For even when they have tried everything, they will never find anything more difficult in the whole range of oratory than that which, once heard, all think they would have said,— a delusion due to the fact that they regard what has been said as having no merit save that of truth. But it is just when an orator gives the impression of absolute truth that he is speaking best.
As it is, when such persons as these get a fair field for stating their
case, they select this as the precise occasion for affected modulations
of the voice, throwing back their heads, thumping their sides and
indulging in every kind of extravagance of statement, language and
style. As a result, while the speech, from its very monstrosity, meets
with applause, the case remains unintelligible. However, let us pass to
another subject; my aim is to win favour for
The statement of facts will be brief, if in the
first place we start at that point of the case at which it begins to
concern the judge, secondly avoid irrelevance, and finally cut out
everything the removal of which neither hampers the activities of the
judge nor harms our own case.
For frequently conciseness of detail is not inconsistent with length in
the whole. Take for instance such a statement as the following:
I came to the harbour, I saw a ship, I asked the cost of a passage,
the price was agreed, I went on board, the anchor was weighed, we
loosed our cable and set out.
Nothing could be terser than
these assertions, but it would have been quite sufficient to say
I sailed from the harbour.
And whenever the
conclusion gives a sufficiently clear idea of the premisses, we must be
content with having given a hint which will enable our audience to
understand what we have left unsaid.
Consequently when it is possible to say I have a young
son,
it is quite superfluous to say, Being desirous
of children I took a wife, a son was born whom I acknowledged and
reared and brought up to manhood.
For this reason some of
the Greeks draw a distinction between a concise statement (the word they
use is
Personally, when I use the word brevity, I mean not saying less, but not
saying more than occasion demands. As for repetitions and tautologies
and diffuseness, which some writers of textbooks tell us we must avoid,
I pass them by;
But we must be equally on our guard against the obscurity which results from excessive abridgment, and it is better to say a little more than is necessary than a little less. For though a diffuse irrelevance is tedious, the omission of what is necessary is positively dangerous.
We must therefore avoid even tile famous terseness of Sallust (though in
his case of course it is a merit), and shun all abruptness of speech,
since a style which presents no difficulty to a leisurely reader, flies
past a hearer and will not stay to be looked at again; and whereas the
reader is almost always a man of learning, the judge often comes to his
panel from the country side and is expected to give a decision on what
he can understand. Consequently we must aim, perhaps everywhere, but
above all in our statement of facts, at striking
the happy mean in our language, and the happy mean may be defined as
saving just what is necessary and just what is sufficient.
By just what is necessary
I mean not the bare minimum
necessary to convey our meaning; for our brevity must not be devoid of
elegance, without which it would be merely uncouth: pleasure beguiles
the attention, and that which delights us ever seems less long, just as
a picturesque and easy journey tires us less for all its length than a
difficult short cut through an arid waste.
And I would never carry my desire for brevity so far as to refuse
admission to details which may contribute to the plausibility of our
narrative. Simplify and curtail your statement of facts in every
direction and you will turn it into something more like a confession.
Moreover, the statement of facts, in which
case, as I have already enjoined, the judge should be prepared for it at
the conclusion of the exordium. Next we must put
forth all our art either to shorten it or to render it less tedious.
We must do what we can to make it less long by postponing some points,
taking care however to mention what it is that we propose to postpone.
Take the following as an example. As regards his motives for
killing him, his accomplices and the manner in which he disposed his
ambush, I will speak when I come to the
Some
things indeed may be omitted altogether from our marshalling of the
facts, witness the following example from Cicero, proof.
pro Caec. iv. 11.
Fulcinius died; there are many circumstances which
attended that event, but as they have little bearing on this case, I
shall pass them by.
Division of our statement into its
various heads is another method of avoiding tedium: for example,
I will tell you first what preceded this affair, then what occurred
in its actual development, and finally you shall hear its sequel.
Such a division will give the impression of three short statements
rather than of one long one. At times it will be well to interrupt our
narrative by interjecting some brief remark like the following:
You have heard what happened before: now learn what
follows.
The judge will be refreshed by the fact that we
have brought our previous remarks to a close and will prepare himself
for what may be regarded as a fresh start.
If however after employing all these artifices our array of facts is
still long, it will not be without advantage to append a summary at the
end of it as a reminder: Cicero does this even at the close of a statement of facts in
the pro Ligario:
pro Lig. ii. 4.
To this day, Caesar, Quintus Ligarius is free from
all blame: he left his home not merely without the least intention
of joining in any war, but when there was not the least suspicion of
any war etc.
The statement of fact will be credible, if in the
first place we take care to say nothing contrary to nature, secondly if
we assign reasons and motives for the facts on which the inquiry turns
(it is unnecessary to do so with the subsidiary facts as well), and if
we make the characters of the actors in keeping with the facts we desire
to be believed: we shall for instance represent a person accused of
theft as covetous, accused of adultery as lustful, accused of homicide
as rash, or attribute the opposite qualities to these persons if we are
defending them: further we must do the same with place, time and the
like.
It is also possible to treat the subject in such a way as to give it an
air of credibility, as is done in comedy and farce. For some things have
such natural sequence and coherence that, if only the first portion of
your statement is satisfactory, the judge will
himself anticipate what you have got to say in the later part.
It will also be useful to scatter some hints of our proofs here and
there, but in such a way that it is never forgotten that we are making a
statement of facts and not a proof.
Sometimes, however, we must also support our assertions by a certain
amount of argument, though this must be short and simple: for instance
in a case of poisoning we shall say, He was perfectly well when
he drank, he fell suddenly to the ground, and blackness and swelling
of the body immediately supervened.
The same result is produced by The accused is a strong man and was fully
armed, while his opponents were weak, unarmed and suspecting no
evil.
We may in fact touch on everything that we propose to
produce in our proof; while making our statement
of facts, as for instance points connected with persons, cause, place,
time, the instrument and occasion employed.
Sometimes, when this resource is unavailable, we may even confess that the charge, though true, is scarcely credible, and that therefore it must be regarded as all the more atrocious; that we do not know how the deed was done or why, that we are filled with amazement, but will prove our case.