Glosses drawn from dreams and superstitions have long since lost their value, owing to the very ease with which they can be invented. But it will avail us little to use glosses in a statement of fact, unless they are consistent throughout the whole of our speech, more especially as certain things can only be proved by persistent assertion.

Take for instance the case of the parasite who claims as his son a young man who has been thrice disinherited by a wealthy father and thrice restored to his own. He will be able to put forward as a gloss or plea that poverty was the reason why he exposed the child, that he assumed the role of a parasite because his son was in the house in question and, lastly, that the reason why the young man was thrice disinherited was simply that he was not the son of the man who disinherited him.

But unless every word that he utters reveals an ardent paternal affection, hatred for his wealthy opponent and anxiety on behalf of the youth, who will, he knows, be exposed to serious danger if he remains in the house where he is the victim of such dislike, he will be unable to avoid creating the suspicion that he has been suborned to bring the action.

It sometimes happens in the controversial themes of the schools, though I doubt whether it could ever occur in the courts, that both sides employ the same gloss and support it on their own behalf.

An example of this may be found in the theme which runs as follows. A wife has stated to her husband that her stepson has attempted to seduce her and that a time and place have been assigned for their meeting: the son has brought the same charge against his stepmother, with the exception that a different time and place are mentioned. The father finds the son in the place mentioned by the wife, and the wife in the place mentioned by the son. He divorces her, and then, as she says nothing in her own defence, disinherits the son. No defence can be put forward for the son which is not also a defence of the stepmother.

However, what is common to both sides of the case will be stated, and then arguments will be drawn from a comparison of the characters of the two parties, from the order in which they laid information against each other and from the silence of the divorced wife.

Still we must not ignore the fact that there are some cases which do not admit of any form of gloss, but must be defended forthright. An example is provided by the case of the rich man who scourged the statue of a poor man who was his enemy, and was subsequently indicted for assault. Here no one can deny that the act was outrageous, but it may be possible to maintain that it is not punishable by law.

If, however, part of the statement of facts tells in our favour and part against us, we must consider whether in view of the circumstances of the case the parts in question should be blent or kept apart. If the points which are damaging to our case be in the majority, the points which are in its favour will be swamped. Under those circumstances it will be best to keep them apart and, after setting forth and proving the points which help our case, to meet the rest by employing the remedies mentioned above.

If, on the other hand, it be the points in our favour which predominate, we may even blend them with the others, since thus the traitors in our camp will have less force. None the less these points, both good and bad, must not be set forth naked and helpless: those in our favour must be supported by some argument, and then reasons must be added why the points which tell against us should not be believed; since if we do not distinguish clearly between the two, it is to be feared that those which are favourable may suffer from their bad company.

Further rules are laid down with regard to the statement of fact, forbidding us to indulge in digression, apostrophe or argumentation or to put our words into the mouths of others. Some even add that we should make no appeal to the passions. These rules should for the most part be observed, indeed they should never be infringed unless the circumstances absolutely demand it.

If our statement is to be clear and brief, almost anything can be justified sooner than digression. And if we do introduce a digression, it must always be short and of such a nature that we give the impression of having been forced from our proper course by some uncontrollable emotion. The passage in Cicero pro Clu. vi. 15. about the marriage of Sasia is a good example of this.

What incredible wickedness in a woman! Unheard of in the history of mankind till she dared the sin! What unbridled and unrestrained lust, what amazing daring! One might have thought that, even if she had no regard for the vengeance of heaven and the opinion of man, she would at least have dreaded that night of all nights and those torches that lighted her to the bridal bed: that she would have shrunk in horror from the threshold of her chamber, from her daughter's room and the very walls that had witnessed her former marriage.

As to addressing another in place of the judge, it may be a means of making a point with greater brevity and give it greater force. On this subject I hold the same view that I expressed in dealing with the exordium, as I do on the subject of impersonation. This artifice however is employed not only by Servius Sulpicius in his speech on behalf of Aufidia, when he cries Am I to suppose that you were drowsed with sleep or weighed down by some heavy lethargy? but by Cicero Verr. v. xlv. 118. as well, when in a passage which, like the above, belongs to the statement of facts, in speaking of the ships' captains he says, You will give so much to enter, etc.

Again in the pro Clueniio pro Clu. xxvi. does not the conversation between Staienus and Bulbus conduce to speed and enhance the credibility of the statements ? In case it should be thought that Cicero did this without design (quite an incredible supposition in his case), I would point out that in the Partitiones ix. 31. he lays it down that the statement of facts should be characterised by passages which will charm and excite admiration or expectation, and marked by unexpected turns, conversations between persons and appeals to every kind of emotion.

We shall, as I have already said, never argue points in the statement of facts, but we may sometimes introduce arguments, as for example Cicero does in the pro Ligario, ii. 4. Ligarius was accused of having fought for the Pompeians in Africa. Cicero points out that he went out to Africa before the outbreak of war was dreamed of and that his whole attitude was discreet. when he says that he ruled his province in such a way that it was to his interest that peace should continue. We shall sometimes also, if occasion demand, insert a brief defence of the facts in the statement and trace the reasons that led up to them.

For we must state our facts like advocates, not witnesses. A statement in its simplest form will run as follows, Quintus Ligarius went out as legate to C. Considius. But how will Cicero pro Lig. i. 2. put it ? Quintus Ligarius, he says, set out for Africa as legate to Gaius Considius at a time when there was no thought of war. And again elsewhere ib. ii. 4.