<GetPassage xmlns:tei="http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0" xmlns="http://chs.harvard.edu/xmlns/cts">
            <request>
                <requestName>GetPassage</requestName>
                <requestUrn>urn:cts:latinLit:phi1002.phi001.perseus-eng2:3.8.17-3.8.24</requestUrn>
            </request>
            <reply>
                <urn>urn:cts:latinLit:phi1002.phi001.perseus-eng2:3.8.17-3.8.24</urn>
                <passage>
                    <TEI xmlns="http://www.tei-c.org/ns/1.0"><text xml:lang="eng"><body><div n="urn:cts:latinLit:phi1002.phi001.perseus-eng2" type="translation" xml:lang="eng"><div n="3" type="textpart" subtype="book"><div n="8" type="textpart" subtype="section"><div n="17" type="textpart" subtype="section"><p> But even in connection with things that are undoubtedly feasible, there
                            may at times be room for <hi rend="italic">conjecture,</hi> as for
                            instance in questions such as whether Rome is ever likely to <pb n="v1-3 p.489"/> conquer Carthage, whether Hannibal will return to
                            Africa if Scipio transports his army thither, or whether the Samnites
                            are likely to keep faith if the Romans lay down their arms. <note anchored="true" place="unspecified"><hi rend="italic">sc.</hi> at
                                the Caudine Forks: see above, § 3. </note> There are some things too
                            which we may believe to be both feasible and likely to be carried into
                            effect, but at another time or place or in another way. </p></div><div n="18" type="textpart" subtype="section"><p> When there is no scope for conjecture, our attention will be fixed on
                            other points. In the first place advice will be asked either on account
                            of the actual thing on which the orator is required to express his
                            views, or on account of other causes which affect it from without. It is
                            on the actual thing that the senate for instance debates, when it
                            discusses such questions as whether it is to vote pay for the troops. In
                            this case the material is simple. </p></div><div n="19" type="textpart" subtype="section"><p> To this however may be added reasons for taking action or the reverse,
                            as for example if the senate should discuss whether it should deliver
                            the Fabii to the Gauls when the latter threaten war, <note anchored="true" place="unspecified">See Livy, v. 36.</note> or Gaius
                            Caesar should deliberate whether he should persist in the invasion of
                            Germany, when his soldiers on all sides are making their wills. <note anchored="true" place="unspecified"> See Caesar, <hi rend="italic">Gallic War,</hi> i. 39, where this detail is recorded, also 40
                                where the speech made to his troops is given. </note> These
                            deliberative themes are of a twofold nature. </p></div><div n="20" type="textpart" subtype="section"><p> In the first case the reason for deliberation is the Gallic threat of
                            war, but there may still be a further question as to whether even
                            without such threat of war they should surrender those who, contrary to
                            the law of nations, took part in a battle when they had been sent out as
                            ambassadors and killed the king with whom they had received instructions
                            to treat. </p></div><div n="21" type="textpart" subtype="section"><p> In the second case Caesar would doubtless never deliberate on the
                            question at all, but for the perturbation shown by his soldiers; but
                            there is still room for enquiry whether quite apart from this occurrence
                            it <pb n="v1-3 p.491"/> would be wise to penetrate into Germany. But it
                            must be remembered that we shall always speak first on that subject
                            which is capable of discussion quite apart from the consequences. </p></div><div n="22" type="textpart" subtype="section"><p> Some have held that the three main considerations in an advisory speech
                            are honour, expediency and necessity. I can find no place for the last.
                            For however great the violence which may threaten us, it may be
                            necessary for us to suffer something, but we are not compelled to do
                            anything; whereas the subject of deliberation is primarily whether we
                            shall do anything. </p></div><div n="23" type="textpart" subtype="section"><p> Or if by necessity they mean that into which we are driven by fear of
                            worse things, the question will be one of expediency. For example, if a
                            garrison is besieged by overwhelmingly superior forces and, owing to the
                            failure of food and water supplies, discusses surrender to the enemy,
                            and it is urged that it is a matter of necessity, the words
                                <quote>otherwise we shall perish</quote> must needs be added:
                            consequently there is no necessity arising out of the circumstances
                            themselves, for death is a possible alternative. And as a matter of fact
                            the Saguntines <note anchored="true" place="unspecified"> In 218 B. C.,
                                when besieged by Hannibal. See Livy, xxi. 14. </note> did not
                            surrender, nor did those who were surrounded on the raft from
                            Opitergium. <note anchored="true" place="unspecified"> C. Antonius was
                                blockaded in an island off the Dalmatian coast which he held for
                                Caesar 49 B. C. Reinforcements on rafts were sent to his rescue.
                                Most were captured; but in one case, of a raft carrying 1,000 men
                                from Opitergium in Venetia, surrender was scorned and the men slew
                                each other rather than yield. See Lucan, iv. 462; Florus, ii. 33.
                            </note>
                     </p></div><div n="24" type="textpart" subtype="section"><p> It follows that in such cases also the question will be either one of
                            expediency alone or of a choice between expediency and honour.
                                <quote>But,</quote> it will be urged, <quote>if a man would beget
                                children, he is under the necessity of taking a wife.</quote>
                            Certainly. But he who wishes to become a father must needs be quite
                            clear that he must take a wife. </p></div></div></div></div></body></text></TEI>
                </passage>
            </reply>
            </GetPassage>