For my part I follow the very highest authorities in holding that there are two forms of statement of facts in forensic speeches, the one expounding the facts of the case itself, the other setting forth facts which have a bearing on the case.

I agree that a sentence such as I did not kill the man does not amount to a statement of facts: but there will be a statement of facts, occasionally, too, a long one, in answer to the arguments put forward by the accuser: it will deal with the past life of the accused, with the causes which have brought an innocent man into peril, and other circumstances such as show the charge to be incredible.

For the accuser does not merely say You killed him, but sets forth the facts proving his assertion: tragedy will provide an example, where Teucer accuses Ulysses of murdering Ajax, and states that he was found in a lonely place near the lifeless body of his enemy with a blood-stained sword in his hands. To this Ulysses does not merely reply that he did not do the deed, but adds that he had no quarrel with Ajax, the contest between them having been concerned solely with the winning of renown: he then goes on to say how he came to be in the lonely place, how he found Ajax lying lifeless and drew the sword from the wound. Then follow arguments based on these facts.

But even when the accuser says You were found on the spot where your enemy was killed and the accused says I was not, a statement of facts is involved; for he must say where he was. Consequently cases of bribery and extortion will require as many statements of this kind as there are charges: the charges themselves will be denied, but it will be necessary to counter the arguments of the accuser either singly or all together by setting forth the facts in quite a different light.

Is it, I ask you, irrelevant for one accused of bribery to set forth his parentage, his past life and the services on which he relied for success in his candidature? And if a man is indicted for extortion, will it not be to his advantage to set forth not merely his past record, but also the reasons which have made the whole province or the accuser or a witness hostile to himself?

If these are not statements of facts, neither is the first portion of Cicero's V. 11. defence of Cluentius, beginning with the words Aulus Cluentius Habitus. For there he says nothing about the charge of poisoning, but confines himself entirely to setting forth the reasons for the hostility of Cluentius' mother to her son.

There are also statements which do not set forth the facts of the case itself, but facts which are none the less relevant to the case: the speaker's purpose may be to illustrate the case by some parallel, as in the passage in the Verrines V. 3. The shepherd was crucifed because the carrying of arms was forbidden. about Lucius Domitius who crucified a shepherd because he admitted that he had used a hunting spear to kill the boar which he had brought him as a present;

or he may desire to dispel some charge that is irrelevant to the case as in the passage of the speech for Rabirius Postumus, X. 28. The charge in question was that Rabirius had worn the Greek pallium instead of the Roman toga. But as an official of the king he was forced to wear Greek dress. which runs as follows: For when he came to Alexandria, gentlemen, the only means of saving his money which the king suggested to Postumus was that he should take charge of the royal household and act as a kind of steward. Or the orator may desire to heighten the effect of his charges, as Cicero Verr. v. 10. does in his description of the journey of Verres.

Sometimes a fictitious statement is employed either to stir the emotions of the judges, as in that passage of the proo Roscio Amerino xxii. 60. dealing with Chrysogonus to which I referred just recently, or to entertain them with a show of wit, as in the passage of the pro Cluentio xx. 57 sqq. describing the brothers Caepasius: sometimes again a digression may be introduced to add beauty to the speech, as in the passage about Proserpine in the Verrines, IV. 48. The words quoted do not occur in our MSS of Cicero. beginning It was here that a mother is once said to have sought her daughter. All these examples serve to show that he who denies a charge may not necessarily refrain from stating, but may actually state that very fact which he denies.

Even the assertion which I made above to the effect that a statement of facts familiar to the judge is superfluous, is not to be taken too literally. My meaning is that it may be dispensed with, if the judge knows not merely what has been done, but takes a view of the facts which is favourable to our case.

For the purpose of the statement of facts is not merely to instruct, but rather to persuade the judge. Therefore, when we desire to influence him in some way or other, although he may require no instruction, we shall preface our statement with some such remarks as these: I know that you are aware of the general nature of the case, but I trust you will not take it ill if I ask you to consider each point in detail.

At times again we may pretend that we are repeating the facts for the benefit of some new member of the jury, i.e. introduced to fill the place of a juror who had had to leave the jury. at times that we do so with a view to letting every bystander as well realise the gross unfairness of our opponents' assertions. Under these circumstances our statement must be diversified by a free use of figures to avoid wearying those to whom the facts are familiar: we shall for instance use phrases such as You remember, It may perhaps be superfluous to dwell on this point, But why should I say more, as you are well acquainted with the fact? , You are not ignorant how this matter stands and so on.

Besides, if we are always to regard as superfluous a statement of facts made before a judge who is familiar with the case, we may even go so far as to regard it as superfluous at times to plead the case at all.

There is a further question which is still more frequently raised, as to whether the statement of facts should always follow immediately on the exordium. Those who hold that it should always do so must be admitted to have some reason on their side. For since the purpose of the exordium is to make the judge more favourably disposed and more attentive to our case and more amenable to instruction, and since the proof cannot be brought forward until the facts of the case are known, it seems right that the judge should be instructed in the facts without delay.

But the practice may be altered by circumstances, unless it is contended that Cicero in his magnificent published defence of Milo delayed his statement too long by placing three questions before it; or unless it is argued that, if it bad been held to be impermissible to defend a man at all who acknowledged that he had killed another, or if Milo's case had already been prejudged and condemnation passed by the senate, or if Gnaeus Pompeius, who in addition to exerting his influence in other ways had surrounded the court with an armed guard, had been regarded with apprehension as hostile to the accused, it would have served his case to set forth how Clodius had set an ambush for Milo.

These three questions, then, served the purpose of an exordium, since they all of them were designed to prepare the minds of the judges. Again in the pro Vareno Cicero delayed his statement of facts until he had first rebutted certain allegations put forward by the prosecution. This may be done with advantage whenever we have not merely to rebut the charge, but to turn the tables on our opponents: thus after first rebutting the charge, we make our statement of facts the opening of an incrimination of the other party just as in actual fighting we are most concerned to parry our adversary's blows before we strike him ourselves.

There will also not infrequently be certain cases, in which it is easy to rebut the charge that is under trial, but the conduct of which is hampered by the past life of our client and the many and serious crimes which he has committed. We must dispose of these first, in order that the judge may give a favourable hearing to our defence of the actual facts which form the question at issue. For example, if we have to defend Marcus Caelius, the best course for his advocate to adopt will be to meet the imputations of luxury, wantonness and immorality which are made against him before we proceed to the actual charge of poisoning. It is with these points that the speech of Cicero in his defence is entirely concerned. Is he then to go on to make a statement about the property of Palla and explain the whole question of rioting, a charge against which Caelius has already defended himself in the speech which he delivered on his own behalf?