in the enunciation of individual arguments, more especially of those which are called ἐπιχειρήματα See v. xiv. 14. But for the moment I shall speak of the first kind. It is not always necessary to employ it.

The nature of the main question is sometimes sufficiently clear without any proposition, especially if the statement of facts ends exactly where the question begins. Consequently the recapitulation generally employed in the case of arguments is sometimes placed immediately after the statement of facts. The affair took place, as I have described, gentlemen: he that laid the ambush was defeated, violence was conquered by violence, or rather I should say audacity was crushed by valour. pro Mil. xi. 30.

Sometimes proposition is highly advantageous, more especially when the fact cannot be defended and the question turns on the definition of the fact; as for example in the case of the man who has taken the money of a private individual from a temple: we shall say, My client is charged with sacrilege. It is for you to decide whether it was sacrilege, so that the judge may understand that his sole duty is to decide whether the charge is tantamount to sacrilege.

The same method may be employed in obscure or complicated cases, not merely to make the case clearer, but sometimes also to make it more moving. This effect will be produced, if we at once support our pleading with some such words as the following: It is expressly stated in the law that for any foreigner who goes up on to the wall the penalty is death. You are undoubtedly a foreigner, and there is no question but that you went up on to the wall. The conclusion is that you must submit to the penalty. For this proposition forces a confession upon our opponent and to a certain extent accelerates the decision of the court. It does more than indicate the question, it contributes to its solution.

Propositions may be single, double or manifold: this is due to more than one reason. For several charges may be combined, as when Socrates was accused of corrupting the youth and of introducing new superstitions; while single propositions may be made up of a number of arguments, as for instance when Aeschines is accused of misconduct as an ambassador on the ground that he lied, failed to carry out his instructions, wasted time and accepted bribes.

The defence may also contain several propositions: for instance against a claim for money we may urge, Your claim is invalid; for you had no right to act as agent nor had the party whom you represent any right to employ an agent: further, he is not the heir of the man from whom it is asserted that I borrowed the money, nor am I his debtor.

These propositions can be multiplied at pleasure, but it is sufficient to give an indication of my meaning. If propositions are put forward singly with the proofs appended, they will form several distinct propositions: if they are combined, they fall under the head of partition.

A proposition may also be put forward unsupported, as is generally done in conjectural cases: The formal accusation is one of murder, but I also charge the accused with theft. Or it may be accompanied by a reason: Gaius Cornelius is guilty of an offence against the state; for when he was tribune of the plebs, he himself read out his bill to the public assembly. The speech is lost. In 67 B.C. Cornelius as tribune of the plebs proposed a law enacting that no man should be released from the obligations of a law save by decree of the people. This struck at a privilege usurped by the senate, and Servilius Globulus, another tribune, forbade the herald to read out the proposal. Cornelius then read it himself. He was accused of maiestas, defended by Cicero in 65 B.C. and acquitted. I In addition to these forms of proposition we can also introduce a proposition of our own, such as I accuse him of adultery, or may use the proposition of our opponent, such as The charge brought against me is one of adultery, or finally we may employ a proposition which is common to both sides, such as The question in dispute between myself and my opponent is, which of the two is next-of-kin to the deceased who died intestate. Sometimes we may even couple contradictory propositions, as for instance I say this, my opponent says that.

We may at times produce the effect of a proposition, even though it is not in itself a proposition, by adding after the statement of facts some phrase such as the following: These are the points on which you will give your decision, thereby reminding the judge to give special attention to the question and giving him a fillip to emphasise the point that we have finished the statement of facts and are beginning the proof, so that when we start to verify our statements he may realise that he has reached a fresh stage where he must begin to listen with renewed attention.